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Preface 
 
I am convinced that every PhD thesis is preceded by a long, eventful journey and this one has not 
been an exception. Now that it is completed I can tell that it was challenging and exciting at times 
but also, ultimately, very rewarding. When I moved into my new office at the Centrum voor 
Duitsland-Studies on the top floor of cosy Huize Heyendael (“het Kasteeltje”) in January 2002, I 
frankly did not know what awaited me. Starting out with a vague idea of the controversy about the 
“German Model”, I ultimately delved into the intricacies of welfare state change. As an “exiled” 
German, I enjoyed the opportunity to study the changes I had noticed in the social policy sphere of 
my country from the certain distance of a neighbouring country. Early on, I got intrigued by the 
ideational literature but, importantly, also found it wanting. This led me to look more closely at the 
role of key politicians and their contribution to the adoption of particular reforms, a line of thought 
that came to be central in the thesis. Five years on and with the benefit of hindsight, I would still 
do it over (while, inevitably, doing some things in different ways...). During all this time, I could 
count on the support of a large number of people and I would like to take the opportunity to 
express my thanks to at least some of them.  
To begin with, my triad of supervisors and, at the same time, promotores. Bob, thank you for 
your ongoing confidence, support, and meticulous comments on my draft chapters (not to forget 
for housing me in Anna’s former office which has once more proven to be a superb place to finish 
a dissertation). Michiel, I owe you thanks for your critical, to-the-point and pragmatic feedback 
over the years and many animated discussions about the nature of (ideational) leadership. Kees, I 
am grateful to you for making me enthusiastic about welfare state research in the first place, for 
inspiring discussions about the imperfections of any research and continuous encouragement along 
the way. I would also like to thank the members of the manuscript commission for agreeing to 
review the dissertation and for their timely and positive comments.  
As a PhD researcher you do not get far without a supportive working environment and again I 
can consider myself fortunate in this respect: In the first two years I enjoyed the good working 
atmosphere with my former colleagues (including the German visiting scholars such as Eric, 
Martin and Birte) at the Centrum voor Duitsland-Studies. After moving on to the Faculty of 
Management Sciences, I got used quickly to my current colleagues at the Department of Political 
Science, which is a great place to work. Without naming you all one by one, let me thank you for 
unequaled collegiality at all times, intellectual stimulation, and helpful comments and suggestions 
on draft chapters, especially from the participants in the Working Groups on International 
Relations and Comparative Politics. And let me not forget to mention many shared indoor and 
outdoor lunches and refreshing afternoon coffee walks to the DE café.  
As it would have been difficult to shed light on German welfare state reforms while being in 
Nijmegen all the time, I travelled to Germany repeatedly: mostly for interviews but also for a two-
month stay as visiting researcher at the Zentrum für Sozialpolitik (ZeS) of the University of 
Bremen. My thanks goes to all who took the time to share with me their memories and inside 
knowledge about policy areas, reform efforts and key politicians in their offices in Berlin, 
Hannover, Bochum, Frankfurt, Düsseldorf, Bonn, Bremen, Leipzig and Nürnberg. This is not to 
forget supporting staff, especially Susan Grzybek en Nicole Schreiter, for their invaluable help in 
arranging appointments. I am also grateful to those who agreed to participate in the survey for the 
health care case. At the ZeS, I would like to thank Gisela Hegemann-Mahltig for enabling my stay, 
and the staff (Eric Seils, Herbert Obinger, Petra Buhr and others) for making me feel welcome at 
 
 
 
 
 
the Barkhof and giving me the opportunity to discuss social policy developments and scholarship 
in Germany.  
I am also grateful to a rather diverse group of people who helped me finish this dissertation in 
one way or another. To Mona and César as well as Amit and his family for their hospitality during 
my interview trips to Berlin, and to my friends back home in Bavaria and elsewhere for their 
support over the years “at a distance”. To my fellow PhD colleagues and friends in the 
Netherlands: Minna, for sharing good and bad times since we met in Fribourg; Gerry, Barbara, and 
Annelies, for good companionship, collaboration and keeping in touch during our projects; 
Nishavda, Laura and Geertje for your unfailing ability to listen and support at crucial moments. 
Simon, thank you for working speedily through this whole manuscript, and Marjet, for helping me 
to prepare the final draft chapters during your stage in Nijmegen.  
Next to immersing myself in the details of reform proposals and processes, I also had the 
opportunity to get involved in other projects, the most enjoyable of which was participating in an 
enthousiastic group of PhD researchers in the NIG European Research Colloquium, organized by 
Markus Haverland and Ron Holzhacker: I really enjoyed these meetings and learned a lot from 
them. I also appreciate the opportunity to spend a few summers working on my methodology 
skills. Attending Essex and Oslo Summer School courses taught by Charles Ragin, Christoffer 
Green-Pedersen, Max Bergman, Sean Carey and others, was an enriching experience and helped 
me to make headway on my dissertation.  
Finally, I am immensely thankful to my parents for always being there for me and supporting 
whatever I chose to do in life. This latest undertaking called Doktorarbeit might have seemed 
virtually endless and abstract to you, but I can assure you it is now really done and has resulted in 
a tangible product (!) in the form of a book. Martin, my loving companion, I owe you thanks for 
everything: for neverending patience, for being a source of realistic optimism and for being there 
for me from the beginning to the end of this journey.  
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1. The Puzzle of Institutional Stability versus Significant Welfare 
State Reforms  
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
During the 1990’s, in the area of political science, there was a prominent tendency for scholars of 
the welfare state to explain the persistence of welfare institutions, even in the face of growing 
structural pressures for change. Among the theoretical approaches that identified the mechanisms 
responsible for the welfare state’s resistance to change, historical institutionalism (Pierson 1994, 
1996), and welfare regime theory (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1996, 1999) played an important role. 
The bottom line of these perspectives is that powerful institutional and electoral mechanisms, as 
well as regime-specific characteristics, are hampering efforts to restructure welfare states. 
Nevertheless, examples of structural or path-diverging change can be identified, especially from 
the late 1990’s onwards, in many European countries, including Germany. This study argues that 
these empirical observations could not be predicted and cannot be explained by the theories of 
Pierson and Esping-Andersen. The main weakness of these approaches seems to be that they fail to 
pay greater attention to ideational leadership of influential policy-makers. The guiding proposition 
of this study is that, in certain circumstances, ideational leadership can overcome institutional 
obstacles to structural reforms. Two goals in particular are pursued in this thesis: Firstly, I will 
endeavour to explain under what conditions policy makers adopt structural welfare state reforms, 
in a context that is characterised by strong institutional and electoral resistance to such change. 
Secondly, I will test the guiding proposition that it is ideational leadership, which – under 
conditions determined later on – explains how policy-makers can overcome institutional obstacles 
to structural reforms. Since it can be plausibly argued that the German welfare state is the example 
par excellence of institutional and political resilience, the unexpected instances of structural social 
policy reform that occurred here constitute the theoretically induced empirical problem of this 
study.  
 
The topic of the present study concerns the recent and current development of advanced 
welfare states. Beginning in the late 1970’s, and well into the 1990’s, many analysts sketched a 
doom scenario for the welfare state. Theorists envisaged dismantlement or at least a substantial 
scale-down of welfare provision. In the 1990’s, however, the dominant view went about a change; 
despite relentless demographic, financial and political pressures for adaptation, the welfare state 
set-up in most advanced countries has remained remarkably stable and change has been, at most, 
incremental. Interpretations from political science and political sociology that tried to explain such 
institutional stability, have focussed on both regime- and programme-level mechanisms that 
seemed to preclude structural change (Pierson 1994; Esping-Andersen 1996; Pierson 1996). Whilst 
trying to explain resistance, they at the same time convey the impression that any change going 
beyond established policy patterns and regime characteristics only occurs under very specific 
circumstances and that therefore the probability of such change is very small. Indeed, the stability 
bias they have introduced into welfare state research may be said to have deflected attention from 
change more generally, and from the perhaps unspectacular, but nevertheless path-diverging 
reforms that are occurring. In my understanding, path-diverging (or path-breaking) reforms imply 
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a rupture with the historical legacy of a policy sector by introducing different policy aims and/or 
instruments, which may lead to an overall change of the organization of welfare provision (Hall;  
Bonoli and Palier 2000a). This theoretical focus is one side of the puzzle that will be dealt with in 
this study. The other side is that analysts have observed and continue to observe welfare state 
reforms that according to the above-mentioned authors are nothing more than anomalies. Instances 
of such path-diverging reforms may be found in many countries across Europe (see Section 1.2.1. 
below). 
The observation of such reforms is especially striking in Germany, because path-breaking 
reforms are not compatible with the frequently cited condition of Reformstau (reform deadlock), in 
which the country is supposed to have found itself, at least since the early 1990’s. Both in public 
and academic discussion, this interpretation of policy continuity has a negative connotation, i.e. it 
stands for the absence of far-reaching reforms of both economic and social policy, which are 
deemed necessary for the very survival of the welfare state. In agreement with the perception of 
Reformstau, most of the literature up until and including the 1990’s leaves no doubt about the 
institutional and political resilience of the German welfare state. Against this background of a high 
level of resistance to major reforms despite substantial reform demands, I will draw attention to 
the fact that Germany has nevertheless been capable of adopting some far-reaching reforms. The 
country will thus provide the context of this project, as will be elaborated in Section 1.3 below, 
and in the chapter on methodology (Chapter 3). 
The present chapter will explain the rationale behind my dissertation project and outline the 
puzzle implied by the occurrence of major welfare state reforms, in Germany in particular, but also 
more generally. I start with a brief introduction to the work of Gøsta Esping-Andersen and Paul 
Pierson, who - both in their own way - have shaped the work of scholarly inquiry into the welfare 
state and the politics surrounding it. While giving due credit to their theoretical and empirical 
achievements, I will subsequently point out that their work suffers from a welfare state stability 
bias. In other words, their theories are not well equipped to explain the occurrence of major 
welfare state reforms. Following on from this, I will argue that despite the predictions of theorists 
as Esping-Andersen and Pierson, advanced welfare states have undergone major reforms in recent 
years, and analysts are likely to observe more of those in the near future. I will illustrate this 
argument with examples, including Germany, in Section 1.2 after introducing my definition of 
major change, the concept of “structural reform”. Section 1.3 will motivate why it is worthwhile 
taking a closer look at Germany and the reforms that have occurred there. More specifically, both 
the country’s political and welfare state institutions should, theoretically speaking, make any major 
reform quite difficult if not well-nigh impossible. This combination of theoretical 
“unexpectedness” and strong institutional obstacles makes Germany a prime candidate for 
systematic study. Having outlined the puzzle at the core of this project, Section 1.4 will look for 
solutions to the puzzle of unexpected yet major welfare state reforms. It outlines the main 
competing explanatory theories that have been discussed in the welfare state literature (economic 
factors, party-political factors, political institutions, ideational factors). Finally, Section 1.5 briefly 
introduces the ideational leadership explanation.  
The remainder of the study is divided into seven chapters. Ideational leadership (IL) will be 
introduced in detail in Chapter 2, including the theoretical rationale for combining ideas and 
leadership, and the conceptual link between IL and its behavioural and communicative aspects. 
Chapter 3 explains the choice for a multiple case study as research design and the methodology 
used in the case studies. It elaborates on the operationalization of the main variables, IL and 
structural reforms, as well as on data sources and methods of analysis. Chapter 4 reviews macro- 
and meso-level sources of resilience found in the German welfare state, and takes a closer look at 
its institutional features and social policy programmes. Moreover, it summarizes the main 
  
The Puzzle of Institutional Stability versus Significant Welfare State Reforms 
 3 
pressures that impact on existing arrangements in the policy areas of old-age pensions, 
unemployment insurance, and health care, and gives an overview of the responses of policy-
makers from the mid 1970’s onwards.1 Chapters 5 through 7 report on the empirical case studies: 
the 2001 pension reform of Minister Riester; the 2003 merger of unemployment assistance and 
social assistance of Minister Clement; and the various health care reforms enacted by Minister 
Seehofer during the 1990’s. Chapter 8 draws together the overall findings by providing a summary 
and compares the empirical results in terms of the validity of the IL hypothesis. It also considers 
the implications of these findings for the literature on welfare state reform as well as for theories 
of policy change more broadly. Finally, it reflects on possibilities for further research on the basis 
of the findings, including the use of other methodologies to evaluate the IL hypothesis.  
 
1.2 Historical Institutionalism and Welfare Regime Theory 
 
The puzzle to be addressed in this project is why major or “path-diverging” reforms occur contrary 
to the theoretical expectations of the dominant literature on welfare state stability, as exemplified 
by the main protagonists Pierson and Esping-Andersen. Therefore, the remainder of this section 
will try to shed light on the following questions: what is the gist of their theories and most 
importantly, what are the implications of their arguments with respect to institutional and policy 
change in advanced welfare states? And, regarding the focus of these theories, what makes them 
problematic? Below, I will briefly introduce the two dominant theories of welfare state types and 
development (Esping-Andersen), and of the contemporary politics of the welfare state (Pierson). 
Whilst highlighting and summarizing the most important features of their theoretical arguments as 
far as they relate to the puzzle, I will focus my critique on their “stability bias”, i.e. a focus on 
explaining the relative stability of contemporary welfare states rather than recognizing that 
seemingly stable institutions may also undergo major changes.  
 
1.2.1 Why a Revision of Dominant Theories in Welfare State Research is Needed 
Welfare Institutions and Welfare State Change  
Before embarking on the discussion of institutionalist accounts stressing the characteristics and 
consequences of welfare state institutions, it is necessary to recapitulate what this specific sort of 
institutions refers to. By welfare institutions, we commonly understand the characteristics of social 
policies, i.e. forms of organisation, policy goals, and practices that have acquired the status of 
institutions in a given country. The typology followed here divides welfare institutions into four 
different categories (Bonoli, George et al. 2000): the mode of access to social benefits, the 
structure of benefits, the mode of financing programmes, and the way of managing social policy 
programmes (involving the state, the social partners, and/or other actors). The latter category 
especially has direct implications for the degree of autonomy of a pro-reform government: the 
more widespread the practice of corporatist policy-making is, the more resistance to reform can be 
expected due to a greater number of potentially reform-hostile groups (Esping-Andersen 
                                                           
 
 
 
1 Chapter 4 covers policy responses until and including the reforms of the Schröder government. Recent reform 
developments under the current CDU/CSU-SPD government led by Chancellor Merkel will be mentioned in the Epilogue.   
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1990:151). The welfare state literature offers rather vague generalizations on how welfare 
institutions influence reforms: generally, it is assumed that welfare institutions restrict the 
possibilities for reform whilst at the same time telling us about the potential for change. This 
potential can vary across sectors within countries that belong to the same welfare state regime, 
since institutional designs are not necessarily uniform within the same regime cluster; and even 
within single countries we will find institutional differences across sectors. 
Three Worlds of Welfare State Regimes  
Esping-Andersen’s work on welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1996), recently joined by 
Pierson (2001),2  implicitly relies on the assumption that welfare state institutions are subject to 
path-dependent processes. In his seminal work The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), 
he distinguishes three clusters of welfare states: a Social-Democratic, a Liberal and a Conservative 
regime. These regimes differ with regard to their mix of institutions that guarantee the provision of 
social security: the state, the market or the family. Secondly, they vary with respect to the kind of 
stratification systems upheld by their welfare programmes (referring to, for instance, the extent of 
status differentiation and inequality the system tolerates). Finally, the degree of de-
commodification, i.e. to what extent people can make a living without having to rely on 
participation in the labour market, varies across these regimes (Rieger and Leibfried 1998: 37). 
Essentially, by devising these regime types, Esping-Andersen has contributed a widely used 
classification of advanced welfare states to welfare state research.3 Going one step further, what is 
his view on the prospects for policy change within these regimes? The three regime types are 
based on certain shared institutional characteristics, which, concerning the possible direction of 
reform, are said to determine regime-specific future policy trajectories as well. Therefore, if 
changes of policy do occur, they are very likely to stay within the previously set-out and regime-
specific policy path. Moreover, when reforms are successfully adopted, this adoption is said to be 
dependent upon a broad consensus among various social interests (Esping-Andersen 1996: 266-
267), as otherwise a regime’s inherent resistance against change is difficult to overcome. Despite 
clear changes in the context of social policy making (as Pierson pointed out in his “new politics” 
argument) and politicians’ efforts to adapt their welfare states to new challenges, until the late 
1990’s, welfare state regimes were not significantly diverging from their institutionally prescribed 
path, as Esping-Andersen has observed: ‘the inherent logic of our three welfare state regimes 
seems to reproduce itself’ (Esping-Andersen, 1999:165). This assumption of path-dependent 
change is also reflected in the expectations about the regime-dependent character of the politics 
surrounding reform: current patterns of change are explained and, by extension, ascribed to the 
type of welfare regime, i.e. ultimately to its particular institutional features (Pierson, 2001a: 454). 
The “New Politics” of the Welfare State 
In addition to the regime theoretical account of Esping-Andersen, another body of literature has 
added a yet greater stability-bias to theories on welfare state politics. In his conception of the “new 
politics” (Pierson 1994; 1996), Paul Pierson identifies three main sources of constraints on 
politicians wishing to pursue radical welfare state reform. First, the welfare state is protected by 
                                                           
 
 
 
2 In the conclusion to his 2001 book, Pierson has adopted his version of ‘new politics’ to different regime types by outlining 
the likely processes of adaptation and their politics.  
3 In their geographical variant, Esping-Andersen’s regime types are also commonly referred to as Scandinavian, Anglo-
Saxon and Continental regimes. 
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the fact that it, after decades of expanison, nowadays constitutes the status quo ‘with all the 
political advantages that this status confers. Non-decisions generally favour the welfare state. 
Major policy change usually requires the acquiescence of numerous actors’ (Pierson 1996: 174).  
Secondly, there are electoral hazards involved in radical welfare state reform. These stem 
from the fact that social policy programmes not only continue to enjoy widespread popularity 
among the electorate at large, but also from that mature policy programmes have created new 
interests, i.e. those who produce and consume social services, and who act as defenders of these 
arrangements. The underlying assumption is that reforms that imply welfare state retrenchment are 
inherently unpopular with the electorate, which means that public opinion acts as a constraint on 
political actors, highlighting the need for politicians to follow blame-avoidance strategies. Thirdly, 
another obstacle that relates to the second one, stems from ‘new organized interests, the consumers 
and providers of social services’ (Pierson 1996: 175) who are claimed to strongly defend welfare 
state programmes such as social housing, health care, education and social security. 4 These 
structures are associated with “path continuity”, which implies resistance to change, and manifests 
itself in organised opposition to reform efforts. Pierson argues that such networks constitute proof 
of “path-dependent” processes, which rest essentially on mechanisms of increasing returns or 
positive feedback. In other words, once a certain course of policy development has been taken, 
setting these processes in motion, it is difficult to reverse it. 5 Applied to welfare state programmes, 
this means that after a particular programme has been initiated,  
 
Organizations and individuals adapt to particular arrangements, making commitments that may render the 
costs of change (even to some potentially more efficient alternative) far higher than the costs of continuity. 
Existing commitments lock in policymakers (Pierson 1996: 175).6  
 
The concept of “path-dependency” is frequently associated with the school of historical 
institutionalism, which sees institutions as ‘relatively persistent features of the historical landscape 
and one of the central factors pushing historical development along a set of “paths”’. The technical 
consequences of this are effects such as policy “lock-in” and “sticky institutions”’(Pierson 2001: 
23 ). This powerful combination of restraints is said to substantially limit the options available to 
policy makers. The implication is, in a nutshell, that path-breaking change is practically ruled out, 
although Pierson is careful to stress that ‘the claim is not that path dependence “freezes existing 
arrangements in place”’ but that ‘change continues, but it is bounded change’, i.e. within the 
previously chosen path (Pierson 2001: 415). Although Pierson, in his “new politics” account, 
draws on a picture of policy-makers caught up in a dilemma between mounting pressure and 
blame-avoidance strategies, he does specify four “political preconditions for significant reform”. 
Accordingly, retrenchment will be facilitated by electoral slack, budgetary crises, strong chances 
                                                           
 
 
 
4 Rieger and Leibfried offer a slightly different view on the political consequences of welfare states’ institutional 
entrenchment Their picture of “claimant and provider classes”, who ‘try to monopolize their new income sources and to 
built up strong lobbying positions’ is a more dynamic one than the one offered by Pierson, as these interests ‘embody 
different potentials for the paralysis or the adaptability of welfare states’ (1998: 366).  
5 This argument has attracted some criticism. For instance, Howlett and Rayner criticize that Pierson’s links between 
institutional densities, increased returns and the high cost of exit from institutions is simply asserted with no proof offered 
(Howlett and Rayner 2006: 11). In their perspective, some studies found evidence that institutions constrain change while 
others found the opposite, namely that institutions can also facilitate change 
6 More precisely, research on technological change indicates that ‘increasing returns’ are based on large set-up or fixed 
cost, learning effects, coordination effects and actors’ adaptive expectations. For a more detailed treatment of the concept 
of path-dependence, its origins in the literature on technological change and its application to political science, see Pierson 
2000.   
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for reducing the visibility of reform, and good prospects for changing the rules of the game, or 
“institutional shifts” (Pierson 1996: 176-178). However, the value of these “tentative hypotheses”, 
as Pierson himself concedes, is doubtful, first of all, because he is not specific enough about what 
kind of outcome they are supposed to bring about: he seems to equate “significant reform” with 
“radical retrenchment” (1996: 176). Furthermore, Pierson does not specify whether any one of 
these conditions or a combination of them need to be met for significant change to occur, and he 
discusses them more in passing than in a systematic fashion. The points he makes about electoral 
slack and financial crises appear intuitively plausible, but as they constitute contextual conditions, 
they do not explain how policy actors go about tackling (and achieving) reform projects. Only the 
third condition, “reducing the visibility of reform”, does say more about the actions of policy-
makers, but it is questionable whether and to what extent the substance of radical reform may be 
credibly hidden from a reform-anxious electorate. Finally, “institutional shifts”, especially when 
referring to EU-level policy-making, say little about how domestic policy-makers would utilize it 
to push reform through. All in all, Pierson leaves us with the impression that he did not seriously 
consider the conditions of path-breaking change; rather, in line with his argument, he sees 
persistence of the status quo as the most likely outcome in the short to medium term.7 
Focusing upon Pierson’s relative disregard for the preconditions for major reforms, my first 
point of critique is the lack of attention paid to the role of political leadership, interests and choice 
in institutionalist accounts. Admittedly, policy makers do play a role in Pierson’s work, but their 
room for political manoeuvring remains severely restricted. In contrast to the “golden era” of 
welfare state enlargement, in the current “era of austerity”, leaders find themselves squeezed 
between external pressures and internal constraints. In particular, global economic and 
demographic pressures threaten the foundations of advanced welfare states while pro-welfare 
public opinion, entrenched interests and path-dependent institutions set the limits for the political 
feasibility of reforms (Ross 2000b). As a result, political leaders have little choice but to resort to 
blame-avoidance strategies, if daring at all to embark on risky welfare state reforms (Pierson 
1994). I rather doubt whether this is a correct depiction of the strategic choices available to policy-
makers nowadays, even in today’s austerity-driven political climate.  
Secondly, as Ross has convincingly argued, Pierson’s portrayal of reform realities is much 
more de-politicised than it should be, despite his label of the ‘new politics’ of the welfare state. I 
share Ross’ view that accounts of welfare restructuring need to consider the role of political 
leadership, including how leaders might deploy, for instance, symbolic politics strategies. In 
addition, dismissing the role of leaders also has implications for how welfare challenges are 
conceived and what kind of political responses are at the disposal of policy-makers (Esping-
Andersen 1996: 12). In line with Ross, a relative disregard for political choice should not simply 
be seen as a matter of meta-theoretical preference. On the contrary, political choice should be 
considered in terms of its analytical merits. Consequently, it seems advisable to opt for a better 
balance between the focus on structures inherent to mainstream theories and the possibilities for 
political agency to overcome the obstacles that structures pose to policy change.  
                                                           
 
 
 
7 Admittedly, the conclusion to his edited 2001 volume (Pierson 2001) goes one step further in specifying the conditions of 
change by hypothesizing about different reform paths for different welfare regimes. However, this text does not build upon 
his 1996 “preconditions for significant change”, but starts from a ‘broad reform consensus’ assumption and is essentially 
still historical-institutionalist orientated.  
 
  
The Puzzle of Institutional Stability versus Significant Welfare State Reforms 
 7 
1.2.2 Criticism of the Two Bodies of Theory 
 
As we have just seen, two dominant approaches in welfare state research have tried to explain the 
remarkable institutional stability of the welfare state until and including the first half of the 1990’s. 
They have centred on both regime-level and programme-level mechanisms that seemed to 
preclude structural change.  
I argue for two reasons that there is a case for revising these two approaches. My first point 
relates to the greatest strength of these theories: they are very well equipped to explain the relative 
stability of welfare states. However, the downside is that by overemphasizing the weight of 
institutions as obstacles to far-reaching change, they leave open few possibilities for such change 
and introduce a stability bias into welfare state research. In particular, change that makes a country 
diverge from the historical legacy of its welfare state institutions is nearly ruled out. Although both 
Esping-Andersen and Pierson give some thought to the conditions of what they call “significant” 
change, they see any real possibilities for leaving historically determined paths of welfare 
provision as severely limited. Therefore, they convey the impression that reforms going beyond 
established policy patterns and regime characteristics can only occur under very narrowly defined 
circumstances. As a consequence, this has deflected attention from actual patterns of change, 
including reforms which imply divergence from an existing policy path (see further on this point 
Section 1.3). 
  My second point of criticism concerns the associated lack of attention to the role of political 
agency in these accounts (Ross 2000a). It is true that policy makers do make an appearance in 
these theories, but their scope for significant restructuring remains severely limited. While Pierson 
sees financial crises, electoral benevolence, the opportunity to “hide” reforms, and changing the 
“rules of the game” as offering politicians rare opportunities for radical change, Esping-Andersen 
remains even more pessimistic about the capacity of policy-makers and thus political agency or 
leadership, as he reserves such reform for rare instances of broad social and political consensus. In 
his view, ‘the alignment of political forces conspires just about everywhere to maintain the 
existing principles of the welfare state’ (Hinrichs and Kangas 2003: 265)  
To conclude, a strong continuity bias, the risk of overlooking empirical instances of welfare 
state adjustment, and the neglect of political agency as a potential motor of such adjustment seem 
to provide valid reasons for proposing a different approach to the politics of welfare restructuring. 
In addition to these points of critique, the fact that there are clear empirical instances of “path-
breaking” reforms create the need for such a new approach, as will be discussed in the following 
section.  
 
1.3 Structural Welfare State Reforms Do Happen: Definition and 
Examples 
 
1.3.1 Questions of Definition: What Is a Structural Reform? 
 
One reason why a great deal of the existing welfare state literature is hardly comparable is the lack 
of a generally accepted definition of welfare state reform. The extent and shape of reforms tend to 
vary greatly across welfare state regimes, individual countries and policy areas; they may even 
vary within countries and between policy areas. As a result, labels of reforms abound, as becomes 
clear if one considers the adjectives used to describe reform more closely. For instance, the 
literature mentions “incremental”, “step-wise”, “far-reaching”, “radical”, “path-breaking” and 
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“major” reforms, to name just a few, 8 but there is a lack of consensus on what these labels involve, 
and, in addition, often authors remain unclear about what it is exactly they are analysing. As 
Pierson has noted, ‘one of the striking features of current comparative research on the welfare state 
is the lack of consensus on outcomes’ (Green-Pedersen 2004: 419).    
The proliferation of terms denoting welfare state change is related to the so-called “dependent 
variable problem”. Indeed, recently, the literature has acknowledged the problem of how to 
theorize and measure welfare state change. The term was coined with reference to the proliferation 
of differences in the conceptualization and operationalization  of retrenchment as the dependent 
variable of welfare state analyses (Clasen and Siegel 2005). However, it has also been referred to 
as a broader problem, as it touches upon the very conceptualization of the welfare state, current 
limitations in theorizing about how it changes, and limitations of data. In response, a rough three-
dimensional typology for categorizing change has been proposed, comprising recommodification, 
cost containment and recalibration (Pierson 2001a: 420).9 In a recent agenda for systematically 
exploring the problem, some authors have stated that it concerns the nature and scale of welfare 
state change, its conceptualization and measurement, and even how policy outcomes can be 
accounted for by causal factors (Stiller and Van Kersbergen 2005: 2). The latter aspect of the 
problem has been noted as the “independent variable problem” (Clasen and Clegg forthcoming).  
In the literature, a great deal of different approaches to welfare state change exists, relying on 
both quantitative and qualitative conceptualizations of change.10 Studies that apply qualitative 
typologies of change (Hall 1993; Hemerijck and Van Kersbergen 1997; Leitner and Lessenich 
2003; Schmid 2003) tend to draw upon more general models of policy change (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1993; Hay 2001; Taylor-Gooby 2002) that have been adapted to a welfare state 
context.11 In this study, I draw attention to a qualitative measure of change, “structural reform”, 
which seeks to capture shifts in the institutional set-up of policies. For theoretical reasons 
explained in Section 1.2, I am first and foremost interested in those reforms that differ from 
incremental changes, usually expressed in quantitative terms (e.g. changes in benefit levels or the 
duration of a benefit). Structural reforms fall into this category as they are too significant to be 
                                                           
 
 
 
8 Furthermore, the factor time may play a role here. For instance, Hinrichs and Kangas have argued that many incremental 
changes may turn out to be third order changes in the long run because their real impact is not always immediately visible 
(Hinrichs and Kangas 2003) 
9 Recommodification refers to the attempt to ‘restrict the alternatives to participation in the labour market, either by 
tightening eligibility or cutting benefits’ (Pierson 2001a:422), that is to strengthen incentives to work. Cost containment 
refers to the attempt to control budgets by means of austerity policies, which include deficit reduction and tax containment 
policies. Recalibration denotes reforms that ‘seek to make contemporary welfare states more consistent with contemporary 
goals and demands for social provision (Pierson 2001a: 425). This threefold conceptualisation of change complemented the 
then dominating view of welfare state reform as ‘retrenchment’, which Pierson himself introduced in his earlier work 
(1994, 1996). 
10 These approaches rely on three main types of indicators to capture (changes in) welfare effort, namely social expenditure 
data (e.g. social spending in percentage of GDP, ‘social rights’ indicators (e.g. measures of ‘decommodification’), and 
institutional characteristics (see for an overview e.g. Clasen and Clegg forthcoming). My definition of ‘structural change’ 
falls into the last category 
11 Taylor-Gooby notes that while the outcomes of quantitative analyses tend to stress stability and resilience to pressures, in 
case studies of policy-making processes are more likely to detect ‘current changes in political alignments and in the 
institutional framework of policy-making which may be opening the way to substantial restructuring’ (Taylor-Gooby 2002: 
598). Statistical analyses tend to lead to an emphasis on continuity because they are necessarily based on data which covers 
a period stretching back into the past, whereas case studies ‘provide a greater opportunity to examine factors that are 
currently significant and thus direct attention to forces making for change’(ibid.).   
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mere routine adjustments of policy, and therefore distinct from the type of reforms historical 
institutionalism or regime theory would allow for or expect.12 
In developing a definition of those reforms, I drew on previously developed and applied 
qualitative definitions of welfare state change. The first such definition was applied by Webber in 
his analyses of German health care reforms (Webber 1989, 1989). While it is based on the domain 
of health care, it may also be applied to other social policy areas (such as pensions, unemployment 
insurance, etc.), as long as they feature similar categories of structure. Webber used the following 
definition:  
 
As structural reforms I defined purposeful state interventions which effected a structural change of the health 
care system. It was assumed that the health care system consists of three structures: a financing structure, a 
providing structure and a regulation structure. A structural reform (in contrast to other reforms) would 
therefore consist of a re-ordering of competences and responsibilities regarding financing, provision, and 
regulation of medical services (Bonoli and Palier 2000b: 263-264).  
 
The financing structure concerns the question of who pays for the programme; the provision or 
service structure is concerned with who is supplying the benefits and/or services linked to a 
programme; and, finally, the regulatory or regulation structure specifies who makes decisions 
about managing the programme. Crucially, it is the reordering of competences and responsibilities 
which distinguishes structural reforms from other reforms.  
Another qualitative typology of welfare state change has been suggested by Bonoli and Palier 
(Webber 1988 ; Pierson 2000). It is based on welfare state institutions or institutional elements of 
social policy programmes, which, as independent variables, ‘pose a significant constraint on the 
degree and the direction of change’. When conceived as a dependent variable, they can structure a 
framework that helps to identify and distinguish reforms that go beyond mere retrenchment or 
cost-cutting (Palier 2002: 113). Therefore, when examining change, the following four 
institutional dimensions of a policy programme can be distinguished: a) the mode of access to 
benefits, b) the benefit structure, c) the financing mechanisms, and, finally, d) the actors who 
manage the system. In my opinion, this difference between sorts of welfare state institutions 
highlights the main structures found in any welfare state programme. In addition, it complements 
Webber’s definition, which is more geared to the service-based health sector. Any social policy 
programme will offer either benefits and/or certain services (benefit structure) to those eligible 
under the programme’s rules and conditions (mode of access); it will be financed by tax-payers 
and/or contributors through certain mechanisms (financing structure); and it will be regulated by 
either the state, social partners or other stakeholder groups, depending on the nature of the 
programme (regulation structure). For my definition of structural reform, I prefer to merge Bonoli 
and Palier’s two benefit-related categories into one for reasons of parsimony, since both features 
relate to the benefit structure. In addition, it is difficult to disentangle the form of benefits from the 
conditions under which they are granted in empirical research. Drawing upon both the Webber and 
the Bonoli and Palier definitions of qualitative welfare state change, my definition of structural 
reform of any social policy programme will include shifts in either  
                                                           
 
 
 
12 As a matter of fact, Pierson and Esping-Andersen do implicitly concede that even in welfare state regimes that are 
notoriously resistant to change and under conditions of institutional resilience and a political climate of austerity, some 
reforms remain likely. Pierson, for instance, concludes his 1996 study of the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, 
and Sweden by arguing that ‘over the span of two decades, however, some changes in social policy are inevitable (…) 
What is striking is how hard it is to find radical changes in advanced welfare states’ (Pierson 1996: 174).  
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• the financing structure, 
• the benefit structure (both provision and rules of eligibility), or, 
• the management or regulatory structure  
 
of any social policy programme or policy. As Webber has argued, shifts in any of these structures 
are about re-ordering competences and responsibilities of actors. To illustrate these three 
structures, what kind of change effected in them would be called “structural”? 
 To start with, the financing structure may be based on taxation, on employment-related 
contributions, or on (insurance) premiums. A switch from a premium-financed health insurance to 
a national health care system based on general taxation would be a structural shift, while the mere 
downward or upward adjustment of contribution rates for the insured would be an incremental 
change. Secondly, a programme’s benefit structure may include means-tested, flat-rate, earnings-
related or contribution-related benefits. Changes from one mode to another, for instance, from a 
contribution-financed to a means-tested system of unemployment insurance, I consider to be a 
structural shift. Similarly, concerning health care, the addition of a new group of health care 
providers would constitute such a change. Conversely, cuts in benefit allowances or the closing 
down of certain types of hospitals (as health care providers) would be incremental changes. 
Finally, the regulation or management structure of a policy may be comprised of different actors, 
such as the state, the social partners (usually trade unions and employers’ associations) and private 
actors. If, in pension policy, trade unions got a say in the regulation of (public) pension funds, or, 
in health care policy, a greater number of actors were to decide about the level of doctors’ 
enumerations, these would also constitute structural shifts. Conversely, if a change in the 
regulation sphere of such programmes leaves the existing distribution of competences intact, the 
change cannot be considered structural, but incremental.   
Adopting a three-dimensional definition of structural reform offers various benefits: it allows 
to capture and classify particular reforms in terms of their consequences for the main structures of 
any social policy programme, as long as the implications of a reform can be distilled from their 
main provisions as they appear in legislation, regulations and the like (see Mahoney 2000, 1999 
for an application to health care policy). In addition, looking to more than one dimension of 
structural reform also makes it possible to choose a threshold for defining a reform as “structural”. 
For instance, one could specify that a particular reform needs to introduce shifts in all three 
structural dimensions of a programme or policy in order to call it a structural reform. However, 
there may be theoretical and empirical reasons to relax such a strict requirement and define a 
change in any one of these three dimensions as a structural reform. In this study, I will choose the 
latter option, i.e. a lower threshold for a structural reform, not least because the literature cited 
above remains unclear on this point: any reform that causes a shift in at least one of the three 
structures of a policy programme will be seen as a structural reform. Finally, my particular 
definition of structural change should help to detect changes that go further than incremental 
reforms but fall short of being a - rarely occurring - paradigmatic reform that transforms all aspects 
of a policy programme (Hall 1993).  
Admittedly, my conceptualization of substantial welfare state change makes no explicit 
mention of the notion of path dependency, one of the central concepts in historical institutionalist 
approaches, which is considered important for both understanding and explaining (the absence of) 
reforms in advanced welfare states (Ebbinghaus 2005; Jochem 2005; Kay 2005; Streeck and 
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Thelen 2005). However, path dependence has recently been perceived less as a synonym for 
institutional inertia (as Pierson emphasized) and its conceptual value has been subject to critical 
scrutiny (Pierson 2000; Jochem 2005).13 While the concept has certain merits, its utility has been 
found to be limited ‘if we want to detect empirically the degree of change [i.e. if it serves as 
dependent variable, SS]’ and the logic of changes in mature welfare states [i.e. the mechanisms of 
and explanations for change, SS]’ (Torfing 2001: 31). It seems that path-dependency suffers from 
a similar problem as the notion welfare state change: confusion about its conceptualization and 
measurement. The proposed definition of structural reform, which manages without the use of 
“path” terminology, circumvents this problem. In addition, studies based on the path-dependency 
concept tend to examine the development of welfare states as a whole (on the macro-level, i.e. the 
level of regimes) or the study of sectoral policies (meso-level, i.e. the level of specific policy 
schemes) over time. In contrast, the definition of structural reform is more geared to my research 
goals, i.e. exploring why single reforms were adopted at specific points in time. At the same time, 
structural reform can be seen as a more closely defined subset of a larger family of ”path-
diverging” reforms, i.e. reforms that leave old policy paths behind and open up new ones. 
However, no matter how the terms “path-diverging” or “path-breaking” are defined exactly,14 they 
seem to imply that a reform has affected (some of) the established parameters or institutional 
characteristics of a policy rather than fine-tuned its instruments, e.g. benefit levels, or the terms of 
access to benefits or services. It is precisely those usually unquantifiable, but potentially 
consequential reforms, which the argument turns to next.    
 
1.3.2 Examples of ”Path-diverging” Welfare State Reforms 
  
The stability bias of welfare state typologies and historical-institutionalist theories of welfare state 
politics is one side of the puzzle that guides this research project. The other side is that analysts 
claim to have found reforms that are distinct from incremental changes, or, following Palier 
(2002), are changes in institutional arrangements (such as financing and management of social 
security) as opposed to mere rollbacks of social policy or retrenchment. Although theorists like 
Esping-Andersen and Pierson would consider such reforms as exceptions that prove the general 
notion of welfare state resilience, a fair number of instances of major or path-diverging reforms 
have been found across welfare regime types since the mid and late 1990’s. The following 
                                                           
 
 
 
13 Jochem (2005) argues that it first served as a descriptive ‘measure’ of resilience of welfare states, as well as to refer to 
causal mechanisms (embodied in welfare state institutions) that ensured reforms would not alter the overall logics of 
welfare state regimes or single programmes. On the other hand, it is too broad a concept to assess the nature of welfare state 
change and fades out the micro-logic of reform processes, especially the creativity of political actors. Similarly, Kay (2005) 
considers common points of criticism, for instance, that path dependency provides a label for the intuition that ‘history 
matters’ without a clear and convincing account of decision-making over time, or that it explains only stability and not 
change. However, despite its difficulties of theoretical vagueness and operationalization, ‘it is a valid and useful concept for 
policy studies’ drawing attention to the fact that ‘its proper application demands sensitivity from scholars to other temporal 
dynamics that may operate in policy development’ (such as an evolutionary perspective or a punctuated equilibrium 
model).   
14 Ironically, although the concept of  path dependency has been applied widely in public policy research since Pierson’s 
article on the underlying mechanisms, i.e. increasing returns (Pierson 2000), the concept of a ‘policy path’ is often not 
defined explicitly (see for an exception Torfing 2001:286, there, a policy path is 'a relatively entrenched way of unifying, 
organizing and regulating a certain policy field'), which has obviously implications for assessing when a given policy path 
is left behind and when a new one is taken. In welfare state research, paths are often implicitly equated with Esping-
Anderson’s welfare state regimes, and ‘path-divergence’ is frequently taken to mean that a welfare state has taken on 
characteristics of another regime. 
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examples concern reforms in both Continental welfare states, where they have attracted 
considerable attention of analysts due to greater adjustment problems (see also Section 1.4 below 
and Chapter 4), and in the Social Democratic and Liberal regimes. As for the Scandinavian welfare 
states, Sweden carried out an important pension reform in the early 1990s (Torfing 1999; 
Andersen and Larsen 2002; Anderson and Meyer 2003); Denmark restructured its pension 
arrangements (Cox 2001) and made the transition to a “workfare” type of labour market policies 
(Clasen 2005; Hagen and Kaarbøe 2006); and Norway’s health care system experienced some 
important decentralizing reforms (Clasen 2005b). Liberal welfare states that have undergone some 
major reforms are the United Kingdom (Boston, Dalziel et al. 1999; Goldfinch and 't Hart 2003), 
New Zealand, Australia (Hacker 2002; Hacker 2004), and, to some extent, the United States 
(Hemerijck and Van Kersbergen 1997; Palier 2000).  
As for Continental regimes, the Netherlands made a switch to more activating social policies 
in a formerly passive welfare state, which constituted one element of the much-envied “Dutch 
miracle” (Vail 2004). More recently, the Dutch health insurance system underwent a structural 
shift: the distinction between those insured via sickness funds and those insured privately was 
abolished (as of January 2006), setting the course for a less particularistic and more universal 
system.15 Even disability insurance, long considered a blemish on the Dutch record of exemplary 
socio-economic reforms has recently (as of January 2006) undergone a structural shift. Instead of 
focusing on disability as such, the reform stresses and seeks to improve people’s (remaining) 
ability to work, reserving full disability benefits only for whose with hardly any or no future 
employment possibilities.16 In France, new paths have been chosen in the reforms of 
unemployment insurance, and in the financing base of social contributions (Ferrera and Gualmini 
2000; Ferrera and Gualmini 2004). Equally, Italy managed to carry out important reforms of 
pension insurance in her run-up to entering Economic and Monetary Union in 1996 (Bönker and 
Wollmann 2000; Busemeyer 2005). Furthermore, a recent major pension reform has been passed 
in Austria, although some analysts associate it with retrenchment rather than innovation (Schmidt 
2003). Finally, analysts have signalled examples of path-diverging reforms in Germany 
concerning pensions, unemployment insurance, long-term care insurance and, to some extent, 
health care (Dyson 2001). The character of the reforms that have occurred in Germany and 
whether (some of) these major reforms also fit my definition of structural reform will be discussed 
in greater detail in the next section and in Chapter 3, where case selection is explained. 
                                                           
 
 
 
15 ‘Eine Mischung aus Prämie und Beitrag. Die Niederländer reformieren ihr Gesundheitssystem’, Handelsblatt 04.10.05, 
p.4  
16 Centraal Economisch Plan 2005, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Planning Analysis (Centraal Planbureau, CPB), 
source: http://www.cpb.nl/nl/pub/cepmev/cep/2005/speciale_onderwerpen/wao.pdf; van Geus, A.J (2003) letter titled 
‘Hoofdlijnen stelsel van arbeidongeschiktheidsuitkeringen’, source: http://www.arbo-advies.nl/WaoGeus.htm 
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1.4 Why Study German Reforms in Particular?  
 
Finding path-breaking reforms is especially striking in the German context, as they seem to 
contradict the usual pattern of German domestic policy change, which ‘usually requires a longer 
planning period, is often incremental in nature, and borders occasionally on a degree of 
institutional inertia which critics describe as “policy immobilization” or “Reformstau” (Immergut 
1990: 202). The Reformstau perspective implies that Germany has been struggling to carry out 
necessary reforms, and those reforms which have passed tend to be incremental adjustments that 
fail to effectively address underlying problems.17  Especially in public but also in academic debate 
about the future of the welfare state, this interpretation of Germany’s characteristic of (relative) 
policy continuity has a negative connotation, as it stands for the absence of structural reforms in 
socio-economic policy that are needed for its very survival.18 For those who believe in Reformstau, 
the issue at hand is not only the welfare state but also the (frequently assumed) stability or 
resistance to change of the German socio-economic model as a whole.19 In turn, this is linked to 
the question of reform capacity, which brings me to the much-discussed institutional and political 
resilience of the German welfare state that is due to its specific welfare and political institutions. 
They will only be outlined briefly in the following sub-section, as Chapter 4 addresses these issues 
in greater detail.   
 
1.4.1 Reform Obstacles: Political and Welfare State Institutions  
 
Firstly, resilience is related to political institutions as they are laid out in the constitution, i.e. the 
Basic Law.  Here, we find that the resilience of German welfare arrangements is related to the 
nature of political institutions as the country’s numerous political-institutional obstacles 
complicate reform adoption. Among them, we find a large number of “veto points” (Scharpf 1988; 
Lehmbruch 2000),20 including the second chamber of parliament, the Bundesrat, the federal 
constitutional court; and a degree of institutional fragmentation only exceeded by few other 
countries, such as Switzerland (Bonoli and March 2000). German federalism with its strong role 
                                                           
 
 
 
17 This view of critics is in line with Pierson’s hypothesis about the politics of restructuring of social policy, which is likely 
to produce ‘more centrist – and thus more incrementalist responses’ (Pierson 2001a: 417)   
18 The term was chosen as the ‘word of the year’ in 1997 (‘Reformstau ist das Wort des Jahres’, Handelsblatt 29.12.97, p.1) 
following a debate initiated by federal president Herzog’s 1997 Berlin speech, in which he demanded a common societal 
effort to break through what he diagnosed a state of reform paralysis (‘Aufbruch in 21. Jahrhundert’, Berliner Rede von 
Bundespresident Roman Herzog 26.4.97,  
source: http://www.bundespraesident.de/dokumente/-,2.15154/Rede/dokument.htm).  
19 Within the broader context of that model, however, my focus in this study is on reform paralysis in the realm of social 
policy. The latter is an integral part of the German social market economy or Soziale Marktwirtschaft, and may be expected 
to play a key role in the process of adapting the German Model to post-industrial challenges. Scholars from such diverse 
disciplines as economics, sociology and political economy have displayed an interest in its specific aspects, e.g. political 
economists have raised questions about the model’s capacity to adapt to changed contemporary economic and social 
circumstances. Such questions explore how institutional structures and/or policies are able to adjust in response to 
mounting problems stemming from financial, economic or demographic pressures. Asking these questions may be 
interpreted as a break with the not all too distant past, when ‘analysis of the German political economy has suffered from a 
tendency to reification of the German model, and as a consequence, from a failure to capture processes of change’  (Dyson 
2001: 138). 
20 The ‘veto point’ argument states that incentives provided by constitutional structures (i.e. formal political institutions) 
shape the de facto decision rules in political systems and thus influence policy outcomes  
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for Länder governments may result in inefficient policy-making (Kitschelt 2001; Anderson and 
Immergut 2005). Regarding the role of party systems, analysts have argued that their composition 
may have an impact on the chances of welfare state reform and/or retrenchment. The German 
combination of parties and their relative strength (weak liberal party; strong centrist and Social 
Democrat parties) means that retrenchment necessitates a “grand coalition” (Schulze and Jochem 
2006). In contrast, the variable “political competition”, as an interaction of party systems, 
elections, and formal political institutions (Schmidt 1987; Esping-Andersen 1996), may work 
either way, helping or hindering reform efforts, as it ‘provides incentives for reform proposals, but 
impedes cooperation among government and opposition to solve policy problems’ (Anderson and 
Immergut 2005: 24). Germany shows high levels of political competition, especially since 
reunification, which has changed the consensus-dominated politics of the “middle way” (Esping-
Andersen 1999) to one of more intense competition between parties and more conflictive political 
debate and political processes (Anderson and Immergut 2005: 24), not least about the contents and 
objectives of reform recipes.  
Turning to welfare state institutions, Germany belongs to the group of Continental or 
Conservative welfare states, which face the greatest demands for adjustment in their core welfare 
arrangements compared to the other welfare state types (Scharpf 1997; Rieger and Leibfried 1998; 
Scharpf 2000a; Pierson 2001). In the words of Scharpf, ‘all Continental welfare states are at 
present confronted with two major problems: insufficient employment and an over-committed 
transfer system. Both these problems are closely connected’ (2000a: 222). The challenges include 
low rates of employment (including low female participation in labour markets); moderate taxation 
levels together with high reliance on social security contributions; moderate to high levels of social 
expenditure (depending largely on income transfers and little on social services); and low to 
moderate levels of wage differentiation and income inequality (Scharpf 2000a: 219). For post-
reunification Germany, these adjustment challenges became especially relevant when 
unemployment figures rose sharply and the social security system, which had been extended to the 
new Länder, was burdened by benefit provision for the recently unemployed and pensioners. The 
rationale for focussing on Germany in this study strongly relates to its prominent position in this 
group of countries appearing to struggle with welfare state reform. Esping-Andersen described 
Germany as ‘the leading and most comprehensive exponent of the social insurance approach’ 
(1996: 84) and may thus be considered the prototype of the status-quo-oriented Continental 
regime. The gist of these observations is that the task faced by most advanced industrial countries, 
and Conservative welfare states in particular, is enormous. For instance, Pierson draws attention to 
the fact that the countries of this regime type face quite painful reform agendas that are bound to 
call forth considerable political challenges (Manow and Seils 2000). Other analysts have suggested 
that ‘in addition to the external shocks of globalisation, internal blockades of institutional policy in 
the welfare state have become the second great challenge for national governments at the turn of 
the millennium’ (Czada 1998: 378).21   
While the preceding has referred to macro-level characteristics of the Continental welfare 
state, one can also discern programme-level mechanisms of resilience. The best example of these 
underlies the difficulty to radically change pay-as-you-go pension schemes. In such schemes, 
                                                           
 
 
 
21 Although the citation may suggest so, economic globalization is not a distinct challenge to national governments, but it 
also impacts on welfare states. However, the form and the scope of this impact remain contested among academics (see 
also economic explanations of welfare state change in Section 1.5). 
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current workers finance the retirement of the previous generation. Once the system has been in 
place for a long period of time, it will resist radical change for the following reason: a shift to 
funded, private arrangements would burden current workers disproportionally, forcing them to 
finance both their own and the previous generation’s pensions. Path-dependency dynamics of this 
sort are also present in other policy sectors, such as health care, and, to a lesser extent, labour 
market policy, where actors coordinate their activities and invest resources according to the 
structures of the existing policy environment (Pierson 2001: 416).22  
 
1.4.2 Pressures for Reform, “Missing” Reform Outcomes? 
 
The level of German welfare state resilience is even more perplexing if one considers the list of 
reform pressures, some of which are specific to the German context (see Chapter 4 for more 
detail): it includes persistently high unemployment and slow economic growth; a relatively high 
(non-wage cost-based) tax burden on labour (Czada 2004); the continuing social and financial 
impact of reunification (OECD 1996; Bönker and Wollmann 2001); and adverse demographic 
trends including the rapid ageing of the population, and relatively low fertility rates (Scharpf 
2000b; Schmidt 2002b). However, these pressures have not been readily translated into reforms, at 
least according to analyses covering the period up to the mid 1990’s. Pierson, for instance, 
contends in his assessment of welfare retrenchment in various European countries that, despite 
continuing demographic and budgetary pressures ensuring an ‘atmosphere of austerity will 
continue to surround the German welfare state’ and ‘a fundamental rethinking of social policy 
seems a remote possibility’ (Pierson 1996: 170), not least due to consensus-promoting political 
institutions.  
Against this background of a high level of welfare state resilience, despite substantial 
demands for reform, I am drawing attention to the fact that Germany is nevertheless capable of 
adopting some far-reaching reforms. Despite the small theoretical likelihood of such reforms, in 
some instances, governments have tried to restructure the German welfare state23 and even 
pessimistic observers of German politics cannot dispute that some important reforms have been 
undertaken during the 1980’s and 1990’s. In this respect, it is worthwhile considering that 
significant developments have taken place in each of the main social policy areas (some of which 
may qualify as structural reforms):24 pension policy (partial privatisation of pensions 2001), labour 
market policy (Hartz proposals to reduce unemployment through temp agencies and other 
instruments 2002/2003, merger of unemployment assistance and social assistance 2003/2004), and 
health provision (attempts at cost-containment and opening up of health care provision during the 
1990s, health care reform 2004, plans for a comprehensive financing reform in 2006). However, 
                                                           
 
 
 
22 For instance, Schreyögg and Farhauer (2005) identified path-dependencies in decision-processes concerning labour 
market and health care policy in Germany. The financing of the statutory health care system is based on contribution 
financing, which implies that current workers pay for health care services of the whole community including their own 
(Schreyögg and Farhauer 2005: 249-250). Leaving this path by for instance financing part of health care services by 
general taxation (like in Scandinavian welfare states) would meet strong resistance as ‘solidarity’ comes under attack.  In 
German labour market policy, social partners are traditionally strongly involved in labour market policy. Trade unions and 
employers contribute through the negotiation of collective agreements to labour market performance, and they exert 
influence by lobbying on the political decision-making process (Ibid: 250-252). 
23 See Bönker and Wollmann (2000) for a discussion of relevant structural changes in the German welfare state in the 
1990’s. 
24 The exact scope, durability, and effectiveness of each of these reforms are open to dispute. However, my study 
concentrates on the events preceding the adoption of particular reforms, leaving aside issues of reform evaluation 
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when this study was designed (during 2002), there were few (comparative) analyses showing that 
far-reaching reforms had been enacted or were under way in Germany; rather, analysts tended to 
argue that Germany had not been capable of significant reforms, at least well into the 1990s 
(Bönker F. and Wollmann 2001; Obinger and Starke forthcoming).25 Analyses of social policy 
development in Germany stood in marked contrast to those of the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands or Denmark, where significant reforms had been carried out and were widely 
acknowledged by analysts. 
Why is that? Perhaps the reforms that have occurred in Germany were not striking enough to 
catch analysts’ attention? Or is this due to a “time lag” problem, which delays one’s attention to 
the most recent reforms under the two Schröder governments, explaining that they have not yet 
been recognised properly by analysts? Both explanations may be relevant, as well as the dependent 
variable problem I have discussed earlier (the disagreement among scholars about how to 
conceptualize and measure welfare state reforms). Moreover, many analysts of contemporary 
developments adopt a macro-level perspective on welfare state development (e.g. welfare state 
convergence),26 rather than taking a case-centred approach to examine the underlying reasons for 
specific changes, although some analysts try to do both (see for a recent example Bleses and 
Seeleib-Kaiser 2004). Frequently, scholars ask whether the design of the German welfare state as a 
whole has (been) changed, that is, whether its initial institutional patterns have been adjusted, and 
if so, in what ways. In this respect, at least three diverging interpretations have emerged.27 Firstly, 
certain authors detect signs of (a liberal-conservative) transformation;28 a second group detects 
sector-specific developments (whilst not addressing whether these may affect the overall shape of 
welfare arrangements);29 and, thirdly, some identify a pattern of relative continuity, more in 
                                                           
 
 
 
25 Around the turn of the century, only few observers thought otherwise, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
which found that economic reforms coupled with steps towards pension reform and fiscal consolidation might be seen as 
the end of reform gridlock (IMF 2000 cited in Bönker F. and Wollmann 2001: 96). 
26 That literature explores whether different welfare states (and regime types) show signs of becoming more similar over 
time. A recent study carried out at the University of Bremen evaluates convergence trends among OECD states between 
1980-2000 (Obinger and Starke forthcoming). 
27 Compare for a slightly different typology the introduction by Lütz in a recent edited volume on comparative welfare state 
developments (Lütz and Czada 2004). 
28 The edited volume by Lütz and Czada (2004) falls into this category as it attests a ‘fundamental marketisation of welfare 
state ideologies, structure and ways of functioning’ and a ‘trend towards convergence within national diversity’ (20), both 
of which they see confirmed by developments in Germany. As for others authors,  Seeleib-Kaiser (2002), argues that a 
transformation has been taken place during the last 25 years: the decreasing commitment of the state to secure workers’ 
former living standards, ‘the key normative principle of the German welfare state’ (Seeleib-Kaiser 2002: 25) is taken as one 
important sign of transformation. Another is that the state has increased its role through greater involvement in public 
family policy (see also in greater detail Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004). Similarly, Leitner and Lessenich highlight in their 
analysis of recent developments long-term care and old-age pensions that the ‘frozen welfare state’ thesis no longer applies. 
Instead, ‘there have been major changes in the logic of exchange that represents the social foundations of the German 
welfare state’ (Leitner and Lessenich 2003:341-342). Lamping and Rüb see the German welfare state on an “irrevocable 
path from a Conservative welfare state to a new new recombinant type” (Lamping and Rüb 2004: 169). Vail concludes 
after his analysis of recent labour market and pension policy reveals that ‘not since the immediate post-ward period has a 
Germany government acted so aggressively to reshape the labour market and welfare state’ (Vail 2003:61). Furthermore, he 
agrees with Leitner and Lessenich, concerning the outdatedness of the ‘frozen welfare state’ thesis (Vail 2004). According 
to him, the approach of the government towards policy making has been shifted from traditional consensus to a more 
conflictive style of policy-making. Ross, in a recent comparison of reform outcomes in Germany and the UK, argues that 
path- breaking changes have occurred in both countries, as a result of “cumulative, largely endogenous and political 
processes” as opposed to the narrow cirucmstances assumed by path-dependence theories, that is by Esping-Andersen and 
Pierson (Ross 2006). 
29 For example, Hering argues that major institutional changes have been taking place in pension policy. These changes that 
have – unexpectedly - occurred in recent years were due to a mix of ‘institutional interference’, and ‘creative opportunism’, 
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agreement with historical institutionalism and the Reformstau perspective30 (Green-Pedersen and 
Haverland 2002; Stiller 2006). However, in this study, the aim is not to settle this debate on long-
term development (although I return to it Chapter 4 in order to put recent reforms into 
perspective), but to find and evaluate a plausible explanation for single striking reforms.  
 
1.4.3 The Puzzle of This Study  
 
Above, I have argued that a particular set of circumstances, the combination of sources of 
resilience, reform pressures and unexpected occurrence of significant reforms, makes Germany an 
engaging candidate for a study of unexpected welfare state reforms. Thus, the guiding proposition 
of this project, which specifies one possible way of overcoming reform resistance, can be 
evaluated in a challenging and intriguing context: challenging, because in Germany the impact of 
institutions on policy outcomes is strong, and because explanations for far-reaching change that do 
not give centre stage to institutional factors may be seen as theoretically inadequate. It is also 
intriguing, as despite the presence of pressures that were increasingly difficult to ignore by policy-
makers, far-reaching reforms have been scarce up until the late 1990’s. However, some reforms 
have occurred that have gone further than being merely incremental. How is this possible? Why do 
we observe significant reforms despite institutional theories predicting the overall continuity of 
existing structures to be the most likely scenario? What explains recent reforms in pension 
arrangements, changing practices in labour market policy and shifting visions of what constitutes 
appropriate health care provision?  
The discrepancy between historical institutionalism and regime theory, backed up by 
supporters of the Reformstau perspective, and the observation of structural reforms in the 
empirical world, forms the puzzle of German welfare state reform. This puzzle serves both as a 
starting point for my analysis and directly translates into an important question: why do radical 
reforms occur despite the strong but questionable claims of scholars such as Esping-Andersen and 
Pierson to the opposite? The puzzle can hardly be solved by looking at historical institutionalism 
alone. I find that Pierson’s “conditions for retrenchment” (1996: 176-178), even if they are 
assumed to apply equally to the restructuring of policies as well as to retrenchment, are only of 
limited value in explaining such reforms. German policy-makers did not experience more electoral 
slack than in earlier periods31 and the budgetary crisis argument in itself is too imprecise, since 
financial strain had been present continuously since reunification (although it varied across policy 
programmes). Opportunities for obfuscation and blame-avoidance, limiting the visibility of reform 
and policy-makers’ responsibilities, are heavily dependent on institutional structures, and in 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
 
 
i.e. innovative and risk-taking political leaders. In the case of pension policy, these leaders ‘employed new and untested 
electoral strategies and attempted to forge a new coalition for pension privatization, irrespective of existing electoral 
constraints, massive resistance from vested interests and hard-to-overcome legacies of existing welfare state programs by 
key politicians’ (Hering 2003: 19-20; see for more detail Hering 2004) 
30 Here, for instance, Leibfried and Obinger question the transformation thesis, saying that definitions of the welfare state 
which stress transformation, ‘do not adequately reflect the high overall stability of German social policy’ (Leibfried and 
Obinger 2003: 214) Rather, they argue that Germany fits Pierson’s ‘new politics’ well, as they find evidence of cost 
containment/retrenchment as well as of politicians’ compensation strategies, but none for a dismantling of the welfare state. 
31 More to the contrary, electoral competition between parties tended to intensify after reunification while the number of 
elections scheduled (not their frequency) tended to increase with a greater number of Länder compared to before 1989. 
However, electoral slack, when exactly understood in Pierson’s sense of ‘when governments believe that they are in a 
strong enough position to absorb electoral consequences of unpopular decisions’ would have to be assessed for each reform 
under consideration.  
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Germany’s system of fragmented authority, Pierson suggests that ‘governments (…) must fashion 
strategies that minimize the need to force multiple policy changes through institutional veto 
points’ (Pierson 1996: 177). What these strategies involve and how they work is not specified 
further. Finally, a fair prospect of “institutional shifts” that may help reform efforts (with Pierson 
giving an example of the EU facilitating pretexts for tackling welfare state reform) is not a 
straightforward explanation either. “Changing the rules of the game”, if understood as changing 
parliamentary procedures, for instance, is subject to high parliamentary hurdles in Germany,32 and 
the influence of EU level policies on national reform processes is far from evident and difficult to 
assess (Huber and Stephens 2001a).  
From the puzzle at the core of this study I have deduced two research goals: Firstly, I aim to 
make a contribution to the understanding of the puzzle of structural reforms in the German welfare 
state, by analysing the conditions under which reform proposals were adopted. Secondly, I aim to 
contribute to prior theoretical work on the politics of welfare state reform. By designing a revised 
theoretical framework of far-reaching welfare state reform, it should be possible to gain a better 
understanding of processes of welfare state change. My framework implies that an answer to why 
Germany is capable of far-reaching reforms has to be answered on a case-to-case basis and should 
take the micro-level of analysis into account, that is, the role of key politicians. I consider both 
research goals to be complementary, since creating such a framework needs to be prior to its 
application in the analysis of case studies. The hypothesis deduced from the framework will then 
be used to explain a number of structural reforms (see Chapter 3). I will return to this hypothesis in 
Section 1.5.   
 
1.5 Existing Explanations and Major Reforms in Germany 
 
Building upon my criticism in Section 1.2, I argue that a revision of the dominantly institutionalist 
orientation of welfare state theory is needed in order to explain structural reforms in advanced 
welfare states. A strong continuity bias that blinds theorists to empirical developments of welfare 
state adjustment, and the negligence of political agency as a potential source of such reforms, are 
reasons enough to find alternative underpinnings. Such a revision should consider factors - in 
addition to institutional ones - that may be capable of a) overcoming institutional obstacles and 
subsequently, b) explaining change through distinctive strategies of political leadership. Since the 
late 1990s, the literature on welfare state politics has highlighted economic, political and, most 
recently, ideational factors as explanatory perspectives of welfare state reform and restructuring. I 
will now describe the main explanatory categories that have emerged in the welfare state literature 
(see also Castles 2001), and how they impact on the politics of welfare state reform.  
Classifying approaches by types of explanations is one way of making sense of the plethora 
of theoretical approaches that seek to account for welfare state change. One can distinguish a) 
economic explanations, including studies of macro-economic challenges (Kemmerling 2005; 
                                                           
 
 
 
32 In July 2006, the German Bundesrat approved a reform of federalism (Föderalismusreform) that may help to disentangle 
competences between the federal government and the Länder and reduce the amount of issues on which both levels have to 
co-decide (‘Bundesrat nickt Föderalismusreform ab’, 07.07.06, sueddeutsche.de, 
www.sueddeutsche.de/deutschland/artikel/141/80061). The effects of these changes on decision-making outcomes, in the 
realm of the welfare state and elsewhere, remain to be seen.    
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Kittel and Winner 2005), internationalization and globalization (Levy;  Ross 2000c; Bonoli; 
Kitschelt 2001; Swank), b) institutional explanations, typically emphasizing political institutions 
(Green-Pedersen 2001; Pierson 2001), c) party-political explanations (Schmidt 2002a; Schmidt 
2002b; Burgoon and Baxandall 2004; Ferrera and Gualmini 2004; Béland 2005; Natali 2005), and, 
d) idea-centred explanations including discourse and framing ( Immergut 1992; Bonoli 2001; 
Howlett and Ramesh; Andersen; Stiller 2006).33 While the first three types of explanations 
constitute the bulk of the literature, idea-centered explanations are a more recent addition. Since I 
consider the latter to be of special relevance to my argument, I will discuss them separately when 
developing my answer to the puzzle of stability versus change in Section 1.6. The first three 
categories of explanatory factors are outlined below and applied, in very general terms, to the 
German situation. What I am primarily interested in is whether these factors are useful in 
explaining the structural changes that have occurred.    
Economic Explanations and Welfare State Change  
This first category features a wide variety of mostly political economy approaches that stress the 
importance of economy-related factors in welfare state change. In part, these explanations consider 
contemporary pressures on advanced welfare states such as the frequently cited macro-economic 
challenges of high unemployment and fiscal strain on national budgets (see for instance Huber and 
Stephens 2001b; Castles 2001). On the other hand, arguments of internationalization and/or 
globalization as a result of intensifying economic integration are seen as affecting national 
(welfare) states, although it is far from clear whether increasing economic interdependence will 
eventually result in a “roll-back” or in expansion of welfare state arrangements.34 Whatever the 
outcome, important mechanisms, through which internationalization affects national welfare 
states, are: the mobility of tax bases (e.g. financial capital and goods); social insurance countering 
risks posed by economic openness; and the much-cited “race to the bottom”, i.e. the scaling down 
of social standards by competitive pressures (see for an overview of these arguments and 
mechanisms Manow 2001). Globalization is felt in national welfare states through the “filter” of 
labour markets, changing the costs and benefits of social policy arrangements. This, in turn, 
heightens the need for reform. Regarding the implications for social policies, Andersen argues:   
 
International integration is a gradual process, not a regime shift. Hence, the development will not display 
abrupt changes calling for sudden and drastic changes in welfare policies. However, the cost and benefits of 
welfare state activities will gradually be affected and this will eventually have some effect on both the size 
and structure of the welfare society (2003: 44).  
 
On the whole, the weight that scholars ascribe to economic factors varies considerably; on the one 
hand, some treat them as contextual variables that narrow down policy-makers’ options for making 
social policy, on the other hand, others see them as significant influence and thus as an explanatory 
factor for welfare state reform and/or retrenchment. 
                                                           
 
 
 
33 In addition, it is possible to add here Europeanization hypotheses which stipulate a link between European level policies 
and national welfare states (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004; Natali 2005; Stiller 2006). This category, in my view, bridges 
economic and ideational explanatory approaches. 
34 Such hypotheses also exist in the context of policy studies more generally. For instance, Howlett and Ramesh have found 
that “internationalization promotes the restructuring of political subsystems in such a way as to form hospitable 
circumstances for swifter and deeper policy changes than would otherwise be the case”, seeing this as a two-stage process 
(Howlett and Ramesh 2002)  
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Regarding whether such explanations would help to explain the structural changes that have 
occurred in Germany, the picture is mixed. On the one hand, given the sluggishness of the German 
economy, economic explanations would seem to predict a lot more reform activity than has 
actually been observed. Economic factors like continuing fiscal strain on public budgets, high 
unemployment, stress on labour markets and tax bases would, in this perspective, open up the road 
to reforms. Similarly, globalization is supposed to add extra pressure on the German welfare state 
to reform its institutions. Although many economic explanations provide plausible arguments 
about how they affect welfare states, they tend to leave open the question of how this pressure 
translates into specific reforms. Above, I have already referred to the striking fact that Germany 
has remained remarkably stable in terms of its welfare arrangements well into the 1990’s, despite 
mounting economic pressures, especially in the wake of reunification. Thus, economic factors may 
well be important as contextual factors in the politics of welfare state reform, yet they cannot 
explain why relatively few structural reforms have happened.   
Political Institutions and Welfare State Change  
In contrast to welfare institutions, which are created through social policy programmes, political 
institutions are the product of constitutional rules, which determine the distribution of power 
between the branches of the executive, legislative and judiciary. In the context of social policy 
reform, the impact of political institutions has been expressed by means of the concept of “veto 
points” (Rhodes 2001), i.e. possibilities built into the political system to block reforms. Another 
term frequently used is “veto player”, which refers to ‘an individual or collective actor whose 
agreement is required for a policy decision’ (Tsebelis 1995: 293). Similar to welfare institutions 
(and possibly interacting with them), political institutions rather play a mediating role - between 
political actors such as individual policy-makers and political parties - on policy outcomes, than 
being a causal factor in producing them. In practice, this means that political arrangements 
influence actors’ opportunities for pursuing and opposing changes, which translate into different 
outcomes (Bonoli, George and Taylor-Gooby 2000:26). Immergut summarizes this “intervening 
variable role” as follows:  
 
Political institutions do not predetermine policies. Instead, they are an integral part of the strategic context in 
which political conflicts take place. Political institutions set boundaries within which strategic actors make 
their choices. […] Political institutions can be thought of as the outermost framework for political conflicts. 
The institutions do not produce or direct political conflicts, but they do define the terms for these conflicts 
(Immergut 1992: 242-243).  
 
Bonoli and Swank add another perception of the precise role political institutions may play. 
Bonoli (2001) finds that there is no straightforward relationship between political institutions and 
processes of welfare state adaptation in the sense that power concentration is related to the degree 
of success of welfare state change or to the extent of change. Alternatively, he concludes the 
following: 
 
Power concentration, however, appears to be related to the form that welfare state adaptation takes: in 
contexts of strong power concentration, reform tends to be unilateral and geared towards retrenchment. In 
contrast, in institutional contexts characterized by veto points, reform tends to combine measures of 
retrenchment with expansion and improvements of existing programmes. (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993: 
240)  
 
Swank (2001), on the other hand, looks beyond the role of political institutions by linking the 
impact of globalization on welfare state retrenchment to more or less favourable institutional 
contexts. In doing so, he takes account of both domestic (i.e. fiscal stress) and international 
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pressures (i.e. internationalization) on welfare states and finds that ‘the welfare state effects of 
notable domestic and international pressures vary systematically across institutional contexts’ 
(Swank 2001: 232). His findings indicate that countries with weak social corporatism, exclusive 
electoral systems and decentralized policy-making authority would be the ones most favourable to 
retrenchment. Conversely, in countries with strong institutions of collective interest representation, 
centralized decision-making and universal welfare states, pressures from domestic and 
international sources were found to have either no retrenchment effect or to have been averted by 
social and economic interests defending welfare state arrangements (ibid: 232-233).   
Would the application of political-institutional factors to the puzzle of few substantial reforms 
help to explain why these occur? As already discussed in Section 1.4, Germany’s political 
institutions (federal state structure with many veto points/players, a majority of legislative 
proposals requires agreement of both chambers of parliament) tend to explain the resilience of its 
welfare state rather than the occurrence of substantial change in political institutions. Even if one 
took Swank’s extended list of political institutions to include the electoral system, the strength of 
social corporatism, and collective interest representation, Germany’s score on these variables 
points towards an obstruction of potential retrenchment: a proportional electoral system and the 
enduring importance of corporatist decision-making including the role of the social partners form a 
solid basis for the defence of the welfare state status quo. In a nutshell, the basic orientation of 
German political institutions is rather to avert substantial change than to promote it. Therefore, we 
need additional explanatory factors to explain why veto players and/or veto points and other 
political-institutional features do not obstruct change in some cases.  
Party-Political Influences and Welfare State Change 
Furthermore, the factor “politics” in reform processes also includes political parties, whose impact 
on social policy outcomes has been increasingly studied in the last decade.35 Indeed, the 
observation that political debate on any salient policy issue (of which welfare state reform is a 
prime example) is shaped by the programmes and behaviour of political parties makes intuitive 
sense. Political parties may impact on outcomes through competition (in the form of substantive 
debates and tactical behaviour) that takes place both within and between political parties (intra-
party and inter-party effects), and which can work either way, potentially reinforcing or defusing 
institutional reform blockades. Predominantly, it is strategic competition between governing and 
opposition parties (the inter-party factor) that obstructs policy-making and reform. A related 
source of party-political influence may be rooted in intra-coalitional conflict, i.e. disagreements 
between government coalition parties about the course of reform.36 Secondly, intra-party struggles 
may hamper agreement within a (governing) party on policy reform initiatives. The latter means 
that the (lack of) agreement on a common policy agenda regarding the direction of reform within 
parties may be crucial as to whether a policy reform does or does not get off the ground (Visser 
                                                           
 
 
 
35 I will treat parties here as distinct from political institutions, following various overviews in the literature. Some studies, 
however, consider parties closely related to a country’s set of political institutions (see for instance Anderson and Immergut 
2005). 
36 However, there are good arguments for attributing such effects to the design of political institutions rather than the 
existence of different parties. The explanation for this is that certain electoral systems are more likely to produce coalition 
governments than others (Lijphart 1984) and therefore make for potential disunity among the parties forming the 
government. 
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and Hemerijck 1998). Below, I will outline some notable contributions of scholars who have 
considered party-political explanations for welfare state change. 
Levy (1999) has looked at (especially social democratic) parties’ opportunities to claim credit 
and pursue a “vice into virtue” strategy by conducting retrenchment together with benefits. Ross 
highlighted the reform capacities of political parties linked to their issue associations (Hemerijck 
and Van Kersbergen 1999). She argues that under certain institutional conditions, party politics 
can matter. Accordingly, leftist parties may be particularly successful in welfare state retrenchment 
following a “Nixon-goes-to-China” logic. Using an analogy with anti-communist President Nixon 
who opened up relations between the United States and China, that logic stipulates that ‘when 
unpopular policies are on the agenda, the latitude for successful policy leadership is largely 
reserved for those who seem least likely to act’ (2000c: 162). For the welfare state, this implies 
that precisely because of parties’ issue associations - leftist parties are frequently seen as welfare 
state defenders by the public - some parties are in a more advantageous position than others to 
carry out reforms.  
Furthermore, Kitschelt states in his work on strategic party configurations that certain 
characteristics of party systems make them more or less amenable to policy reform. Specifically, 
a) the combination of a strong liberal party plus the decline of welfare state defending parties, b) 
the absence of competing (leftist) parties, c) a party organization that is non-conducive to strategic 
inertia at grass-roots and elite level, and d) party competition centred around economic issues 
rather than socio-cultural ones makes for welfare state retrenchment (Kitschelt 2001). Similarly, 
Green-Pedersen (2001) has demonstrated the importance of party systems as they offer different 
opportunities to engineer a party-political consensus for retrenchment measures. From his study of 
the Netherlands and Denmark, it appears that the pivotal role of the Christian Democrats in the 
Dutch party system explains why retrenchment became possible, while in Denmark’s bloc system 
a similar effect did not occur.  
Are these arguments about the influence of the party-political factor able to shed any light on 
substantial changes in Germany? According to Kitschelt, the characteristics of Germany’s party 
system do not make it prone to retrenchment: the country does not have a strong liberal party, 
while a strong leftist party – the Social Democratic SPD - forms part of the political competition, 
and the competition for votes is more centred on social than on economic issues. Judging the 
explanatory value of “vice into virtue” strategies and the “Nixon-goes-to-China” logic is more 
difficult: the former may have played a role in enabling the few structural reforms under the 
Schröder government, although it is debatable whether opportunities for credit-claiming (e.g. in 
the 2001 pension reforms) were sufficient to overcome the resistance of various veto players who 
also opposed the reform for electoral-tactical reasons. The “Nixon-goes-to-China” thesis has not 
been confirmed by the mixed record of the two Red-Green Governments, which certainly made 
less progress in conducting reform than the thesis would predict. All in all, partisan factors tend to 
be much better equipped to explain stability than change in the German context. From the above, it 
follows that one needs to look to other explanations than those dealing with strategic party 
behaviour.    
 
1.6 A Promising Solution to the Puzzle: Political Actors and Ideas  
 
After having reviewed various types of explanation and having stated their inability to explain 
significant reforms in the German context, this section will pave the way for my proposed solution 
to the puzzle stated earlier. In doing so, I will firstly describe some recent approaches that have 
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ventured beyond a sole focus on institutions in explaining welfare state reform - as my 
contribution also strives to do. Secondly, I will take a closer look at the contribution of idea-based 
explanations of change, and in a last step, explain why we should consider ideational leadership 
when explaining the politics of structural welfare state change. 
 
1.6.1 Beyond Mainstream Institutional Approaches  
 
Since the point of departure of this study is the dominance of approaches that emphasize the 
weight of institutions and related processes of path-dependence and lock-in, reform explanations 
can also be viewed in terms of their theoretical closeness or, conversely, their distance to 
institutionalist perspectives. While classifications of this kind are always, to some extent, 
subjective, we may roughly distinguish explanations, which allow for complementary factors 
whilst still (to a larger or lesser extent) acknowledging institutional factors, and those which, by 
looking explicitly at the influence of politics, wish to shed more light on the “how” of substantial 
welfare state change. Contrasting these two groups paves the way for my argument about 
explanatory factors that the previous typology of explanations did not contain, namely political 
actors and ideas. 
A considerable body of welfare state scholarship echoes the resilience arguments of Esping-
Andersen and Pierson. A first group of analysts ascribes considerable importance to the notion of 
institutional resistance, while formulating hypotheses based on other explanatory factors that may 
play a significant role in the politics of welfare state reform: their theorizing goes beyond 
Pierson’s (1996) limited discussion of strategies of blame avoidance with a view to effecting 
reform. The role of strategic configurations of party systems, corporatism and social pacts in 
shaping responses to reform pressures, may serve as examples here (Palier; Béland 2005;  Starke 
2006). Moreover, Pierson’s more recent insight that the politics of reform may differ, according to 
the type of welfare state regime in which it is taking place (Pierson 2001a), falls into this group. 
 The second cluster of studies goes one step further by challenging the dominance of 
institutions in explanatory approaches. These authors raise the question whether and, if so, how 
other political factors may play a considerable role in restructuring processes (although they vary 
in their claims on how important their influence is). Analyses of political agency and leadership 
strategies (Ross 2000a), party politics (Ross 2000b, Levy 1999, Green-Pedersen 2001), policy 
discourses (Cox 2001, Schmidt 2002a, 2002b), and opportunities for politicians to frame 
unpopular reform initiatives (Ross 2000a) belong to this category. In addition, a whole range of 
analyses seeking to explore significant changes in welfare provision has been inspired by the 
literature on policy learning and public policy analysis (Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Braun and 
Busch 1999; Blyth 2003). These latter analysts have also employed policy-learning concepts in 
theoretical and empirical accounts of welfare restructuring processes (Ross 2000a; Cox 2001; 
Schmidt 2002b). By doing so, they have contributed to shifting the focus in welfare state research 
from status quo analysis towards exploring the conditions under which structural reforms do occur. 
At the same time, they usually pay attention to institutional constraints without overstating their 
power. From these policy learning approaches, there is only a small step to another explanatory 
category, which has been the most recent addition to the literature (cf. Chabal 2003; Béland 2005), 
namely ideas.  
 
1.6.2 Ideational Factors and Welfare State Change  
 
Ideational factors usually refer to the role of ideas, norms and values in policy-making (see for an 
overview Hahm, Jung et al. 2004). In this context, it has been suggested that ideas may be 
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instruments37 in political actors’ strategies to overcome reform blockades. For instance, politicians 
can use them to justify potentially unpopular restructuring measures by serving to overcome 
reform hurdles such as a parliamentary opposition reluctant to consent to a specific reform. 
Furthermore, ideas can serve as “road maps” to policy-makers, helping them to select feasible 
policy strategies out of a larger set of policy options (Thompson 1994). Moreover, they can ‘give 
content to preferences and thus make action explicable’ (Gallagher, Laver et al. 2001:702 ).  
A growing number of analyses have, of late, focused on the role of framing and discourse in 
processes of retrenchment and other types of welfare state reform. This study is trying to make a 
contribution to this literature, as it addresses the role of ideas but considers them in conjunction 
with the role of political actors and their strategies (see for more detail Chapter 2). To mention a 
few noteworthy contributions to the framing and discourse literature, Ross looked into the 
conditions under which politicians can create public understanding for reforms. In her view, 
successful framing of issues can help politicians push through unpopular policy initiatives (Stiller 
and Van Kersbergen 2005). Similarly, Cox made a case that in the Netherlands and Denmark, 
policy-makers had been successful in creating a necessity for change, while in Germany, this 
condition was supposedly absent. He argues that politicians, who manage to create an “imperative 
for change”, will be the ones who are able to overcome path-dependency of existing policies 
and/or institutions (Anderson and Immergut 2005). Finally, Schmidt made an argument for the 
impact of cognitive and normative discourse on reform outcomes after studying and comparing 
economic adjustment processes in several advanced welfare states. She argues that such discourse 
may be an independent explanatory factor in the politics of adjustment, while welfare state reform 
will not succeed (as in Germany) if such a discourse is absent (Lehmbruch 2000).38 
How would these approaches deal with the situation in Germany? Both Schmidt and Cox 
found, in their respective studies, the absence of a reform-facilitating discourse or a need for 
change, looking at the period before 2001. In this sense, these two perspectives explain stability 
rather than change. Regarding Ross’ argument about the condition of successfully framing issues, 
the question is whether her conditions - based on a case study of the UK under Prime Minister 
Thatcher - would also hold in the German context. For this, one would need to test her conditions, 
i.e. frame compatibility (with existing frames), issues which lend themselves to divisive framing, 
and the trustworthiness and credibility of framing actors, in specific reform processes preceding 
instances of significant reform. Only then could it be decided whether they have explanatory 
value, which is why the value of existing ideational approaches cannot be adequately assessed at 
this stage: it is, at best, mixed.  
While the above explanations focus on the role of ideas in the guise of framing and discourse 
arguments, they also, more or less explicitly, indicate that it is hard to ignore the ways in which 
ideas get linked to political agency and how the transmission of ideas is carried out by political 
actors. I will return to this crucial question in Section 1.6.3. While some strive to clarify the 
influence of ideas, and consider more explicitly how they are linked to policy-makers who use 
                                                           
 
 
 
37 This use of instruments in the sense of argumentative “weapons” or “tools” is not to be confused with the more 
conventional notion of policy instruments. 
38 A recent example of such research in countries other than Germany is Béland (2005). He has underlined the “crucial role 
of ideas and frames in the construction of reform imperatives and in the elaboration of a coherent reform agenda” in a study 
(in the context of of the UK and the US of  “personal ownership and possessive individualism in the current neo-liberal 
attempt to restructure modern social policy and encourage the spreading of financial capitalism” (Béland 2005: 35) in the 
1980s in the UK by Thatcher, and since 2003 in the USA by George W. Bush (2005: 35). 
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them in order to push for reform (Ross, Cox), others are far less explicit on this (Schmidt). This 
point will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 2. What matters most for the present argument, 
however, is that some scholars recognize that ideas do play a role in welfare state adjustment, 
usually in connection with other explanatory factors. The challenge ahead is to learn more about 
how such processes work. How can we go about this?  
 
1.6.3 Political Agency and Welfare State Change: Towards the Notion of Ideational 
Leadership 
 
In answering this question, I aim to focus on a combination of explanatory variables on the input 
side of politics. Having seen that other variables are of little explanatory value in the German 
context (Section 1.5), including ideational approaches, I consider political agency and ideational 
factors together to be essential in explaining why institutional barriers to reforms can be 
overcome. Therefore, my proposition on ideational leadership (IL) implies that influential policy-
makers, who make use of ideas to justify policy choice and/or as principles for policy selection, 
may convince resisting actors of the need for and appropriateness of reform, and are thus able to 
overcome institutional barriers.39 In the IL analytical framework, key political actors are senior 
politicians such as cabinet members (cf. Ross 2000b; Maier 2003; Béland 2005). They are 
assumed to possess the authority to take initiatives on reform proposals and see it as their 
responsibility to implement them. In addition, the framework relies on the assumption that instead 
of being pure office-seekers, some politicians tend to be more policy-oriented (Braun and Busch 
1999: 342). This study will correspondingly focus on the impact of those policy-makers, who are 
mostly interested in making an impact on policy (policy-seeking), rather than being focussed on 
the benefits of office (office-seeking). 
The choice for this proposition redirects attention to the relatively underexplored micro- or 
individual level of analysis, i.e. the role of political agents seen as individual politicians.40 This 
approach contrasts with the explanations described in Section 1.5, which are found at other levels 
of analysis (with the possible exception of the work of Cox (2001) and Ross (2000a), as their 
analyses also highlight individual decision-makers): at the macro-level, which corresponds to the 
welfare state regime, we can find economic explanations, including arguments about 
internationalization and globalization, related discursive arguments, and arguments about the 
influence of political institutions. With regard to the meso-level, which corresponds to the level of 
welfare state programmes or policies, we can find “politics matters” arguments that include the 
influence of party-political factors and welfare state institutions.  
Regarding the IL approach, which puts individuals at the centre of investigation, rather than 
politics or institutional characteristics, I am trying to fill a lacuna left by meso- and macro-level 
approaches, by evaluating whether IL as an individual-level explanation can overcome reform 
resistance, thus shedding light on the adoption of unexpected reforms. To be more succinct, my 
intention in this study is not to develop a complex model that combines all possible explanatory 
                                                           
 
 
 
39 This proposition acknowledges that the capacity of policy-makers to do so cannot be seen in isolation from the influence 
of welfare and political institutions and the role of political parties. 
40 Related questions that have recently attracted the interest of scholars are why these agents decide to embark on 
electorally risky reforms in the first place (Stiller and Van Kersbergen 2005  and how political competition plays a role in 
actors’ choice of reform strategies (Anderson and Immergut 2005).  
 
  
Chapter 1 
 26 
factors. Instead, I consider it more rewarding to concentrate on one explanatory factor, IL, and 
evaluate its relative influence vis-à-vis a limited number of contrasting explanations.  
There are three points that need clarifying with regard to the relationship between IL and 
other explanatory factors: Firstly, the IL framework recognizes the impact of (political) 
institutions, as they shape the (decision) rules of reform processes and, in turn, have the ability to 
block other actors who have a stake in the status quo of welfare programmes. IL-type actors need 
to engage in and overcome ensuing resistance. Secondly, in addition to the role played by 
institutions, I acknowledge the role of political parties in processes of policy change and the 
struggles with the course of reform that can result both within and between parties (which can 
form an important source of reform resistance). In particular, there is a possibility that strategic 
actions of political parties can reinforce (due to the effects of interacting with political institutions) 
reform obstacles. Germany proves to be a good example of this relationship: the interaction 
between federal institutions (which imply negotiated solutions) and political parties (which follow 
a logic of competition) may lead to reform blockades (Blondel 1987). Ideational leaders, in their 
efforts at structural reforms, will tend to face resistance from party-political sources. Thirdly, I 
assume that key policy-makers use ideas as “justifying aids” in order to overcome institutional and 
party-political obstacles. This implies, in relation to the various ontological assumptions behind 
the role of ideas in policy-making, that my approach recognizes the importance of interests in 
policy-making, as opposed to more social constructivist-inspired approaches where ideas are seen 
as logically taking precedence over interests. Finally, even though my focus lies with the micro-
level of analysis, it is important to realize that studies of welfare state change employing meso- 
and macro-level factors have made significant progress in explaining welfare state reforms. 
However, the point I would like to make is that they cannot explain every single unexpected 
reform, and, in fact, tend to generate too many contrasting explanations for the same outcome 
(Stiller and Van Kersbergen 2005).  
 
1.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined the puzzle that lies at the core of my project: the unexpected occurrence 
of structural welfare state reforms in the light of institutionalist approaches. More specifically, I 
have taken issue with the welfare state stability bias present in the work of Esping-Andersen and 
Pierson. In my eyes, their theorizing fails to explain adequately the occurrence of major welfare 
state reforms. Furthermore, despite the predictions of these theorists, advanced welfare states have 
seen major welfare state reforms in recent years. I have offered a definition of such major but not 
usually quantifiable reforms, labelled “structural reform”, by drawing upon earlier work on 
qualitative notions of welfare state change. To illustrate my argument about theoretically 
unexpected, yet major reforms, I have presented examples from Germany and other advanced 
welfare states. I have also explained that Germany offers an intriguing context for investigating the 
occurrence of structural reforms due to its combination of reform obstacles (political and welfare 
institutions), and salient reform pressures from multiple sources of strain (socioeconomic, fiscal, 
demographic). All of these factors combine in a perplexing mix of institutional obstacles on the 
one hand, and large incentives to tackle reforms on the other, while theoretically unexpected but 
major reforms have even occurred in Germany.  
In a brief search for solutions to this puzzle, I have shown that different types of explanations 
(economic, institutional, party-political), when taken by themselves, cannot satisfactorily account 
for those reforms in the German context. Finally, I have reconsidered the role of political agency 
and the ways in which it can be linked to ideational accounts of welfare state change, by 
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introducing a guiding proposition on ideational leadership (IL). The rationale behind IL is linked 
to the weaknesses of other explanations. Since macro- and meso-level explanatory factors - in the 
German context - seem to be more appropriate to explain stability than major reforms, the solution 
to the puzzle may lie in looking for explanations found at the micro-level of analysis, such as IL. 
The IL concept is based on the insight that it is problematic to ascribe an independent influence to 
ideas without taking into account what policy-makers do with them. Moreover, it is difficult to 
show such an autonomous influence empirically. This is because ideas are abstract constructs and 
cannot “move” around the policy-making arena in the way political actors do. It is more likely to 
see them linked to an agent in some way or another (Moon 1995; Helms 2000; Goldfinch 2001).  
It is important to realize, however, that IL cannot be seen as completely detached from 
welfare institutions on the one hand, and political-institutional and party-political factors on the 
other (all of which simply cannot be disregarded or controlled when conducting case study type 
empirical research). Therefore, it is important to explore and observe how IL interacts with these 
factors, which, at least in the specific German context, appear to be more reform-obstructing than 
reform-enabling.  
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2. Ideational Leadership: Definition and Origins of a Concept Based 
on Leadership and the Role of Ideas in Policy-making 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I will explore the origins of the concept of ideational leadership (IL), present its 
different aspects and illustrate its relationship with the occurrence of structural reforms in the 
context of the welfare state. My main argument will be that there is an analytical advantage in 
drawing up a concept which combines elements from leadership approaches with elements from 
ideational approaches to policy-making and change. In this sense, I am resuming the discussion 
from Chapter 1 about the ways in which political agency and the merits of ideational approaches 
together help to explain structural change in welfare states that cannot be explained by macro- en 
meso-level explanatory factors. In particular, I will suggest that idea-based approaches can be 
improved by linking ideas to agency and will specify how actors make use of ideas in pushing for 
policy reform. In doing so, it is necessary to draw attention to causal mechanisms that link policy-
maker’s behaviour and policy outcomes, starting from the assumption that the quality of theories 
can be improved by specifying, as far as possible, the mechanisms linking variables and outcomes. 
On the other hand, theories specifying functional requirements of leadership can be made more 
concrete by insights from ideational approaches that offer input on how leaders communicate 
effectively in order to achieve policy change. As this chapter will illustrate, the IL concept draws 
on the extensive literature on the role of ideas in policy making (see for overviews  Goldfinch and 
't Hart 2003; 't Hart and ten Hooven 2004: 46), as well as on leadership (Jones 1994; Thompson 
1994; Campbell 1998; Ross 2000b; Van Kersbergen 2002; Chabal 2003; Wight 2003; Hahm, Jung 
et al. 2004). I will argue that the “joint concept” of ideational leadership builds upon these two 
bodies of literature and compensates for some of their respective weaknesses.   
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section 2.2 summarizes the weaknesses of the two 
literatures and introduces IL as a “joint concept” that bears both imprints of the ideational 
literature and the literature on leadership in a context of policy change. Section 2.3 reviews the 
literature on leadership: it first explains why organizational theories are ill-suited to inform IL and, 
following on from this, why political leadership theories draw attention to the importance of 
leadership but are less suited to provide building blocks than theories of leadership in policy-
making contexts. Section 2.4 offers an overview of the ideational literature by way of examples 
that show how ideas influence processes of (social) policy change that can be linked to political 
agents. Subsequently, the building blocks of IL, various components or tasks of leadership that 
enable reform, and elements relating to the role of ideas in policy-making, are introduced (Section 
2.5). This last section also presents the concept of institutional lock-in and introduces the 
constituent aspects of IL, including an assumption on the general orientation of IL-type actors. In 
the course of this discussion, I will refer to the relevant leadership concepts and work on ideas 
which have inspired the IL concept in one way or another. In addition, the causal mechanisms 
linking the aspects and institutional lock-out (as opposed to institutional lock-in, see Chapter 1) are 
explained. 
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2.2 The Problems of Two Literatures Trying to Explain Policy Change  
 
2.2.1 Limitations of Leadership Concepts in Explaining Policy Change 
  
There have been notable efforts in the leadership literature to spell out the relationship between 
leadership and policy change. A considerable amount of theorizing has developed on how leaders 
should behave in order to accomplish innovation and far-reaching policy change. In addition, 
scholars have been thinking about the conditions under which behaviour associated with 
leadership leads to important reforms. Notwithstanding these efforts, I argue that the leadership 
literature generally suffers from a shortcoming in specifying such behaviour and needs to be 
improved in some respects. More specifically, the problem lies in the following: although all 
leadership concepts that will be discussed point in fairly general terms to the possibilities for 
individual actors to change policy instruments or institutional structures, they tend to remain vague 
on how political agents need to behave and what they need to communicate to their audiences in 
order to successfully push through change. In other words, what I find lacking is a concise 
specification of what leaders do and say to achieve change, including the causal mechanisms 
between leadership-related behaviour and/or leadership tasks and structural reforms. Obviously, 
there is some variety between leadership theories regarding this aspect, which will be illustrated 
further in the literature review.  
As a consequence, further efforts are necessary in order to improve theorizing on the types of 
behaviour linked to leadership. In my view, it is possible, with the help of the ideational literature 
(see Section 2.4), to formulate theories about reform-oriented leadership in more concrete terms 
with a view to improving them. Possibly, doing so will also contribute to an improved 
conceptualization and understanding of processes of major policy change. I argue that the key to 
improving conceptualisations of leadership (in that they explain the link between leadership and 
reforms in more concrete terms) lies in combining them with elements of idea-based approaches to 
politics and policy-making.  
 
2.2.2 Limitations of Ideational Approaches  
 
Just as there are weaknesses in the leadership literature, there are also problems with ideational 
approaches. To me, the first apparent limitation is that idea-based approaches to policy-making 
and policy change sometimes result in bold statements about the causal effects of ideas in relation 
to policy outcomes. That is to say, scholarly work on the role of ideas in policy-making tends to 
make claims about causal explanations, but fails to specify and demonstrate the causal nexus 
between the presence of certain ideas and their effects. This is regrettable, as specifying causal 
mechanisms is a way of making theoretical frameworks more sensitive to the dynamics of political 
struggles in policy-making (Andeweg 2000). Whether this omission is intended or not, fact is that 
evidence for the presence of certain policy ideas or a policy discourse is often implicitly linked to 
a policy outcome without providing further explanation as to how these are connected to a specific 
policy outcome. Schmidt, for example, rightly asks how to establish the causal influence of 
discourse, but instead of an answer, she formulates statements that sum up conditions: ‘For 
discourse to have a significant influence in the adoption of a policy programme, in short, it must 
be able to help policy actors overcome entrenched interests, institutional obstacles, and cultural 
blinkers to change’ (Schmidt 2002b: 251).  
Secondly, in my view it is difficult to imagine ideas having an impact by themselves, i.e. 
completely detached from what policy-makers do, let alone show such a connection empirically. 
This is because ideas are cognitive and/or normative constructs, which cannot enter the policy-
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making arena on their own and, for that reason, need an agent to gather them, put them on a 
political agenda and communicate them to a certain audience (cf. Ross 2000b; Lieberman 2002). 
Even though there are various, and sometimes competing, theoretical perspectives on how public 
policy is made, few would deny that actors have some sort of impact on policy-making, even 
within the confines of institutional possibilities; the issues involved make up the seemingly 
intractable structure-agency problem (see for a lucid description of the problem Berman 2001). 
Some observers, however, ascribe more importance to agents, arguing that policy transitions 
should be understood in terms of a relationship between structural possibilities and political 
agency (Campbell 1998). I rather agree with the latter view as it helps to reintroduce the 
opportunities, implied by political leadership, into a perspective of politics dominated by 
institutions. To give an example, the actor in question may be a policy-maker who has developed a 
new vision on a policy problem and “sells” a new policy or reform initiative to the opposition 
party and interest groups. However, this seemingly simple act is likely to encounter difficulties in 
the political arena and cannot be performed by any political agent: ideas that effect changes on the 
political agenda must typically be promoted by influential policy-makers who enjoy institutional 
access (Béland 2005: ???).41 Those influential policy-makers would need to get an issue on their 
government’s policy or decision-making agenda, which is typically laid down in coalition 
agreements or similar public policy declarations outlining new policy or policy reforms. I take this 
observation as a prompt to study more closely the possibilities of political agency influencing the 
course of structural welfare state reforms: in order to bring change onto the political agenda (and 
ultimately to make decisions on particular reform initiatives), ideas must be promoted by political 
agents that enjoy institutional access. In my framework, these potential ideational leaders occupy 
posts of key policy-makers, that is, they are senior politicians such as cabinet members.42 To sum 
up, I argue that idea-based approaches to policy change can be improved by linking ideas to a 
certain actor or “carrier” and by specifying how this carrier makes use of them in pushing for 
policy reform. In this undertaking, it is necessary to think carefully about the causal mechanisms 
linking policy-makers’ behaviour and policy outcomes, starting with the assumption that the 
quality of theories can be improved by specifying - as far as possible - the mechanisms linking 
agents and outcomes.  
In order to address the limitations of the two literatures, I present the concept of ideational 
leadership (IL). It rests on the insight that leadership theories, which specify functional 
requirements of leadership, can be made more concrete with the help of ideational approaches, if 
these offer some input on how leaders communicate effectively in order to effect policy change. 
Concepts of leadership generally lack precision in describing how political agents behave when 
they get involved in the process of pushing through change. On the other hand, the ideational 
literature tends to claim that ideas have causal effects on policy outcomes without substantiating 
this claim and without considering their link to the policy-making process. In my view, these 
shortcomings may be addressed in two ways. To respond to the shortcoming of leadership 
concepts, it is necessary to shift the theoretical focus onto the carrier of such ideas, i.e. on political 
                                                           
 
 
 
41 Campbell is not specific about what he means by ‘political agenda’. In public policy research, one can finds a distinction 
between different kinds of agendas, such as in Rogers and Dearing’s (1987) model of agenda-setting, which features a 
media, a public and a policy agenda (see for an overview of the field Parsons 1995: 110 ff.)  
42 Only few studies on the impact of cabinet members, i.e. ministers, on policy outcomes have been undertaken, but they 
underscore the importance of taking the micro-level of analysis into account (see for an overview of the field Parsons 1995: 
110 ff.) On the other hand, the scope of ministerial authority may be restricted by prime ministerial government, coalition 
leadership, a government programme or rules of collective decision-making (Andeweg 2000). 
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actors and how they make use of or handle ideas in specific policy processes. Furthermore, in 
order to address the causality question and the lack of agency when considering ideas by 
themselves, it is necessary to engage in empirical research focusing on those actors. Such research 
may examine the role that ideas have played in actors’ behaviour and, in doing so, describes or 
illustrates the causal mechanisms that link these ideas to policy outcomes. By developing a 
concept that captures these thoughts and by evaluating its plausibility, this study intends to make a 
contribution to both aims. It explicitly combines political actors, via the concept of leadership, and 
the role of political ideas, by asking how leaders make use of ideas in order to achieve far-reaching 
reforms even against the odds of institutional and political obstacles. 
On a more general conceptual note, an explanation that considers both agency and ideas also 
goes some way towards seeing them both as determinants of policy outcomes. Indeed, some 
authors have pleaded for the influence from both interests and ideas to be considered  instead of 
treating them as rival explanations (cf. Gibson and Fiedler 2000). Indeed, to ask whether either 
interests or ideas are the chief determinants of policy outcomes may be a misleading way of 
addressing the issue, because it neglects the possibility that the interaction between them is what 
counts. In the same vein, Ross has argued that ‘two alternative, mutually consistent forces driving 
welfare restructuring are ideas and interests’ (Helms 2000: 24). She argues that a combination of 
the two factors is slowly receiving more attention, as the disadvantages of exclusively structural 
(institutional and interest-based) explanations become clearer. However, to achieve changes on the 
political agenda, individuals need ‘to grab new ideas and promote them’ (ibid: 25). Furthermore, 
an integration of ideas and agency can help to advance knowledge about the role of ideas in 
policy-making, if better research methods are developed to evaluate the impact of ideas. For 
instance, in order to demonstrate that ideas matter as an independent variable, one should try to see 
whether it is possible to establish and demonstrate connections between ideas held by individuals 
and/or groups and the decisions ultimately made by political actors (Sabine 1973: 22). More 
recently, Béland (2005) has argued that institutionalist scholars may pay greater attention to 
ideational processes without abandoning their core assumptions, as policy ideas may matter in and 
beyond agenda-setting processes. At the same time, he stresses that further research on the role of 
ideas in social policy should develop methods ‘to evaluate the concrete influence of ideas on 
welfare state politics’(Helms 2000: 14). In response to such calls for the integration of ideas and 
interests in explanatory models and improved methods for gauging the influence of ideas,  this 
study makes a contribution in both respects: on a conceptual level, by considering how to combine 
agency with ideas in the IL concept, and by devising a research design to evaluate its impact. 
 
2.2.3 Ideational Leadership: Reform-Oriented Leadership Plus the Role of Ideas in Policy-
Making  
 
IL is about leadership achieved with the help of ideas. Before going into its meaning in more 
depth, a general definition may be key policy-makers who use strategies that are idea-based 
(“ideational”), and purposively aim for the achievement of change, even in view of institutional 
and electoral challenges (“leadership”). The concept of IL describes a certain resource of key 
policy-makers that helps to transform the resistance of reform opponents against reforms into 
acceptance (or at least neutrality) towards a particular reform initiative. In this fashion, the 
presence of IL can plausibly be linked to the adoption of structural reform in policy areas 
belonging to the welfare state. More specifically, IL is conceptualized as a cluster of abilities of 
key policy makers, including 1) to expose drawbacks of old policy principles and policies built on 
them; 2) to make consistent efforts to legitimize new principles and policies (using cognitive and 
normative arguments), 3) to frame reform resistance as problematic for societal welfare (and 
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possibly for the interests of lobbyist groups, in terms of their long-term welfare political 
influence); 4) to make efforts at political consensus-building in support of the reform initiative; 
and 5) to be predominantly policy-oriented. These patterns of behaviour taken together neutralize 
or at least decrease reform resistance by convincing opponents of the merits of new policy 
principles and allow the adoption of innovative reform initiatives (the aspects of IL are developed 
in depth in Section 2.5).  
My hypothesis about IL thus associates key policy-makers’ behaviour with the concept with 
the occurrence of structural welfare state reforms. The different aspects of ideational leadership, 
when taken together, reduce the level of institutional lock-in associated with welfare state 
arrangements and enable structural reforms to be adopted. This hypothesised relationship between 
IL and structural reforms may at first sight appear tautological, if one assumes that the observation 
of leadership necessarily implies achieving a certain outcome (structural reforms) or if one 
automatically associates the term leadership with reform adoption. There may be a certain danger 
in making this argument, but when taking a closer look at the issue, it is largely unfounded. 
Tautological here refers to the danger of formulating an explanation that is true by definition and 
therefore not falsifiable. The aspects of IL are all formulated with a view to specifying the 
relationship between them and the shaping of conditions for institutional break-out, which allow 
structural reform to occur. However, this does not mean that the specification or definition of IL 
(the independent variable), “includes” structural reform (the dependent variable). In my 
hypothesis, IL is merely related to, but not equated to structural reform; therefore, the presence of 
IL in a reform process does not automatically imply a structural reform: this clearly leaves room 
for falsifying the hypothesis. However, my opinion is that it can only be shown by empirical study 
of structural reform cases whether or not key policy-makers indeed acted in accordance with the 
hypothesized aspects of IL and, if this was the case, whether the role of these IL-type actors could 
be linked to the occurrence of structural reforms. 
The core concepts of the hypothesis include “key policy-makers”, which refer to those 
individuals who are most likely to wield ideational leadership. I consider them to be senior 
members of the executive (such as ministers and prime ministers) who are authorized to initiate or 
commission major reform proposals and who are able to perform as political leaders in the context 
of a reform process (cf. Gibson and Fiedler 2000; Helms 2000). Whether it takes one such 
individual or several of them to push through a far-reaching reform project is largely an empirical 
question, which will be answered in the empirical case studies. In addition, “reform resistance” is 
the sum of resistance that can be wielded against a reform proposal, mostly by formal veto power 
of an actor or institution, but also by other forms of visible opposition (for instance, strikes by 
trade unions). It stems from welfare state institutions, political institutions (e.g. parliament(s), 
possibly in interaction with political parties, whether governing ones or opposition parties), and 
societal interest groups (for instance, employers and trade unions). Finally, the term “structural 
reform” is used to denote major reforms. As such, it is conceptually different from incremental or 
stepwise reform.43  
                                                           
 
 
 
43 As explained in Chapter 1, a structural reform introduces changes to one or several structural dimensions of a social 
policy area, i.e. its financing, benefit or management structure. The financing structure determines who pays for a certain 
social programme and by which mechanism payment is effected; the benefit structure combines regulations on who 
provides services or financial provisions (‘benefits’); the management or regulatory structure is about who is the competent 
body to regulate the policy field (Webber 1989) . This definition is in line with criteria for institutional reform except for 
excluding the ‘mode of access to benefits’ as another institutional aspect (Palier 2002). 
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2.3 A Bird’s Eye View of Leadership: Theories and Concepts  
 
In this section, I will offer a review of leadership concepts that are relevant to the development of 
IL.  During the discussion, I will both outline these concepts and point to their shortcomings. The 
focus will be on concepts close to contexts of politics and policy-making (as opposed to leadership 
in business and organizational contexts) that can elucidate processes of policy change. This 
selective approach is by no means intended to deny the wide variety of leadership concepts that 
has been developed in the field of business administration and management, where leadership 
enjoys considerable popularity and the attention of practitioners, but which are beyond the context 
of this study. After some definitional clarifications and a brief historical outline, the review takes a 
brief look at organizational leadership theories, explaining why they are less relevant to the 
argument I am going to develop, and then proceeds to concepts from the field of political and 
policy science that either help to underline why leadership can help to explain structural reforms or 
deliver building blocks for the constituent aspects of IL in Section 2.5.  
Leadership is a ubiquitous concept44 and enjoys considerable popularity as a topic of 
academic study.45 Apart from the field of business economics and management, as stated before, 
leadership theories also have been of interest to political and policy science. A leader has 
traditionally been defined as “the person who leads or commands a group, organization, or 
country”.46 Leadership has been defined as “the position of a leader” and “the ability to lead”,47 of 
which the latter meaning comes closest to the definition of IL in this study: the focus will indeed 
be on the abilities of key policy-makers. A definition from the public policy tradition stresses the 
result-oriented element of leadership, described as ‘the actions of a person who (whether elected, 
appointed or emerging by group consensus) directs, coordinates, and supervises the work of others 
for the purpose of accomplishing a given task’ (Luke 2000: 191). A definition of leadership in 
political contexts refers to leadership as essentially an exercise of power “to get things done”.48 IL, 
however, while focusing on what policy-makers need to do to get reforms adopted, differs from a 
pure exercise of power on the basis of authority, as it also stresses the clout of ideas in the process.  
In political science, the phenomenon of leadership constitutes a classic area of scholarly 
interest. A recent overview of the field covering political leadership (Gerth and Mills 1948) 
                                                           
 
 
 
44 Blondel expresses this ubiquity as follows: ‘Leadership is as old as mankind. It is universal, and inescapable. It exists 
everywhere, - in small organizations and in large ones, in businesses and in churches, in trade unions and in charitable 
bodies, in tribes and in universities. It exists in informal bodies, in street gangs and in mass demonstrations (…) Leadership 
is, for all intents and purposes, the no.1 feature of organizations. For leadership to exist, of course, there has to be a group: 
but wherever a group exists, there is always a form of leadership’ (Blondel 1987: 1)  
45 Since leadership is to be found almost everywhere in daily life of modern societies, it is not surprising that it is matched 
by a popular concern. Such concern is reflected in the amount of academic publications, where already in 1990, 7.500 
empirical leadership studies were reported (Bass 1990 cited in Gibson and Fiedler 2000: 191). To employ another measure 
of academic interest in the field, the 1980s saw approximately five articles a day being published on leadership in the 
English language, while by the 1990s this amount had doubled to ten articles a day (Grint 1997: 2) 
46
 The Concise Oxford English Dictionary. Ed. Catherine Soanes and Angus Stevenson. Oxford University Press, 
2004.Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. source: 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t23.e31569 
47 Pocket Fowler's Modern English Usage. Ed. Robert Allen. Oxford University Press, 1999. Oxford Reference Online. 
Oxford University Press, http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html? subview= Main&entry= t30.e2207 
48 ‘It (i.e. leadership) is power because it consists of the ability of the one or few who are at the top to make others do a 
number of things (positively or negatively) that they would not or at least might not have done. But it is not, of course, just 
any kind of power (…). Thus it seems possible to define political leadership, and specifically national political leadership, 
as the power exercised by one or a few individuals to direct members of the nation towards action. (Blondel 1987: 3)   
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suggests that both normative and empirical approaches to leadership have been developing.49 The 
normative tradition of leadership more generally as well as political leadership date back to the 
philosophy of Plato and his Republic and Statesman (about 500 B.C.) as one of the earliest 
examples,50 although references to leadership were even found in ancient Egyptian documents 
(Gibson and Fiedler 2000: 191). Even before the beginning of political modernity, the so-called 
“Fürstenspiegel” was modeled on Thomas van Aquino’s De regimine principum.51 A radical 
change from such writings came with Machiavelli’s classic 16th –century work Il Principe, in 
which he formulated systematically the “technical” base of political leadership as power politics.52 
With the arrival of modernity, the search for “good government” and “good political leadership” 
took on a different meaning: based on the thinking of Locke and Montesquieu, it was to be secured 
by institutional innovations (as the separation of power) and less through the leadership of one or 
more individuals.53 In contemporary political science, normative approaches have resurfaced in 
contemporary political science, in studies of “good government” and a “code of good 
administration” in a mostly Anglo-Saxon debate on the ethical basis of leadership (Dobel 1998 
cited in Helms 2000: 414).54 While these normative approaches are important, they are less 
relevant to my account of ideational leadership, as IL does not include prescriptive goals but is 
explanatory in character.  
In contrast to these historically prominent normative approaches, empirical approaches to 
political leadership can be roughly divided into personal, structural, and interactionist approaches. 
The first two can be seen as representing opposite sides of the same continuum: while personal 
approaches magnify the qualities and personal attributes of individual leaders, more radical 
versions of structural approaches leave very limited room for political leaders to influence 
government decisions. In the intermediate interactionist view, scholars try to incorporate both 
personal and structural factors; doing justice to patterns of interdependence and mutual dynamics. 
In addition, the influence of short-term contextual factors that may open unpredictable “windows 
of opportunity” is taken into account (March and Olsen 1989: 416-420). As an empirical approach 
                                                           
 
 
 
49 This paragraph draws substantively on the overview in Hesse 2000.  
50 In the work of Plato, the idea of a leader is embodied in the ruler, most explicitly in the Statesman. The former is seen to 
play the main role in political absolutism, which is justified ‘in case the ruler is really an artist at his work’. Therefore, ‘in 
the ideal state the consent of subjects is no part of the ruler’s equipment, since the subject’s liberty according to the customs 
and traditions of the law can only work to hamper the free artistry of the ruler who knows his art’ (Sabine 1973: 81)   
51 These fairly early normative accounts of leadership formed a ‘political-pedagogically motivated confrontation of ideal 
and image, of real picture and ideal picture of the ruler’ (Mühleisen and Stammen 1997, cited in Helms 2000: 413).  
52 Machiavelli was the first to establish politics as an independent subsystem (within the state) and reflected upon it in the 
framework of a rational doctrine for action that rejected an individualistic normative-moralistic motivation for politics. 
However, he remained somewhat normative in the sense that he elevated the act of overcoming political crises to the 
highest norm for successful political action (ibid: 413) and therefore of political rulers or leaders. In the Prince, leadership 
appears as the exaggerated idea of the ruler’s power. ‘The ruler, as the creator of the state is not only outside the law, but if 
law enacts morals, he is outside morality as well. There is no standard to judge his acts except the success of his political 
expedients for enlarging and perpetuating the power of this state’ (Sabine 1973: 323).  
53 Rousseau acknowledged political leadership in the form of the “legislateur”, but ascribes to him rather the role of a 
catalyst in order to reach a desirable and institutionally bolstered finite state (Sabine 1973: 414).  
54 Other normative elements have been present in ex post facto evaluations of different styles of leadership of key 
politicians (Graubard and Holton 1962) and in the work on the leadership of US presidents and their leadership styles 
(Rockman 1984). In German political science, recent contribution in the field also have a normative connotation, for 
instance, when defining “state politics as leadership task”, assigning it function of leadership, orientation, organization, and 
conveyance. Accordingly, politicians are expected to determine and define problems, determine the outline of possible 
actions and goals of action; mobilize and unite necessary actors for collective tasks and organize consensus and acceptance 
for common ways of action and motivate the actors involved in such processes (Sabine 1973: 81). 
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to leadership, my argument about IL finds itself in the last category, as it engages explicitly with 
the possibilities for leaders to break through resilient structures.  
 
2.3.1 Organisational Leadership Theories  
 
In organisational studies, leadership theories are divided in two types, one based on personal 
attributes and abilities of individuals,55 and another based on transactional theories of leadership 
(Gibson and Fiedler 2000: 193).56 In recent years, a third category has emerged,57 adding 
transformational58 and charismatic leadership59 theories. There have also been attempts to go 
beyond conventional ways of classifying leadership in terms of leaders’ traits, characteristics and 
behaviour that define ideal types focusing on traits, contingencies, situations and “constitution” ('t 
Hart and ten Hooven 2004).60 These categories of leadership are concerned with understanding 
and predicting outcomes of leadership behaviour in organizational contexts (within private or 
public organizations). These notions of leadership may be appropriate in describing what leading 
                                                           
 
 
 
55 These centre on personality attributes and traits, leader behaviour, and went on to consider also situational (i.e. 
organizational) characteristics (Gibson and Fiedler 2000:192-195). 
56 Transactional theories, which emerged in reaction to exclusively personality-based approaches, comprise so-called 
contingency theories which are also sensitive to the nature of the leadership situation when considering the effects of a 
leader on performance. Theories that fall into this category stress factors like motivational structure and situational control; 
the characteristics of followers and tasks; level of participation granted to followers; and include complex models allowing 
for a variety of leader behaviour and intervening group process variables. 
57 This most recent group focuses on effects of certain personalities (using a more parsimonious set of indicators than 
previously) expressed in the types of charismatic and transformational leadership (Ibid: 195-200). The latter (together with 
visionary leadership) are among the more common theories of organizational leadership and share the following elements: 
having a compelling vision challenging the status-quo; infusing that vision in a way that inspires and motivates employees; 
empowering others and enlisting followers in the vision and developing mutual trust and personal loyalty between leaders 
and followers (Luke 2000: 47-48)  
58 Transformational leadership, based on the historical analysis of political and social leadership by Burns (1978), has 
resulted in two functions of leadership within the organizational context. It stimulates high levels of performance within 
organizations and it can help to transform organizations in response to rapidly changing environments (Luke 2000: 46). 
59 A charismatic leader draws upon a bond between him and his or her followers, ‘where the leader grips followers with a 
specific vision for action or by other means than merely emotional appeals to survive a crisis’ (ibid.). Charismatic 
leadership is rooted in the typology of legitimate domination by Max Weber (1921), referring to three different bases of 
authority as ‘pure’ or ideal types: traditional, charismatic and legal-rational forms of legitimization (Gerth and Mills 1948: 
78-80). The traditional form of authority is associated with traditional ‘rulers’, such as kings and other dignitaries, who 
derived their power from ‘ancient recognition and habitual orientation to conform’. The second category (which Weber 
qualified as the one political scientists should be most interested in) is ‘charismatic’ domination, resting on ‘the authority of 
the extraordinary and personal gift of grace (charisma), the absolutely personal devotion and personal confidence in 
revelation, heroism, or other qualities of individual leadership’. As examples, Weber refers to the ‘magician and the 
prophet on the one hand, and in the elected war lord, the gang leader and condotierre on the other hand’ (ibid: 80). 
Furthermore, as examples of political leadership (which Weber saw as a sub-category of charismatic leadership), he refers 
to the “demagogue” of the ancient city states and to the parliamentary party leader of the contemporary constitutional state. 
Finally, domination can be based on ‘legality’, which hinges on the ‘belief in the validity of legal statute and functional 
‘competence’ based on rationally created rules’ (ibid: 79).  
60 In the ‘trait approach’, the ‘essence’ of the individual leader matters more than the context in which he or she operates. A 
‘contingency approach’ implies that both individual traits and the context in which a leader finds him- or herself are 
‘knowable and critical’ (Grint 1997: 5), assuming that leaders have an awareness of both their skills and the context in 
which they find themselves to assess when their leadership style is advantageous in a given situation, and to make use of 
their leadership skills when necessary. Third, the ‘situational approach’ is similar to the contingency approach regarding the 
situation while the leader is supposed to adapt his behaviour and actions to suit the situation. Finally, the ‘constitutive 
approach’ suggests that it may be impossible to know the true essence of both the leader and the situation. This approach 
contends that we may not know the true essence of a leader or the situation he finds him- or herself in, and instead be 
dependent on other people’s accounts to make judgments on the person and/or the context.    
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individuals do in those contexts. However, the environment in which an ideational leader operates, 
differs from the context in which a hospital manager or business leader functions: key policy-
makers function within institutionally defined roles (cf. Maier 2000), they are publicly accountable 
for their actions and subject to electoral concerns; in addition, in accomplishing their tasks, they 
have to deal with a wide variety of other (and potentially resisting) political and institutional 
actors. Furthermore, ‘policy leadership targets solving complex, boundaryless public problems in 
highly interconnected policy arenas’, is ‘intergovernmental and intersectoral in nature’ and 
consequently ‘faces constraints and challenges substantially different than those facing 
contemporary organizational leadership’ (Lieberman 2002: 48). In other words, despite the wealth 
of approaches in the organizational field (and some overlap in classification of approaches), the 
concept of IL cannot gain from their insights. Next, I will turn to concepts that are more geared to 
contexts of political and administrative science.  
 
2.3.2 Political Leadership Concepts  
 
For the building of the IL concept, the seminal work of Burns on political and social leadership 
(1978) is of relevance. For Burns, throughout history, leadership in society has been either 
transformational or transactional. Transactional leadership involving an exchange between the 
leader and his follower(s) can be of many kinds (such as economic, political or psychological), but 
the relationship between them is limited to bargaining. Transformative leadership stands in 
contrast to that concept.61 Burn’s theory on how transformative leaders change their followers’ 
motivations can surely be applied to different (political) contexts, but is it also relevant for 
developing explanations for far-reaching social policy reform in contexts of institutional inertia? 
On the one hand, his concept of transformative leadership does seem to overstate the possibilities 
of leaders in multi-actor contexts of policy-making. On the other hand, his theorizing provides a 
convincing argument for considering acts of “non-coercive” leadership as a possible explanation 
for significant (and lasting) change, underscoring the importance of considering leadership-based 
explanations.62 In addition, Burns sees leadership as a necessary factor in achieving what he calls 
“significant” or “real” change,63 which is compatible with my definition of structural change, that 
is, the creation of new institutions, leaving behind old policy paths. In other words, Burn’s 
hypothesis strengthens my case for focusing on leadership as a factor that helps to explain large-
scale and impacting change.   
To continue, Blondel has contributed a theory of political leadership in the interactionist 
tradition and he sees leaders as constrained by their environment, but also as counting upon 
‘institutional and other resources’ (Blondel 1987: 182). His leadership typology is based on an 
assessment of its impact, which is closely tied to the external environment and the opportunities 
                                                           
 
 
 
61 ‘Such leadership occurs when one or more persons engage with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one 
another to higher levels of motivation and morality.[…] Transforming leadership ultimately becomes moral in that it raises 
the level of human conduct and ethical aspiration of both leader and led, and thus it has a transforming effect on both’ 
(Burns 1978: 20) 
62 ‘Paradoxically, it is the exercise of leadership rather than that of “naked power” that can have the most comprehensive 
and lasting causal influence as measures by real change’ (Burns 1978: 439)  
63 ‘Real change means the creation of new conditions that will generate their own changes in motivations, new goals, and 
continuing change. Leadership analysis, with its emphasis on motivation, improves explanation by enabling the analyst to 
identify purpose among all the eddies and cross-currents of the many forces at work – purpose that can be measured in 
itself to some degree and compared to intended results (real change)’ (Burns 1978: 441).  
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and constraints this offers.64 Blondel’s thinking on leadership is important for IL, as his typology 
points out a link between innovative leaders and “large changes”, which again underlines the 
rationale for taking up leadership as one component of IL: it indicates, similarly to Burns, that for 
achieving large-scale change, innovation carried out by leaders is necessary, which is what I argue 
IL to be all about. Surely, this raises questions about what “innovative” involves, i.e. what 
precisely leaders need to do in order to achieve far-reaching change.  
 
2.3.3 Leadership in a Context of Policy-Making and Change 
 
While the leadership concepts of Burns and Blondel have emphasised the general connection 
between leadership and far-reaching change (and thus underline my choice for looking at 
leadership as an explanatory factor for structural reforms), the question is how leaders prepare the 
way for such change. To answer this question, I will turn to leadership concepts in the context of 
policy-making. These offer more precisely defined elements for developing the IL concept, as they 
are conceptually closer to the events investigated in this study (structural reforms in advanced 
welfare states) than the concepts presented in the previous sub-sections. Theorizing on how 
leadership manifests itself in public policy contexts needs to reflect the context of constraints and 
challenges leaders are dealing with in policy-making. Such contexts were absent or specified to a 
much lesser degree in the concepts of political leadership we have seen above. In addition, 
leadership concepts tailored to policy-making contexts identify, at least crudely, functional aspects 
of the behaviour of those working towards policy change. I will discuss the concepts of policy, 
innovative and reformist leadership, all of which are closely tailored to a policy-making context.65  
 “Policy leadership” refers to a form of leadership that ‘works in political and inter-
organizational contexts where authority is shared and power is dispersed […]’ (Maier 2003:49). It 
consists of four essential tasks, which represent a ‘more complex set or pattern of activities and 
processes commonly found in successful policy leadership efforts’. Out of the four tasks, the three 
relevant ones are: a) raising the issue on the public and policy agendas by focusing attention on it; 
b) convening the set of individuals, stakeholders etc. needed to address the issue; c) forging 
agreements on policy alternatives and viable options for action (ibid: 49-50). These three tasks are 
directly related to the stages in the policy process, which I consider to be relevant for the IL 
concept.66 The first step requires ‘leaders to intervene in the policy arena by directing attention 
towards an undesirable condition or problem, defining and framing the issue in a way that can 
                                                           
 
 
 
64 Blondel conceptualises leadership impact along two dimensions, as the extent of change (none [i.e. status-quo 
maintenance], moderate, large) and the scope of change (wide, moderate or specialized). The first dimension serves to 
‘distinguish the “great” leaders [from one another], depending on the extent to which they are concerned with maintenance 
or change in the society’; the latter ‘helps to differentiate between ‘great’ leaders and policy-makers by assessing the scope 
and range of intervention’ (Blondel 1987:94). Nine different types of leadership impact result; concerning the specialized 
scope or policy area dimension, there are ‘managers’ (no change), ‘adjusters’ (moderate change) or ‘innovators’ (large 
change). However, leadership cannot be assessed without paying due attention to the environment of leaders, who are 
subject to internal (from within the polity) and external (from outside the polity) which both create constraints and create 
room for manoeuvre (ibid: 113). 
65 Luke’s work on policy leadership has been customized to the US context of policy making, and Moon’s innovative 
leadership concept relates to the empirical context of the UK. Finally, ‘t Hart’s reformist leadership concept has been 
applied to macroeconomic policy reform in Australia (‘t Hart and Goldfinch 2003).  
66 The fourth task, ‘sustain action and maintain momentum during implementation’ corresponds to the implementation 
phase of the policy cycle and is beyond the scope set for IL. For the sake of completeness, this task involves policy 
legitimization, building constituent support and advocacy coalitions, create implementation structures, resource 
accumulation and mobilization, rapid information sharing and feedback, and maintaining a policy learning approach  
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mobilize others around the search for responses’. The second aspect entails that policy leaders 
have to bring the necessary people together to address a situation earlier defined as undesirable. 
Such mobilization of an collective effort may be achieved by, for instance, ‘advocacy coalitions, 
collaborative alliances, issue-oriented networks, political action committees, and stakeholder 
groups’ and may either be organized around the problem itself or around particular solutions (Luke 
2000: 52-53). The third aspect is perhaps the most critical one: policy leadership requires coming 
to agreements, which involves ‘multi-party problem-solving among diverse interests that results in 
the development of multiple strategies to achieve agreed-upon outcomes’ (ibid: 53). While it is 
difficult to devise a theoretical perspective to guide this process, it is said to involve direction 
setting, option generation, searching, designing and crafting policies, selecting policy options and 
authorizing and adopting them (ibid: 56-58). In some respects, policy leadership remains deficient. 
For example, in Luke’s view, policy leadership cannot be associated with any one individual, since 
the context of public policy making makes for the ‘decreasing [of] the ability of any one 
individual, agency or institution to mobilize a sufficient number of individuals behind any 
particular policy agenda’ (Braun and Busch 1999:49). Policy leadership thus rests on a different 
view of agency compared to the one I adopt for IL. Furthermore, some tasks of policy leadership 
remain underspecified; the third task, for instance, ‘forging agreements on policy alternatives and 
viable options for action’ leaves it to the reader’s imagination to decide how a policy leader would 
go about doing this. 
Moon (1995) bases his concept of “innovative leadership” on two dimensions, political will 
and political capacity, and develops a typology of office-holding. Therein, innovative leadership is 
characterized by a strong sense of political will and strong policy capacity. Other forms of office-
holding, as a combination of absence or presence of these dimensions are zealotry, managerialism 
and inertia (Moon 1995: 3-4). The first characteristic implies commitment to pursue particular 
policies together with ‘a partisan rather than consensus-seeking approach to policy-making’. It 
also implies ‘determination to pursue policies beyond those which arise by force of circumstance’. 
Strong policy capacity, on the other hand, implies ‘(…) an understanding of cause and effect in the 
policymaking process which might assist innovation (…) enhanced by policy learning prior to and 
during office’. The latter is said to ‘enable office-holders to increase their capacity to innovate in 
ways that might have been beyond them on election’ (Moon 1995: 2). Essentially, innovative 
leadership combines political motivation with political or policy capacity, which distinguishes it 
from the earlier concept of policy leadership that was defined in terms of a sequence of tasks. In 
short, ‘irrespective of its direction and goals, innovative leadership requires a sense of purpose 
backed up with some coherence’ and ‘it entails not just taking others along a path, but doing so in 
a fashion sufficiently informed to achieve lasting policy redirection’ (Braun and Busch 1999:3). 
As with policy leadership, this leadership type requires ‘an understanding of cause and effect in 
the policymaking process which might assist innovation’. While its aspects of commitment and 
cognitive insight in bringing about innovation are valuable insights for developing IL, the concepts 
again lack precision: the very general phrasing of the latter requirement does not tell us much 
about how political actors put it into practice. 
Finally, “reformist political leadership” is perhaps the most useful concept to consider in 
assembling IL; it also has the closest links with the chosen context of policy reform (Maier 
  
Chapter 2 
 40 
2000).67 It builds upon an earlier version of the concept, “reformist leadership” (‘t Hart 2000), 
which distinguishes a communicative and a strategic or coalition-building dimension. Reformist 
communication includes ‘unmasking the status quo’, ‘communicating will power’, and 
‘propagating a solution’. In addition, the coalition-building dimension involves co-opting groups 
needed for implementation and controlling the game.68 “Reformist political leadership” consists of 
a number of functional requirements: ‘articulating the need for reform’; ‘proposing a set of radical 
reform objectives’; ‘seeing to it that these are politically sanctioned’; and ‘guarding their integrity 
during implementation’ (Goldfinch and ‘t Hart 2003: 237). These are then translated into five 
propositions based on the policy change literature. Firstly, ‘articulating the need for reform’ stands 
for a - preferably dramatic - portrayal of current issues as serious and acute crises. Secondly, 
reform leaders are to gather allies in order to form a coherent team that will support important 
changes. Thirdly, reformers would have to ‘develop and employ strategies targeted at persuading 
their political environment that the proposed changes are both desirable and inevitable, as well as 
being practically feasible’. Fourthly, seeing to political sanctioning involves ‘managing to secure 
early support for implementing actors for their crisis-response strategy’. Fifthly, tight control of 
leaders over the crisis-management process, both formally and in terms of taking personal 
initiative, is a final requirement (Goldfinch and ‘t Hart 2003: 238-41). In short, ‘reformist 
leadership requires the embracing of novel policy ideas, the skills to “sell” them to diverse 
audiences, and the wielding of power to see them enacted’ (ibid: 237).69   
Compared to the concepts of policy and innovative leadership, reformist leadership has added 
value because it draws attention to the communicative and coalition-building aspects of leadership, 
an important distinction that will be translated to the IL concept, since it describes its essential 
elements in rather concrete terms. Thus, a reformist leader would be expected firstly to highlight 
the problems with the policy status quo, and then to communicate, resolve and propagate a 
solution to the problem. This makes it much more tangible than the concepts of policy or 
innovative leadership, where the communicative aspect of such leadership remained unaccounted 
for. However, even the specification of reformist leadership could be improved upon, by for 
                                                           
 
 
 
67 To the best of my knowledge, the study of Goldfinch and ‘t Hart (2003) has gone furthest in evaluating the effects of 
reformist leadership in a context of policy change. Its aims are linked to the aims of this study, as the authors ‘seek to 
enhance the actor perspective on major policy reforms’ (Goldfinch and ‘t Hart 2003: 235).   
68 The aspects of this earlier concept are as follows (they only slightly differ from the later concept of “reformist 
leadership” discussed in the main text): the first element requires that leaders present the current situation in a policy area 
or the existing system as a threat to central societal values and interests. Secondly, leaders are expected to commit 
themselves forcefully (i.e. publicly and verbally) to the objective of a reform. Finally, they need to present their proposals 
as unavoidable, desirable and achievable, especially compared to competing policy option, if these exist. The coalition-
building dimension involves co-opting groups needed for implementation and controlling the game. Co-opting of groups 
means that leaders ensure themselves early of the support of groups which are indispensable for the implementation of the 
envisaged reforms. Controlling the game, on the other hand, assumes that leaders exert (preferably personal) control over 
crucial forums, the timing and the ‘rules of the game’ in the reform process (‘t Hart 2000).  
69 In his more recent work, ‘t Hart has developed, based on dichotomy of communication and coalition-forming, three types 
of (reformist) leadership: a) constructive, b) reformist, and c) conserving leadership ('t Hart and ten Hooven 2004). While 
the first type assumes creating or establishing new institutions or policies, only the last two types can be applied to the 
realm of policy reform. Reformist leadership closely resembles the concept in ‘t Hart’s earlier work and includes, as four 
conditions for successful leadership, the four aspects of reformist leadership discussed in his work of 2000. Conserving 
leadership is a sub-type of reformist leadership, preserving the valuable parts of the existing order while possibly doing 
away with or changing other parts of the same order. Such a leader may argue that further reform measures are impossible 
to realize; chose an incremental reform strategy, or add new institutional or policy goals to compensate for those that have 
been replaced in the course of reforms (‘t Hart 2004: 94-100). 
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instance, spelling out more clearly what persuasive arguments involve and how it links certain 
leader behaviour to policy results.  
 
2.3.4 Building Blocks for the IL Concept  
 
During the preceding discussion, some important points about the usefulness of leadership 
approaches, but also about their shortcomings, have been highlighted. As the shortcomings are to 
be compensated for by the linkage of elements of leadership and ideational approaches, a number 
of elements become relevant for accurately defining the IL concept. I consider three features to be 
important building blocks, namely 1) “unmasking” or rejecting the status quo, 2) consistently 
propagating the solution, and 3) making efforts at political consensus-building. The first two seem 
essential in preparing the ground for and making an argument for innovation in any policy sector, 
while the third one recognizes the fact that even relatively autonomous political actors will 
typically have to secure some support from other actors (whether individuals or organizations), in 
order to assure the success of a reform project (exceptions to this may apply in presidential 
systems without checks and balances, or autocratic states, which do not concern us here). For these 
reasons, these three aspects have entered into the conceptualization of ideational leadership.  
 
2.4 Making Sense of Ideas: A Short Survey of the Ideational Literature 
 
2.4.1 Defining and Classifying Ideas  
 
As I have stated at the beginning of the chapter, the leadership literature does not sufficiently 
specify what political agents need to do in order to bring about change. I have also argued that this 
gap may be filled by considering the role of political ideas and ask in what ways policy-makers 
make use of them to promote reforms. However, it does not suffice to contend simply that political 
leaders who make use of political ideas when pleading for reforms are more effective in decreasing 
reform resistance. What is also needed is a theoretical account of how political ideas are linked to 
the occurrence of far-reaching or structural reforms that imply a break-through of institutional and 
political obstacles. Devising or, to use a more graphical metaphor, “building” a concept that 
combines scholarly thinking on leadership with the insights of the role of political ideas in policy-
making may be better at explaining how structural policy change in the context of the welfare state 
occurs. This section discusses the merits of some idea-based approaches and shows how they 
complement the three aspects of leadership, which are to be incorporated into the IL concept. 
To begin with, it is necessary to consider what is actually meant by “ideas”. While the term is 
used in everyday speech to express anything from thoughts to opinions, beliefs or feelings, the 
definition of an “aim or purpose” comes closest to its use in the study of public policy-making 
processes. Since the 1990’s, the role of ideas in policy-making has been the subject of lively 
discussion in political science, even to such an extent that some labelled it ‘the decade of ideas’ 
(Goldstein and Keohane 1993). In a broader sense, the interest in ideas as explanation of policy 
outcomes in various areas (e.g. in foreign policy) increased considerably after the end of the Cold 
War (Maier 2000; Bonoli and Palier 2000a). However, this evolving field of political research is 
marked by a high level of heterogeneity, as authors hardly use the term “idea(s)” as a generic 
concept to describe the object of their research. Many contributions use ideas in a wider sense of 
the word, referring to “paradigms”, “discourse”, “norms”, “world views”, “narratives”, “beliefs”, 
“frames” or “knowledge” to name just a few of the terms used (see for a systematic overview of 
the field Braun 1999).     
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Within a wide variety of ideational approaches, the ones of interest for this study focus on the 
role of ideas in processes of policy-making and policy change. Such approaches are ‘not looking in 
the first instance […] at who will get what, when and how, but rather at what has been the role of 
ideas for policy change, how the ‘environment’, i.e. institutions, distribution of power and 
interests, affects the role of ideas and in what way ideas are transformed into political action’ 
(Braun 1999:189). This focus generates questions such as how much ideas matter, when they have 
some influence on the policy-making process, and how they relate to actors’ interests and choices, 
and which have already generated a great deal of theoretical and empirical work. In this 
connection, Braun and Busch offer a list of functionally defined categories of ideas (Parsons 1995: 
4), according to which ideas may:   
 
• provide “resources” for political cooperation, 
• legitimize policy action, 
• structure policy options as “cognitive frames”, 
• provide catalytic element of changes in policy instruments/institutions as well as inhibit 
such change, 
• help to understand institutional change different from power-based approaches, by 
emphasising learning processes and policy evolution, and 
• transform perceptions of interest and change actors' strategies in significant ways 
 
As a corollary to the amount of ideational approaches, there is no lack of attempts at classifying 
ideas in policy-making. This is, however, not the place to map out all possible classifications. 
Instead, I would like to suggest a definition of “idea” in policy-making that may be used to pin 
down the “ideational” element in the IL concept. To this end, I use a classification which assumes 
that ideas can play different roles in policy-making: they justify decisions, help to select policy 
strategies, or serve to define interests (Sabatier 1999).70 In the first perspective, informed by the 
rational choice tradition, actors refer to ideas when justifying their courses of action, which they 
base on exogenous, i.e. given, interests. Ideas thus function as “justifiers” and are seen as mere 
instruments in reaching a set goal. In addition, ideas may serve as “road maps”, helping actors to 
choose between different courses of action, policy strategies and so forth (Béland 2005:13-14). In 
the second perspective, ideas gain more leverage when uncertainty helps actors to select a strategy 
from different options, given they lack the necessary information about all of these. Finally, in the 
third view, ideas are seen as much more influential than in the previous two. Its advocates argue 
that ideas precede the formation of (material) interests and therefore define those interests in the 
first place, challenging the nature of interests as “given”, as the rational choice tradition suggests. 
The last perspective is clearly inspired by a different world view, in which material interests are 
not fixed, but subject to “intersubjective” understandings, i.e. commonly held and shared 
conventions which only then “constitute” interests. It assumes, as Maier (2000) puts it, an 
‘endogenization of interests, and their explanation in terms of ideas’ which is ‘the hallmark of the 
social constructivist approach’ (Cox 2001: 22).     
Given these three positions on the role of ideas, which one is the most appropriate as a basis 
for explaining potentially contentious processes of social policy reform? I propose that the first 
                                                           
 
 
 
70 A related classification groups ideas according to how agents use them in policy-making. Accordingly, ideas may serve 
as direct solutions to policy problems, act as constraints to policy makers’ options, and constitute aids for policy-makers to 
frame their policy proposals in a way that legitimises reforms (Campbell 1998:398).  
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view on the role of ideas may be the most useful one to analyze how political actors manage to 
bring about structural reforms. Ideas that are used to justify potentially unpopular welfare state 
reforms may play a role in convincing crucial reform opponents, e.g. veto players, to adopt 
reforms.71 This view is compatible with thinking of ideas as “justifiers” in seeking to overcome 
reform blockades. Additionally, it can be helpful to view ideas as “road maps”, aiding a selection 
of policy strategies, if one was interested in predicting what reform strategies are chosen by policy 
makers. However, this study does not pursue this line of research.72 Regarding the third and social 
constructivist view, which stipulates that all interests are based on ideas, I consider it inappropriate 
for an analysis of reform processes that take place in the context of many stakeholders and vested 
interests. I think that the interests of actors in maintaining or gaining political power can hardly be 
“deconstructed” into ideas, although, as I will suggest later, it is possible to view interests as both 
having a material and ideational component. For the purpose of this study, it is irrelevant whether 
the interests of leaders (or of resisting stakeholders) can be traced back to certain ideas, since it is 
not primarily concerned with the origins of key policy-makers’ interests; instead, the focus lies on 
how leaders use available ideas in their quest to get reforms adopted. More importantly, by 
conceiving the role of ideas as helping policy-makers to justify policies, IL can be defined as an 
actor-centred explanation that incorporates ideas as justifying devices for overcoming 
institutionalist obstacles of welfare state change.  
 
2.4.2 Different Views on the Role of Ideas in Policy-Making or How Do Ideas Enter Policy 
Processes?  
 
The rise of idea-based approaches in public policy research may be seen to some extent as a 
counter-reaction to the focus on corporatist intermediation (in the 1970’s) and network theory (in 
the 1980’s), both of which assumed that political negotiations were essentially based on interests. 
In the 1980’s, there also emerged a number of studies examining organisations and networks (in 
their approach they were close to network theory), which, however, were not compatible with an 
interest-based approach and pointed to an ideational dimension in politics.73 Among these novel 
network and community approaches, which for a large part also sought to offer more general 
explanations of the relationship of ideas and policy-making, the studies of Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith (1988, 1993) and Kingdon (1995)  stand out, as they address the issue of how ideas matter 
(Schmidt 2002b: 173 ). In their analyses, the central issue is how, within so-called policy 
                                                           
 
 
 
71 The notion of veto players as actors that can potentially and actually block reforms is based on the work of Tsebelis 
(1995), see also Chapter 1. 
72 In this view, ideas assist to reject policy options (given there are several plans for adjustment and uncertainty about 
which one to chose) that are incompatible with norms and values held in a polity about a certain policy area, for instance, 
pension or labour market policy. Given the fact that in contemporary welfare states adjustments to the institutions and 
policies are necessary, but that the direction of change can be controversial, this implies a need for ideas that can help 
policy-makers to make that decision. Even though the options of policy makers may be pre-structured by certain 
characteristics of welfare institutions (Bonoli and Palier 2000a), it is plausible to consider cognitive and normative ideas as 
guiding principles in helping to decide the course of reform. 
73 Rather than looking at interest groups, they stressed the role of advocacy coalitions, epistemic communities and discourse 
coalitions (Etheredge 1985, Jobert and Muller 1987, Heintz and Jenkins-Smith 1988, Heman 1988, Sabatier 1988;  cited in 
Braun 1999:11), using novel metaphors to describe (parts of) the policy process, such as ‘coalitions’, ‘streams’, ‘sub-
systems’ and ‘networks’. The emergence of such approaches went hand in hand with a general questioning (from different 
intellectual sources) of the hitherto predominant rational choice approach in the field of political science.  Neo-
institutionalist, normative, neo-Marxist and interpretivist approaches aimed to explain the role of ideas, beliefs, word views 
etc. to supplement or to substitute interest-based explanations (Braun 1999: 11-12) 
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communities and networks (composed of politicians, civil servants, experts, policy analysts, and 
stakeholders such as interest groups), ideas are advocated within certain policy areas. The rationale 
behind this focus was that by examining such networks or community, analysts were to learn if 
and how an idea has had an impact on policy outcomes. In the advocacy coalition framework 
developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, the interaction of various advocacy coalitions - 
containing actors from various institutions and their shared set of policy beliefs within a policy 
subsystem - is the focal point of analysis. There, major policy change is a result of competition 
between advocacy coalitions and events outside of the policy subsystem. Ideas here appear in the 
form of policy beliefs of various sorts, which are diffused by processes of policy-oriented learning 
(Sabatier 1999: 9). 
In contrast, the role of agency is more pronounced in Kingdon’s multiple stream model 
(Kingdon 1995). Major policy change is said to occur when a policy entrepreneur succeeds in 
making use of  a “window of opportunity”, connecting the otherwise independent streams that 
make up a policy process: the problem stream (data on problems and proponents of various 
problem definitions), the policy stream (proponents of solutions to policy problems), and the 
politics stream (elections and elected officials) (cf. Converse 1964; Schmidt 2002b:9). The policy 
entrepreneur is thus the crucial carrier of ideas in this framework (cf. Gerth and Mills 1948).74 
 
2.4.3 Ideas and Social Policy Reform 
 
The two preceding sections have specified a view of the analytical relationship between actors and 
ideas (actors using ideas primarily as “hooks” and possibly as “guideposts”), which is appropriate 
to the current research context. They have also looked at relevant approaches that make the role of 
ideas in policy-making more concrete, associating them with advocacy coalitions and policy 
entrepreneurship. The next step will be to explore how ideas may be connected to political agency, 
that is, to key policy-makers trying to promote social policy reforms. In parts of the ideational 
literature focusing on social policy change, this aspect of the role of ideas has also received due 
attention: ideas often appear there under the guise of “discourse” or “framing”. For instance, Cox 
argues that the ‘social construction of an imperative for change’ explains why substantial social 
policy reforms happened in Denmark and the Netherlands, but not in Germany (Arthur 1989). In 
order to achieve such understanding, Cox sees “path-shaping” processes, in other words, the 
framing of issues in ways that generate widespread support for reform, as a crucial factor: 
 
The explanation (…) lies in the ability of Dutch and Danish policymakers and the public to construct a new 
discourse that facilitated reform and the failure of the Germans to do so. By carefully framing issues, Dutch 
and Danish leaders overcame the path-dependent constraints of existing policy institutions (Cox 2001: 496).   
 
This example shows that politicians who successfully created a public understanding for policy 
change are singled out as the explanatory factor for reforms. It highlights the need to consider 
agency as a necessary factor in convincing the public of the need for reform and stresses the 
                                                           
 
 
 
74 The concept of “epistemic communities” takes up a position between the two frameworks (Haas 1990). Being closely 
connected to network or community approaches, ‘epistemic communities’ consist of professionals who share common 
causal and political beliefs or values and are committed to translate these convictions into public policies to enhance human 
welfare. Haas also highlights the role of policy “brokers”, who bring ideas into the policy process, is crucial, while the 
persuasiveness of an idea that is brought forward, and making alliances with the dominant political coalition also matters 
(Parsons 1995: 174). 
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importance of “framing”, which needs to be examined in more detail. 
As another example of an idea-based explanation for welfare state reform, Ross specifies 
necessary conditions for successful framing of policy initiatives by political leaders. She links 
these conditions to the characteristics of different welfare regimes and applies them to a specific 
case of reform in the United States (North 1990). Her concern is under what conditions politicians 
may successfully frame reform proposals, which are assumed as potentially unpopular. Framing is 
presented as an intentional strategy of actors to overcome reform obstacles:  
 
Framing and the selective application of political discourse, the process whereby the advantages of a policy 
are styled and communicated, is one means by which leaders attempt to compensate for the disappointment 
and loss of legitimacy that usually accompany the attrition of popular social supports (Ross, 2000a: 170). 
 
The conditions for such framing are related to extant or existing “frames”, actors, institutions and 
the nature of the policy arena. Successful framing is more likely where new frames respond ‘to 
those already operative’. Secondly, the credibility (i.e. knowledgeable of the subject matter) and 
trustworthiness of actors, and when issues allow themselves to be depicted in divisive terms 
(when, for instance, the programmes involved are means-tested and count on relatively little 
support from medium and high-income earners) are favourable factors. Thirdly, certain 
institutional state structures, such as particular types of federalism, can facilitate the reframing of 
issues. Finally, a variety of conditions attached to a particular policy arena can help to reframe 
policy issues (Ross 2000a: 173-176). However, when it comes to specifying to what extent 
framing contributes to a concrete policy result, Ross merely points to the difficulty of estimating 
its precise impact, as ‘framing does not occur in an institutional and political vacuum’ (Ross 
2000c: 188). Ross sees it as a conditional (or intervening) variable rather than an independent 
variable in its own right: ‘where cultural, institutional and policy legacies are conducive to 
reframing welfare, political leaders can hope, in Levy’s (1999) view, to turn “vice into virtue”,75 
especially if they enjoy public trust on the issue’ (ibid: 188). While her work makes a valuable 
contribution by further specifying the contextual conditions for framing, it fails to directly spell 
out what the framing exercise itself should entail. However, this is precisely what we need to know 
in order to make the ‘ideational’ of the IL concept more concrete.  
This gap is filled to some extent by another study. In her recent work, Schmidt specifies the 
conditions for how, where and when discourse is supposed to matter (Heclo 1974; Ferrera and 
Gualmini 2004). Discourse is conceptualized as having a content or ideational dimension 
(including cognitive and normative aspects) and an interactive dimension (the coordination and 
communication of the discourse). It is said to capture:  
 
(…) not only how policy actors managed to reach agreement on the construction of the policy programmes 
that changed political-economic practices but also on how political actors sought to gain acceptance for these 
policies and practices through legitimising discourses capable of convincing the public that change was both 
necessary and appropriate (Hall 1993: 308-309). 
 
In contrast to Ross’ more cautious argument about the impact of framing, Schmidt posits that 
discourse may be an explanatory factor in the politics of economic adjustment. She addresses the 
question whether one can specify the causal influence of discourse in the politics of adjustment 
                                                           
 
 
 
75 The Levy argument states that ‘vice-into-virtue’ reformers target ‘inequities within the welfare system that are either a 
source of economic inefficiencies or substantial public spending’. By focussing on such “vices” , reformers have been able 
to pursue “virtuous” objectives (Levy 1999: 240). 
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alongside other variables such as culture, institutions and interests. To this end, the role of 
political-institutional context (single versus multi-actor systems) and its consequences for policy-
makers and envisaged policy adjustments are explored, if the content and/or the communicative 
dimension of the discourse fail(s) to function properly. After carrying out a comparative case study 
of macro-level economic and welfare reforms, she argues that discourse can explain change (or its 
absence): ‘discourse has mattered to the adjustment process in all three countries, with its presence 
in many cases easing adjustment, while its absence in many cases stymieing reform’. In this 
process,  discourse is said to matter in two ways:  
 
[First] ideationally, by representing a policy programme as conceptually sound – cognitive function – and 
resonating with national values – normative function. [Second,] it mattered interactively, by serving policy 
actors as the basis for constructing a policy programme – coordinative function – and political actors as the 
basis for persuading the larger public as to its merits – communicative function. (Schmidt 2002b: 256).  
 
Regarding the causal influence of discourse, she contends that, firstly, the success of discourse in 
the process of adjustment depended on the ideational dimension as well as on the interactive 
dimension, 76 and secondly, that  
 
Discourse matters most in moments of crisis, when the accepted ideas and discourse no longer sufficiently 
explain policies, the policies no longer appear to solve the problems of the day, and/or the practices they 
facilitate no longer work. The crisis itself is mostly the result of external events, although it may also come 
from internal contradiction in and/or between the discourse, the policies, and the practices (Hemerijck and 
Schludi 2000: 309).  
 
While the conditions for successful discourse are an interesting extension of Ross’ theory on 
framing, Schmidt’s account of the causal influence of her various conceptions of discourse lacks a 
clear-cut causal mechanism linking discourse and adjustment and could be improved in this 
respect. The essence of these examples presented from the discourse and framing-related literature 
is that idea-based argumentation and justification may be either a conditional (Ross) or 
independent (Schmidt) explanatory factor in welfare state restructuring, and some of its elements 
are important for building an idea-based explanation for structural reforms. Following on from 
this, I will specify which aspects of ideational approaches will be drawn upon for the 
conceptualization of IL.   
 
2.4.4 Building Blocks for the IL Concept  
 
Which elements of the ideational literature are suitable for complementing the building blocks 
already drawn from the leadership literature? Firstly, the analyses by Cox and, in particular Ross, 
draw attention to actors’ framing efforts and suggest that politicians may be at an advantage by 
framing their reform message in a careful way. In that respect, these contributions re-emphasized 
that it was necessary to look at how actors relate to ideas about policy. Furthermore, they 
underscore my earlier choice for seeing ideas as “hooks”, helping policy-makers to justify policies. 
By taking up the role of ideas, as theorized in the framing literature, it is possible to think of IL as 
                                                           
 
 
 
76 On the ideational dimension, this depended on both how convincingly actors made the necessity for new policies and 
how ‘appropriate’ they were in the light of existing national values. On the interactive dimension, success is said to depend 
on whether the discourse was causally important before or after the fact (i.e. to enable policy-makers to gain agreement 
before agreeing on a programme or to change opinions and win elections (Schmidt 2000b: 308-9). 
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an actor-centred explanation that incorporates ideas as justifying devices for overcoming 
institutionalist obstacles of welfare state change.  
The second relevant ideational element of IL concerns the substantive characteristics of 
argumentation that policy-makers use in their statements about and on policy. Here, the ideational 
dimension of politicians’ discourse, an important theme in Schmidt’s work, becomes relevant. In 
essence, a persuasive (and therefore successful) policy discourse is composed of cognitive and 
normative arguments that are each based on a different logic: the “logic of necessity” and the 
“logic of appropriateness”.77 Cognitive arguments are said to justify policy choice through the 
‘logic of necessity’. Such arguments provide ‘core ideas with great potential, demonstrate 
relevance, applicability, coherence, and greater problem-solving capacity of a programme’ 
(Schmidt 2000b: 218, Table 5.2). The logic rests in that cognitive arguments establish a causal link 
between a policy problem and the solution proposed by a policy-maker. On the other hand, 
normative arguments are said to legitimize through the “logic of appropriateness”, implying that 
they ‘respond to problems of the polity and reflect/affect national values’ (ibid.). Therefore, 
normative arguments justify policy solutions in terms of (societal) norms and values, which are 
compatible with the belief systems of those to be persuaded. How can these observations help to 
develop the IL concept? They inform its second aspect, “consistently propagating a policy 
solution”, in the sense of specifying the substance of propagating. By taking up the ideational 
element of Schmidt’s argument about policy discourse, it is possible to clarify what propagating 
involves by stating that IL-type policy makers need to rely both on cognitive and normative 
arguments in order to legitimize their reform plans persuasively. In other words, the second aspect 
of IL becomes “consistently legitimizing the policy solution with cognitive and normative 
arguments”.  
The insights into the substantive components of discourse raise some questions about how the 
choices of individuals can be influenced. In order to conceptualize what successful ideas are all 
about, one needs to spell out some assumptions on individual choice made in ideational 
approaches. For these approaches, the human search for meaning precedes the making of 
choices.78 In addition, they assume that how individuals arrive at decisions does not only depend 
on their interests or preferences, but also on cognitive frames and belief systems,79 which allows 
ideas to form part of their decision-making.  The search for meaning involves cognitive 
frameworks which enable actors to know what “is” and what is “feasible”; in a second step, 
                                                           
 
 
 
77 Note that Schmidt’s ‘logic of appropriateness’ that underlies the quality of normative arguments differs from the one 
used by March and Olsen in their work on political institutions (1989). Their logic of appropriateness relates to action that 
it instigated by institutional rules, routines and obligations based on institutionally defined roles. Therefore, it contrasts 
with the other great logic behind human action, the logic of consequentiality, in which ‘behaviours are driven by 
preferences and expectations about consequences’ (March and Olsen 1989: 160). While March and Olsen see political and 
social institutions to define what is appropriate behaviour for a person in a specific situation (ibid: 23), Schmidt sees 
national values as a base of normative arguments to legitimize policy programmes and to underlie her ‘logic of 
appropriateness’. By the second logic, the ‘logic of necessity’ (which is not explicitly defined) Schmidt seems to imply that 
the justification of a policy programme (by using cognitive arguments) demonstrates the necessity for its adoption, 
presenting it as a solution to current problems and to avoid possible problems in the future. Thus, her ‘logic of necessity’ is 
related to March and Olsens’ logic of consequentiality, which stresses that action is based on rational calculation of 
consequences. Equally, Schmidt assumes that policy-makers who point out cognitive cause-effect (or consequence) 
relationship can make a convincing (or successful) case for a policy proposal. 
78 At least two processes characterize the search for meaning: cognitive frameworks of the mind help to order, retain and 
understand information about the world; norms and values enable their evaluation (Inglehart and Klingemann 1978: 206).  
79 This term was coined by Converse and refers to a set of beliefs held by actors which are related to each other in a 
coherent fashion (Converse 1964)  
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evaluation enables actors – on the basis of values and norms – to find out what they “ought” to do 
(Goldstein and Keohane 1993). In order to consider how individuals can be influenced in their 
decision-making processes, it is useful to draw upon a distinction made by Braun between 
different types of interests, “material” and “ideal” ones (Braun 1999: 13-14), drawing upon Max 
Weber’s distinction between the two concepts (Weber in Hall 1993: 61 ff.), before the rational 
choice tradition reduced interests to strictly material concerns.80 The difference between the two 
lies in that ideal interests are based on value orientations (such as image considerations or 
normative principles underlying an organization), while material interests are based on goal-
rationality. If one accepts Braun’s conclusion that actors’ choices are either driven by material or 
by idealistic motivations, depending on the difference between a particular situation and actors’ 
need structures,81 this enables the communicative message of ideational leaders to “speak” to these 
motivations and potentially be in a position to influence and change them. This conceptualization 
may be applied to individuals and collective entities alike.  
Therefore, the third building block of IL relates to Braun’s conceptualization of interests in 
relation to the choice of actors. I think that conceptualizing ideal interests, as being distinct from 
material interests, has important consequences for thinking about how reform resistance can be 
overcome. This is because this distinction between types of interests offers insights on how IL may 
reduce or neutralize such resistance. In the context of reform resistance caused by institutional 
lock-in effects, resisting actors (individual or collective ones) may hold ideal interests, i.e. 
considerations about their public image or reputation alongside their material interests, for 
instance, related to their bargaining position and the welfare of their constituents. How can this 
insight be linked with the behavioural aspects of IL? An ideational leader may deal with resisting 
actors in the following ways: by framing this resistance as a) problematic for societal welfare,82 
and b) detrimental for the bargaining position of interest groups and the long-term welfare of their 
constituents.83 While the latter option remains possible but is contingent on several theoretical 
assumptions (such as, whether actors actually do believe it affects their bargaining position and the 
relative influence of interest groups), I consider the first possibility, appealing to opponents to be 
sensitive to societal welfare, more plausible, as well as easier to test empirically. It will therefore 
be taken up as the third aspect of the IL framework as “framing reform resistance as problematic 
(to societal welfare)”. Having assembled the ideational elements for IL, the next section 
summarizes the complete theoretical framework. 
                                                           
 
 
 
80 Braun’s concern was to better understand the relationship between belief systems and interests to assess ultimately the 
influence of belief systems on the choices of (individual or collective) actors. 
81 ‘Cognition helps not only to determine what ‘is’ but also what actors perceive they can do to solve the conflict between 
their ideal and material need structure on the one hand and their perception of the real situation on the other hand. The 
result is then, either actions based on “goal orientation” or actions based on “value-orientation” (Braun 1999: 14)  
82 The idea behind this is that reform opponents confronted with the charge of being indifferent to societal welfare (which 
according to political actors is in danger when reform is delayed or blocked) may care about the consequences for their 
public image (which forms part of their ideal interests) and adapt their stance. 
83 In that case, opponents confronted with the prospect of future material losses for their constituency and their own 
position may be more likely to accept possible short-term losses implied by reforms to avert losses in the longer term. 
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2.5 Unwrapping IL: Consequences, Aspects and Limitations  
 
2.5.1 Structural Reform as Reversal of Institutional Lock-in  
 
The ideational leadership hypothesis deals above all with institutional obstacles to reform, induced 
by institutional lock-in. With regard to the second obstacle, electoral resistance, it is assumed that 
politicians who dare to launch structural reform proposals are either not concerned with electoral 
pressure at the time of taking such action (because of their timing well ahead of elections), or are 
prepared to take a political gamble, in the sense that they hope to convince voters of its added 
benefits in the medium or long term, although it may be costly to them in the short term. 
Turning to the issue of overcoming institutional obstacles, it is instructive to reconsider the 
literature on institutional lock-in including recent work that specifies how this condition can be 
reversed, i.e. under what conditions an institutional break-out is likely to occur. The origins of 
such thinking lie in attempts to explain technological and economic change (Hemerijck and 
Schludi 2000). In brief, lock-in theory specifies why and when suboptimal policy alternatives are 
difficult and impossible to replace (“lock-in”), and when it is possible (“break-out”) in the 
presence of a superior alternative, taking into consideration factors such as positive feedback, 
network externalities and sunk costs. Following North’s suggestion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) 
to transform this body of theory in such a way as to allow the study of institutional change, the 
study of institutional lock-in has by now moved beyond its initial context. Since then, several 
disciplines, such as institutional economics, law and economics, and political science, have 
discovered the concept (Woerdman 2002). As for political science, Pierson has tried to adapt 
techno-economic lock-in theory to a institutional context within the study of politics (Ferrera and 
Gualmini 2004). In contrast to Pierson, who focussed on the conditions of institutional inertia, 
Woerdman has systematically worked out a theory of lock-in including conditions for its reversal, 
i.e. institutional break-out and thus institutional change (Woerdman 2002: 475). He states that four 
conditions need to be present in order to cause an institutional break-out: a) a superior alternative 
is available, b) existing policy suffers from a decreasing problem-solving ability, c) information on 
the alternative needs to be improved, and d) switching costs are lowered.  
The first condition refers to the assumption that, in order to prepare the way for innovation 
and structural policy change, there has to be a superior policy alternative, proposal or plan. It is 
argued that this is both a necessary condition for an institutional lock-in, as well as for a lock-out, 
which is what we are interested in (Windrum 1999, cited in Woerdman 2002: 91), as it enables 
structural reforms to happen. Secondly, the status quo of policy must be such that its problem-
solving capacity has been or is in the process of being reduced, that is ‘when it becomes less (or 
ceases to be) effective with a view to a particular policy target’ (Woerdman 2002: 92-93). When 
existing policy is being viewed as becoming ineffective, the policy actors concerned will begin to 
discuss policy alternatives (Simon 1997, cited in Woerdman 2002). Here, Woerdman also notes 
that the visibility of deterioration matters and is highest when a crisis is at hand so that the 
attention of both politicians and the public will be raised (Nooteboom 2000, cited in Woerdman 
2002). Thirdly, improving the information about the alternative means actively reducing 
uncertainty about a change to the alternative policy, by either providing more and better 
information or by making this information known among as many decision-makers as possible 
(Woerdman 2002: 91). Finally, the lowering of switching costs to an alternative policy may 
involve a number of different aspects: solving legal obstacles; inducing cultural change in favour 
of an alternative; reducing or stopping lobbying efforts by vested interests or even reducing the 
vested interests themselves (Woerdman 2002: 96-97).  
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I argue that the above insights from institutional economics on lock-out situations can be 
applied usefully to the study of how political actors carry out structural reforms in contexts of 
institutional inertia. To re-state the IL hypothesis, I theorize that the different aspects of ideational 
leadership, when taken together, have effects (through distinct causal mechanisms), reducing the 
level of institutional lock-in in a given policy area and enabling structural reforms to be adopted. 
The mechanisms behind the IL aspects taken together establish four conditions for institutional 
break-out (superior alternative and decreasing effectiveness of the status quo, more and better 
information, decreasing switching costs) outlined above. Once these conditions for institutional 
break-out exist, I assume that structural reform proceeds, given that there is a proposal for reform. 
In practical terms, this means that the proposal will be adopted, usually by parliamentary vote. 
There are four causal mechanisms that together link the different aspects of ideational leadership 
with the outcome of structural reform:84 a) policy failure or loss of effectiveness brings on the 
search for alternatives; b) creating insights into the logics of appropriateness and necessity behind 
the innovation helps to lower switching costs and re-define values underlying old policy and 
institutions; c) reform-critical interest groups that are made to “face the facts” or redefine (the 
perception) of their interest, lower switching costs; and d) forging consensus based on policy-
seeking and not power-seeking motives reduces switching costs.  
The assumption about the effect of these mechanisms is that they together create a situation of 
institutional break-out that reverses earlier lock-in and policy stickiness, the typical mechanisms of 
path-dependency. Engineering an institutional break-out enables policy-makers to push through 
structural reform, which transforms existing institutional structures (the status quo) in any one 
social policy area. On a conceptual level, I associate at least two sorts of causal mechanisms with 
IL’s capacity to overcome the situation of institutional lock-in: one sort operates at the level of 
beliefs (both cognitive and normative) of opposing actors and the level of (ideal) interests. Here, 
one can speak of an “ideational mechanism” working through a change in cognitive and normative 
preferences (compare Section 2.4.4), which relates to Heclo’s concept of “puzzling”.85 Secondly, 
the other type relates to interests and changes the perception of opposing actors’ interests, which is 
reminiscent of the notion of “powering within puzzling” (Braun 2000).86 The combination of these 
two mechanisms, which effect changes in beliefs and norms as well as in ideal interests, creates 
the conditions for an institutional break-out, and allows structural reform to materialize. 
Subsequently, I will discuss each of the aspects of IL, describing the causal mechanism they 
“trigger”, i.e. how they contribute to a situation of institutional break-out, and, subsequently, 
structural reform.   
                                                           
 
 
 
84 The causal mechanisms linking the separate aspects and the outcome of policy reform draw on insights from the 
literature on the role of ideas in policy-making, institutional change and policy change more generally.  
85 These terms refer to Heclo’s often-cited distinction between two dimensions of policy-making: ‘Politics finds its sources 
not only in power but also in uncertainty – men collectively wondering what to do. Finding a feasible course of action 
includes, but is more than, locating which way the vectors of political pressure are pushing. Governments not only ‘power’ 
(or whatever the verb for that approach might be); they also puzzle. Policy-making is a form of collective puzzlement on 
society’s behalf; it entails both deciding and knowing. Much political interaction has constituted a process of social 
learning expressed through policy (Heclo 1974: 305-306). 
86 Alluding to Heclo’s distinction, they argue that powering and puzzling may not be separate activities but ‘crisscrossing’ 
ones, as policy actors try to organise consensus around preferred policy solutions and the puzzling process tends to be 
disturbed by political considerations (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004: 25-28).   
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2.5.2 Constituent Aspects of IL and their Links to Structural Reform  
2.5.2.1 Exposing Drawbacks of the Status Quo 
This first aspect is concerned with key actors identifying and signalling the drawbacks of the 
policy status quo and the old policy principles it is based upon. In other words, the existing 
situation in a policy area is linked to themes like failure, inefficiency, crisis, loss of welfare and the 
like. The rejection of the status quo is theoretically close to the literature on policy learning (Braun 
1999; 't Hart 2000; Goldfinch and 't Hart 2003). This literature argues that human insight into 
failures is a necessary condition for bringing innovation onto the political agenda. Policy failure 
can lead to policy learning and is in fact commonly seen as its prerequisite. A well-known 
definition of policy learning phrases it as ‘a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of 
policy in the light of the consequences of past policy and new information so as to better attain the 
ultimate objects of governance’ (Weaver 1986:278). Moreover, as Hemerijck and Schludi argue, 
policy learning ‘requires a readiness to subject pre-established policy ideas to critical insights, new 
information, and experience across time and place’ and ‘is about the mobilization of ideas and 
expertise to identify problems and propose solutions’ (Pröpper and Bleijenbergh 1995: 131). With 
regard to the leadership literature, this aspect resonates with the concepts of policy and reformist 
leadership. The first aspect of policy leadership is relevant here, as it involves getting an issue on 
the policy agenda by focusing attention on it. However, Luke leaves it to the reader’s imagination 
how such focus can be achieved. For the “how” of achieving policy change, reformist leadership 
offers further inspiration. It is the communicative aspect of that concept, which is of relevance 
here, as it stresses that leadership needs to ‘unmask the status quo’ and ‘articulate the need for 
reform’.  
The causal mechanism that links the policy failure aspect with institutional lock-out allowing 
for structural reform, works in the following way. In lock-in theory, developing insights among 
important actors into the declining problem-solving capacity or effectiveness of existing 
institutions/policies is necessary for any possible changes to new structures. In drawing upon more 
complex psychological concepts, Heclo highlighted that learning from failures, which is usually 
invoked in notions of policy learning, is analogous to “operational conditioning” (where actors 
select options based on positive or negative reinforcements obtained by trial and error), as opposed 
to “pavlovian learning” (see Heclo 1974). Underlying such conditioning is a consequentialist 
logic, which regards negative stimuli (i.e. penalties associated with ineffective behaviour or 
failure) to be more important than positive ones; this is due, in turn, to the negativity bias that 
characterizes social actors: they tend to be more sensitive to losses than to gains (Pröpper 1989).87 
Whatever mechanism best describes the importance of the insight into failures, such failure needs 
to be established before a breakthrough of institutional blockades or lock-in processes can induce a 
transition from one set of institutions to another (Woerdman 2002). This mechanism is an example 
of an ideational-type mechanism, as it impacts on the cognitive preferences of actors: by referring 
to the “fact” of policy failure, IL-type policy-makers make resisting actors aware that the status 
quo is no longer viable; consequently, these see the policy status quo in a different light than 
previously and start to allow for possible changes in their set preferences. 
                                                           
 
 
 
87 For this line of the argument, I have drawn upon Ferrara and Gualmini’s analytical framework of institutional change 
(Ferrera and Gualmini 2004). 
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2.5.2.2 Legitimizing New Policy  
The second aspect specifies that IL-type policy-makers consistently attempt to legitimize new 
policy principles. In part, this aspect draws upon earlier work about the importance of showing 
commitment and consistency in pursuing reform, which may be found in reformist leadership (‘t 
Hart 2000; ‘t Hart and Goldfinch 2003), and in innovative leadership (Moon 1995). Two elements 
of innovative leadership, the sense of commitment and coherence in pursuing a particular reform, 
underscore this aspect; and the same is true for two elements within the communicative dimension 
of reformist leadership, ‘communicating will power’ and ‘propagating the solution’, both of which 
relate to the legitimization of new policies and their underlying principles.      
While commitment and consistency in pursuing a particular reform course lends a sense of 
credibility to policy proposals, another component of this aspect stresses the substantive quality of 
a policy discourse. In other words, the communicative efforts of policy makers should consist of 
cognitive arguments (linking problems and solutions; expressing a “logic of necessity”) and 
normative arguments (linking proposals to national values and beliefs; expressing a “logic of 
appropriateness”), in order to be convincing and, in the final analysis, “successful” (Schmidt 
2002b).88 Cognitive arguments in a given discourse should demonstrate the relevance of the policy 
programme, applicability, coherence and place it in relation to other programs; normative 
arguments in a discourse show how it resonates with entrenched values and identity – they may 
even serve to change them (Schmidt 2002b: 219-221). In Schmidt’s framework, the logics behind 
a persuasive discourse rest on a model of individual choice that is based on cognitive frames and 
belief systems as well as on interests rather than on interests alone. This is a relevant observation 
for the concept of IL, as it underscores the earlier named assumption of seeing interests as both 
material and ideal (or idea-based). 
It is possible to discern a causal mechanism between the legitimization of new policy 
principles and institutional lock-out, which leads to structural reform. The act of legitimizing new 
policy principles impacts on the conditions for institutional break-out, as specified in lock-in 
theory: policy-makers who use plausible, cognitive arguments about policy proposals facilitate 
information about superior institutional alternatives, which is necessary in order to end 
institutional inertia. Additionally, normative arguments  relating to existing values or possibly 
redefining them as a way of accommodating reform, are important in terms of lowering switching 
costs to alternative institutions (Woerdman 2002:96-97). The combined effect of this second 
mechanism is that IL-type leaders, through their consistent use of cognitive and normative 
arguments, stressing why their alternative works and how it fits existing societal principles, 
persuade reform opponents. As the policy failure mechanism, this one is also ideational: it brings 
about the preference for change in reform opponents, who move from rejection or denial towards 
acceptance of new policy principles. Such movement, in turn, contributes to decrease institutional 
lock-in.   
2.5.2.3 Framing Reform Resistance as Problematic   
The third aspect of IL stipulates that key policy-makers frame reform resistance as “problematic”, 
that is, potentially harmful to societal (or collective) interests. The reasoning behind this is that 
                                                           
 
 
 
88 The distinction between cognitive and normative arguments used by Schmidt is by no means the only one. Dunn, for 
instance, offers a detailed classification and analysis of policy arguments and the knowledge claims they contain. For 
instance, he distinguishes - amongst others - authoritative, explanatory and pragmatic and value-critical arguments (Dunn 
1993). 
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senior politicians may request that policy stakeholders (such as organized interest groups or certain 
segments of the population, for instance, pensioners) subordinate their particularistic interests to 
some greater societal interest once politicians have decided on the necessity of far-reaching 
reforms that are supposedly in accordance with and serve such societal interest. The assumption 
behind this runs as follows: although the preferences of political or societal actors are frequently 
equated with their particularistic (and material) interests; actors are free, in principle, to act 
according to the collective interest, subordinating their particularistic ones.89 This aspect implies 
that policy-makers denounce the abuse of stakeholders’ interests (which manifest themselves by 
blocking behaviour) as detrimental to reform processes, while appealing to stakeholders to re-think 
their opposition in favour of reform in order to achieve consensus. This element of IL assumes, 
based on the conceptualization of interests as “ideal” and “material” interests (Marsh and Furlong 
2002), that such pleas induce policy stakeholders to think twice about the policy implications of 
resistance. More specifically, it may impact on the perception of their ideal interests; for instance, 
as far as considerations about their public image are concerned.  
While such appeals from key policy-makers can be seen as a way of lowering resistance by 
lobbyists and interest groups, it may also be viewed, in the terms of lock-in theory, as an attempt 
to get them involved in the reform process by making them “face the facts”, that is, the primary 
reason behind the need for a reform initiative. Therefore, the causal mechanism between such 
appeals by policy-makers directed towards reform critics and the achievement of an institutional 
lock-out, which leads the way for structural reform, works like this: it represents a strategy to cope 
with the resistance of vested interests that can help reduce switching costs to alternative 
institutions and facilitate an institutional break-out (Woerdman 2002: 97-98). The mechanism 
behind this aspect is based on ideal interests, not material ones. It states that IL-type policy 
makers, by appealing to the consciences of reform opponents, may influence the ways in which 
they perceive their interests (which, in turn, helps to create one of the conditions for institutional 
break-out). By understanding certain reform measures in the light of the greater, societal interest, it 
is hypothesized that they adapt their behaviour accordingly (although this switch may also contain 
an element of self-interest, so as not to appear backward-looking and to show that they can adapt 
to new circumstances).    
2.5.2.4 Efforts at Political Consensus-Building  
The fourth aspect of IL is concerned with policy-makers’ efforts at political consensus-building. In 
essence, consensus-building serves to mobilize support for a particular reform plan and can be 
found in several leadership concepts, such as reformist and policy leadership. Reformist 
leadership, in its strategic or coalition-building dimension, distinguishes one relevant element in 
particular, namely ‘controlling the game’(Hall 2003; Gerring). It refers to the exertion of influence 
on the organization of decision-making or, in other words, procedural leadership (Gerring 2005: 
241-242). However, there is one important difference between this element and the fourth IL 
aspect: whereas Goldfinch and ‘t Hart indicate that leaders might use manipulative tactics when 
‘controlling the game’, the consensus-building aspect of IL emphasizes that a leader does not act 
manipulatively, but is policy-oriented in his motivation (see Section 2.5.2.5 below). In addition, 
this aspect is informed by the third task of policy leadership, ‘forging agreements on policy 
                                                           
 
 
 
89 See Braun for a detailed discussion of the conditions which may induce actors to step back from particular interests and 
endorse collective or societal interests and institutionalised arenas where some of these conditions apply (Braun 2000). 
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options and alternatives’. Once policy leaders have brought together stakeholders and knowledge-
holders, they need to ‘help convert and transform their concerns for the issue into viable policy 
responses’. Rather than being a linear and well-ordered process, this task resembles ‘a stream of 
individual sub-decisions and multiple iterations between information gathering and processing, 
generating and exploring options, narrowing down, and selecting options’ (Luke 2000:54-55). If 
this is a correct portrayal of matters, perhaps it is futile to try and theorize in more detail about 
consensus-building (which may involve potentially chaotic and idiosyncratic processes) and 
concentrate on its result, i.e. the emergence of such a consensus. What counts is that an ideational 
leader, who strives to propagate a particular reform proposal, also cares about assembling 
sufficient support whilst at the same time this activity does not preclude him from staying open for 
suggestions from other actors.  
The causal mechanism between efforts at political consensus-building strategies and 
institutional lock-out can be formulated along the following lines. Attempts by an IL-type actor to 
gather support in favour of a particular reform proposal have two effects: to lower the level of 
resistance and to heighten the chances of having a proposal accepted by those actors (whether 
institutional or individuals) who might otherwise veto it. The mechanism assumes a certain 
receptiveness on the part of such veto players. They are more likely to be convinced by IL-type 
leaders (that is, politicians who plead for the replacement of policy by new, credible initiatives) 
who also actively reach out to those criticizing their plans, than by those who do not. In the 
terminology of the institutional lock-out framework, forging of consensus may reduce switching 
costs to an alternative policy and thus facilitate an institutional lock-out. 
2.5.2.5 The Orientation of an Ideational Leader  
As the IL framework is nearing completion, I will finally draw attention to the orientation or 
motivation of IL-type actors. While the four aspects of behaviour associated with IL refer to 
procedural aspects of actor behaviour (belonging to a particular process), I believe that such actors 
also share a fifth characteristic, as a kind of general orientation. Politicians may base their actions 
on several motivations. In the political science literature, it is common to distinguish at least two 
motivations, which allows drawing a distinction between “policy-seeking” and “power-seeking” 
individuals. Policy-seeking is usually described as the motivation to have an impact on public 
policy, and is associated with an interest in “good” policy (when translated to the current context, 
an interest in the substance of a particular reform project).90 As such, it is opposed to power-
seeking and/or office-seeking, where acquiring and maintaining a position of authority as well as 
consuming the rewards of public office form the central motivation.91 From the discussion thus far, 
it will have become clear that IL-type actors are closely associated with the policy-oriented or 
“good policy” motivation. However, this does by no means imply that they are completely 
unaware of their own authority and sources of power. On the contrary, a certain awareness of their 
                                                           
 
 
 
90 For another interpretation of policy-seeking, the thinking of Max Weber is relevant. In his essay ‘politics as vocation’ 
(Gerth and Mills 1948: 115), he argued that ‘three preeminent qualities are decisive for the politician: passion, a feeling of 
responsibility, and a sense of proportion. In other words, ‘passionate devotion to a “cause”’, ‘responsibility to this cause’ 
and ‘his ability to let realities work upon him with inner concentration and calmness’ constitute the strength of what Weber 
saw as a “political personality” ’. 
91 Some authors work with a more fine-grained typology of motivations. Weaver, for instance, in focusing on blame-
avoiding behaviour also distinguishes credit-claiming and non-electoral motivations next to a ‘good’ policy motivation. He 
describes the latter as follows: ‘[policy makers] may act because they think an action is worthwhile even if it has no 
political payoff’ (Weaver 1986:372)  
  
Ideational Leadership 
 55 
position of authority to launch policy innovations and of the limitations on mustering political 
support (relevant for the fourth aspect of IL, making efforts at consensus-building), distinguishes 
them from policy-makers whose actions are exclusively focused on maintaining power. IL-type 
actors, in contrast, are able to think goal-oriented, whenever the search for a consensus on a reform 
project dictates it, but exhibit a preference for argumentative efforts (as the first three aspects of IL 
illustrate). They follow a pragmatic political strategy with a dual view of politics: as the 
‘realization of cooperation for common goals’, trying to present and frame policy goals in line 
with normative ideas held in a polity and as a “power contest”, where making concessions to one 
party can contribute to the goal of building overall consensus for a reform initiative (Gerring 
2004).  
This dichotomy between policy-seeking and power-seeking, which serves to illustrate what 
IL is and what it is not, can also be illustrated by another pair of concepts: the Habermasian pair of 
“communicative action” and “strategic action” (Habermas 1981 cited in Pröpper 1989: 478-479). 
The first term relates to Habermas’ notion of communicative rationality, and the behavioural type 
of communicative action.92 What is the implication for the IL concept? The concept of 
communicative rationality (and action) underpins the idea of “policy-seeking”, as well as its 
counterpart, strategic acting, the idea of “power-seeking”. It underscores the notion that ideational 
leaders do clearly distinguish themselves from other policy-makers who choose to act 
strategically.93 In addition, some of Pröpper’s criteria for rational discussion94 serve to back up the 
two first behavioural aspects of IL-type actors: I expect them to show commitment to their goal of 
policy innovation and to consistently underline their case with reasoned (cognitive and normative) 
arguments.  
All in all, the policy-orientation of IL-type leaders contributes to the workings of the four 
causal mechanisms described earlier. The assumption is that reform-resisting actors are more 
easily influenced by someone who legitimizes a policy proposal on the basis of policy substance 
than by someone who acts on the basis of strategic motives, that is, to maintain or increase power. 
The discussion in this section so far leads to the following conceptualization of IL: 
 
 
                                                           
 
 
 
92 Communicative acting applies if someone tries to reach mutual agreement (on the basis of a ‘speech act’, i.e. in a 
discussion situation) by giving arguments which are as plausible as possible. The more such arguments he or she presents 
in a given speech, talk etc., the greater the communicative rationality of his or her action will be. Communicative 
rationality, in turn, can be divided into a material and a procedural component. Material rationality refers to the extent to 
which an argument is acceptable in the context of an act that has to be justified: here, the quality of the arguments used is 
crucial. The material rationality of a speech act therefore increases the more plausible or acceptable it is on the basis of the 
arguments the speaker uses. In contrast, procedural rationality is about the form of someone’s argumentation and whether 
the way in which someone justifies or pleads for a certain way of action is acceptable. Procedural rationality thus increases 
the more someone abides by the discussion rules (Pröpper 1989: 68).  
93 Note that strategic action is understood here in the Habermasian sense of the term, that is, violating the rules of 
procedural rationality by trying to use material (or other) compensation, coercion and deception to achieve one’s aims and 
not by presenting plausible arguments (Pröpper 1989: 478-480). Strategic acting presupposes that a person does not use 
plausible arguments and does not adhere to the rules for a rational discussion, but exerts power. This implies using means 
such as money, coercion and deception to achieve his or her aims instead of resorting to plausible arguments.  
94 These include a committed attitude (fulfilling obligations that have been entered into), accountability (statements should 
be supported by arguments), consistency (in terms of speaking and acting), relevancy (of arguments contributed in relation 
to the conclusion reached), objectivity (avoiding untrue, tendentious and personal statements) and openness (avoiding 
barriers to others and their contribution in the discussion). See Pröpper 1995 for a more practice-oriented adaptation of 
these rules.   
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Figure 2.1: Conceptualization of IL  
 
 
2.5.3 Institutionally Informed Conditions for IL  
 
Having discussed the concepts’ constituent aspects, I will briefly formulate some theoretical 
expectations regarding the plausibility of the IL hypothesis during the various stages of a reform 
process. These expectations may also be described as conditions under which I expect IL to be 
more or less effective.95 They are influenced by two factors: the different phases of a reform 
process, which I classify as agenda-setting, legislative, and decision-making phases and the 
varying relevance of institutional veto-players during the different phases. It should be noted that 
this categorization of the policy process differs from the common model of the policy cycle, 
which, based on the classic works of Harold Lasswell (1951) and Gary Brewer (1974), was 
formulated by Charles O. Jones and James Anderson (Collier and Mahoney 1996: 11). The latter 
model includes the following phases or stages: 
  
• agenda-setting (process by which problems come to the attention of government) 
• policy formulation (process by which policy options are formulated within government) 
• decision-making (process by which government adopts a particular course of action or 
non-action) 
• policy implementation (process by which government puts policies into effect) 
• policy evaluation (processes by which the results of policies are monitored by state and 
societal actors; possibly leading to re-conceptualization of policy problems and solutions  
 
Deviating from this model, I am using a slightly different classification. The agenda-setting phase 
refers to the period during which the government sets priorities for concrete reform projects and 
then puts them on its political agenda. During this period, I expect IL to be present and 
instrumental in reducing societal and political resistance that prevents a government from tackling 
a specific reform project. This is because institutional veto-players have no formal say at this stage 
of the process (in the classic policy cycle model this phase would include both agenda-setting and 
                                                           
 
 
 
95 The classification of policy-making phases and institutional veto-players is admittedly tailored to the German situation 
and would have to be adapted accordingly when studying structural change in other countries.  
   Aspects of IL 
   
        Communicative/behavioural aspects 
 
    1) Exposing the drawbacks of the policy status quo 
    2) Making consistent efforts to legitimize (the principles of) new policy 
    3) Engaging with reform opponents by framing their resistance as “problematic” 
    4) Making efforts at political consensus-building to muster support for a particular reform 
 
       Orientation/motivation aspect 
 
    5) IL-type policy-makers are policy- rather than power-oriented 
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policy formulation).  
In the following legislative phase, the government - possibly with input and involvement 
from the parties in the governing coalition and interest groups - works out and presents a reform 
plan or draft bill which is eventually debated in parliament, possibly amended, and finally put to 
the vote (in the classic policy cycle model, this still corresponds to the policy formulation phase). 
During this phase, I expect IL to be present and effective in taking away any societal and political 
resistance that is mounted, either by political parties or interest groups against the specific reform 
proposal of the government. The purpose of IL at this stage is to achieve a vote of the coalition 
parties sufficient to adopt the proposal. Very often, such acceptance by the first chamber of 
parliament, the Bundestag, is not sufficient if a draft bill also concerns the interests and 
competencies of the Länder. In this case, the second chamber of parliament, the Bundesrat, is able 
to veto a proposal, after which a mediation procedure is set to begin.  
Therefore, I distinguish a third and final phase in reform processes, namely a decision-making 
phase (as in the classic policy cycle model), during which the Mediation Committee, a joint body 
of Bundestag and Bundesrat members, engages in compromise-seeking, in order to find a solution. 
This is precisely when institutional veto-players have the greatest power to block reform 
proposals; besides, the negotiations at this stage often involve horse-trading between coalition and 
opposition parties because often, more than one draft bill is discussed by the committee at the 
same time. During this stage, I expect IL to have but little effect: this is because persuasive 
argumentation, appeals to stop resistance and consensus-building become subordinated to the 
dynamics of negotiations and, frequently, political deals. In short, the expected role of IL during 
those three phases outlined above is as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2.2: Effects of IL during policy phases 
 
 
During the empirical case studies, I will concentrate on these three phases and see whether my 
expectations about IL show any resemblance to real reform processes. The phases of policy 
implementation and evaluation are not considered in this framework of reform processes, because 
the definition of structural reform is tied to the actual legislative adoption of a reform, rather than 
to how a policy fares in terms of implementation and possibly evaluation. This means that for the 
purposes of this project, the phases of policy implementation and evaluation are not taken into 
consideration. 
 
2.6 Conclusion   
 
To complete the theoretical part of this study, this chapter has outlined a theoretical framework 
built around the concept of ideational leadership (IL). IL seeks to offer an answer to the puzzle that 
 Phase                               Effect IL  
------------------------------------------------- 
Agenda-setting               medium to strong 
 
Legislative                     medium to strong 
 
Decision-making                  weak 
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was presented in the first chapter, the contradiction between empirical reform realities - major 
reforms do occur - and theoretical expectations as expressed by historical institutionalism and 
regime theory. Section 2.2 has summarized my criticism of the ideational and leadership literatures 
(lack of specification of how leaders achieve policy change and why they want to achieve it, little 
focus on causal mechanisms, lack of political agency), arguing that the concept of IL is able to 
compensate for those weaknesses, particularly regarding their capacity of these approaches 
explaining major policy change. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 have reviewed the leadership and ideational 
literatures (including their origins and main relevant concepts) in order to locate the various 
building blocks for IL as a “joint concept”. To develop IL, I have identified leadership tasks that 
facilitate significant reform, and incorporated elements regarding the effectiveness of ideas in 
policy-making. In both reviews I have highlighted the specific weaknesses of existing concepts in 
more detail and explained how IL remedies them. In Section 2.5, I have explained the concept of 
institutional break-out and the outcome of structural reform; the roots of the distinct aspects of IL 
in various leadership concepts and ideational approaches; and the supposed causal mechanisms 
between the aspects and structural reform. I have also illustrated the general policy-oriented 
motivation of IL-type actors, contrasting with power-seeking and strategic action.  
To conclude, IL is a concept that departs from traditional thinking about leadership as being 
essentially power-related. By contrast, IL focuses on innovation-mindedness and persuasion, and 
on breaking down vested resistance to change without purely resorting to underlying sources of 
authority. IL adds yet another leadership concept to the extensive literature and it is legitimate to 
ask questions about its specific contribution. My answer is that IL extends the meaning of 
leadership, in the particular context of politics and policy-making, in an interesting direction. As 
such, it contributes to research that ‘map[s] the complex interaction between policy ideas, vested 
interests and political institutions during all stages of the policy process’ (Landman 2000: 15). 
Whether the concept can be successfully applied to empirical contexts of social policy-making will 
be evaluated in the remainder of this study. Before presenting the empirical case studies, however, 
Chapter 3 turns to the question of how such an evaluation may be designed. 
3. Research Design and Methodology 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter deals with the research design and the methodological basis of this study. It has three 
aims. Firstly, starting with a short recapitulation of the rationale of the project, it presents the 
research design used to answer the research questions. Secondly, it elaborates on the 
operationalization of the IL concept introduced in Chapter 2. Finally, it provides an overview of 
the data sources and analytic methods used in the three case studies.  
The structure is as follows. Section 3.2 presents the research questions and indicates which 
part of the study addresses which question. Section 3.3 starts with the argument that it is 
worthwhile carrying out a study of structural reforms in the German politico-institutional context, 
which, according to dominant theories, strongly inhibits major reforms. It then presents a multiple 
case study design exploring whether IL as a theoretical construct has empirical relevance, and in 
what ways it matters. Section 3.4 begins by recapitulating the different aspects of IL and shows 
how the concept can be operationalize d in order to make it visible by means of empirical 
observation. Subsequently, I explain my choice of sources and the methods used to analyze them 
(Section 3.5). Finally, Section 3.6 summarizes the findings of the pilot case study (the first out of a 
total of three cases), which led to some amendments of the original conceptualisation of IL.  
 
3.2 Goals and Research Questions 
 
The aim of my research is twofold. Firstly, it explains under what conditions policy makers adopt 
structural welfare state reforms in a context that is presumably characterised by strong institutional 
and electoral resistance to such change. Secondly, it evaluates the working proposition that it is IL, 
which - under conditions to be specified - explains how policy-makers are capable of overcoming 
institutional obstacles to structural reforms. Since it can plausibly be argued that the German 
welfare state is the example par excellence of institutional and political resilience (see Chapter 1), 
the unexpected instances of structural social policy reform that did occur are taken as the empirical 
object of this study. The research questions guiding the project are:  
 
1) In what ways and under what conditions can key policy-makers overcome institutional/electoral 
obstacles and succeed with structural welfare reform?  
2) To what extent do we observe ideational leadership in the reform processes explored in the 
comparative case study and how is it related to the adoption of structural reforms?  
3) What are the implications for dominant theories of welfare state research as well as for theories 
of policy change?  
 
Question 1 has guided the theoretical part of the research by asking how the contradiction between 
theory, on the one hand, and the empirical world, on the other, can be overcome. Question 2 is the 
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central empirical research question which was split into sub-questions for each case; Chapters 5 
through to 7 will each answer this question separately, while Chapter 8 gives an overall answer on 
the viability of the IL hypothesis. Question 3 points to the theoretical implications of the findings, 
which are also explored in Chapter 8.  
 
3.3 Research Design and Strategy  
 
As I have argued in Chapter 1, the rationale for selecting Germany bears a strong relation to its 
prominent position amongst countries with Continental welfare regimes, which appear to be 
struggling with welfare state reform (Esping-Andersen 1996, 1999; Scharpf 1997). Equally, I have 
established that the choice for Germany should ensure that the IL proposition, which specifies one 
possible way of overcoming reform resistance, is evaluated in a challenging (many theoretical 
obstacles to reform) as well as an intriguing context (relative absence of substantial changes 
despite mounting pressures). Therefore, the context of the project will be the German welfare state 
(seen as a composition of various social policy areas with distinct policy legacies, instruments and 
institutions), forming the background of investigation for a case study-type research design.  
Before outlining the parameters of this design, a few words are in place with regard to the 
efficacy of a case study or small-n study as compared to a large-n study. Rather than making a 
statement in the debate on qualitative versus quantitative research methods in favour of either of 
these, I would merely like to place my choice of methodological approach in the context of this 
debate, and, in addition, briefly reflect on my position in terms of ontology and epistemology 
(Collier 1993; see for an introduction relevant to political science: Collier and Mahoney 1996). 
As far as ontology, the science of being, is concerned, I agree with the observation of Hall 
(2003) that the ontologies (when defined as assumptions about the nature of the social and political 
world, and particularly about the nature of causal relationships) of some theories used in 
comparative political science are no longer in line with the requirements for one of its most 
frequently used techniques, regression analysis. For instance, the ontologies underlying theories on 
path dependency are based on certain assumptions about causal structures that are not compatible 
with the assumptions required for standard regression techniques, which have established 
themselves as a popular comparativist method in the field. As a solution to this divergence, Hall 
suggests ‘small-n research designs based on systematic process analysis’ (Yin 2003:374). 
Concerning my ontological stance in this study, ideas, frequently seen as “subjective” constructs, 
are regarded as vital objects of research.96 Although my study aims to generate knowledge about 
causal processes, which is generally acknowledged as an aim of positivist research, I think it is 
possible to pursue this aim while considering ideas as potential explanatory factors in the context 
of my research question.  
As for my stance on epistemology, which reflects the way one looks at knowledge and the 
process of acquiring it, I gravitate towards a more subjective view than would be typical for a 
positivist approach. This is due to practical reasons and to my choosing to evaluate the IL 
hypothesis by exploring the presence of certain argumentative patterns and styles of leadership. 
                                                           
 
 
 
96 The term “subjective” here is taken to mean “originating from ideas in peoples’ heads”, as opposed to “objective” or 
“material”, which implies an existence independent of human perception. 
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The slightly subjective stance towards epistemology becomes visible in my use of data sources: in 
addition to using documents, I chose to rely on information gained from semi-structured 
interviews. From a methodological point of view, data gathered in such interviews tend to be 
considered as more subjective (and unreliable) than other sorts of data, for instance, quantifiable 
survey data, and thus more remote and distinct from “objective” observable facts. Although I look 
at policy processes as chains of observable facts, I nevertheless acknowledge the value of 
perceptions and subjective views of the individuals who were either involved in or observed these 
processes, in order to re-construct the latter by way of analysis and evaluate the role of key actors’ 
leadership. In addition, I believe this “more subjective” ontological and epistemological position is 
compatible with choosing a case study design, which I now turn to.  
Finally, some preliminary remarks on the current status of the case study in political science 
research are appropriate. As Gerring has poignantly observed, the role of the case study in 
contemporary political science lies somewhere between ‘an often-maligned methodology and a 
heavily practiced method’ (Mahoney 2000: 352). I share his observation completely and think that 
both methodological opponents and advocates of this ubiquitous method should be more sensitive 
to its potentials and limitations. The critics of the case study method need to admit that for some 
research contexts and questions, which do not allow the application of sophisticated statistical 
methods, small-n research offers considerable advantages. Its advocates, on the other hand, should 
discourage and avoid methodological criticism by a) better understanding the value and utility of 
case studies and b) improving the methodological soundness of case studies in terms of their 
validity and reliability. Trying to set a positive example, this chapter explicitly addresses issues of 
scientific quality, reflecting upon why a case study design is the most suitable design in finding an 
answer to my research questions.  
 
There are at least three reasons that point to the case study as the most relevant research 
design: firstly, my actor-centred hypothesis on policy change involves the examination of actors’ 
communicative actions and patterns of behaviour, which do not lend themselves easily to 
quantification and statistical research. Admittedly, for some research questions the use of a 
quantitative approach to textual analysis of documents may be perfectly possible. However, this 
does not imply that this is true for my research question about IL. As it calls for a broader range of 
evidence of political behaviour over the time span of reform processes, a research design based on 
the quantification of terms or arguments used in public speech is not appropriate. On the contrary, 
a case study design offers a better way, by intensive study of patterns of political behaviour within 
certain time limits, of establishing which of these patterns were present and what role IL played 
among them.  
Secondly, in order to be able to explain in as much detail as possible how IL matters for 
structural welfare state reform, it is worth tracing, as far as the available data allows, the 
mechanisms linking the different aspects of IL with the final outcome, the adoption of reform. 
This is in line with recent research on what causation entails: one of the criteria for providing good 
causal arguments is the specification of such mechanisms.97 Causal mechanisms connect a 
supposed cause with a purported effect and without them, we cannot fully and thus satisfactorily 
explain how an X generates an outcome Y (Mahoney 2003: 178-9). Given the way in which I 
                                                           
 
 
 
97 Other formal criteria for causal propositions are (Gerring 2005: 171): specification, precision, breadth, boundedness, 
completeness, parsimony, differentiation, priority, independence, contingency, analytic utility, intelligibility, relevance, 
innovation and comparison.  
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formulated my theoretical framework, by connecting IL-type leaders and structural reform and by 
wishing to find causal mechanisms as ways of enhancing the value of explanatory theories, the 
next logical step is to find an appropriate research design able to identify them. The search for 
causal mechanisms is best achieved  by a case-study type investigation, as it enables the analyst to 
make use of process-tracing or related techniques of causal inference in small-n analysis (Hall 
2003, Mahoney 2003). In the context of the present investigation, the best way of tracing how IL is 
linked to structural reforms is by conducting a case study. As Gerring has stressed, an appropriate 
case study is capable of investigating causal mechanisms and, due to ‘its characteristic style of 
evidence-gathering – over-time and within-unit variation – is likely to provide clues as to what 
links a purported X to a particular Y (…). Ceteris paribus, case studies are more likely [than cross-
unit analyses] to shed light on causal mechanisms and less likely to shed light on true causal 
effects’ (Mahoney 2003: 349).  
Finally, even if it was possible to devise quantitative indicators for the IL concept and there 
were suitable data available for measuring and evaluating it, the specific nature of the dependent 
and independent variables would make the likelihood of many available cases or observations 
more limited. Firstly, the relevant outcome of reform, structural reform, due to its nature, is limited 
in numbers, which puts a cap on the number of possible observations (at least if one decides to 
limit the study to one particular country, for instance Germany). In addition, in any one country, 
there are only a limited number of potential IL-type actors,  if they are assumed to be ministers 
responsible for social policy areas. These limitations due to theoretical reasons, together with the 
fact that the research question focuses on the intricacies of social policy-making processes that 
only allow structural reforms to happen in particular circumstances, suggests a small-n and 
therefore a case study design as the most suitable way of setting up the research process.98  
To summarize, the main reasons for choosing a small-n case study pertain to the nature of the 
hypothesis, which calls for the use of qualitative data to evaluate it; the intention to track down 
theorized causal mechanisms that explain how IL works, which can only be done by close scrutiny 
of case study material; and the practical limitation of the scarcity of structural reforms.     
 
3.3.1 Type of Case Study and Case Selection  
 
Having seen why a case study is the most sensible choice of research design, I would now like to 
turn to the object to be studied: processes leading up to structural reforms. I will consider several 
of these processes; therefore, the design is a multiple case study. Multiple case studies have 
become a more prevalent research strategy compared to single case studies and offer important 
advantages, as their results are considered as more compelling, and as they offer more “robust” 
evaluations than single case studies do. However, cases need to be selected carefully and should be 
considered in terms of a “replication” logic (as opposed to a “sampling” logic). This means that 
case selection should proceed in a way analogous to multiple experiments, with the expectation, at 
the outset of the study, of either similar or contrasting results arising from the cases (Yin 2003: 
53). Cases are defined as political decision-making processes leading to the adoption of reform 
                                                           
 
 
 
98 If the study had included more than five cases, an application of Charles Ragin’s qualitative comparative analysis or 
fuzzy-set techniques (Ragin 1987; 2000) would have been an alternative. This innovative technique allows analysts to gain 
knowledge about combinations of explanatory factors which are either necessary of sufficient for a certain outcome (QCA). 
In the case of fuzzy-set analysis, it is even possible to allow for a greater variation of explanatory variables (both 
quantitatively and qualitatively). See also Chapter 8. 
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initiatives. The research question on the link between structural reforms and IL suggests a literal 
replication of cases (ibid: 47), predicting similar results in terms of the presumed relationship 
between these two variables, which is to be evaluated in several cases. The empirical range of the 
design is restricted in the following ways:  
 
• time-wise: for the selection of cases, the period from 1990 up to 2004 was considered, 
covering a period that saw different governments in terms of party composition (two 
Christian Democrat-led cabinets under Chancellor Kohl followed by two Social 
Democrat-led governments under Chancellor Schröder), 
• space-wise: as already pointed out, the study focuses on the German context; this choice 
of a single country, in turn, was linked to the choice of 
• a more intensive empirical range: the cases or reform initiatives belong to three prominent 
social policy areas (health care, old-age, pensions, unemployment insurance as a part of 
labour market policy).  
 
It follows that the project is not comparative as traditionally understood in political science, 
i.e. comparing welfare states across countries, but in the sense that reform efforts are compared 
across different social policy areas within the context of one country. The underlying rationale is 
to explore whether distinct features of the respective policy areas (such as particular institutions, 
actor constellations, policy legacies, contextual factors) influence the chances of success for 
political actors to push through structural reform. For instance, will political leaders be able to 
justify structural reforms in the health care sector (characterised by strong interests of 
stakeholders), with the same ease - or difficulty - compared to the reform of unemployment 
insurance schemes (where the interests of the social partners matter)? In other words, the analysis 
within individual cases is complemented by cross-case analysis in order to see whether this yields 
additional perceptions of differences of reform across welfare state sectors.  
 
The selection of cases was guided by three different criteria: methodological soundness 
(regarding selection on the dependent and independent variable); equal distribution across social 
policy sectors, and, to a lesser extent, timing of the reforms (see the paragraph on selection criteria 
below). The cases also differ in character: the first two cases cover two reform initiatives that 
turned into successfully adopted structural reforms. In contrast, the third case covers the period in 
office of a presumed ideational leader and his reform initiatives and achievements. This particular 
combination of cases was chosen to ensure variation on the independent variable, i.e. IL. In 
addition, each of the cases fulfils a slightly different methodological role within the multiple case 
study design, which means that their analyses differ in emphasis.  
The first case study verifies whether it is possible to trace IL at all in the data collected. It was 
originally designed as a pilot study, but will be treated as a normal case since it only led to 
minimal adaptations of the theoretical framework. The second case serves to confirm the 
conclusions about the plausibility of IL from the first case, and to reveal its effects on the outcome 
of structural reform as clearly as possible. In the third and final case, the focus lies on evaluating 
the reform achievements of a presumed ideational leader. Furthermore, the analysis needs to 
establish whether the selection of that individual can be backed up by finding IL-related aspects in 
his behaviour. The selection of the third case entailed particular difficulties relating to the 
closeness of the dependent and independent variable in this study and necessitated extra caution, 
as the following demonstrates. 
In order to select a policy-maker, I conducted a small expert survey of three “candidate” 
ministers, inquiring about four criteria that would help identify a presumed IL without relying on a 
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detailed analysis of his performance in the context of a specific reform. The results favoured one 
particular minister. On closer inspection, it appeared that this result may have been biased, as the 
wording of the questions (particularly about the criteria dealing with legitimising reform and 
overcoming reform resistance) may have been read by respondents to imply that candidates had 
actually accomplished structural reforms. To be more specific, there was the danger that, as it 
were, respondents (being familiar with each minister’s  policy legacy) had made their answers 
dependent on their knowledge of whether these ministers had actually accomplished far-reaching 
(in the terminology of this study: structural) reforms. If this is a correct reconstruction (although it 
is hard to verify without repeating the entire survey, which is impracticable), the survey 
inadvertently produced results on the basis of the dependent variable, which conflicts with the aim 
to make a selection on the independent variable (IL). In order to avoid the risk of actually selecting 
a candidate on the dependent variable, structural reform, and to ascertain (or disprove) the results 
of the survey, I employed an additional criterion for that selection. This criterion can be deduced 
from the aspects of IL without being linked to the outcome of reform, and specifies whether 
candidates voiced their ideas on policy-making in their policy area before taking office or shortly 
thereafter.99 After re-checking candidates’ scores on this additional element, the candidate singled 
out by the survey could still be confirmed as a presumed ideational leader. In this fashion, the 
selection of the third case was conducted via triangulation of several selection criteria, trying to 
ensure an unbiased case selection on the basis of the independent variable, in accordance with the 
research design. The case study can thus be split into two phases:  
 
Multiple Case Study, first phase:  
• A first case selected on the dependent variable (successfully legislated structural reform, 
originally designed as a pilot study), evaluating the plausibility of the research hypothesis, 
and enabling the fine-tuning of the operationalization  of the central concepts. This case 
covered the 2001 pension reform. 
 
Multiple Case Study, second phase:  
• A second case selected on the dependent variable (successfully legislated structural 
reform) with a theory-evaluating function. This case covered the 2003 Hartz IV reform, 
which merged unemployment assistance and social assistance.  
• A third case selected on the independent variable (the presence of a supposed ideational 
leader) with a theory-evaluating function. This case was centred on one particular 
minister in the area of health care, in order to evaluate his reform efforts in the light of the 
previously defined criteria for IL and structural reform.  
 
During the first phase, the focus was on checking whether the operationalization  of the IL concept 
was viable. During the second phase, the aim was to establish whether the assumed hypothetical 
relationship between IL and reform adoption could be empirically corroborated.  
 
                                                           
 
 
 
99 Since the ideational element of IL is essentially about using policy ideas (in a cognitive and normative sense) to 
legitimize reforms, it can be assumed that a potential ideational leader enters office with outspoken ideas he or she would 
like to put into practice.  
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Selection Criteria  
In order to respect principles of methodological soundness, my case selection was based on a 
number of considerations. These included choosing cases on the dependent or independent 
variable; on the policy areas and their policy legacies; and on the timing of the reforms. The 
research design should ensure a reasonable test of the relationship between IL and structural 
reforms. This necessitates that a) the presence of the independent variable (IL) is examined while 
ensuring a certain outcome of reform on the dependent variable (structural reform), and b) the 
presence of a certain outcome of reform as a “value“ on the dependent variable (structural reform)  
is examined while ensuring the presence of the independent variable (IL).  
What principles should the design respect in order to avoid the pitfall of selection bias, which 
can seriously distort or at least devalue the results of a case study? Firstly, ‘selection should allow 
for the possibility of at least some variation on the dependent variable’ (Berelson 1971:129). In 
addition, selection of cases on the independent variable is possible, as ‘selecting observations (…) 
according to the categories of the key causal variable causes no inference problems’ (ibid: 137). 
Finally, one should not select cases on both the independent and dependent variable, since ‘in so 
doing, it is easy to bias the result inadvertently’ or to commit a serious methodological error when 
‘explanatory and dependent variables vary together in ways that are known to be consistent with 
the hypothesis that the research purports to test’ (ibid: 142).  
My stance is that it is important to recognize these basic rules of small-n research, whilst at 
the same time not overstating their value. As Collier and Mahoney have argued (1996), it is 
doubtful whether selection bias, which is a term originating from the problem of how to choose 
one’s cases or observations in quantitative research, can be equally applied to small-n research.100 
The more immediate danger at hand, when violating the rules specified by King, Keohane and 
Verba, is to have non-variation on either the dependent and/or the independent variable in a 
research design that tries to demonstrate causal relationships (Clasen 2005). Moreover, as Collier 
and Mahoney argue, there are instances when a design based on non-variation (or limited non-
variation, as in the design described here), is nevertheless sensible and justifiable. One relevant 
motive for the deliberate selection of cases on one extreme value is the wish to analyse an outcome 
of exceptional interest, zooming in on it in order to gain a better understanding of both the 
outcome and its causes. Another motive is that existing theories provide only limited insight into 
the outcome of interest. In this case, dismissing a non-variation design categorically may be the 
wrong choice if one takes into consideration the trade-offs of choosing a different design. If little is 
known about the outcome of interest, a more detailed study of few cases may be more fruitful than 
a broader study focussing on positive and negative cases. On the other hand, choosing few cases 
may mean losing analytic leverage. However, a careful contextualised study of very few cases 
                                                           
 
 
 
100 Although selection bias is often used as an argument to criticise designs that are based on non-variation of the dependent 
variable, a number of counterarguments or alternative interpretations exist in the literature on comparative methods and 
small-N analysis (Collier and Mahoney 1996: 72-73). Firstly, Mills’ method of agreement, that is, seeking to identify 
features that differ across countries but account for the same observed outcome (Landman 2000: 29), and allowing to distil 
common elements from a diverse set of countries that have greater explanatory power (Collier 1993: 112) also enables 
analysts, by means of eliminating other explanations, to come to conclusions about causal inference, although it is 
considered a weaker tool than regression analysis. Secondly, designs based on non-variance can play an important role in 
discovering new explanations of known outcomes or new hypotheses which can, in the long run, feed into more large-scale 
comparative evaluations of the same information. Thirdly, counterfactual reasoning is often employed in such design, 
which compensates for the weakness of real variation in explaining the outcome (1996: 74).  
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would be more productive than a less valid study of its occurrence and non-occurrence (ibid: 72-
74). Both motives are relevant for the study at hand: indeed, too little is known about how far-
reaching welfare state reforms come about and what causes them. Equally, instances of structural 
reforms provide a good example of outcomes “of exceptional interest”, precisely because they are 
deemed impossible by existing theories. Given the motives of this project, selecting cases on the 
criterion “structural reform” is defensible.  
In addition, provisions have been made to limit the danger of non-variation on the dependent 
and the independent variable. By adding a third case, selected on the independent variable IL, the 
dependent variable to open to vary, since the reform outcome (structural or non-structural) is to be 
assessed through the analysis. Equally, at the outset of the first two cases, the independent 
variable, IL, was free to “vary” between “no IL-type actor” and “IL-type actor”, as the value of the 
variable was only to be established through the analysis. Therefore, the design allowed limited 
variation on the supposedly dichotomous variables IL and structural reform, on the basis of which 
one can better judge the relationships between them.,       
What is the purpose of the different case studies in the overall design? To start with, the first 
and second cases were chosen by selecting a structural reform (dependent variable) and analysing 
whether a key politician a) does have the qualities of an ideational leader, and b) his actions can be 
related to the realization of this structural reform. In contrast, the third case was chosen on a IL-
type actor (independent variable), and is supposed to show whether IL leads to structural reforms.  
As for the choice of policy areas, I selected the main policy areas of the welfare state. They 
include old-age pensions, unemployment insurance as a sub-section of labour market, and health 
care policy. A study of the various reform initiatives launched in these areas in the time period 
under consideration (both incremental and structural) brought to the fore that two reforms certainly 
qualify as a structural reform as defined in Chapter 1. This led to the selection of the first two 
cases: partial privatization of old-age pensions (2001), and the so-called Hartz IV reform 
(2003/04), which introduced cuts in unemployment assistance and created one uniform benefit for 
those long-term unemployed available to the labour market. Taking into consideration the 
comparative element of the project (comparing major policy sectors), it was decided to select the 
final case in the third important area of social policy, health care policy. This case is not centred, 
however, on a specific reform process, but for reasons of research design (selection on the 
independent variable, as explained above), on a specific leading politician and the evaluation of his 
policy legacy. With regard to the timing of the three cases, they fall under two different 
governments in terms of party composition; the ones led by CDU chancellor Kohl (1990-1998), 
and the first and second government led by SPD chancellor Schröder (1998-2002 and 2002-2005). 
As my argument about IL is not premised on any particular partisan incumbency, this spread of 
cases across time allows controlling for the political style of different governments.  
 
3.3.2 Hypothesis Evaluation  
 
The study relied on two related hypothesis-evaluating strategies. In the context of the pilot study or 
plausibility probe (first phase of the case study), I made use of explanation-building, which is a 
special variant of the analytical strategy of pattern-matching (Eckstein 1975: 120). While enabling 
a plausibility check of the operationalize d theoretical concepts, the analysis of data concerning the 
German 2001 pension reform also served to evaluate the plausibility of the hypothesis, in the sense 
of being “workable”. In other words, the purpose was to fine-tune my explanation of structural 
welfare reform with the help of the pilot case, allowing for some conceptual revisions before 
proceeding to the remainder of the case studies. This is in accordance with the logic behind the 
explanation building technique, which relies on iteration: the findings of an initial case are 
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compared with an initial theoretical proposition; the proposition is revised, if necessary, in the 
light of the case, and the new proposition is examined further in other cases.    
In the second phase, the analysis of the cases consisted of two tasks: 1) screening data for 
evidence for the presence of IL, making use of operationalized indicators for behaviour and speech 
acts of reformist leaders, and 2) screening data for evidence of alternative explanations that could 
have equally played a role in causing reform adoption or abandonment. This double strategy 
applies to the second case, where, based on the fact that structural reform has taken place, the 
workings of IL could be traced. In the third case, screening the data for evidence of IL was 
replaced by relying on a set of specified indicators of IL, which served to determine an IL-type 
policy-maker beforehand. The second task was to reconstruct the political processes surrounding 
reform efforts during a definite time period; to establish whether the ensuing reforms were 
structural or not; and whether IL could plausibly be linked to these results, or whether alternative 
explanations applied.  
In order to provide some guidance in analyzing case study evidence and to define priorities 
for what should be analyzed and why, a case study analyst should have a general analytic strategy 
(Yin 2003: 109). In my study, it consisted of one main proposition, the IL hypothesis, and two 
rival explanations (see for different types of rival hypotheses ibid: 113). While the indicators for 
IL provided general guidance as to what kind of data to collect and what to look for in the data, the 
second strategy was to define and evaluate rival, or as I prefer to call them, alternative 
explanations. Alternative explanations imply that a certain outcome is the result of influences other 
than the one(s) hypothesized. By collecting information about them, hypothesized explanations 
can become potentially stronger by excluding other plausible explanatory factors or alternative 
explanations.  
In his volume on leadership (1975), Burns specified, from the perspective of individual 
actors, in what ways resistance to change may be overcome. He considered a number of possible 
strategies, including coercive, normative, utilitarian, empirical-rational strategies, power-coercive, 
and re-educative strategies. While choosing to exclude coercive strategies from his conception of 
leadership, he stated that ‘the common thread […] running through these diverse strategies is their 
difficulty’, as most of them seem to aim at changing both attitudes and behaviour of ‘subordinate 
decision-makers in government or business or other collectivities who are supposed to administer 
the change’ (Burns 1978: 417). Based on Burns’ list, I chose two plausible alternative strategies of 
individuals that may help to overcome reform resistance and could be applied in an analysis 
examining whether such strategies mattered in concluding a particular reform process.  
The first alternative explanation consists of political leaders trying to ignore or outmanoeuvre 
reform critics (both inside and outside parliament). This may involve “changing the rules of the 
game” in their favour, either through ad hoc strategies that effectively by-pass or neutralize 
potential veto players (such as a second chamber of parliament), or even by amending 
constitutional rules in order to make it easier to get legislation passed.101 Depending on the 
circumstances, this strategy may involve literally ignoring protests from interest groups or trying 
to use possibilities during a legislative process to neutralize parliamentary opposition. In short, this 
explanation sees politicians at least not engaging with reform criticism and at most adjusting the 
institutional context in order to push through their preferred policy adjustments. Therefore, in a 
certain sense, it reflects the use of political power.  
                                                           
 
 
 
101 The latter is, admittedly, an extreme and mostly theoretical possibility, which, in the German context would presuppose 
a two-third majority in the Bundestag to be realized.  
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The second alternative explanation claims that key policy-makers offer concessions in order 
to push through reforms. The promise of some form of pay-off, i.e. financial benefits or other 
compensation for societal groups and/or political veto players, is another way to calm opposition 
and get reforms adopted. In this line of thought, political ideas are considered secondary and the 
distributional context of negotiations, i.e. the satisfaction of material interests, is dominant. 
Political leaders who make content-related concessions or offer pay-offs, may in turn receive 
support of opposing groups and/or individuals needed to realize their goals. Thus, this second 
explanation stands for quid-pro-quo transactions or exchanges. Theoretically, these two power- 
and exchange-related explanations can be distinguished from the IL hypothesis, which draws 
attention to processes of persuading critics and getting consensus for reforms.  
In short, the value of rival or alternative explanations in the evaluation of IL is twofold: 
Theoretically, they remind us of the fact that the IL explanation should be seen in the context of 
other possible factors, i.e. that its operation may be related to other mechanisms being present at 
the same time. Methodologically, they offer a tool to “isolate” the causal workings of IL: By 
checking whether alternative explanations hold in the case of a specific reform initiative, and 
establishing that they do not apply, the case for asserting that IL has been present and effective in 
overcoming resistance, is strengthened.  
In addition to a general analytic strategy, it is also necessary to evaluate processes within 
cases in order to come to conclusions (within-case analysis). One of the most frequently used 
techniques is pattern-matching (Eckstein 1975; King, Keohane et al. 1994). Pattern matching 
essentially ‘compares an empirically based pattern with a predicted one (or with several alternative 
predictions). If the patterns coincide, the results can help a case study to strengthen its internal 
validity’ (Yin 2003: 116). This approach further requires that the type of outcome is known in 
several cases and that the examination centres on how and why this outcome came about in each 
case. Analogous to using rival explanations as a general analytic strategy, the patterns of within-
case analysis refer to rival explanations (IL or alternative explanations). Within-case analysis is 
possible since the values of the dependent variable (reform outcome) were either known (Cases 1 
and 2), or were going to be identified (Case 3) as to evaluate the relationship between different 
explanations and reform adoption. By contrast, the third case served to corroborate the effects of a 
presumed ideational leader in terms of his reform record (rather than on showing in detail how he 
or she operated).  
In addition to pattern-matching for independent variables, I employed the technique of 
process tracing, which is often associated with the possibilities of case study research for studying 
complex processes in their entirety, taking into account a variety of contextual factors. Following 
the scholars who coined the term in political science, process tracing refers to ‘the effort to infer 
causality through the identification of causal mechanisms’ (George and McKeown (1985) cited in 
Ragin 1994: 363). However, those who apply process tracing should also strive for methodological 
rigour as Mahoney stresses:  ‘when using process tracing, methodologists need to explore more 
seriously the extent to which it is really possible to specify causal mechanisms as empirical 
hypotheses with directly testable implications’ (Mahoney 2003: 368)  
Equipped with evidence found through pattern-matching and process tracing, the final 
question will be whether the IL hypothesis can be confirmed or needs to be rejected. In this sense, 
the comparison of the multiple case study results functions as a test. In order to make the test 
rigorous, a consistent decision guideline is needed, relying on clear criteria to evaluate the 
proposition on the basis of the collected evidence and allows the reader to judge the quality of the 
analysis. These criteria relate to two sorts of evidence: firstly, evidence of a key politician showing 
the five communicative/behavioural and motivational aspects during the policy process, 
introduced as ‘operationalize d aspects’ of IL in Section 3.4 below. Secondly, evidence based on 
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documents and/or individual interview accounts confirming or disconfirming that 
communicative/behavioural and motivational aspects of a key politician contributed to the 
adoption of a reform. If we find such evidence for the presence of IL-related strategies and 
possibly also traces of the effects of such strategies (as formulated in the causal mechanisms set 
out in Chapter 2) in all of the three cases, there are grounds for confirming the proposition. 
Conversely, if the cases reveal only thin evidence of IL and its effects, or if aspects of IL are 
present, but fail to produce structural reforms (which is possible in the third case study based on 
the selection of the independent variable), the hypothesis is in trouble.  
 
3.4 Operationalizing Ideational Leadership and Structural Reform  
 
3.4.1 Aspects of IL and Empirical Indicators  
 
As Chapter 2 has outlined in some detail, IL draws upon a host of concepts belonging to the 
literatures on political ideas and leadership, indicating that it contains more than just one 
“functional” aspect. In a nutshell, IL implies that key policy-makers display a small number of 
communicative and behavioural characteristics. The guiding proposition states that ideational 
leaders leave a significant imprint on political outcomes by transforming resistance of reform 
opponents into acceptance or neutrality towards reform initiatives, resulting in structural 
reforms.102 Figure 3.1 below reiterates the aspects of IL as presented in Chapter 2:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Conceptualization of IL   
 
 
The process of operationalization is about translating abstract concepts and their components into 
more concrete and therefore measurable (but not necessarily numerical) indicators. Typically, in 
order to measure or otherwise identify abstract ideas and concepts one needs to develop indicators 
that will function as “proxies” for the original concepts. I will propose indicators for aspects 1 
                                                           
 
 
 
102 That such acceptance may not come ‘for free’ is of no concern here; possibly policy-makers may be forced to make 
concessions to reform opponents in other matters than the reform issue at hand. 
Aspects of IL  
 
Communicative/behavioural aspects 
 
1) Exposing the drawbacks of the policy status quo 
2) Making consistent efforts to legitimize (the principles of) new policy 
3) Engaging with reform opponents by framing their resistance as “problematic” 
4) Making efforts at political consensus-building to muster support for a particular reform 
        
Orientation/motivation aspect 
 
5) IL-type policy-makers are policy- rather than power-oriented 
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through to 4 in the following sub-sections below, where I make a distinction between the two main 
sources of collected data, documents and interviews (the two groups of sources will be discussed 
in more detail in Section 3.5). Following on from this, it needs to be verified whether this 
operationalization will suffice by confronting the indicators with empirical data. This can only be 
established after pre-screening the data with the help of the defined categories and indicators and, 
more importantly, performing a preliminary analysis by using them (Egle, Ostheim et al. 2003). I 
will address these latter issues in Section 3.4.2. 
 
3.4.2 Indicators for Analysing Textual Data from Documents  
 
In order to guide the search for aspects of IL in textual material, each aspect has been turned into 
an analytical category with one corresponding guiding question about the key policy-maker and 
one or several indicators.  
Exposing the Drawbacks of the Policy Status Quo  
The guiding question for this aspect of IL was: “did a key politician clearly reject the pension 
policy status quo (and its old policy principles)?” To answer this question, documents were 
examined in search for certain indicators, i.e. lines of argument that express one of the following 
(note that indicators may consist of one or several connected sentences rather than single words or 
groups of words):   
 
• identifying pressing problems and associating them with the status quo of existing 
policies and institutions and/or underlying policy ideas;  
• linking these problems to policy failure, crisis, inefficiency, loss of welfare etc..     
 
To give some examples, arguments that fit this analytical category may stress that ‘old 
policies (and/or their principles) are no longer viable/effective because of…’ One genuine example 
of this is a statement like ‘(…) the statutory scheme has to respond to societal changes if it is 
supposed to still exist in the future’ or ‘what will be decisive is a fundamental turnaround: we no 
longer pay for unemployment but place people into jobs instead’. With this category, I am 
interested in whether such arguments are used at all, that is, whether key policy-makers evoke 
policy failure. A negative instance in this category (instance of non-occurrence) exists if a 
politician’s call for reform is legitimized without reference to the status quo or using arguments 
stressing arguments that ‘existing policy arrangements must be maintained’. 
Making Consistent Efforts to Legitimize New Policy 
For this analytical category, the guiding question was: “did a key politician clearly express and 
legitimize new policy principles, using cognitive arguments (related to problem-solving) and/or 
normative arguments (related to societal norms and values)?”  In order to identify this aspect of IL 
empirically, I sought to identify lines of arguments that  
 
• link suggested policy solutions and/or new policy principles with aforementioned 
problems (cognitive argument), for instance, ‘this measure will address the problem of 
contributions linked to work’; or 
• link suggested policy solutions to norms and values present in society (normative 
arguments), for instance, ‘this measure is in congruence with our current understanding of 
social justice’. 
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To cite some examples from politicians statements, arguments in this category may read like ‘this 
concept was designed to provide not only a suitable but also a just answer to many future 
questions in old-age provision’, or ‘our maxim “Fördern und Fordern” is a guiding idea behind 
the new basic benefit for the unemployed: by implementing it, every unemployed person receives 
the support she or he needs’.   
Here, we are interested in whether cognitive and normative arguments are used by policy-
makers and whether they tend to occur closely together in a text. The latter may be assessed by 
recording instances of close re-occurrence. This second category can be considered as absent when 
policy-makers do not make an explicit link between problems and solutions, or when they do not 
refer to underlying values/policy principles while discussing a policy proposal.  
Engaging with Reform Opponents by Framing Resistance as “Problematic” 
The third aspect of IL translated into a corresponding analytical category, for which the guiding 
question read: “did the key politician appeal to critics to give up their reform resistance?” In other 
words, the search concentrated on arguments that point to the negative effects of opponents’ views 
by labelling their behaviour as irresponsible in view of the common interest or society as a 
whole.103 Possible examples of this category are statements like ‘blocking this law is contrary to 
pursuing the common interest’ or ‘such a position is socially irresponsible’. Genuine examples 
from policy-makers’ statements read as follows: ‘the parliamentary opposition would have a 
severe credibility problem if it dared to veto the tax credits to citizens for private pension 
provision’, or ‘it is important to give a warning to those who make for pessimism in Germany (…) 
they must not and they will not stop our reforms’. In order to assess this aspect of IL, it is 
necessary to check whether such arguments appear in documents at all or whether politicians use 
other rhetorical means to deal with the resistance they encounter, or do not address it with at all in 
communicative terms. Correspondingly, we can refer to a negative instance for this category if 
politicians do not raise the issue of resisting or blocking behaviour by other political actors.  
Making Efforts at Political Consensus-Building to Muster Support for a Particular Reform 
Initiative 
The fourth aspect of IL, which the analysis of the first case (designed as a pilot) brought to the 
fore, relates to political consensus-building. It is perhaps the most troublesome aspect of the 
concept in terms of its measurement or identification. The question to be asked in order to find 
evidence for this category reads: “did a key politician engage in political consensus-building in 
order to push through reform, based on an interest in reform contents or does he engage in tactical 
games in order to keep his power?” Generally speaking, little information on consensus-building 
activities of policy-makers is available in publicly accessible documents on reform, which explains 
why I do not define specific analytical categories such as lines of argument that express 
consensus-seeking behaviour. Instead, evidence on consensus-seeking needs to be inferred from 
background information about reform processes, including press coverage and, most importantly, 
interview accounts.  
                                                           
 
 
 
103 A second and distinct category of arguments, ‘point to the inconsistencies in opponents’ behaviour by confronting them 
with the consequences of non-cooperation for their interests (or those of their constituents)’ was dropped after the analysis 
of the pilot study (see Section 3.2.2) 
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Policy-Orientation of Key Policy-Makers    
This last aspect of the IL framework relates to the orientation or motivation of policymakers. As 
with the consensus-building aspect of IL, it is not easy to specify indicators for it; in addition, 
documents tend to contain sparse evidence of policy-makers’ attitude towards their role in office. 
Again, it is most likely to derive evidence about policy-makers’ orientations from background 
information contained by press articles and interviews. For instance, one may try to find remarks 
by different observers about a minister’s motivations and attitude towards his office, concerning a 
particular reform project, or about his general political style. Taken together, such pieces of 
evidence enable us to come to judgements about whether an official is more led by policy 
concerns, or is, conversely, more office- and power-oriented.  
 
3.4.3 Analysing Interview Data  
 
In contrast to the analysis conducted on texts, the analysis of interview protocols did not rely on an 
explicit operationalization of IL in terms of its underlying aspects. It would be tedious and 
unproductive to ask different experts and observers very detailed questions on whether key 
politicians used particular arguments in presenting and defending the reform.104  
More specifically, the aim of the interviews was to collect substantive information about the 
whole of the reform process rather than to focus exclusively on the question of leadership as seen 
from within the reformist political camp. The range of topics covered included, of course, the 
leadership style of central political actors, as well as (the perception of) their strategies, but also 
other aspects of the process including other relevant actors, and the development of the process. 
All of these elements cannot be captured as easily by the study of a combination of documents. As 
regards identifying evidence for certain aspects of IL, such as political consensus-building and the 
political orientation of supposed ideational leaders, questions were asked about whether political 
actors were result-oriented and tried to use their political network to engineer enough support to 
push through their policy proposal, and whether this was done for reasons of maintaining power or 
making sensible policy choices (although this proved difficult to disentangle empirically). In order 
to organize and analyze interview data in a systematic manner, and to enable a comparison of 
different accounts, I employed an analytic grid based on the interview schedule that captured the 
gist of the answers based on interviewee-approved protocols.   
 
3.4.4 Dimensions of Structural Reform and Empirical Indicators  
 
In Chapter 1, I defined the dependent variable in this study, structural reform. To reiterate briefly, 
it concerns reforms that involve structural shifts, i.e. changes in the distribution of either 
competences or responsibilities in the financing structure, the benefit structure, or the management 
of regulatory structure of a social policy programme. The nature of a structural shift depends on 
the particular dimension in question. The financing structure indicates how a programme is 
financed, and financing may be comprised of general taxation, payroll contributions, or insurance 
premiums. For instance, a clear shift from reliance on one source of financing to another source, or 
creating a new combination of sources can be seen as a structural shift. Concerning the benefit 
                                                           
 
 
 
104 Moreover, this strategy is problematic and little rewarding for the analyst due to the time elapsed between the reform 
processes and the interviews: interviewees tend to have difficulties remembering arguments in detail.  
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structure, benefits can be either means-tested, flat-rate, based on earnings, or based on payroll 
contributions, reflecting different rules of eligibility and ways of calculating them. I consider the 
reforms that stipulate shifts from one form of benefit to another form to be structural. Finally, the 
management or regulatory structure of a scheme specifies which actors take the decisions 
concerning its day-to-day management and/or implementation. Typically, this task rests with the 
state (or public agencies), the social partners or private actors. A structural shift in this dimension 
involves a change in the composition of managing actors, for instance, if the state decided to 
replace a managing body operating under public law with several private actors.  
The analytical distinction of different structural dimensions of policy programmes forms the 
basis for operationalizing the concept of structural reforms, that is, to identify them among the 
large number of reforms that are passed in social policy programmes. In other words, identifying a 
reform as structural involves scrutinizing the provisions contained in social policy legislation for 
shifts in the three structural dimensions of financing, benefits, and management, as outlined above. 
These shifts constitute at the same time the empirical indicators for structural reform, if the 
provisions of a piece of social policy legislation imply a shift in at least one of the dimensions. In 
this study, I have resorted to a combination of secondary sources so as to avoid the time-
consuming task of checking pieces of social policy legislation for these indicators. More 
specifically, these sources included a summary database of changes in German social policy 
legislation (Gohr and Seeleib-Kaiser 2003), analyses of German social policy developments that 
include the evaluation of reforms ( e.g. Alber 2001; Schmid 2002; Schmidt 2005), as well as 
newspaper-based compilations of social policy reforms (Süddeutsche Zeitung; Die Zeit). On the 
basis of these sources, I identified two clear examples of structural reforms, the Riester pension 
reform and the Hartz IV reform, which provided the context for the first and second case studies. 
As far as the third case on health care is concerned, indicators of structural shifts in the three 
policy dimensions were applied to the different pieces of reform legislation as part of the analysis 
in order to establish their character.   
While this part of Section 3 has elaborated on the operationalization of the independent (IL) 
and dependent variables (structural reform) of this study, the next part will address the usefulness 
of conducting a pilot study and discuss its results.   
 
3.4.5 Refining the Theoretical Framework Through a Dialogue Between Theory and 
Evidence: the Pilot Case  
3.4.5.1 The Rationale of a Pilot Case Study 
Before elaborating on the results of the pilot study, some general comments about their sense and 
utility are in place. Although more frequently used in large-scale quantitative studies involving 
surveys, pilot studies can also be fruitful in more qualitatively oriented case-study designs 
involving no more than just a handful of cases. In his well-known work on the purposes of case 
studies, Eckstein used the term plausibility probe to refer to what I call a pilot study. According to 
his reasoning, ‘plausibility probes involve attempts at determining whether potential validity may 
reasonably be considered great enough to warrant the pains and costs of testing’ (Opielka 2004: 
108). In this study, a pilot study was required to evaluate the validity of the initial theoretical 
framework. Regarding such evaluations, Eckstein argued that ‘at a minimum, a plausibility probe 
[...]  may simply attempt to establish that a theoretical construct is worth considering at all, i.e. that 
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an apparent empirical instance of it can be found’ (Esping-Andersen 1990: 109 ; Bonoli and Palier 
2000b).105 Similarly, the authors of a much-acclaimed work on social science methodology state 
that  
 
Pilot projects are often very useful, especially in research where data must be gathered by interviewing or 
other particularly costly means. Preliminary data gathering may lead us to alter the research questions or 
modify the theory. The new data can be gathered to test the new theory, and the problem of using the same 
data to generate and test a theory can be avoided (Palier 2002: 22-23). 
 
In addition to these more general goals of pilot studies, the one carried out in this project had three 
specific goals, being of a practical, theoretical, and methodological nature:  
 
• improving upon the initial operationalization  of IL, starting from some initial 
dimensions; 
• getting familiar with relevant sources; this applies mostly to documents but also to 
knowledgeable interviewees; 
• designing and presenting methods of analysis that combine the informational value of 
both documents and interview data 
 
From these goals, the first one (improving the initial operationalization of the IL concept) was the 
most important one theoretically-speaking, as the insights gained by focusing on the German 2001 
pension reform were to be used to refine its dimensions. The ultimate purpose was, eventually, to 
come up with a hypothesis that is more useful to work with than the initial one (not to be confused 
with exploring the validity of the hypothesis). This process is in line with a conception of social 
research where data and/or evidence on the one hand, and analytic frames, derived from ideas and 
theory on the other, inform each other (see Chapter 3 in Siegel 2002). More specifically, it was 
believed that the IL concept could gain if confronted with empirical data about a recent reform 
process. By comparing the theoretically-derived dimensions of ideational leadership with the 
actions of the key politician in the case, Minister Riester, the analytic frame was to be refined and 
attuned in line with the complexity of real-world data and the analyst’s understanding of IL, which 
developed in the process of data collection and analysis. At any rate, the goal was to come up with 
a workable theoretical framework that could be readily used in the second stage of the research 
design. 
3.4.5.2 Results of the Pilot Study and Amendments to the IL Framework 
This summary focuses on the implications of the pilot study’s findings with relevance to the 
theoretical framework. Next to the empirical research question on the form and the effects of IL, 
the question was what the analysis of the case would suggest in terms of the plausibility of the 
operationalized theoretical framework and the methodology used. The exercise in textual analysis 
showed that it was possible to detect and record pre-defined instances of text reflecting dimensions 
of the rather abstract concept of IL. The method proved suitable to detect general patterns of 
justification in documents such as opinion articles, speeches and interviews. Regarding the 
usefulness of the analytical categories defined earlier, the results suggest that the indicators of the 
                                                           
 
 
 
105 Conversely, a plausibility probe may reveal that empirical instances or a theoretical concept cannot be found and thus 
needs to be refuted. To allow for this possibility, I also formulated negative instances of IL aspects in my operationalization 
of IL.  
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first and second aspects of IL (giving arguments that de-legitimize the status-quo and legitimize 
reform proposals) may be used in the second stage of the research design with minor changes.106 
Judging the plausibility of the third aspect (framing reform resistance as problematic) is somewhat 
more difficult since statements about the behaviour of reform opponents occurred much less 
frequently than statements concerning the first two aspects. Moreover, they occurred in the context 
of direct confrontation of reformists with the parliamentary opposition, with the former 
denouncing the latter for playing tactical games so as to obstruct reform adoption. This casts doubt 
on the need for the distinction to be made in the operationalization of the third aspect (between 
societal welfare in general and the interests of certain societal groups). The reasons for this may lie 
in either the selection of documents (implying that arguments about reform resistance and interest 
groups may well be found in other documents), or in the fact that politicians simply do not use 
such arguments and, consequently, the third aspect might not be helpful for describing (and 
identifying) ideational leadership at all. I decided to keep the aspect in the framework, but to 
narrow it down to concern with societal welfare, and not necessarily with the bargaining position 
of interest groups and the long-term welfare of their constituencies. The first part of the analysis in 
the pilot study based on texts thus helped to identify the communicative efforts of key politicians 
and judge the usefulness of the analytical categories designed to do so.  
However, much more information about the reform process and, especially, on how this 
communication was received, was gained through the analysis of interview data.107 For instance, a 
majority of interviewees acknowledged leadership of Minister Riester, in the sense of 
acknowledging his skilful communicative efforts to both inform about and justify reforms by 
argument. Yet many of those interviewed pointed to difficulties caused by the minister’s 
leadership style in other respects, especially as far as the communication with the SPD 
parliamentary party and their junior coalition partner, the Greens, was concerned. Little sensitivity 
to reform-resistant circles and their potential influence, as well as the choice for developing a far-
reaching reform project within the confines of the ministry before going public do not merely 
reflect a strategic choice, but also a lack of insight into how to build consensus for the proposal. In 
that sense, interviewees’ observations highlighted the need for another aspect to the IL concept, 
which takes into account a key politician’s awareness of, and sensitivity to consensus-building in 
the political arena.108 In addition, this insight from the pilot study underpinned another aspect of 
IL. Apart from pointing out the need for an IL-type leader to engage in consensus-building 
                                                           
 
 
 
106 Concerning the first aspect, the literature on reformist or innovative leadership and on policy learning and failure 
assumes that political actors break radically with the status-quo, pointing to its ineffectiveness. Yet the material on the 
German case illustrates that the minister referred to ‘old’ institutions, i.e. the statutory pension scheme, in almost respectful 
terms (this may be due to a political context where discrediting ‘long-serving’ institutions is not easily done, and to the 
characteristics of a PAYGO system which has created powerful legal rights based on contributions). This suggests that the 
indicators for the first aspect of IL (‘exposing the ills of the status quo’) need to be adapted accordingly, i.e. that an 
ideational leader may maintain some policy principles while introducing others. Yet, this does not change the core meaning 
of the aspect, i.e. pointing out the ills of the status-quo and adds an additional nuance. Concerning the second aspect, old 
policy principles are, in the pension reform case, not discarded completely as they are still seen valuable but no longer 
sufficient to deal with current demographic and economic circumstances; therefore they need to be complemented by new 
ones (see Riester’s motto ‘Solidarität mit Gewinn’): this point complements the operationalization  of the 2nd IL aspect.  
107 It should be stressed here that the purpose of the interviews was to reconstruct the reform process by and large through a 
wide range of different perceptions rather than to reconstruct it meticulously in all of its details. If the latter had been the 
goal of this study, hundreds of interviewees would have been needed, which would have exceeded the available time and 
resources.  
108 The aspect of consensus-building replaced an initial fourth aspect of IL named ‘anticipating bureaucratic bottlenecks’, 
was dropped from the framework due to a lack of relevance for the reform process and measurement problems.  
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activities, it also reinforced another assumption related to the orientation or motivation of policy-
makers, namely that IL-type policy-makers engage in far-ranging reforms not simply because it is 
their task or because they are driven by electoral concerns. They also do so because of a personal 
concern with the subject matter they are working on, which may induce such policy-makers to 
become competent and knowledgeable in all of its facets (compare Chapter 2, paragraph 4.2.5). 
Through his engagement in the pension reform case, Minister of Labour Affairs Riester provided a 
good example of such policy-orientation. In short, the results of the pilot led to the following 
conceptualization of IL: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Amended Conceptualization of IL 
 
 
To conclude, this sub-section dealt with the purpose and results of the first case study, which 
was initially designed as a pilot. It started out with three goals of a practical, theoretical and 
methodological nature. To what extent have these goals been achieved? In terms of theory 
(improving upon the initial operationalization of IL), the analysis of both textual and interview 
data have revealed that the aspects of IL needed some fine-tuning, and amendments were made to 
the theoretical framework. In terms of the practical and methodological goals (data gathering and 
processing), the pilot has also served its purpose. Firstly, practice in locating suitable documents 
has been acquired as well as experience with selecting and approaching interviewees, and 
inquiring about contacts for subsequent cases. Secondly, the triangulation of data sources was 
found to be beneficial: for instance, while textual analysis of documents helped to spot evidence 
(e.g. examples of reformists’ argumentation) that could not be explored by interviews, the latter 
yielded hints about this  argumentation was received (which is impossible to infer from documents 
alone).  
 
3.5 Data Sources and Methods of Analysis 
 
After explaining the general analytic strategy, this section turns to the sources and methods of data 
analysis in the empirical case studies. It will give a general overview of the materials and sources 
for gathering the data needed to answer the empirical research question. The sources used can 
roughly be categorized as documents on the one hand, and interviews conducted by myself on the 
other.  
Aspects of IL    
 
Communicative/behavioural aspects 
 
1) Exposing drawbacks of the policy status quo  
2) Making consistent efforts to legitimize new policy principles (amended)  
3) Engaging with reform opponents by framing their resistance as ‘problematic’ for societal 
welfare (amended) 
4) Making efforts at political consensus-building to muster support for a particular reform 
(added)                            
  
Orientation/motivation aspect 
 
5) IL-type policy-makers are predominantly policy-oriented  
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3.5.1 Documents and Methods of Analysis  
 
The first group of sources, documents, can be further classified as either primary or secondary 
sources. Primary documents included parliamentary documents (plenary protocols, draft bills, 
motions, commission reports),109 a variety of documents produced by individual members of the 
government (speeches, statements and biographical accounts) and ministries (ministerial 
declarations, policy draft papers, programmes, implementation schedules; communications by 
individual officials), and the government more generally (declarations on policy programmes, such 
as Agenda 2010, position papers on policy development and evaluation) as well as regular 
publications by ministries and other government agencies (e.g. Bundesagentur für Arbeit). This 
category also covered reports by commissions and working groups advising on or preparing input 
for reform legislation, internal communications of political parties, and policy statements, press 
declarations and publications by the social partners (especially by trade unions) and other policy 
stakeholders involved in the making or administration of policy (e.g. local government 
associations, sickness funds, health care providers). Regarding secondary sources, I consulted a 
combination of scholarly sources and press articles. The former consisted of research reports and 
working papers, academic journal articles, books and dissertations dealing with (aspects of) 
specific reform processes or with reform developments in German social policy (generally or 
concerning specific sectors). As for the latter, I drew on media coverage of policy developments 
and specific reform processes and relevant opinion articles in quality print media (such as the daily 
papers Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Frankfurter Rundschau, 
Handelsblatt and others; and the weeklies Die Zeit and Der SPIEGEL).  
The aim of combining primary and secondary documents was to get a better overview of the 
development of policy proposals and relevant debates. Furthermore, both sources taken together 
provided an outline of the policy-making environment and the positions of relevant actors before 
the initiation of legislative processes by the government and the formal decision-making by 
parliament. While many of these primary and secondary documents served to gather information 
about the policy process in a general sense, those sources containing arguments of ministers, such 
as speeches, parliamentary proceedings and press interviews, were analysed more thoroughly. I 
selected sources, in which one could expect to find relevant arguments about policy failure and the 
legitimization (by stressing the necessity and appropriateness) of reforms. Texts produced by 
reformists themselves, and first and foremost those written or presented by the relevant minister, 
seemed a logical choice. For instance, I worked with a selection of available speeches (e.g. 
delivered in the context of a parliamentary debate or to a party audience), press interviews, articles 
written by ministers for newspapers and magazines; and, in the first case study, with a 
biographical account written after Minister Riester left office.110 The minister’s biography 
constituted a convenient source revealing his thoughts on his largest reform project before, during 
and after the reform process. Despite its obvious limitations (bibliographical accounts seldom offer 
                                                           
 
 
 
109 These were accessed via the online legislative databases of the Bundestag (http://www.bundestag.de), but I also 
consulted the relevant collections of ‘legislative documentation’ (Gesetzesdokumentationen) in the Bundestag 
Parliamentary Archive in Berlin.  
110 I do not claim that the selected texts are comparable in all respects, since they vary considerably in length, audience and 
purpose. However, looking at materials written for different contexts and at different points in time during a reform process 
should ensure a fairly good representation of the reformists’ approach to justify and legitimize reform proposals vis-à-vis 
the political arena and the public. 
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neat answers to the particular questions of an analyst), it disclosed the perceptions of a central 
actor on the reform process, in a similar fashion to those explored in the expert interviews.111 
Regarding the other two ministers, Clement and Seehofer, biographical accounts were not 
available and neither did they consent to being interviewed, which necessitated consulting 
alternative sources and interviewees (but see Section 3.5.2 below). 
The analytical method performed on this selection of documents is relatively straightforward 
and can be described as qualitative content analysis. In a first reading of the texts, documents were 
pre-structured according to functional criteria (such as introduction, presentation of policy goals 
and instruments and explication of the state of the policy sector). Next, passages containing 
relevant information surrounding the issue of reform were identified, classified, and recorded 
using the indicators belonging to the categories derived from the IL aspects. In this fashion, whole 
sentences or phrases within sentences were turned into evidence of pre-defined indicators and 
could (after their translation into English) be included as direct or indirect citations in the case 
study reports. 
 
3.5.2 Interview Accounts and Methods of Analysis 
 
Alongside the study of documents, I chose interviews as my second important data source. Despite 
the time-consuming and costly character of this method of data collection, I considered it a 
necessary complement to the analysis of textual material. The goal was to collect perceptions and 
views of a diverse range of individuals holding different positions in various organizations who 
had been involved either as direct participants in or close observers of political processes.112 I 
considered these individuals to be an asset both for gathering factual information and personal 
views and experiences, and to reveal different viewpoints on the same social policy processes. For 
the study as a whole, I collected data based on conversations and other sorts of communication 
with more than thirty individuals; most of whom I met in the context of face-to-face interviews. 
The motive behind conducting these interviews was to reach a balanced understanding of reform 
processes, and to make a satisfactory assessment of the relative influence of strategies associated 
with IL. More specifically, the interviews were designed to generate first-hand knowledge about 
the course of the reform process, the strategies used by reformists, the leadership style of the 
minister, how it came to the acceptance of reforms and what factors may have helped reformists to 
push through reforms. The individuals to be interviewed included expert observers of policy 
development and policy-making, i.e. social policy specialists from private and public research 
bodies, as well as from universities. In addition, I aimed to consult actors involved in the policy 
process, such as parliamentarians specializing in social policy issues, trade union officials, and 
representatives of other stakeholders and interest groups.  
The first case was based on nine interviews in total, eight of which were conducted in person 
and one via e-mail. For the Hartz- IV case, the count was ten genuine interviews, two telephone 
interviews and one communication via e-mail. Finally, for the health care case, thirteen face-to-
face interviews were held. The style of the interviews was half-structured, rather than non-
structured, in order to ensure that important points were covered and to obtain comparable 
                                                           
 
 
 
111 Although former minister Riester was not available for an interview on his pension reform project, the availability of his 
biography made up for this to some extent. Given his account, I learned about his ideas on the need for reform and breaking 
away from the policy status-quo, and his views on policy-making and political power defining his political style. 
112 See the Appendix for more details about interviewees.   
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accounts of answers. In conducting the conversations, I made use of an interview schedule that 
covered the following topics and could be adapted for each case and interviewee if necessary: 
interviewees’ perceptions concerning the process in general, the main actors in favour of and 
against the reform proposals, strategies followed by those who advocated the reform (consisting of 
a communicative strategy related to IL, and two strategies corresponding to the two alternative 
explanations), reasons for the increase in reform acceptance and factors that may have facilitated 
eventual reform adoption. Questions were pre-formulated based on the topics and, where 
necessary, followed up by probing questions.  
Regarding the analysis of interview material, I worked with transcripts of the conversations 
that covered the main points made by the interviewee rather than complete word protocols. As 
with documents, I applied qualitative content analysis to the transcripts. By comparing and 
contrasting the accounts with the help of an analytical grid, I recorded relevant views, arguments, 
and other sorts of background information that were to appear as direct or indirect citations in the 
various case study reports. Since the great majority of interviewees preferred anonymity, the 
Appendix lists them by their position and organizational affiliation only. In order to ensure both 
accuracy and reliability of the three analyses of complex reform processes, the finished analyses 
were sent to those interviewees who had provided valuable input for writing them, as well as to the 
three key politicians concerned, Riester, Clement, and Seehofer, who had not been interviewed. 
The reactions received were positive and affirmative with regard to the scope and depth of the 
analysis. Those responding to my request found their views and opinions accurately represented 
and gave positive comments about the thoroughness of the analyses. Former Minister Wolfgang 
Clement personally endorsed and welcomed the analysis of the Hartz IV reform.113    
 
3.5.3 Organisation of Cases and Data Collection  
 
Figure 3, which serves as a heuristic device, illustrates the steps followed in organizing data 
collection and analysis in the context of the first two cases. The list of steps gives an impression of 
what the case approach entailed in terms of data collection and analysis, excluding the techniques 
used to conduct the actual analysis of the material collected. Concerning the third case, Step 1 did 
not apply since the time frame was already defined by the period in office of the minister chosen. 
Furthermore, the focus in this case lay more on re-constructing the politics surrounding the 
reforms, while paying attention to whether the minister’s role reflected aspects of IL, to evaluate 
the initial choice of the minister as presumed ideational leader, and the assessment of reform 
outcomes (see Section 2.2. above and Chapter 7).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
 
 
 
113 Personal communication, 22.11.06 and 28.11.06, see also Chapter 6, footnote 183.  
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Figure 3.3: Case Study Organization  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
To conclude, this chapter has outlined and motivated the methodological choices I have made in 
this project. It has presented a variant of the case study method, the multiple case study, as a 
suitable research design to assess the concept of IL, searching for the theorized links between IL 
and the adoption of path-breaking social policy reforms. Next, it has defined the unit of analysis 
and the parameters of the case study, including the rationale for using a multiple case design and 
the analytic strategies used to evaluate the IL hypothesis. The main empirical question is to what 
extent ideational leadership can be observed in the reform processes, and how it relates to the 
adoption of structural reforms. Within the design, each case fulfils a distinct function and has a 
slightly different emphasis. The first case study primarily serves to check whether evidence of IL 
can be found in the empirical material at all. The second case is meant to confirm the conclusions 
about the plausibility of IL and to look at its effects on structural reform, as far as the data allows 
conclusions about them. In the third and final cases, the focus lies on looking at whether the 
reverse relationship holds, i.e. whether a presumed ideational leader also manages to adopt 
structural reforms and whether a selection on reputation-based criteria can be confirmed by (some 
of the) aspects of IL used in the first two case studies. Moreover, I have presented an 
operationalization of the main concepts, IL and structural reform, capturing the former in five 
categories of actors’ communicative and consensus-seeking behaviour as well as motivation, and 
the latter in three structural dimensions of policy (financing, benefits and regulation). This was 
followed by reporting the motives for and the results of a pilot case study, explaining how this 
resulted in a fine-tuning of the initial theoretical framework. The chapter ended by presenting the 
study’s main sources, documents and semi-structured interviews; my approach to data collection; 
and as a way to making sense of written and interview data, the analytic method of qualitative 
content analysis. 
Preparation and Data Collection: 
Step 1:   Selecting a time frame of the reform process for the analysis 
Step 2:   Getting an overall picture of the main actors in the reform            
              process and their initial policy positions 
Step 3:   Selecting a mix of documents 
Step 4:   Selecting interviewees and conducting interviews 
 
Analysis:  
Step 5:   Performing text analysis using pre-defined indicators 
Step 6:   Comparing and contrasting interview accounts using an analytic 
              grid 
Step 7:   Evaluating plausibility of alternative explanations with the help 
              of both sources 
Step 8:   Combining information from Steps 5 through 7 to draw  
              conclusions on presence and effects of IL relative to alternative                   
              explanations  
Step 9:   Evaluating whether reform outcomes were structural in  
              character (this replaces Steps 7 and 8 in Case 3) 
 4. Surveying the German Welfare State: Challenges, Policy 
Developments and Causes of Resilience  
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter provides a link between the explanation of the puzzle at the heart of this study and its 
empirical part by taking a closer look at the assertion about the strong reform resistance associated 
with the German welfare state. It will zoom in on this resistance by providing an overview of the 
main macro-level (regime-level, political-institutional context) and meso-level (programme-level) 
characteristics of German social policy arrangements. Section 4.2 presents the main characteristics 
and principles on which this - in essence Bismarckian - welfare state regime is built. Some of these 
principles can still be seen more than 125 years after Bismarck created the first social insurance 
programmes. The discussion includes the principles of wage-centred social insurance; ensuring the 
former standard of living; familialism; and corporatism. The second part of the section describes 
the various “post-industrial” pressures that are impacting on mature welfare states and the specific 
reaction of the Continental type, leading to ‘welfare without work’ (Esping-Andersen 1996). In the 
specific German context, this implies that the effects of external shocks on employment and state 
finances have been buffered by using social policy programmes and their budgets. Section 4.3 
summarizes what German governments have undertaken in reacting to the pressures on social 
policy arrangements and reviews overall trends in policy development since 1975. It is organized 
chronologically and considers the record of the Social-Liberal coalition, the Christian Democrat-
Liberal coalition and the Red-Green coalition ( see for 1998-2003 also Myles and Pierson 2001; 
Swank; Palier). The purpose is to illustrate how the major policy programmes evolved over time - 
complementary to and in more detail than the subsequent case studies are able to provide - and to 
show when patterns of cost-containment or consolidation were punctuated by reforms that went 
further than incremental changes, i.e. reforms inducing shifts in the structures of those 
programmes.114 Given the limited and deficient response of German policy-makers to pressures on 
the welfare state, Section 4.4 then turns to the supposed sources of resistance to comprehensive 
change. It first discusses the sources of “stickiness” on the level of political institutions and then 
probes into those linked to social policy programmes. Central to the discussion will be the three 
policy sectors to be analyzed in the empirical chapters: old-age pensions, unemployment 
insurance, and health care, whose features are also briefly introduced (see for detailed 
introductions of social policy programmes e.g. Leisering 2000; Palier 2002; Bleses and Seeleib-
Kaiser 2004; Schmidt 2005). Policy-making on old-age pensions is subject to the influence of 
trade unions, employers and public pension insurers. The effects of policy legacies (and therefore 
                                                           
 
 
 
114 A survey of recent debates on social policy reform, some of which have the potential to make further inroads into 
traditional resistance to change can be found in the afterword. They concern pensions (increasing the legal pension age), 
further activation of the unemployed (revision of the Hartz reforms) and a financing reform of the statutory health 
insurance. 
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path-dependence) are especially salient here because of the particularities of the PAYGO-scheme 
(which makes switching to another system especially costly),115 but also due to other programme 
characteristics. Secondly, the regulation of unemployment insurance, as one important element of 
labour market policy, is subject to the influence of the social partners. The relevant sources of 
resistance to change relate to self-governance and the ability of the social partners to agree 
collectively on the terms of work for labour. Thirdly, the health care sector is notorious for its 
plethora of interest groups and, specific to the German case, structures of self-governance, which 
are in many ways interlinked with political institutions. The effects of policy legacies can be felt, 
for instance, in the contribution-financed statutory health insurance. The remaining policy sectors, 
social assistance and long-term care, are arguably less relevant for a discussion of policy legacies 
and will only be addressed briefly.116  
 
4.2 The Continental Welfare State and its German Prototype 
 
4.2.1 Macro-Level Characteristics 
 
Esping-Andersen’s seminal contribution to the conceptualization of the welfare state was his work 
on welfare state regimes (Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004), which has widely been used in the 
literature dealing with social policy change and reforms, assessing, for instance, the extent to 
which there has been convergence towards one specific regime type. Next to the Social 
Democratic and Liberal types, Esping-Andersen distinguished the Continental or Conservative 
welfare state, which is my main concern here. This type of regime is based on the kind of social 
insurance introduced by Bismarck in the 1880’s and has at least four main characteristics. While 
explaining these briefly, I will also point out why they are potentially linked to change resistance.  
Firstly, the Continental welfare state rests mainly on the wage-centred social insurance 
principle. That is to say, its benefits and services are financed by contributions withheld from 
wages, rather than financed by general taxation. This defines both the nature of the benefit 
(contribution-based rather than flat-rate) as well as their financing source (workers and employees 
rather than the general population). At the same time, contribution-based benefits tend to be 
associated with “earned” or rather accumulated rights, which may pose legal and technical 
problems to retrenchment and reforms. In addition, trade unions, which represent contributors, 
may be expected to defend these benefits. Secondly, the Continental welfare state is biased 
towards granting benefits to male bread-winners. The usually generous provision of benefits is 
geared towards ensuring the previous standard of living in cases of illness, old age and 
unemployment. Thirdly, this welfare state type exhibits a focus on familialism, i.e. its programmes 
and benefits are tailored to the male breadwinner, while his family provides a safety net that plays 
                                                           
 
 
 
115 Under a PAYGO scheme, old-age pension benefits are financed mainly by wage-based pension contributions borne by 
employers and employees in equal parts. The level of benefits is dependent on the level of contributions (and ultimately this 
depends on employment levels, being vulnerable to demographic and economic developments).  
116 Social assistance is also considered in Chapter 6, while long-term care, as the most recent social policy programme, will 
be considered more than an example and consequences of path dependence than a programme showing lock-in effects 
itself.  
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a supplementary role: it is expected to take over responsibilities that, in other welfare state types, 
belong to the state (e.g. the provision of public day care in Scandinavian welfare states), or are left 
to the market (e.g. the provision of private day care in Liberal welfare states). Such biases come at 
the expense of the availability of social care services such as they exist in Scandinavian welfare 
states. The last two principles define the beneficiaries of welfare state arrangements as well as the 
nature and generosity of benefits. As a rule of thumb, generous earnings-related benefits tend to 
receive more (political) support from large parts of the population than targeted and flat-rate 
benefits and reducing them may be much more difficult (Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004).117 It is 
to be noted that the first three characteristics are linked to the welfare regime type: ensuring living 
standards, putting a prime on the family as “service provider” and maintaining differences of 
status according to occupation.  
Fourthly, as Schludi (2001: 63) points out in his discussion of pension reforms, Conservative 
welfare states also tend to be corporatist in nature. They usually allow for a partial decentralization 
of state authority to quasi-public administrative bodies which are often controlled by 
representatives of business and labour, i.e. the social partners. According to several authors, this 
characteristic increases the number of key actors in welfare state politics, giving them plenty of 
opportunities to delay or obstruct policy change contrary to their interests (Esping-Andersen 1996; 
Andersen 2003; Genschel 2004). In turn, this diminishes the state’s capacity to control social 
policy development, for instance, by adding actors who legitimately participate in debates about 
welfare state reform (Palier 2002). In addition, Myles and Pierson point out that the role for trade 
unions in the administration of social policy transfers grants them a de facto veto power against 
reforms (Leibfried and Pierson 1995; Scharpf 2002 ; Glatzer and Rueschemeyer 2005). 
Concerning the German context, Leisering states that “intermediaries”- organizations that stand 
between the state and individual beneficiaries - are characteristic of the provision of welfare. In as 
far as these organisations enjoy a privileged legal status as providers and coordinators of social 
services they form part of a state-regulated and corporatist structure of society. Potentially, such 
intermediaries can produce a high level of flexibility, but the extent to which they form a 
corporatistically regulated and solidified actor structure means that they also constitute a source of 
paralysis. Corporatism and regulation appear to many as a main source of inflexibility in the 
process of adapting to global challenges (Leibfried 2005).  
Among the Continental European welfare states, the post-war German welfare state can be 
literally described as its prototype. During its “Golden Era”, that is, up to the mid-1970’s, it 
exhibited fully the characteristics identified by Esping-Andersen. Through the course of its historic 
development (Ferrera 2005; Steffen 2005), Germany became characterized by a wage-earner-
centred social policy, which carried certain implications in terms of requirements for employment 
relationships and benefit recipients. Wage-earner centred implied two things: a social policy that 
applied more or less to male earners or bread-winners and an associated sphere of unpaid welfare 
services by married women. Moreover, the male bread-winner’s mode of employment was the 
standard employment relationship, resting on four assumptions: work as dependent work with a 
single employer, or as full-time job; a salary higher than the subsistence level; a continuous, as 
                                                           
 
 
 
117 Flat-rate benefits are less likely to be supported by medium and high-income earners than earnings-related benefits, as 
with rising incomes, flat-rate benefit will not contribute more to someone’s standard of living. The political implication is 
that flat-rate (and low level) benefit structures might be related to a lack of support from medium and high income earners. 
As wage inequality increases, such benefits are supported mainly for ideological reasons rather than based on material 
interest and are more easily subjected to criticism. Thus, it is easier to reduce flat-rate/means-tested benefits than 
contributory ones (Palier 2002). 
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well as sufficiently long employment history; a life course following the education-work-
retirement track;  and, income and social policy status of the earner’s wife and children derived 
from and dependent upon the male breadwinner status (Muckenberger 1985 cited in  Stiller 
2006:18). From these assumptions, the wage-earner approach establishes some rules concerning 
the entitlement to social benefits: before receiving them, someone must have been in employment; 
benefits are based on the level of previous earnings; and, while someone is receiving benefits, he 
or she should demonstrate his willingness to work (this does not apply to retirement benefits). 
While these rules define entitlements for those who have formerly been or are currently able to 
work, only those who do not meet such criteria should resort to other forms of benefits, i.e. tax-
financed social assistance. The corollary is that this social policy model can only function as long 
as the majority of the working population is in a standard employment relationship (implying also 
that women stayed home for care) and employment is freely available (Lewis 2002: 18-19).  
From these assumptions and rules we can clearly recognize the aims at the core of 
Continental welfare states: familialism and securing current standards of living. The focus on 
bread-winners ensured that women tended to look after their children (although it did not exclude 
them from work completely), and the link between previous earnings and benefits ensured that 
those receiving benefits could more or less rely on an income in case of old-age, long-term illness 
or unemployment. This brief discussion of the wage-earner principle indicates that some crucial 
conditions need to be met in order to make the system work properly. Since the end of the welfare 
state’s “Golden Era”, however, some of these conditions have certainly been eroded, which was 
mirrored in the literature by a focus on its “crisis”. After having zoomed in on the core principles 
of the Continental welfare state and the specific implications of the wage-earner approach for 
German social policy, I now take a closer look at adjustment pressures and how Continental 
welfare states have reacted to them.   
 
4.2.2 Pressures on Contemporary Welfare States  
 
By the end of the 20th century, it had become indisputable that modern welfare states had come 
under pressure to adapt their institutional make-up in response to changes of a political, social and 
economic nature. This concern has also been reflected in the comparative welfare literature since 
the mid-1990’s (Bonoli 2005). One basic problem of Continental welfare states (and other welfare 
state types) is that the post-war conditions, under which the welfare state was created and its 
programmes were developed and implemented, no longer hold (ibid: 21). To recapitulate the more 
specific sources of pressure, these are changes in social and economic conditions which threaten 
the fundamentals of the welfare state’s policy arrangements: they include the changing nature of 
employment and the development of post-fordist labour markets, changes in family composition 
and the role of women, and, finally, unfavourable demographic developments such as ageing and 
declining birth rates (Pierson 1998). The combined effect of these developments has affected the 
standard employment relationship, the male bread-winner model, and the earner-centred 
contribution base, upon all of which the Continental welfare state was built. Some of these 
developments are challenging some specific programmes more than others; I will now discuss 
each of them in turn, focusing on endogenous sources of strain.118 
                                                           
 
 
 
118 To these largely endogenous sources of strain on welfare states, one may add a decline of traditional corporatist patterns 
of interest intermediation as well as external pressures stemming from developments such as globalization and intensified. 
European integration (van Kersbergen 2000: 22). For reasons of space, these trends are not discussed in detail here.  
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Firstly, changes in family values and gender roles have resulted in a decline in the traditional 
family, which has been increasingly replaced by households made up of single persons and single 
(or divorced) parents. In addition, the division of labour within families has been changing. The 
former has led to relatively more claims on social benefits and/or child care services from these 
households; the latter development has resulted in a questioning of traditional assumptions built 
into welfare state programmes on who should receive social benefits (Scharpf 2000a). In addition, 
different household structures combined with new forms of work (see below) have generated new 
social needs and demands that are denoted as “new social risks”. Such risks include reconciling 
work and family life, lone parenthood, long-term unemployment, belonging to the so-called 
working poor, or insuﬀicient social security coverage. New risks tend to be concentrated among 
women, the young, and low skilled workers (Scharpf 2000a). 
As far as the organization of economies and the situation of labour markets and employment 
are concerned, many changes have occurred in that sphere, too. These include a slowdown of 
productivity and economic growth compared to the post-war era (Hemerijck, Manow et al. 2000); 
a transition to post-fordist (or post-industrial) labour markets, implying deindustrialization, a 
growth of the service sector, new technologies; and flexibilization of employment that affected 
employment patterns, leading to less life-long careers and more variety in employment types, 
including temporary and irregular work (Manow and Seils 2000). The consequences for the 
welfare state and its programmes may be direct, as their sustainability is affected by an overall 
reduction of stable contribution revenues (endangering the financing base of programmes), and the 
fact that less stable employment and lower growth rates tend to produce especially higher 
structural levels of unemployment (especially with rigid labour markets), putting a greater strain 
on corresponding benefit schemes (Pierson 1998: 544). Also, the effect may be indirect, as the 
governments of advanced welfare states face a ‘trilemma of the service economy’. In line with this 
argument, governments need to increasingly balance conflicting goals of employment growth, 
wage equality and budgetary requirements (Manow 2001 in Pierson 1998:544 ). I will readdress 
the problem below when the response of Continental welfare states is explained. In addition, a 
related argument is that the past expansion of welfare states led to mature and costly welfare states 
and sizeable fiscal commitments for governments that hamper policy flexibility, constantly create 
budgetary pressures and thus set extra constraints on governmental use of revenues. Of these 
commitments, health care and pension schemes make up the largest proportion. Sizeable 
commitments are also claimed to drive up unemployment because of upward pressure on the 
taxation of labour through increasing social policy contributions (Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004). 
During the mid-1970’s, these contributions as a share of gross wage still totalled about 30 percent, 
but rose to over 35 percent in the mid-1980’s and reached a critical threshold of 40 percent in the 
mid-1990’s (Döhler 1995:673).119 In 2003, contributions had reached about 42 percent of gross 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
 
 
Concerning the influence of globalization on welfare states, there exists a sizeable literature disagreeing about the precise 
nature of the relationship, i.e. whether there is a negative or positive impact, and the mechanisms involved (see for 
overviews of the literature Andersen 2003; Genschel 2004). In a recent contribution to the debate, an edited volume by 
Glatzer and Rueschemeyer stresses the mediating effect of domestic institutions and political struggles on the effect of 
globalization on welfare states (Glatzer and Rueschemeyer 2005). Similarly, with European integration (or 
‘Europeanization’) it is difficult to detect effects on national social policy because of conceptualization issues; in addition, 
its effects on national social policies are hard to trace empirically. In addition, there is disagreement as well as differing 
empirical evidence the strength of such effects  (see for examples on both issues Leibfried and Pierson 1995; Scharpf 2002; 
Ferrera 2005; Leibfried 2005; Steffen 2005; Stiller 2006). 
119 The strong rise of contributions in the 1990s was caused by a number of extraordinary factors: the introduction of long-
term care insurance; additional burdens for social insurances because of reunification and the increase of other sorts of 
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wages (including both contributions from employers and employees) with contributions for 
pensions (19.5 percent) and health care (on average 14.3 percent) making up the bulk of this 
amount.  
The sensitivity of experts (especially economists) and policy-makers to the (supposedly 
adverse) effects of non-wage labour costs and its employment effects has considerably increased 
since the mid-1990’s. This has resulted more recently in concrete pledges of policy-makers to at 
least contain or lower the rise of contribution rates: to give two examples, the 2003 reform 
programme Agenda 2010 of Chancellor Schröder was intended to decrease non-wage labour costs 
from 42 to at least 40 percent.120 Also, the current CDU/CSU-SPD government took up the issue 
in its coalition agreement of fall 2005, striving to keep social contribution rates durably below 40 
percent.121 Finally, a combination of demographic trends that lead to population ageing is a final 
and important challenge for welfare states. The combination of longer life expectancy and 
decreasing birth rates has led to a growing share of the population aged 65 and older.122   
The corresponding figures for Germany envisage increases in the retired population (65 years 
and older) from 15 percent in 1990 to 26.1 percent in 2030 and 28.4 percent in 2050 (UN 
Population Division 1999 in: Rosewitz and Webber 1990:44 ). The predictions of the German 
Statistical Office are even more drastic: in its 2003 population outlook it concluded that the 
proportion of those aged over 60 is to increase from a current 23 percent to 37 percent during the 
next fifty years; at the same time, the proportion of those under 20 years is to decrease from 21.3 
percent to 16 percent. Through these changes, the German population, given a certain level of net 
immigration, will shrink from 82 million to 75 million during the same time period. As life 
expectancy still increases, the higher proportion of retired people will drive up the average age of 
the population; at the same time, the share of the working population will decrease by 15 to 30 
percent until the year 2040 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2003 in: Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004:25). 
These developments have immediate and far-reaching implications for social policy programmes: 
on average older populations put more strain on (statutory) pension and health care schemes, while 
the amount of contributions tends to decline (because of a decrease in those paying contributions); 
this necessitates a search for complementary sources of funding if current benefits and service are 
to be maintained. Fiscal strain on these two schemes in particular is set to increase, the average 
increase in pension spending between 2000 and 2030 is set at 3.9 percent of GDP across the 
OECD countries, for health care provisions, it is set at 1.7 percent, totalling an average increase of 
expenditures for these two programmes of 5.6 percent of GDP (OECD 1996 in Pierson 1998: 550-
551). As far as Germany is concerned, the proportion of GDP spent on pensions and health care 
has shown a continuous upward trend since reunification (1992: pensions 10.5; health care 10.4 
percent; 2000: pensions 10.9; health care 10.7 percent; 2003: pensions 12.4; health care 10.9 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
 
 
(‘versicherungsfremde’) expenditures, such as pension payments to migrants from the former ethnic German areas in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Ibid: 674).  
120 Speech by Chancellor Schröder to Parliament, Mut zum Frieden und Mut zur Veränderung, 14.03.2003, Bundestag 
parliamentary protocol 15/32, p. 2479-2493.  
121 Coalition agreement of CDU/CSU-SPD 11.11.05, ‘Gemeinsam für Deutschland – mit Mut und Menschlich-keit’, p.21, 
source: http://www.bundesrat.de/nn_38758/DE/foederalismus/bundesstaatskommission/Mitglieder/ 
Koalitionsvertrag,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/Koalitionsvertrag.pdf 
122 While the percentage of the population in the OECD countries aged over 65 was still 9.4 percent in 1960, it was 
projected to rise to nearly 14 percent by the year 2000 and is anticipated to reach 23 percent by the year 2035, with the 
major part of this transition to occur from 2010 onwards, when the large cohort of ‘baby boomers’ are retiring (OECD 
1995, 1998 in Pierson 1998: 550).  
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percent).123 In a ten-year period, the ratio for pension expenditure/GDP has thus risen by 1.9 
percent and for health care by 0.5 percent, combining to 2.4 percent. With the onset of 
demographic effects after 2010, this trend is set to continue. 
 
4.2.3 Reactions of Continental Welfare States to Pressures: ‘Welfare Without Work’ 
 
With regard to the reaction of Continental welfare states to these pressures, their problems with 
responding to the changing economic situation (and to economic crises) have received the most 
attention in the literature. The gist of the arguments is that such crises, which usually bring about 
unemployment and higher burdens on public budgets, tend to threaten its basic workings. In the 
following, I will refer to the difficulties of adjustment that relate to the characteristics of 
Continental welfare states in general. At the same time, these problems are particularly relevant for 
Germany, given that the country has had to cope with a particular challenge, in many respects 
comparable to an external economic shock, namely reunification (Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 
2004). The fiscal and economic implications of integrating Eastern Germany into the Federal 
Republic were heavy burdens on public budgets and social security systems, which exacerbated or 
intensified other sorts of pressure and were not experienced by other countries.  
In reaction to the challenges described above (and in particular economic pressures), the 
Continental model seems to be unable to generate employment growth. Instead, labour markets are 
characterized by high and chronic unemployment levels, especially among the young, low female 
participation in the work force, and sluggish service sector growth. All of these factors combine 
and make labour markets into typical “insider-outsider” markets (Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004: 
78-79). Esping-Andersen argues that the model:  
 
(...) has an inbuilt tendency to eat the very hand that feeds it. Unable to promote employment expansion, it 
reverts to labour supply reduction policies which, for males, mean unemployment and pension costs; for 
women the necessary continuation of male breadwinner dependencies. This translates into extremely high 
labour costs and labour market rigidities because the ‘insiders’ are compelled to defend their employment 
security’ (Rosenbrock and Gerlinger 2004: 80).  
 
This inbuilt tendency towards self-destruction, to put it somewhat bluntly, has also been identified 
by other analysts. For instance, in discussing the Continental model, Scharpf notes their ‘low or 
very low rates of total employment’ as well as ‘low or very low rates of female participation in the 
labour market’ and stresses that ‘the comparatively high dependence of Continental welfare states 
on social insurance contributions also creates specific vulnerabilities’ (Bandelow and Schubert 
1998: 219-221). This vulnerability works two ways: employment losses weaken the financing base 
of social security programmes while putting higher burdens on them, especially in the case of 
unemployment insurance. On the other hand, insurance-based benefits tend to be more resistant to 
retrenchments or replacement by means-tested benefits than tax-based benefits, which explains 
why higher burdens usually translate into higher contributions for benefits. Thus, ‘Continental 
welfare states are vulnerable to a vicious cycle in which rising unemployment will lead to 
increases in non-wage labour costs which will further reduce employment opportunities in private 
sector services’ (Webber 1989: 222).  
The “vicious cycle” illustrated by Scharpf has also been described, from a more distinctly 
political economy perspective including firm behaviour in reaction to economic shocks, as a 
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‘pathological spiral of welfare without work’ (Rosenbrock and Gerlinger 2004). This spiral 
implies that in reaction to competitive pressures; firms try to increase labour productivity, which 
not only means investments in training, but also dismissing workers, and mostly those who are less 
productive and most costly. Given the Continental welfare state’s dependence on male bread 
winners, it results in rising social security contributions and taxes. In the meantime, non-wage 
labour costs have increased, which invites firms to review their productivity again and leads to 
even more lay-offs. This ‘particular interplay between production and social protection’ leads to 
overall low employment and high structural employment, low female participation rates, declining 
participation of older workers, weak growth of part-time employment and employment in the 
service sector (ibid: 109).  
The patterns of “insider-outsider” labour markets, “vicious cycles” and “welfare without 
work” indicate a general difficulty or perhaps even an inability of Continental welfare states to 
cope with the challenges of a socio-economic nature, leading to loss of employment. The 
following question is how Germany, as a prototype of this welfare state type, has tended to react to 
these challenges. Two analyses of German economic adaptation have taken a wider political 
economy perspective as their point of departure. Firstly, and offering an alternative explanation for 
Germany’s poor employment performance, Manow and Seils find a process of “dual 
externalization” of costs by the state and firms onto the welfare state in adjusting to external 
shocks, most recently German reunification, but also in earlier crises (Brandhorst 2003). In a 
broader study, analysing the historical development of the German political economy and its 
system of social protection at length, Manow identifies two patterns illustrating the use and misuse 
of the welfare state in coping with external shocks, showing that the welfare state served as a 
buffer and shock absorber for both the labour market and public finances (Bleses and Seeleib-
Kaiser 2004).124 These studies suggest that social policy programmes have been instrumentalized 
by the state and by firms, indicating that these actors preferred additional burdens for the welfare 
state to substantial reforms, despite the risk of endangering its financial viability in the long run. 
However, demonstrating that social policy programmes are repeatedly used for buffering 
economic shocks does not yet provide a clear explanation for the resilience of these programmes. I 
will cover these sources of resilience in its social policy model in Section 4.4. Before that, 
however, I will consider the development of German social policy over time.  
 
4.3 Reacting to Pressures? Policy Developments since the Mid-1970’s 
 
This section deals with the answers policy-makers formulated in response to the pressures 
illustrated in Section 4.2. Did policy-makers attempt comprehensive reforms in their reaction to 
slow growth and unemployment, demographic developments and other pressures? Did they adjust 
policies or did they prefer to react by adopting incremental reforms, as the supporters of the 
Reformstau perspective would argue? The answer is given in the form of an overview of German 
social policy development, focussing on the changes to the three main programmes, old-age 
pensions, unemployment insurance and health care (which are also at the core of the structural 
reform analyses in Chapters 5 through 7). Its purpose is to offer a general impression of whether 
                                                           
 
 
 
124 First, governments used social insurance schemes to cope with the labour market consequences of the crisis. Second, 
social insurance schemes are used (with a certain time lag) to cope with the financial implications of the crisis which occurs 
through cost-shifting at the expense of the contribution-financed social programs. 
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reforms were more incremental or more comprehensive (and possibly structural) in character 
rather than tracing whether different types of pressure had resulted in matching policy 
amendments (the latter would be beyond the scope of this study and would warrant a distinct 
research project). Also, it presents information that cannot be included in the case studies, which 
zoom in on particular reform processes, in order to acquaint the reader with the general picture of 
German social policy development over time. In terms of its time frame, the overview covers the 
main phases of social policy development since the end of the “Golden Era” and is structured by 
the periods of subsequent coalition governments. For each period, I will describe the general 
characteristics of each government’s approach to social policy before summarizing the main policy 
changes in each of the three programmes, including major reform legislation. The main purpose of 
these summaries is to indicate overall policy trends; they are not intended to cover each reform in 
detail.  
 
4.3.1 The Social-Democrat/Liberal Coalition (1969-1982): Expansion and the Beginning of 
Consolidation
125
  
 
From 1969 onwards, the new Social-Democrat/Liberal (SPD-FDP) coalition set the German 
welfare state on an expansionary course, which was part of a common reform plan backed by both 
parties.126 A prime example of this expansionary course, which took place across all programmes, 
expanding the circle of programme beneficiaries and raising the levels of transfers and services, 
was the 1972 pension reform (see for the main provisions Schmidt 2005: 94). This course of 
widening and deepening the welfare state had to take a blow with the recession of 1974, when, for 
the first time, a financial crisis in social policy budgets became a real possibility. The first reaction 
of policy-makers was hesitant, and first cost containment measures only followed after the change 
in leadership from Chancellor Willy Brandt to Helmut Schmidt in 1974. The 1975 budget initiated 
a different kind of social policy, and, first of all, introduced cuts in active and passive labour 
market policy, including unemployment benefits. After the federal elections in 1976, cost 
containment gained pace and during 1977 and 1981 it brought cuts in all major programmes: a 
time of consolidating social budgets in line with the levels of 1970 had begun.127  
In September 1982, the coalition fell apart, not least because the positions of SPD and FDP 
on economic and social policy had become irreconcilable. This change of government to a new 
conservative-liberal coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP ended an era of high hopes with regard to 
social policy and, towards the end, deep frustration amongst their party members and electorate. 
                                                           
 
 
 
125 The general part of this and following two sections are based on Schmidt 2005, Chapter 1.4.  
126 Quantitative measures of welfare state activity confirmed this new strategy: the percentage of the population living 
primarily from social security income rose from 14.4 per cent in 1969 to 18.2 per cent in 1982 (reflecting more pensioners 
and more people receiving unemployment insurance) and the ratio social expenditure/GDP climbed from 24.6 percent in 
1969 to a high of 31.4 percent in 1975 and only slightly fell to 30.7 percent in 1982. This expansion was primarily financed 
from higher contributions, which also rose from 27.8 percent at the beginning of the period to an impressive 34 percent at 
its end (Schmidt 2005: 93).  
127 This included a number of measures: the automatic adjustment of pensions to wage increases was delayed; co-payments 
were introduced in the health insurance scheme, which also saw the institution of a body consisting of health care 
stakeholders which was to deliberate about further cost savings; eligibility rules of unemployment insurance were tightened 
and the levels of transfers were lowered. Other areas of social benefits, such as social assistance, child allowance and others 
were also affected. In order to stabilize social budgets, the SPD-FDP government raised contribution rates across all social 
insurance programmes. Since these measures were considered to be insufficent, the federal government also resorted to 
balance deficits by transfers between social budgets and between the federal budget and social budgets. 
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Evidently, “social capitalism” had reached its limits. The legacy of the SPD-FDP government was 
visible with a high unemployment rate of 7.5 percent, more than 2 million social assistance 
recipients and a combined social contribution rate of 34 percent of gross wages. On the positive 
side, the social expenditure/GDP ratio had been increased, at least until 1975, and the welfare state 
as a whole had worked well as a buffer in the years of economic turmoil (Schmidt 2005: 98).   
How did major programmes fare during this period after the end of expansion? Labour 
market policy was clearly dominated by cost-containment concerns which, as far as 
unemployment  transfers were concerned, led to the first benefit cuts (from 1975 onwards), and to 
a pro-cyclical approach to active labour market policy: this means that in times of high 
unemployment, measures were cut, only to be expanded again when the economy recovered 
(Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004: 51). Furthermore, programmes that promoted individual training 
(a part of active labour market policy), which had been initiated by the same coalition, were 
cancelled, and the level of benefits across social programmes was decreased while tightening of 
eligibility rules: this applied to unemployment insurance as well as to pensions (Schmidt 2005: 
97).  
With regard to old-age pensions, several adjustments were made in 1977 and 1978 including 
the postponement of annual benefit adjustments, caps on future benefit increases, and a technical 
measure minimizing the wage-based adjustment of benefit levels. On the revenue side, the 
contribution rate was increased by a half percentage point and a new contribution for the 
unemployed (to be paid by the Federal Employment Agency) was introduced. On the whole, the 
Social-Democrat/Liberal coalition enacted incremental benefit curtailments, which were largely 
designed to control expenditures (Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004: 68-69).  
Concerning the area of health care, the mid-1970s marked the beginning of a perennial effort 
of cost-containment. Therefore, the post-war aims of expansion and matching patient demand were 
replaced by a focus on revenue-based expenditure policy. As an addition to the first 1977 cost-
containment law, the so-called Concerted Action in Health Care (Konzertierte Aktion im 
Gesundheitswesen) was established as a corporatist body of interest concertation designed to 
support the aims of this legislation (Brandhorst 2003; Gerlinger 2003: 387-388). This period also 
saw the first introduction of patients’ co-payments for medical services.  
 
4.3.2 The “Era Kohl” (1982-1998): Consolidation, Expansion and “Restructuring” 
 
The new CDU/CSU-FDP coalition led by chancellor Kohl started its period in office with 
diagnosing crisis, both in the economy, and in the systems of social security. As a consequence, 
two steps were seen as necessary: putting on the breaks immediately with regard to social 
expenditure and, in the long term, restructuring social policy with a stronger focus on solidity, 
security, and stability as well as on individual abilities and initiative (2005: 99). Schmidt focusses 
his discussion of the Kohl period on  to what extent the coalition achieved its goals in 
consolidating social budgets, distinguishing two periods: firstly, from 1982 until 1990 the 
government could book successes, while from 1990 onwards, this policy encountered reactionary 
tendencies (2005: 100-103).  
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The first period was characterized by a mix of cost-containment and improvement of 
revenues, backed by Minister of Labour and Social Affairs Norbert Blüm.128 To start with, the new 
government carried on with a restrictive social policy, while stepping up the pace of 
consolidation.129 In response, the opposition and trade unions were furious about what they saw as 
large-scale retrenchments (Sozialabbau), while the Government stressed that consolidation had 
been carried out carefully and in a socially balanced manner. With the benefit of hindsight, the 
1980’s were termed a period of “smooth consolidation” compared to social policy adjustments in 
other European countries (Schmidt 2005:11). However, there was a countermovement to this 
trend, which, from 1985 onwards brought about improvements in social policy, such as in 
unemployment insurance (longer entitlements for older unemployed) and an expansion of family 
policy. Therefore, the first period saw no dismantling of the welfare state but high doses of cost-
containment while the welfare state was left essentially intact.  
The second period, in contrast, saw further attempts to consolidate social budgets but these 
were overshadowed by forces that had a contrary and thus expansionary effect. The reasons for 
this lay in the decision to fund reunification generously (while there was an underestimation of its 
costs), a rapidly rising unemployment rate and the set-up of a new social programme, long-term 
care insurance, in 1994.130 Apart from consolidating social budgets, the Kohl Government also 
intended to carry out qualitative changes in the welfare state or restructuring (Umbau). However, 
such restructuring was to conserve its social insurance character and leave the right of the social 
partners to conclude collective agreements (Tarifautonomie) untouched.131  
How were the major programmes affected by the phases of consolidation and the intentions 
of restructuring? It is again convenient to distinguish two periods, one before and one following 
reunification. Starting with labour market policy, the 1980s were synonymous with ‘selective cuts 
and targeted improvements’ (Clasen 2005: 64). In 1983 and 1984, this meant a repetition of the 
previous pattern of ‘small and dispersed cuts, which mainly disadvantaged peripheral workers, 
while refraining from benefit retrenchment which might affect core workers’. Between 1984 and 
1987, this pattern of ‘selective retrenchment’ turned into one of ‘selective expansion’ (e.g. easier 
access to unemployment benefit, extending entitlement periods for some groups from twelve to 
thirty-two months). Subsequently, there was a reversal to selective retrenchment when active 
                                                           
 
 
 
128 The ratio social expenditure/GDP was reduced accordingly from almost 31 per cent to 27.6 per cent in 1990. 
Programmes which contributed most to this trend, were old-age and widowers’ pensions, health care policy and 
unemployment insurance. 
129 This translated into several cost-cutting reforms in the years 1983 and 1984, which, among others, targeted social 
assistance (decrease of indexation), unemployment insurance and assistance benefits (level of benefits/tightened eligibility 
rules) and pensions (faster introduction of health insurance contribution, deferral of automatic adjustments and limitation of 
disability pensions). 
130 These developments contributed to a steep rise in total payroll contributions (from 35.9 percent in 1989 to 42.2 percent 
in 1998) which for the most part were caused by the decision to increase social contributions across all programmes. The 
social expenditure/GDP ratio again rose to 31.9 percent in 1996 and was higher than at the beginning of the Kohl era.  
131 The goals set included the reduction of unemployment, adapting the welfare state to socio-economic and demographic 
change, introduce more flexibility and personal responsibility into the system and redirect social provision to those who 
needed it most (2005: 104). From a macro-perspective, looking at the German welfare state in its entirety, Schmidt 
identifies the following successful outcomes of the restructuring plans (2005:105-106): the rapid transfer of the West 
German systems of social security to the new Länder (which on the other hand also meant immense costs); the decision to 
establish a long-term care programme in 1994; the strengthening and extension of family policy despite the difficult 
budgetary situation from the mid 1980s; the dampening of expenditure-raising effects of unemployment and ageing in 
pensions (reforms in 1992, 1999 and health care: 1993, 1997) 
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labour market measures were cut and access to benefits was restricted for people with less 
continuous employment histories (ibid: 65). Similarly, Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser note a selective 
trend towards recommodification: younger and middle-aged workers were increasingly forced 
back into the labour market because of the curtailments in the unemployment insurance and 
assistance schemes (exceptions were made for unemployed workers with children). Older workers, 
however, were able to claim benefits for a substantially longer amount of time, which allowed 
firms to externalize dismissal costs and this had a downward effect on the labour supply. At the 
same time, active labour market policy covered more individuals without causing higher 
expenditures, as less funds were allocated to these programmes (Hartmann 2003: 56).  
In the period following reunification, firstly, selective cuts continued (cuts in labour market 
programmes; selective reductions in ALG [unemployment insurance benefit] and ALH 
[unemployment assistance] focusing on those without children; scaling back of ALH for claimants 
without prior receipt of ALG). Then, signalling a change in development, from 1995 onwards, two 
things happened: on the one hand, retrenchment gained speed (now even core workers had to 
accept small-scale benefit cuts), and activation policies became more pronounced in the granting 
of formerly “passive” transfer payments. As for the latter, a focus on employability and work 
requirements was noticeable for ALH and social assistance claimants, but also for those who were 
claiming long-term ALG benefits (Clasen 2005: 69-70). Additionally, Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 
stress that active labour market measures were used extensively to combat unemployment and 
incentives for early retirement from the 1980’s were replaced by other measures. With respect to 
the curtailment of transfer payments, they note a continuing trend toward recommodification of 
workers, again exempting those unemployed with children (Bandelow forthcoming, 2007 : 61).  
With regard to developments in old-age pension arrangements in the same two periods before 
and after 1990, what can we observe? Arguably, the change in Government did not affect the 
direction or pattern of pension policy, leading to a pre-1990 period of consensual adaptation and 
adjustment. More specifically, this caused ‘a wide range of cutbacks affecting current and future 
pensioners (...) aimed at curtailing expenditure for both pension insurance funds and the federal 
government’. The measures employed to achieve this goal included several increases in 
contribution rates, softened by lowering pensioners’ contribution rates to unemployment insurance 
(Clasen 2005: 105-106). Just before reunification, in 1989, an important pension reform was 
concluded (to take effect in 1992), which included major new aims such as indexing pensions in 
line with net rather than with gross earnings and fixing the level of federal subsidies (Schmähl 
1993, 1999 cited in Clasen 2005: 107).  
The post-unification period was characterized by the breakdown of the traditional pension 
consensus between the major parties: this meant more cross-party conflicts over pension policy 
and an increase in the politicization of the pension issue. This new conflictive style culminated in 
the 1997 pension reform as a ‘new and more far-reaching round of cutbacks and revenue 
enhancing changes’ (Clasen 2005: 111-112): this reform combined changes affecting the level of 
pensions, limiting early retirement options for disabled people, and the introduction of the so-
called demographic factor (designed to link the indexation of pensions with the life expectancy of 
generations of pensioners). From the perspective of the principles of pension insurance, the “Era 
Kohl” saw a number of changes: in several steps, all of which constituted incremental reforms, the 
government strengthened the link between contributions and pension benefits, which boils down to 
weakening what was conceived to be a “socially adequate” retirement income. Thus, pensions 
moved away from the wage replacement principle, especially for those who were unable, for 
whatever reason, to complete the required amount of contributions to receive a full pension. On 
the other hand, pension arrangements increasingly accommodated the needs of families by 
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introducing child-rearing credits, which is seen as a ‘systematic departure from the strong male 
bread-winner model and wage-earner centred social policies’ (Clasen 2005: 75).   
Finally, in the area of health care, we can distinguish at least two periods during Kohl’s 
chancellorship. The period up to 1992 continued to be dominated by a traditional cost-containment 
strategy, including several elements: revenue-centred expenditure policy (focusing on stable 
contribution rates); a cautious strengthening of sickness funds versus care providers (in terms of 
their competences); a cautious correction of supply-side structures and incentives for care 
providers (regarding, for instance, the remuneration of doctors and the budgeting of their services); 
and a trend towards the privatization of health care costs via co-payments (Saalfeld 2003:247-
248). During the 1980’s, the early involvement of interest groups in reform processes foreclosed 
the changes in incentives for care providers, which had been on the policy agenda since 1985 
(Schulze and Jochem 2006: 117). The 1988 Health Care Reform Act (GRG) was intended to go 
further than mere cost-containment, but it was substantially watered down in the process 
(Immergut 1992). From 1992 until 1998, the government strategy changed, notably because the 
failure of the GRG had made visible the limits of traditional cost-containment. The 1992 Health 
Care Structural Reform Act (GSG) marked the beginning of a shift in health policy that would 
continue to be felt until the present. The focus on stable contribution rates was strengthened and 
backed by the introduction of sectoral budgets for expenditures and new steering instruments were 
either introduced or extended in order to change the incentives of stakeholders (free choice of 
sickness fund, introduction of budgets, more privatization of health care costs from 1996 
onwards): this combination amounts to a ‘paradigmatic change in health care policy’ (Bonoli 
2001: 249-250). While the GSG introduced the most far-reaching changes and which was adopted 
still in consensus between the two major German parties, from 1995 this health care consensus 
broke down and the later reforms of the period (in 1996 and 1997) were adopted against the will of 
the SPD opposition. Towards the end of the Kohl period, the focal point of reforms switched from 
health care providers to the insured and, to some extent, to sickness funds (Bonoli 2001: 213).         
 
4.3.3 The Red-Green Coalition (1998-2005): Cost-Containment and Structural Change 
 
Evaluations and interpretations of the Red-Green coalition often centre on the question whether it 
stood for continuity or discontinuity of policy and whether its course in social policy-making was 
particularly social-democratic in character. While the coalition itself (both towards the end of its 
first term in 2002 and its second term in 2005) issued positive self-evaluations in terms of having 
reached its social policy goals, outside evaluations were less positive about their policy legacy. On 
the one hand, critics from the left (including the left wing of the SPD and trade unions) diagnosed 
their approach as a ‘neo-liberal tax and welfare state reform project’ in order to secure Germany’s 
status as an investment and industrial location (Standort Deutschland). On the other hand, more 
business-related circles detected continuity of an ambitious social policy including high social 
contributions, a high social expenditure/GDP ratio and high-standard social policy and labour law 
regulations: this view identified an urgent and unfulfilled need for reforms under the Red-Green 
coalition (Reformstau), comparable with the immobility of the latter years of the Kohl 
Government.  
Since probably neither of these views correctly characterizes Red-Green social policy 
making, it is more fruitful to point out those instances of reforms which were in line with what 
could be expected from a SPD-led Government and those which constituted a break (Schmidt 
2005: 113). The first reforms in 1998 were directly linked to what the SPD had promised during its 
election campaign, and repealed some late reforms of the Kohl government: this applied to 
pensions (suspension and later abolishment of the demographic factor that was to lower pension 
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levels gradually, introduced by the 1998 reform), disability pensions; the deregulation of 
dismissals; cuts in sickness benefit; and the introduction of privatizing measures and instruments 
strengthening personal responsibility in health care insurance. In contrast with these reforms, the 
Schröder Government was also capable of breaking with established policy legacies and thus 
produced discontinuities with the policy of earlier governments: examples of this were the Riester 
pension reform with its move towards a ‘revenue-oriented expenditure policy in old-age pensions’ 
(during the first term) and the labour market reform Hartz IV (ibid: 114-116).  
What happened to the major programmes in this period? Regarding labor market policy, the 
Schröder Government continued and extended active labour market schemes as well as the 
differential treatment of unemployed by benefit type in accordance with the two objectives of 
“status adequate” reintegration and maintaining a sizable second labour market (i.e. subsidized 
public employment). In 2001, new legislation introduced stricter rules for job-search activities, 
profiling and reintegration contracts for unemployed persons (Clasen 2005: 72-73). Following the 
2002 Hartz proposals and the announcement of Schröder’s reform programme Agenda 2010, the 
year 2003 saw an ‘acceleration of the speed of reform’ and the ‘breaking of new ground by 
introducing new benefit structures’ (ibid: 75), when the reforms called Hartz I, II and III 
(including for instance, organizational reforms of job centres and the federal employment agency, 
introduction of new forms of [self]-employment) were adopted.  
Hartz IV was a second path-breaking reform and originated from the proposals of the Hartz-
Commission on labour market reform. It merged social assistance with unemployment assistance, 
replacing the latter with a new means-tested benefit.132 Regarding the guaranteed standard of 
living, Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser note that active and passive labour market policies enacted 
during this period reduced the commitment to this principle by further weakening the wage-earner 
centred approach. As far as passive labour market policy is concerned, rather than reversing the 
cuts of the Kohl Government, the Red-Green coalition continued them. Then again, the 
unemployment insurance scheme became more family-oriented by defining family time as 
equivalent to contributions. Regarding active labour market policy, it is striking that the aim of 
getting the unemployed back into standard employment had de facto been given up, as measures at 
odds with the guaranteed living standard principle were enacted (Immergut 1992: 66).133  
Similarly, old-age pensions experienced at least one path-departing reform in contrast to 
previous periods. As a whole, the post-1998 period first saw a combination of reversed policy and 
incremental changes134 and then a structural reform, the Riester pension reform, which was 
discussed as early as 1999 and got adopted in 2001. That reform marked the transition towards a 
pension policy that is oriented towards securing its financing base and stabilizing contribution 
rates, rather than towards securing a certain level of benefits. As a result, future decreases in 
                                                           
 
 
 
132The Hartz IV-reform strengthened the incentives for unemployed to accept job offers and sanctioning the unwillingness 
to comply, while considerably widening the definition of which jobs were ‘acceptable’. The principle of the ‘activating’ 
welfare state was applied to social assistance and unemployment insurance through Hartz IV (Schmidt 2005: 119-120).   
133 These measures included the increasing promotion of new forms of subsidised self-employment and temporary work. In 
addition, employers were freed from paying unemployment insurance contributions for older workers and public support 
was granted for jobs with wages below the former income of workers.  
134 The Red-Green coalition started by suspending parts of the 1997 pension reform under Kohl (especially its demographic 
factor which was to lower pension levels in the long run) and cuts in disability benefits. It also added some revenue-
enhancing reforms such as including low-wage earners and those in atypical employment into the circle of contribution 
payers and introduced a tax on energy consumption that was to complement pension fund revenue. In turn, contribution 
rates could be lowered by 1.2 percent to 19.1 percent in 2001 (Clasen 2005: 112-113).  
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benefit levels could no longer be ruled out and were met with a new privately funded but state-
subsidized pillar, the Riester pension plans. This novelty was path-breaking in so far as it departed 
from the traditional social insurance state adding an element of capital-funding in old-age 
provision, which tends to be associated with Liberal welfare states (Schmidt 2005: 116-118). In 
reaction to renewed pension budget deficits in 2003, another round of incremental cutbacks 
included the suspension of pension indexation for 2004 and cuts that would affect pension 
entitlements of those in higher education and starters as well as those wishing to retire early. 
Another reform containing measures with long-term effects was legislated in 2004 with the so-
called “sustainability factor” (which incorporates the changing ratio between contributors and 
recipients into the pension formula), designed to influence future pension adjustments (ibid: 116-
117). The reforms of the Red-Green coalition have been characterized as a ‘partial privatisation of 
the old-age and disability insurance system, minimising its decommodification potential, whilst at 
the same time expanding family-oriented benefits’. While the government withdrew from the 
principle of guaranteeing the achieved living standard in the public system, it offered fairly 
generous incentives for people to participate in the new private pension scheme and it intended to 
improve the situation of very low-income senior citizens by enacting a special social assistance 
benefit for them (Tsebelis 1995: 77).  
In health care policy, the Red-Green coalition was committed to increase efficiency by 
modernising care provision structures and contractual relations between stakeholders: this should 
ensure the stability of contribution rates and retain a comprehensive benefit catalogue in the 
statutory health insurance (SHI). Three distinct phases can be distinguished (Tsebelis 1999: 7). 
Initially (1998-2000), the government repealed a number of privatizing measures of the Kohl 
Government and adopted the 2000 SHI Reform Act: it modernised contractual relations and care 
provision in order to control costs and improve quality in the SHI. In a second phase, from 2001 to 
2002, the coalition sought to address some visible malfunctions in the system: the existing risk-
adjustment scheme and regulation concerning medication provision. In the future, the risk-
adjustment scheme would take account of more characteristics of the insured population, including 
morbidity (from 2007), thus reducing risk selection of sickness funds and strengthening the 
solidaristic character of the SHI (Swank 2001 : 218). With regard to medication, a number of 
reform acts were enacted after budgets for pharmaceuticals and rules concerning regress of doctors 
had been lifted, in order to control price hikes by other means (see for details Bonoli 2000: 266-
268). After 2003, the 2004 Health Care Modernisation Act (GMG) and some subsequent reforms 
strengthened the pace of privatizing costs, but also introduced some innovations.135  
 
4.3.4 General Patterns of Change in Major Programmes  
 
To conclude this section, I will identify some general patterns of change from the early 1970’s to 
the present. Labour market policy and especially unemployment protection underwent a 
continuous series of cuts that started off moderately in the 1970’s, gained speed during the 1980’s, 
                                                           
 
 
 
135 The GMG, on the one hand, reduced the benefit catalogue, increased co-payments including the much-discussed 
quarterly flat-rate charge for seeing a doctor (Praxisgebühr) and increased the share of the contribution rate paid by 
employees by 0.5 per cent. On the other, it reinforced family doctor schemes, strengthened patients’ rights by including 
their associations in the major self-governance venue, the Federal Commission (Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss), and 
introduced an independent Institute for Quality and Efficiency. During late 2004, one controversial measure of the GMG, 
which would have excluded dental replacements from the SHI, was repealed: in return for re-inclusion in the SHI 
catalogue, the insured had to accept an increase in contributions by 0.4 percent (Bandelow forthcoming, 2007: 20-21). 
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with instances of selective expansion towards the end of the decade. The 1990’s first saw an 
intensification of active labour market policy, followed by further curtailments and tightening of 
eligibility rules. After 1998, the trend towards cost-containment and restricting access to benefits 
continued, but, most importantly, the general approach to labour market policy became more 
focused on activating job-seekers. With the Hartz-Commission’s work, the different elements of 
labour market policy were questioned and generated reform activity which culminated in a 
structural reform that merged unemployment assistance and social assistance and intended to 
change demands on job-seekers and job centres alike. All in all, after three decades of cost-cutting 
and gradual tightening of access, the policy field had experienced some reforms that went beyond 
these measures, introducing an element of activation (and thus recommodification) and changing 
benefit structures.    
The development of old-age pensions followed a similar pattern. After a last spell of 
expansion in the early 1970’s, pensions experienced continuous cuts in levels and annual 
adjustments with contributions rising until and including the 1990’s. In the course of this 
development, the policy instruments used to contain the rise of pensions became ever more 
extensive, reflecting also the realization of beginning demographic stress on the statutory pension 
scheme. After 1998, the mix of cost-containment and increasing revenues briefly continued, but it 
was punctuated in 2001 by a structural reform that introduced a privately financed pillar of old-age 
provision and replaced the goal of preserving pension levels with stabilizing contribution levels. 
Since then, more efforts to stabilize contribution rates have been undertaken, which amounts to a 
continuing course of cost-containment.   
Finally, health care policy is somewhat comparable with the other two policy areas. Cost 
containment was introduced as a goal in the late 1970’s and has been a guiding theme in policy-
making with the goal of stabilising contributions becoming ever more entrenched by the early 
1990’s. Structural reforms had been initiated in the early 1990’s (sickness funds, self-governance) 
with continuing cost containment, the burdens of which are increasingly borne by patients instead 
of care providers. In contrast with pensions and unemployment insurance, which provide benefits, 
the provision, financing and management of health care services is much more complex, giving 
rise to conflicting goals between stakeholders. This characteristic makes agreement on structural 
reforms more difficult than in other social policy domains.     
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4.4 Sources of Resilience: Political Institutions and Programme 
Characteristics
136
  
  
4.4.1 The Political-Institutional Context   
 
The German post-war constitution, the Basic Law of 1949, has contributed to democratic regime 
stability, democratic consensus and government and policy stability. However, it is also held 
responsible for high transaction costs of policy change, and problems with accountability and 
transparency (Lehmbruch 2000: 347). German policy-making in general and the capabilities of 
governments to effect policy changes in the area of the welfare state in particular, are influenced 
by the political-institutional make-up of the state. In other words, the political-institutional context 
is an important source of welfare state resilience. Its constitution ‘created a host of powerful 
institutional checks on the government’ which ‘led to complex, multilayered agency relationships’ 
and decisions that ‘are frequently compromises between the federal government and some of these 
various actors’. However, ‘if no compromise is possible, the status quo is preserved, thus 
increasing the risk of a reduction of the system’s problem-solving capacity’ (ibid: 371).  
Various features of the German political system are relevant in this respect, and I will briefly 
discuss them in turn. The country’s multiple veto points include a bicameral parliament, a federal 
state structure, a strong judiciary and judicial review of policies by the Federal Constitutional 
Court, and corporatist procedures for interest mediation.137 In essence, the existence of veto points 
may allow government decisions to be blocked by other political actors (Manow 2005; Trampusch 
2005).138 In turn, the existence of (institutionally defined) veto points allows formal veto players to 
wield some influence on policy outcomes (Döhler and Manow 1997; Pierson 2001).139 However, 
whether this will happen ultimately depends on certain conditions, for instance, whether formal 
veto players actually make use of blocking opportunities offered by veto points. Therefore, it is 
premature to conclude that veto players will always hinder decisions - as the literature often does - 
                                                           
 
 
 
136 Clasen argues that next to formal political and welfare state institutions, linkages between social policy programmes and 
features of national political economies should be considered as a third category of institutions that influence welfare state 
reform patterns (Clasen 2005a: 35). For instance, ‘production regimes’ including industrial relations, labour market 
regulation and financial governance structures have linkages with social policy arrangements (Huber and Stephens 2001a). 
Germany has been classified as a coordinated market economy (Hall and Soskice 2001), which entails strong employee 
representation at company level, extensive coordination among firms based on business associations and industry-wide 
collective bargaining between social partners without state interference, the so-called Tarifautonomie. Clasen finds a 
specific link  in the ‘the notion of a ‘social wage’ (the entitlement to a wage replacement benefit rendered by employment-
based contributions to social insurance, complemented by a high level of employment protection), implying ‘that for 
German workers, wages, insurance-based “deferred wages” and employment protection are interlinked domains’. 
Combined with the fact that large German employers and trade unions concur in their interest to invest in workers’ skills, 
this linkage between the political economy and the welfare state may have led to less retrenchment in Germany compared 
to countries with different production regimes such as the UK (ibid: 36-39). 
137 See Schulze and Jochem for a discussion of these features in interaction with party competition in the context of pension 
policy (Schulze and Jochem 2006)  
138 The argument goes that the ability of government to achieve a desired policy outcome depends on the  presence or 
absence of veto points to a large extent (Immergut 1992; Bonoli 2001). A further distinction can be made between formal 
and informal veto points; the former exist because of constitutional provisions, the latter allow access of interest groups to 
the formal decision-making processes.  
139 Tsebelis defines ‘veto players’ as ‘individual or collective actors who agreement is necessary for changing the status 
quo’. He further distinguishes institutional veto players (in presidental systems) and partisan veto players (in parliamentary 
systems). Moreover, Tsebelis argues that the policy change becomes less likely the more veto players exist, the larger the 
difference between their policy positions and the less cohesive these positions are (Tsebelis 1995).   
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but also to take those conditions into account. Moreover, interest groups may try to form alliances 
with formal veto players or influence their policy preferences during a political reform process: if 
the former are successful, they may be considered “informal” veto players (Nullmeier and Rüb 
1993; Clasen 2005), increasing the likelihood of influencing policy outcomes, either in the sense 
of blocking or expediting them.  
In addition, the co-existence of two systems of regulation with different and potentially 
conflicting logics of action has increasingly produced blockades in policy-making. Scharpf has 
coined the term “joint-decision trap”, describing the combination of multiple veto points and a 
bicameral parliament that may feature different party majorities in the two chambers of Bundestag 
and Bundesrat (Schludi 2002); this condition has also been referred to as “incongruent 
bicameralism” (Siegel 2002). Seen from another angle, the problem stems from potentially 
conflicting systems of regulation in a federal state; i.e. the two arenas of political party 
competition and negotiation between different state levels (Myles and Pierson 2001).140 These 
conflicting logics manifest themselves in particular when there are indeed different majorities in 
the Bundestag and Bundesrat (as was the case most of the time in the 1990’s and thereafter) and 
when the nature of policy proposals requires mandatory consenting legislation (necessitating 
Bundesrat approval).141 The federalism veto point arguably leads to imperatives for consensual 
reform (which often means that policy preferences of interest groups and/or particular party 
factions are accommodated) and to an implicit “grand coalition” in German reform politics 
between the government and the opposition (Clasen 2005; Reissert 2005). However, at the same 
time, its importance should not be overstated, as the blocking potential of federal structures is 
arguably conditional on the difference in preferences between political actors (Clasen 1994).142  
Furthermore, German policy-making also takes place within the context of a strong role for 
the law and the judiciary. This feature makes for a powerful restriction on the competences of 
parliament, especially for the role played by the Federal Constitutional Court, leading to a situation 
in which governance can be characterized as ‘governing with judges’ or even ‘governing by 
judges’ (Schmidt 2003: 128). As far as corporatist structures are concerned, Germany has 
traditionally featured strong relations between the state and between societal interest groups. In the 
post-war era, labour relations became based on social partnership, on collective bargaining 
between employers and trade unions without state interference, as well as on the corporation of 
these social partners in both implementation and administration of welfare state policies 
(Schreyögg and Farhauer 2004). At the same time, formal (or institutionalized) and informal 
                                                           
 
 
 
140 In a situation of differing majorities, the opposition acquires a quasi-governing role in the Bundesrat and tends to block 
legislation for electoral-strategic reasons, not least because the largest parties tend to compete on social policy issues. 
Because of the frequency of elections (on the Länder and federal level), electoral competition tends to be more or less 
present all of the time, which works against reforms or at least creates a permanent electoral risk for a reform-eager 
government. As a result, opposition parties tend to do well in Länder elections, strengthening their (majority) position even 
further.   
141 The latter is frequently the case with social policy legislation, as long as it touches administrative issues or financing 
issues that concern the interests of the Länder.   
142 According to Manow, ‘the veto point argument crucially depends on the assumption of significant differences in policy 
preferences between the different veto players/parties’. Furthermore, such difference cannot simply be assumed in the 
German context, as the preferences of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats on the welfare state used to be rather 
similar well into the 1990s. Even in the current context of the German debate about welfare state restructuring, he argues 
that ‘what hinders reform efforts is not so much the blocking effect of federal structures, but rather the dynamics of inter-
party competition’ (2005: 224-225).  
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channels of interest groups also try to influence policy-making, forming policy communities that 
are typically located at the level of policy sectors (Giaimo 2002; Schreyögg and Farhauer 2004).  
Given the country’s array of institutional constraints on government activity, this fosters a 
sense of immobility, as Schmidt (2003: 202) has put it: ‘policy change in domestic politics in 
Germany usually requires a longer planning period, is often incremental in nature, and borders 
occasionally on a degree of institutional inertia, which critics describe as “policy immobilization” 
or Reformstau’. This is said to apply social policy-making in particular, since another set of 
institutional obstacles reinforces the constraints posed by the political-institutional context. 
 
4.4.2 Welfare State Institutions and Policy Legacies  
 
Rather than political institutions, the school of historical institutionalism sees policy legacies as the 
main source of resilience in the face of adjustment pressures on mature welfare states. In other 
words, welfare state institutions themselves are considered as forming powerful obstacles to either 
retrenchment or restructuring because they are often subject to path-dependent processes, making 
changes to alternative institutional arrangements costly. The reference to PAYGO-type pension 
systems serves frequently as a prime example (see for instance Rosenbrock and Gerlinger 2004: 
411-416). In the following discussion of sources of resilience in social policy programmes, I will 
first of all turn to schemes of old-age provision.   
4.4.2.1 Old-Age Pensions  
The German system of pension provision has relied for most of its history (until 2001) on a single 
statutory pension pillar (with some separate schemes for special occupations like public sector 
workers, professionals and farmers). Those who are employed, pay wage-related contributions up 
to a ceiling, with the burden shared equally between employers and employees. Since 1957, the 
guiding idea of the system has been that pension benefits should reflect relative living standards 
achieved in working life (tight coupling of entitlements and wage-based contributions), while 
solidaristic elements include tax-credits for non-contributory periods (e.g. unemployment; 
education). Pension levels are generally indexed, traditionally in line with gross earnings changes, 
but since 1992 based on net earnings. In the 1980s, pensioners could still count on a pension level 
of 70 per cent of average net earnings (assuming 45 contributory years) but, not at least because of 
labour market changes, actual payments vary widely. A general minimum pension was only 
introduced recently (2001), as were publicly subsidized private pensions (Schreyögg and Farhauer 
2004: 95-97).143 
Originally, pensions rested on a number of interlinked principles, including a guarantee of the 
former living standard, the social insurance principle, automatic adjustment of pensions to the 
development of gross wages, self-governance of pension funds as bodies of public law, a federal 
subsidy and financing by contributions, based on a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) arrangement (Döhler 
and Manow 1995: 94-95).144 The last of these principles is very relevant for the argument about 
the sources of resilience because it implies that contributions paid on the basis of wages provide 
the financial base of the system.  Despite an additional infusion from public budgets, i.e. the 
                                                           
 
 
 
143 For reasons of brevity, this section only sketches the contours of German pension arrangements. See for more details in 
English e.g. Clasen 2005a (Chapter 5) and Schludi (2002).  
144 Nullmeier and Rüb (1993) discuss how these and other principles of German pension arrangements came under pressure 
between the mid-1970s and the 1989 pension reform.  
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federal budget, pension benefits are essentially financed from these contributions. This means that 
pension benefits paid at any one moment are essentially financed by the current working 
population. If a government planned to switch to another pension system, for instance, capital-
funded pensions, this would create a major difficulty: while setting up a new system from scratch, 
there would still be the obligation to meet the pension payments for those who have contributed to 
the PAYGO system for most of their working careers. Therefore, those in employment at the time 
of system change would, theoretically, have to pay contributions for current and soon-to-be 
pensioners and make contributions of some sort to the new system in order to start saving for their 
own future pension. Essentially, this age cohort or generation would have to shoulder a 
prohibitively high burden, which puts governments into a difficult situation. The biggest problem 
would be that employees could simply not afford to pay for two systems at the same time. In 
addition, employers would have to shoulder even higher non-wage labour costs and are unlikely to 
consent to this. Both reasons would make it a futile task for governments to communicate the 
message of a double burden to the electorate; that is why an abrupt change from one system to the 
other is practically impossible to achieve. Even a more gradual change, so to speak, phasing out 
the PAYGO component in a pension system and replacing it by other elements, such as capital-
funded private or company pensions, tends to be politically delicate, as Chapter 5 on the Riester 
pension reform will illustrate. Technically speaking, in this type of social policy programme, path 
dependency relates to high switching costs from a PAYGO scheme to another manner of funding.  
A second important institutional characteristic seen to foster resilience is the social insurance 
character of pension arrangements, where contributory entitlements constitute quasi-property 
rights (Webber 1989: 63). Siegel constructed an institutional index of reform elasticity to assess 
the degrees of freedom for policy-makers in pursuing retrenchment policies. This index reveals 
that pension systems with means-tested benefits have considerably less barriers, both legal and 
political, to government interventions. On the other hand, earnings-related social insurance-based 
pension systems, such as the Bismarckian and thus the German one, enjoy a high degree of 
protection (Döhler and Manow 1995). Similarly, the resilience of Bismarckian pension 
arrangements also depends on the degree of system maturation. In this line of argument, the more 
mature a pension system is, the higher the share of persons with substantial benefit entitlements 
who are likely to oppose benefit cuts (Alber 2001). Accordingly, since German pension 
arrangements are certainly mature, legal and political obstacles to reform can also be expected 
from this source.  
In addition to these strictly institutional sources of social policy resilience, pension 
arrangements are “sticky” because influential non-state actors defend them. This line of reasoning 
relates to the characteristic of corporatistic relations that is present throughout the German welfare 
state (see Section 1.1). According to this argument, it is to be expected that established societal 
actors in the area of pensions, particularly trade unions, but also self-governing bodies with 
employer and trade union involvement such as the VDR (Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherer),  
resist far-reaching restructuring efforts if they go against the interests of pensioners.145  
                                                           
 
 
 
145 Nullmeier and Rüb stress that self-governance in the pension sector is a central and inviolable policy principle and 
embodies an institutional instrument of cooperation between employers’ associations and trade unions, who act to represent 
pensioners (1993: 114).  
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4.4.2.2 Unemployment Insurance 
Unemployment insurance provides protection against the loss of income, and, in agreement with 
the principles of the Bismarckian welfare state, also aims to secure the standard of living in the 
case of unemployment. As such, it can be seen as the passive element of labour market policy, 
while its active component includes diverse measures to re-train and eventually reintegrate the 
unemployed. Until 2004, German unemployment protection consisted of two tiers: a first tier 
based on the insurance principle and financed by compulsory contribution (split equally between 
employers and employees) up to a certain wage ceiling (unemployment insurance benefit, ALG); 
and a second tier with a benefit related to former earnings, based on means-testing and financed by 
general taxation (unemployment assistance, ALH) for those not eligible (anymore) to ALG.146 
Both benefits were administered by the Federal Employment Agency (former Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeit, since 2004 renamed Bundesagentur für Arbeit), which is a tripartite organization (governed 
by employer, trade union and state representatives) subject to federal legislation. Apart from its 
responsibility for transfers, it also oversees and finances active labour market measures and 
programmes. Both active and passive measures are financed from the agency’s budget and the 
federal government is obliged to help in the case of deficits. This set-up of funding implies three 
things: until recently, benefit receipt would determine the access of individuals to labour-market 
measures; a pattern of crowding-out of active labour market programmes would be encouraged 
when unemployment was high, increasing benefit expenditures; and the federal government would 
be biased towards cost-saving by its obligation to balance the agency’s deficits (Hering 2001: 54-
56; Hinrichs 2003; Timmonen 2005).  
Compared to the field of pensions, where most institutional characteristics tend to impede 
policy change, it is more difficult to detect sources of path-dependency in the institutions 
regulating unemployment benefits. Rather, the issue of reform capacity (with the other side of the 
coin being resilience) in unemployment systems has been approached via the degree of 
institutionalization of such systems. For instance, Siegel (2002) constructed an institutionalization 
index, which attempts to measure the degrees of freedom for a state to embark on reform in these 
unemployment arrangements. A high degree of discretionary power (and a high score) is 
associated with means-tested unemployment systems (e.g. New Zealand and Australia), while a 
high degree of state restrictions (and a low score) are found in social insurance-based systems, 
which tend to exhibit traditions of self-governance and delegation to corporatist actors. Germany’s 
arrangements resemble more closely those of Scandinavian countries than those of Anglo-Saxon 
ones. 
Other authors have adopted a somewhat different perspective, looking at the actor 
orientations of those participating in labour market policy – which includes unemployment 
arrangements - more generally. Regarding this approach, the preferences of main interest groups 
and their ability to influence policy-making can be considered as sources of resilience. Such 
analyses find that path-dependency can be linked to the existence of corporatist actors in the 
governance of social policy, which is denoted by self-governance and the social partners (Doehler 
and Manow 1995, p.140 cited in: Hinrichs 2003: 249). The existence of self-governance structures 
often pre-empts state action in the sphere of interest groups. In addition, the social partners, 
employers associations and trade unions, whose right to conclude collective agreements is 
                                                           
 
 
 
146 A third inofficial tier of the system was formed by social assistance as a potential source of income for unemployed (see 
Chapter 6). 
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guaranteed by the constitution, tend to guard this right carefully and thus play a central role in this 
policy area. Path-dependency manifests itself as follows: reform plans presented for labour market 
policy tend to be regarded as suspicious by the social partners, as they guard their autonomy and 
sources and mechanisms of influence in political decision-making processes. Institutionalized 
practices make it more difficult to break from the existing path, as social partners exert influence 
on the labour market’s performance via their collective agreement and income policies. In 
addition, they influence political processes indirectly through lobbying activities, which can lead 
to mutual blocking of reform initiatives (Hinrichs and Kangas 2003: 251).147  
4.4.2.3 Statutory Health Care Insurance  
The German health care system is dominated by the statutory health care insurance (SHI), which 
covers about 90 percent of the population, while the remainder is insured by private insurance 
companies. The SHI is financed by payroll contributions, which are paid in equal parts by 
employers and employees up to a certain wage ceiling; those who earn more take out private 
insurance. Contributions are administered by a wide choice of sickness funds, which in the past 
have insured the population according to individuals’ professional affiliation, but, since the mid-
1990’s, are practically obliged to insure anyone. Sickness funds conclude collective agreements 
with associations of care providers, the Kassenärztliche Vereinigungen, whose members, 
individual physicians, offer health care services in kind to the insured and receive payment from 
the funds in return. The provision of health care services mostly takes place in the ambulant 
(general practitioners and specialists) and the hospital sector (see for a more general introduction 
Lamping and Rüb 2004; Schulze and Jochem 2006).    
In the area of health care, the PAYGO financing base of the SHI has been identified as an 
important source of resilience (Schmähl 2003: 249).148  The introduction of the Bismarckian health 
insurance in 1883 already marked the beginning of the PAYGO path in the SHI. Since the 1970’s, 
it has become clear that productivity and employment rates were unlikely to increase indefinitely, 
and the “generational contract” underlying the system would be especially sensitive to the 
upcoming demographic changes. However, alternatives have so far been mostly ignored by 
stakeholders and policy-makers in the field, leading Schreyögg and Farhauer to diagnose a lock-in 
effect, i.e. the end-state of a path dependent development, as far as the financing side of the SHI is 
concerned.  
While this argument concerns technical issues about the switch between financing modes, it 
only tells part of the story about resilience in the German health care sector. Additionally, it is 
important to realize that this institutionally induced lock-in is recognized as such and is left intact 
                                                           
 
 
 
147 The crucial point is that the social partners tend to disagree about the direction of reform. Trade unions tend to protect 
dismissal protection, increase wages or decrease working hours, while employers tend to prefer the opposite: longer 
working hours, decreasing wages and loosening of dismissal regulations. Being aware of the crisis on the labour market 
they both try to enter a new path, but direct their energies in diametrically opposite ways. As a consequence, their efforts 
block each other, making it impossible to change the lock-in and reinforcing the status quo. According to Schreyögg and 
Farhauer, ‘a common strategy of the social partners and thus a pooling of reform potential cannot be seen in Germany; 
rather, they concentrate on traditional concepts of the enemy’ (2004: 251). 
148 Similarly as with statutory pension insurance, the basic choice when creating a health care system from scratch would be 
between a capital-funded and a PAYGO variant. PAYGO financing assumes that one generation finances the benefits (or, 
in this case, health care services) of an older generation. The main implication is that the body administering the funds does 
not build up a capital buffer, as the incoming funds are being used up by the beneficiaries at any time. This contrasts with a 
capital-funded system, where any individual of a particular generation builds up his own capital base in order to finance 
current and future benefits or services.   
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by relevant actors in the sector. One feature of the German SHI in comparative perspective (still in 
place in the mid-1990’s) is its ‘high extent of structural continuity, which even endured repeated 
and comprehensive change of functional requirements on the health care system relatively 
untouched’ (Schludi 2002: 141).149 In this view, structural continuity stems from three sources, the 
federal “joint decision trap”, the dominance of coalition governments (i.e. politico-institutional and 
party-political factors), and a strong presence of interest groups (Verbandslastigkeit), as well as a 
bias of policy-makers towards their wishes. While the former two factors more generally help to 
shed light on limits of reform capacity in the German political system, for an examination of 
resilience it is instructive to consider their interaction with the interest group factor. The prominent 
role of interest groups not only refers to conventional pressure group politics, but also to the 
(highly legitimated) transfer of regulatory competences to the self-governing associations of 
doctors and sickness funds (see also Chapter 7). In addition, we see a high degree of linkage 
between heterogeneous societal interest groups (including clientelistic relationships between 
health care associations and the party system). Moreover, there are also links with the social 
partners, employers and trade unions, who hold posts in sickness funds’ boards of directors (ibid: 
142-43).  
The interacting dimension with political institutions and the party system comes in as follows: 
coalition governments, the federal system and the degree of codification in German policy-making 
offer many possibilities for vetoing reform proposals, which in the past often resulted in the 
watering down of such proposals in the phase of policy formulation (Riester 2004). The special 
position of the small liberal FDP, as defender of particularistic interests and the obstacles posed by 
federalism to the change of financing regulations in the hospital sector, illustrate in two ways how 
such linkages conserve existing structures (Schulze and Jochem forthcoming, 2007: 144). Firstly, 
the FDP has been using its role as junior coalition partner to represent the interests of self-
employed care providers, such as doctors (see also Chapter 7). Secondly, as hospital financing 
depends on a dual modus between the sickness funds and the Länder (the former finance operating 
costs and the latter cover the cost of investments), costs and benefits are distributed unevenly 
between them. This constellation, due to a Länder blockage in the Bundesrat (ibid: 144), has long 
obstructed a reform of hospital financing in favour of the federal state and the sickness funds. 
To sum up, sources of reform resistance in the statutory health insurance can be found both in 
institutional characteristics defining its financing mode as well as in the interlinkages between 
sector-specific actors with other societal stakeholders and the political and party systems.     
4.4.2.4 Other Programmes  
Long- Term Care Insurance  
The programme of long-term care insurance is the latest addition to the German welfare state, as it 
was only introduced in 1994. Essentially, it constituted an extension of the social insurance 
principle to a field previously covered by either social assistance benefits or family care. It is 
                                                           
 
 
 
149 Döhler and Manow approach this puzzle in a three-fold analytic framework, to explain why the German SHI is both 
remarkably stable and adjusts to changes in functional requirements at the same time. Their framework includes sectoral 
structures or institutions, actors and ideas: in their conception, ‘structural continuity cannot only be understood as a result 
of a institutional configuration, which is only permeable for strategies of incremental development, but also relies on the 
guiding function of a health policy organisational model (Ordnungsmodell), which effectively limits the range of 
admissable options for reform’ (1995: 142). For my argument on stickiness, I only draw upon what they identify as 
‘sectoral structures’.  
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financed by compulsory payroll contributions of the working population, pensioners, and those 
privately insured. Concerning benefits, the scheme recognises three different categories of need 
along with fixed-ceiling benefits, which are designed to cover the costs of care partially. Those 
eligible for the benefit can choose between higher in-kind benefits to cover professional long-term 
care or cash benefits for care-takers who provide service in the claimant’s household (Schludi 
2005: 27). In comparison with similar schemes in other European welfare states, the following 
points can be noted: the scheme only covers part of the real costs of care services, which is 
reinforced by expenditure ceilings; concerning its financing base, employers bear less 
responsibility compared to other insurance schemes; and benefits are flat-rate rather than income-
related. What can be said about resilience in this area of German social policy? It is debatable 
whether this scheme, after a time span of just over ten years, can be considered a mature 
programme that has developed lock-ins. On the other hand, although the scheme’s weaknesses 
have already surfaced,150 so far no comprehensive proposal for reform has emerged. However, the 
long-term care insurance scheme itself is path-dependent in relation to the other welfare state 
programmes (if one looks at it from a slightly different angle), as can be seen from its main 
features: it encourages informal care, it preserves the principle of familialism and, since it offers 
flat-rate and limited benefits, it continues the dependency those claiming long-term care benefits 
on social assistance (Schludi 2002:34 ).  
Social Assistance 
The social assistance programme was initially designed to provide means-tested benefits in order 
to guarantee a minimum income to anyone in need. That is, all persons were deemed to be eligible 
irrespective of their status on the labour market. In contrast to the other programmes discussed 
earlier, social assistance is not based on payroll contributions, but on general taxation. It is 
regulated by federal law, but administered and financed out of local government budgets. The 
benefit consists of a flate-rate amount for each person in a household as well as an amount to cover 
the cost of housing and it is paid indefinitely, as long as individual need persists. With the Hartz 
IV reform (see Chapter 6), the approach to social assistance for recipients has changed markedly: 
since 2005, a clear distinction has been drawn between those recipients available to the labour 
market and those who are not: while the former are now eligible to the new long-term 
unemployment benefit (ALG II) and subject to more pressure to find a new job, only those unable 
to work due to physical or other reasons continue to be eligible for social assistance. In terms of its 
institutional design, there are hardly any grounds in arguing that it is resistant to far-reaching 
changes, rather, its character as “benefit of last resort”, its flat-rate character, and tax-base 
financing make it sensitive to changes.  
4.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has summarized the institutional context of the German welfare state, reiterating the 
argument that both its welfare and politico-institutional characteristics make for a high degree of 
resilience and, therefore, reform resistance. Section 4.2 has examined macro-level characteristics 
                                                           
 
 
 
150 The scheme has been plagued by deficits and a debate about reform developed during the last years of the second Red-
Green coalition (2004-2005), revolving about how to make its financing base more robust.  
 
  
Surveying the German Welfare State 
 105 
of the Continental welfare state, that is, the principles of wage-centred social insurance, guarantee 
of living standards, familialism, and the more structural element of corporatist relations, indicating 
that they tend to inhibit change. By taking a closer look at the German wage-earner approach, I 
have stressed that its dual focus on income based contributions and male bread-winners makes it 
vulnerable, as contemporary socio-economic and demographic pressures tend to undermine its 
financing base. I have also presented the various endogenous sources of pressure on welfare states 
(value-based, socio-economic, and demographic), finding that they are likely to impact most on 
pension and health care schemes (through ageing effects and decreases in the amount of 
employment), but also on unemployment schemes (through socio-economic changes and sluggish 
growth). Following on from this, I discussed the limited capacity of Continental welfare states to 
react to economic shocks, which produces adjustment patterns with adverse effects on labour 
markets and employment. With respect to Germany, in particular, the state has been employing 
social policy as a shock absorber and thus as a means to solve economic and financial problems 
rather than focussing on reforming it.  
Section 4.3 has enquired whether successive German governments have found effective 
answers to adjustment pressures resulting in the adaptation of welfare state arrangements. The 
presentation of German social policy developments from the mid-1970’s until 2005 focussed on 
general features of policy-making and on the degree of change in three major policy programmes: 
as for the latter, significant change has been rather rare in German social policy during most of this 
period. As for old-age pensions and unemployment protection, in both areas, general patterns of 
cost-containment and a tightening of eligibility rules were punctuated by only few structural 
reforms (reforms that go further than incremental adjustments) since the year 2000. With pensions, 
the latter resulted in a privately financed and state-subsidized additional layer: policy-makers had 
reacted to continuing financial and demographic pressures besetting the statutory scheme. With 
unemployment protection, the Hartz IV reform introduced new benefit structures and a much 
greater focus on activating policies, reacting to persistently high rates of unemployment. In the 
health care sector, I found a similar pattern of cost-containment, intermingled with elements of 
more comprehensive reforms (introducing an element of competition between sickness funds, 
widening the responsibility of patients and of self-governance) during the 1990’s. There, policy-
makers have continuously sought ways of controlling perennial cost pressure and keeping the 
scheme’s finances under control, usually with short-term success only.  
Subsequently, Section 4.4 has considered the various types of structures which are commonly 
held responsible for such (relative) policy immobility. These include the political-institutional 
context of the fragmented German political system, where a bicameral parliament, a federal state 
structure, a strong judiciary and well-developed channels for interest intermediation and influence 
on policy outcomes interact to make policy-making a rather complex undertaking with plenty of 
opportunities for the derailing of reform processes. Moreover, sources of resilience have also been 
identified in welfare state institutions. The statutory pension scheme was found to be “sticky” 
because of its financing mode, its social insurance character that creates rights to benefits, a high 
degree of system maturation, and the presence of influential (self-governing) corporatist actors 
who strive to defend pensioners’ interests. Unemployment protection is characterised by a high 
degree of institutionalization, which fosters path-dependent effects. In other words, the social 
insurance character of provision and especially the strong role of corporatist actors, in particular 
the social partners (and their contrary preferences) work in favour of the status quo. Health care 
policy counts on two main sources of resilience: firstly, as with pensions, the scheme’s 
contribution-based financing mode locks in the current system, and secondly, the strength of (self-
governing) interest groups and their interaction with political institutions leads to strong obstacles 
to change.  
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This review of both the pressures for and the institutional obstacles to policy reform has 
confirmed the essence of arguments given in historical institutionalism and regime theory relating 
to policy stability. These arguments provide ample grounds for claims that Germany, as the 
prototype of Continental welfare states, is rarely capable of significant change. Moreover, this 
outline of German social policy development provides us with two contrasting observations. 
Firstly, most changes in major programmes since the 1970s have been incremental (representing a 
level of policy change, which the aforementioned theories would allow for, while still assuming 
overall policy stability), and often related to cost containment rather than restructuring policy 
arrangements. Secondly, mounting pressures of the sort bearing upon all contemporary welfare 
states, and the extraordinary burden of reunification have only recently translated (or, in my view, 
have been translated by political leaders) into significant reforms. Despite numerous institutional 
obstacles to reform in the German polity and in its social policy arrangements, the question to be 
asked is under what conditions these obstacles cease to block such reforms. In addition, another 
question is whether the robustness of resilience arguments has been overstated by the literature.  
All in all, the evidence suggests that German social policy-makers have mostly been trying to 
cut back the costs of social benefits and services (by restricting access and cutting benefit levels). 
However, in some instances, they have adopted reforms that went beyond cost containment and 
constituted genuine, structural policy shifts. These more comprehensive reforms, as attempts to 
accommodate pressures on advanced welfare states (which began to be felt particularly after 
German unification), were relatively rare and were only launched (and adopted) after the turn of 
the century. The question at hand is as follows: Did ideational leadership, in the ways described in 
Chapter 2, overcome the many sources of resilience and allow for the adoption of those structural 
reforms? In investigating this question, Chapters 5, 6, and 7 will analyse in much more detail the 
performance of key policy-makers in a context of institutional resistance. 
 
 5. IL and the 2001 Pension Reform  
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter reports on the first empirical case study of this project. By examining the political 
process that led to the German pension reform of 2001, it outlines ways of identifying ideational 
leadership (IL), and examines if and how IL played a role in the adoption of this remarkable 
reform package. I will approach IL by trying to demonstrate its effects on the adoption of the 
reform, and by asking whether alternative explanations for achieving path-breaking reform could 
have played a role. The pension reform case was first designed as a pilot study in order to evaluate 
the plausibility of the IL hypothesis, and to prepare for data gathering and processing (as outlined 
in Chapter 3). Since its results only led to minor theoretical revisions of the IL framework, it also 
forms the first empirical test for the IL concept in a series of three cases. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 provides some necessary background 
information about the reform and the rationale for the case selection. Section 5.3 familiarizes the 
reader with the political context of the subsequent analysis. The two following sections focus on 
the main empirical question, i.e. whether IL was present, and how it influenced the adoption of the 
reform. The analysis includes, on the one hand, an examination of argumentative patterns of the 
key politician in charge of the pension reform, Minister of Labour, Walter Riester (Section 5.4) 
and, on the other hand, an analysis of how the reform came to be adopted (Section 5.5). 
Throughout the analysis, quotes from textual and interview material will serve as evidence to 
illustrate the different aspects of IL and its role in the final outcome of the reform. The conclusion 
summarizes the findings, and establishes that Minister Riester displayed three characteristics of an 
ideational leader; that he additionally used concessions in order to get the reform adopted; and that 
some of his mistakes in the process point to additional aspects for inclusion in the IL 
framework.151  
 
5.2 The Riester Reforms: Towards a Multi-Pillar Pension Scheme  
 
I chose the German 2001 pension reform as the empirical context for the first case for several 
reasons. As far as the legacy of the Schröder Government is concerned, it was among its most 
important reform projects and eventually materialized because of a redefinition of ideas and 
interests in the SPD (Trampusch 2005). The adoption of that reform has attracted notable attention 
in the literature on welfare state politics and change, for its supposedly “path-breaking” character 
                                                           
 
 
 
151 The implications of the findings for the conceptualization of IL can be found in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.4.5) 
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(Dünn and Fasshauer 2001; Schludi 2002; Jacobi and Mohr 2004; Riester 2004; Reissert 2005; 
Schulze and Jochem forthcoming, 2007). However, the most important reason for analyzing this 
particular reform is that its outcome showed some genuine structural shifts in the three dimensions 
of social policy in line with the criteria used in my study. Despite the numerous changes made to 
the initial proposals, the Riester pension reform changed structural features of German pension 
arrangements. I will briefly describe the most salient features of the reform before identifying its 
structural reform characteristics. 
The ultimate goal of the new legislation was to end the predominance of the biggest pillar of 
German pension arrangements, a state-administered PAYGO scheme. The same reform package 
also envisioned other changes to the status quo of old-age benefits that will be of lesser concern 
here and will be mentioned only as far as they mattered for the adoption of the overall reform (e.g. 
introduction of minimum pension and reform of survivors’ pensions).  As far as the main 
innovation of the reform is concerned, Minister Riester’s original reform concept envisioned the 
introduction of a capital-funded supplementary private pension pillar alongside the statutory one 
and the offer of tax-deductible contributions for those participating in the scheme. The obligatory 
character of the private scheme was dropped at an early stage in the reform process due to protests 
against what was seen as an inappropriate act of state coercion. This new capital-funded scheme 
was designed to compensate future pensioners for reduced replacement rates in the statutory 
scheme. Getting the German working population to invest in private pension plans was seen as 
necessary for alleviating at least some of the financial and demographic pressure bearing heavily 
on the state-administered scheme, in order to make it more viable for the future, at least in the 
medium-term.  
 
5.2.1 Main Reform Provisions 
 
The 2001 pension reform in Germany was adopted after a process that lasted nearly two years, and 
during which the provisions contained in the reform proposal frequently changed. The same 
process caused extensive discussions between the Government and the opposition on the one hand, 
and between the coalition parties and interest groups (especially trade unions) on the other. The 
actual parliamentary process took half a year to be completed for the most controversial bill (from 
in total three draft bills) that constituted the core of the reforms and required approval of the 
Bundesrat. In the following section, I will concentrate on the two main pieces of legislation 
emerging from this period, the Old-Age Provision Act (Altersvermögensgesetz, AVmG) and the 
Old-Age Provision Extension Act (Altersvermögensergänzungsgesetz, AVmEG).152 The first act, 
which contained the provisions establishing a new private pension tier as a supplement to the 
existing statutory scheme, was passed in May 2001 after lengthy discussions in the Mediation 
Committee and the following approval by the Bundesrat. The second act, which included the legal 
provisions for changing the pension formula and cutbacks of pension levels in the public pension 
scheme, had already been passed in January 2001 by the Bundestag; it did not require Bundesrat 
approval.  
                                                           
 
 
 
152 A third bill that was part of the Riester reform package, the less controversial reform of reduced capacity and disability 
pensions, had already been passed as a separate law in December 2000 (Bundesgesetzblatt, 23 December 2000) and will 
not be dealt with here: the case study will concentrate on the first two laws as they are those relevant for the structural 
changes to pension policy arrangements.  
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What were the core provisions of the reform? The most important innovation was certainly 
the creation of a new private pension pillar, designed as a voluntary and tax-subsidized scheme. In 
addition, in this newly created and privately administered scheme, occupational pensions came to 
play a greater role than in the past. This was achieved by granting employees the right to convert 
part of their salary into pension contributions for occupational pension plans 
(Entgeltumwandlung). The introduction of a private pension scheme was combined with cutbacks 
of replacement rate cutbacks in the statutory scheme, which were substantial, but not radical. In 
order to achieve this, a so-called “indexation factor” was introduced into the pension calculation 
formula. That factor would ensure a gradual reduction of replacement rates from 70 percent before 
2001 to 67 percent of net wages by 2020 and to a minimum of 64 percent in 2030.  
The final design of both core provisions, the creation of the private pension tier, and the 
adjustments made to the statutory scheme reflected a series of concessions by the government, 
since the initial reform proposals had gone further. While the reform process offers a good 
example of how some elements of an ambitious reform proposal may be dropped during a process 
of political debate and parliamentary decision-making, it also shows that in the same process, other 
innovative provisions may be added. Four major corrections were made to the core provisions in 
the course of the reform process, both before and during the parliamentary phase: these concerned 
the obligatory element of the private scheme, the size of the contributions, the extent of public 
subsidization and the role played by occupational pensions in the new pension system. How each 
one of these changes emerged will be dealt with in Section 5.3.  
 
5.2.2 Structural Characteristics of the Riester Reform 
 
In what sense was the Riester reform a structural reform? In general, the structural dimensions of a 
pension insurance scheme can be divided into a financing, a benefit and a regulatory or 
management structure. The intention of breaking open the traditional one-pillar pension system 
qualified the Riester reform as a structural reform, as it clearly brought alterations to the system’s 
finance and benefit structure, but also to its regulatory structure. Firstly, regarding the financing 
structure, the new legislation widened the financing base to include several sources of funding. 
Those participating in the statutory scheme would, if they chose to do so, also contribute to a new 
private scheme (albeit with state support), in addition to their existing wage-based statutory 
contribution (shared equally by employees and employers). This meant that the total contribution 
the insured made towards old-age provision increased and that their personal responsibility for 
ensuring the financing of old-age pensions was to be greater than under the one-pillar system. 
Secondly, the new legislation also introduced changes to the benefit structure of pension 
provision.  In the new format, it included benefits from a two or even three-pillar pension 
structure, instead of a single statutory one. Future pensioners were from now on to rely on 
pensions consisting not only of a statutory scheme benefit, but also of payments from privately 
administered Riester schemes and, if applicable, of an occupational pension scheme.  
Thirdly, the reform provided for a diversification of the regulatory structure in pension 
arrangements, which had hitherto been administered by bodies subject to public law. Private 
schemes were to be administered by banks and insurance companies, although their pension 
products were subject to state regulation. In addition, through the strengthening of occupational 
pensions, which are set up and administered according to collective agreements between 
employers and trade unions, another change in regulation was introduced. 
 Due to these shifts taking place across the three structural dimension of pension policy, the 
Riester reform qualifies as a case for my study, with its focus on explaining instances of structural 
reforms. The next section examines the details of the reform process.  
  
Chapter 5 
 110 
5.3 The Reform Process: Chronology, Actors, and Policy Positions   
 
Before proceding with the analysis, I will outline the main events of the reform process, showing 
how the initial proposals were translated into a reform outcome, the final legislative acts.153 As 
Table 5.1 below illustrates, considerable time passed between the announcements of Riester’s first 
core points of the reform in 1999, and the passing of the last bill based on them, in May 2001. The 
length of the process allowed plenty of opportunities, for those disagreeing with the provisions, to 
demand changes.  
 
Date Event 
 
17 June 1999 Presentation of cabinet decision on reform concept by Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs 
 
21 June 1999 Obligatory character of private pensions is withdrawn 
 
30 May 2000 Presentation of draft by the coalitional working group (Eckpunktepapier) 
 
June 2000 Government  announces return to net wage indexation for 2001 and presents 
pension reform plans 
October 2000 Break-down of extra-parliamentary compromise talks SPD-CDU, FDP 
continues to work with the coalition 
14 November 
2000 
1st reading of legislative drafts  
 
11-13 December 
2000 
Changes to drafts after parliamentary hearings, concession on occupational 
pensions 
 
26 January 2001 2nd reading of legislative drafts and approval of changes, Bundestag adopts bill 
 
February 2001  Bundesrat invokes Mediation Committee 
 
May 2001  Further changes to the bill, Bundesrat approves bill on 11.05.01  
 
Table 5.1: Important events in the reform process 1999-2001  
 
The gradual transformation of the initial proposals was not least due to the controversy about 
several provisions of Riester’s first reform draft. The story of their amendment illustrates very well 
how far-reaching reform initiatives may be modified through processes of public debate and 
parliamentary decision-making. The positions of the main actors are summarized in Table 5.2 
                                                           
 
 
 
153 This summary draws on the discussion in Schludi (2002), p.159-174. 
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below. 
 
Actors Position on pension reform  
Minister Riester,  
Ministry of Labour  
advocated major changes in pension arrangements: lowering pension 
levels, introducing an obligatory second private tier 
Governing coalition: 
SPD and Green 
parliamentary groups 
SPD-left wing opposed privately financed pensions, SPD “modernizers” 
backed Riester; Green party backed the plans on most features  
CDU/CSU 
parliamentary group 
favoured a comprehensive reform including cuts in statutory pensions; 
critical of size of the private pension tier and regulations concerning 
investments within the scheme, substantive interests tied up with tactical 
(electoral) motives 
  
FDP parliamentary 
group 
favoured privatisation of pensions; supported cuts in pension levels if that 
would lead to lower contribution levels/taxation; resisted basic pensions 
 
Trade unions: 
umbrella organisation 
DGB and constituent 
members  
 
favoured preservation of the statutory scheme and guarantee of minimum 
pension levels; very critical of private schemes, favoured greater role for 
occupational pensions in overall pension provision and regulation through 
collective agreements; individual unions split on approach: from more 
conservative (e.g. IG Metall) to more reform-minded (e.g. IG BCE) 
VDR (German 
Association of Public 
Pension Insurers) 
 
supported preservation of existing pension scheme; rejected compensation 
factor to lower pension levels 
 
Table 5.2: Main actors and policy positions concerning the 2001 pension reform  
 
Before the 1998 federal elections, during their last term in office, the CDU/CSU-FDP Government 
had passed the 1999 Pension Reform Act, which included a substantial reduction of pension levels 
(from 70 percent to 64 percent of net wages), to be realized via the so-called “demographic 
factor”. However, due to pre-election pledges in a campaign that had stressed the issue of pension 
reform, the new Schröder Government reversed this measure with an eye to sustaining current 
pension levels. Thereafter, it was faced with the dilemma how to tackle the strained public pension 
budget without making significant cuts which, as Schludi put it, ‘would violate voter as well as 
union expectations for the less painful reform that the SPD had announced in its election 
campaign’ (2005: 146). As an intermediate step, in the summer of 1999 the Government resorted 
to other measures that would temporarily relieve the pension budget, announcing the end of net 
wage indexation of pensions. At the same time, Minister Riester presented his ideas on a major 
pension reform to the public for the first time. At this point, his initial plan included a 
supplementary and mandatory pension pillar financed by workers and employees with a 
contribution of 2.5 percent of gross earnings; a new tax-financed and means-tested minimum 
pension to complement the existing statutory insurance; independent pension claims for married 
women; and a reform of disability pensions. This early catalogue of reform ideas was 
complemented in May 2000 with a plan to control rising pension expenditures in the statutory 
scheme. The curbing of expenditures was to be achieved by a change in the pension formula, 
which introduced a so-called “adjustment factor” (Ausgleichsfaktor). The implementation of this 
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factor ensured that younger age-cohorts received a much lower pension level within 50 years of its 
enactment, amounting to 54 percent of average wages in 2050 as compared to 70 percent at the 
time of the reform.  
Most of these plans did not make the final version of the draft bill, as they were subject to 
massive criticism on several fronts. To begin with, the mandatory character of the private pillar 
was dropped shortly after its announcement in response to considerable criticism. Minister Riester 
had designed the private pension tier as mandatory, so as to achieve a specific goal: obliging 
Germans to invest in private pensions plans was meant to take some of the financial and 
demographic pressures off the statutory pension scheme in order to make it viable for the future. 
Financial pressure (and related economic pressure) stemmed from the fact that the revenue bases 
of public pension schemes had been shrinking since the economic crisis of the mid-1970’s, and 
additionally, pensions had been used frequently by governments to offer an early exit for older 
employees and the unemployed. The latter became especially relevant after reunification, when the 
Kohl Government used this instrument to ease the burden after reunification, following the 
collapse of the economy in the Eastern Länder. Furthermore, the number of regular jobs had been 
decreasing, with a concomitant rise of atypical employment exempted from social insurance 
contributions. These developments furthered the gap between revenues and expenditures in 
statutory pension insurances (Reissert 2003: 10-11). As for demographic pressures, the dual threat 
of increasing life expectancy and declining fertility rates increased the share of elderly persons 
relative to the working population. For social insurance, and pension schemes in particular, this 
meant, with a projected age dependency ratio increase in the EU from 24 percent to 49 percent  in 
2045 (ibid: 11), that transfers to the elderly would have to double in the coming decades, putting 
enormous pressure on governments, who were looking for ways to lessen this burden. 
Notwithstanding these pressures, Minister Riester felt impelled to withdraw the mandatory 
element of the plan, given the stance of the Christian Democrats, the trade unions, and the SPD’s 
junior coalition partner, the Greens. In addition, the plans provoked angry reactions from the 
media, interest groups and the general public in June 1999, at a very early stage in the reform 
process. Shortly after the largest German tabloid BILD had run the headline ‘wave of anger rolls 
towards Bonn’, the Ministry changed this core element of the reform, replacing it by a voluntary 
participation (Heinelt 1994).  
Yet, even this voluntary scheme still faced considerable opposition both by leftist hardliners 
in the Minister’s party, the Social Democrats, and by some trade unions, who opposed it on 
ideological and distributional grounds. On the one hand, they distrusted investments in capital 
markets as a basis for pension provision, and feared too high financial obligations for low-wage 
earners. On the other hand, they opposed the privatization of pension provision, because they saw 
it as a violation of the parity principle, which stipulated that employers and employees should each 
pay half of the total contribution sum.   
Another bone of contention was the reduction of pension levels through the introduction of an 
adjustment factor in the pension formula. According to Riester’s draft bill, this factor would be 
initially applied in 2011 and increased to a maximum of 6 percent in 2030. The effect was a 
gradual decrease of replacement rates to 64 percent while keeping contribution rates under the 
level of 22 percent until 2030. 154 Protests against this measure were heard by the left wing of the 
                                                           
 
 
 
154This factor was to be applied first in 2011 with a reduction effect of 0.3 percent. Afterwards, it was to rise with 0.3 
percent annually until 2030 and would remain at a maximum of 6 percent thereafter. See Bundestags-Drucksache 14/4595. 
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SPD, trade unions, the pension fund peak association VDR, and even by parts of the CDU. They 
feared that the statutory system would degenerate into a system that, over time, would offer not 
much more than a social assistance-level pension.  
Finally, the plans for a means-tested minimum pension, although not a central element of the 
structural reform, but contained in the same reform acts, also met with political resistance, this 
time by both CDU and FDP, the VDR and employers’ associations. Their main argument was that 
this novel measure, which would in fact replace the entitlement of the elderly to social assistance, 
resulted in the clear-cut distinction between contribution-based social insurance (such as statutory 
pensions) and means-tested social assistance being lost. As a result, employers in particular feared 
further increases in pension expenditure (and thus non-wage labour costs as a whole). In turn, 
critics maintained that this would give an additional boost to employment in the black economy, 
further undermining the contribution base of the statutory pension scheme.  
Minister Riester felt unable to ignore these points of criticism and made a number of 
concessions.   These concessions were aimed at appeasing the critics in his own party, the Green 
party, the CDU, and the trade unions.155 I will address each of them in turn. The CDU, whose 
support was critical in securing Bundesrat approval for the reforms, did very well, as they gained 
concessions in most areas. As outlined earlier, the mandatory element of the private pension 
scheme and the plan for a minimum pension protection disappeared, largely due to the insistence 
of the opposition. In addition, the Government restored the indexation of pensions to net wages (as 
opposed to gross wages) and adapted the provisions concerning survivors’ pensions. It also met 
and even went beyond CDU demands for state subsidies and tax credits to those participating in 
the private pillar: this caused another major change to the initial proposals. During the course of 
the extra-parliamentary talks between the Government and the opposition, and several rounds of 
“bidding”, the extent to which the state would help individuals finance the new private pension 
contributions was extended. While Riester originally envisaged modest support for citizens with 
low incomes only, he changed it to include tax credits applicable to middle and higher incomes 
and earmarked an amount of € 10 billion annually, to be extended to € 20 billion in 2008.  
Furthermore, the size of the private pension tier turned out to be larger than originally 
planned in response to demands by the CDU/CSU, but also by the FDP and the Green coalition 
partner (Mohr 2004). While contributions were first set at 2.5 percent of gross wages and to be 
gradually phased in by 2007, the law included the provision of 4 percent of gross wages as its 
target for 2008.  The greatest driving force behind this increase was the decision of the 
Government to agree on cutbacks in the pension replacement rates, mainly under pressure from the 
CDU. As mentioned above, the Red-Green coalition had reversed the last pension reform of their 
predecessors for electoral reasons, but the CDU/CSU had since been pleading for these measures 
to be re-instituted, which Riester did by introducing the “adjustment factor”. Moreover, the 
gradual reduction of pension levels which it implied was to be compensated by corresponding 
increases in private provision, given the previous commitment of the Social Democrats to keep an 
overall pension level (composed of statutory and private pensions) of 70 percent. Eventually, the 
initially much criticised “adjustment factor” was modified by the parliamentary committee and 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
 
 
Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung und zur Förderung eines kapitalgedeckten 
Altersvorsorgevermögens (AmVG), 14.11.2000. 
155 It should be noted that Riester started to offer concessions to the CDU in order to win their eventual parliamentary 
approval. Only when this strategy proved futile, he also approached the trade unions, hoping to influence also reform critics 
within the SPD (see also Section 5.5.1).  
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replaced by a VDR-sponsored “indexation factor”, which was to reduce gross-wage increases of 
replacement rates by changes in contribution rates.156 The net effect of all this was that 
replacement rates would not drop below 64 percent after 2030.     
In contrast to the CDU, which had taken a rather confrontational stance towards the 
Government, the smaller liberal opposition party, the FDP, continued cross-party negotiations with 
the coalition (even after the CDU had abandoned them in October 2000) in an attempt to shape the 
reform plans more to their own liking. However, after a number of substantial concessions from 
the Government to the trade unions had materialized that were out of line with the FDP’s idea of 
lowering pension levels in exchange for lower contribution rates (see below), an agreement with 
the Government’s line of policy became almost impossible. 
The Government also saw the need to appease its own reform critics, i.e. the left wing within 
the SPD parliamentary party, and related to them, the trade unions, who, during the reform 
process, tried to wield as much influence as possible on the coalition via its channels with SPD 
parliamentarians. Minister Riester, felt pressed to accommodate their key demands out of necessity 
to gain their support for the Bundestag vote (not least because it looked as if the CDU would deny 
its approval). Concessions made on this count included the scaling down of the effects of the 
adjustment factor, which was changed into an indexation factor, implying a smaller reduction in 
replacement rates in the long term. This new factor also had different effects: it affected both 
current and future pensioners in similar ways, while the adjustment factor would have introduced a 
de facto differentiation in replacement rates to the detriment of current pensioners, which was very 
controversial (Reissert 2003: 149). Furthermore, the role of collectively negotiated occupational 
pension schemes was strengthened vis-à-vis individual pension plans. This increased the influence 
of trade unions in the regulation of that particular part of the new pension system. As a result of 
trade union pressure for a contribution by employers to employees’ private pension savings, a 
compromise was reached, which stipulated that collectively negotiated occupational pensions 
should take precedence over individual pension plans. In the process leading up to the 2000/2001 
reforms, the trade unions had been changing their attitude towards the role of collectively agreed 
retirement provision and the overall viability of the statutory system. Schludi argues that unions 
became aware that they could not oppose decreasing benefit levels in the public scheme 
indefinitely, and that their organizational self-interest would be served by participating in the 
regulation of occupational pensions with the collective framework agreement (Reissert 1998: 170-
171). The change in attitude towards lower pension benefits had been a particularly long and 
conflictive process, in which, interestingly, the then metal workers’ union (IG Metall) chairman 
Riester also played his part: in 1997, Riester and the former trade union peak organisation DGB 
(Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) chairman Schulte on one side, and former DGB vice-chair 
Engelen-Kefer on the other, were quarrelling in public about whether cuts in pension benefit levels 
were inevitable or not (Gemeindefinanzreformkommission 2003: 19). Finally, an intervention 
from the highest ranks of the DGB prompted the Government to add a provision to the bill that 
amended the statutory pension scheme, ensuring that the standard pension level would not fall 
below 67 percent (Niveausicherungsklausel).157 Eventually, the DGB was happy to have achieved 
                                                           
 
 
 
156 Bundestag-Drucksache 14/5146. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung und zur 
Förderung eines kapitalgedeckten Altersvorsorgevermögens (AmVG). Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Ausschusses 
f. Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 24.01.2001 
157 The 67 percent, however, correspond in fact to the previously mentioned 64 percent according to the previous pension 
formula because of changes in the definition of the net wage (Fehr and Jess 2001 in Schludi 2002:166)    
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those changes, as well as others, such as fairly generous state subsidization of supplementary 
pensions, and improvements in survivors’ pensions.158  
 During the latter stages of the parliamentary process, the CDU, despite the accommodation 
of their demands by Minister Riester, continued to oppose the reform on, what seemed to be, 
tactical grounds. Therefore, the Government could still not count on their support for the vote on 
the reform plan in the Bundestag and, more importantly, in the Bundesrat, which eventually had to 
approve the Old-Age Provision Extension Act, covering both the private pension pillar and the 
basic pension for the disabled and elderly. Getting the latter to approve that act was not easy given 
the combination of continued CDU resistance, the lack of a Red-Green majority in the Bundesrat, 
and some sceptical Länder governments, including some where the SPD participated in the 
Government. In January 2001, on the advice of the coalition parties in the parliamentary 
committee discussing the draft bill, the whole reform package was divided into a part containing 
the cuts in the statutory insurance, which could proceed without Bundesrat approval, i.e. the Old-
Age Provision Extension Act, and another part involving financial matters of concern to the 
Länder, and as such, dependent on Bundesrat approval, i.e. the Old-Age Provision Act 
(BAHauptstadtvertretung 2004b: 271). It is possible that the Ministry also anticipated problems in 
gaining the consent of the Bundesrat and urged this strategy. However, only after protracted 
negotiations with the CDU and the Länder co-governed by the SPD in the Mediation Committee, a 
deal was struck and the law approved by the Bundesrat in May 2001, albeit by the smallest 
majority possible for the governing coalition. Again, the Government had to accommodate 
demands, such as the inclusion of real-estate as a form of retirement savings under the private 
scheme and the establishment of a federal agency responsible for administering government 
allowances. Other concessions to the Länder included an extension of the range of products to be 
included (and funded) under the private scheme, and more generous financial compensation. Even 
the provisions of the Old-Age Provision Act (passed in January 2001) were again amended during 
the mediation procedure to include a reduction of cutbacks in survivors’ pensions at the request of 
the CDU (Jantz 2004). The final agreement was reached only after Schröder and Riester had 
persuaded the Länder Berlin and Brandenburg to vote in favour of the bill, on the condition that 
the new agency administering private pension subsidies should be located in their area.  
 
5.4 Analysis Part I: Observing Ideational Leadership  
 
This section forms the core of the study and assembles evidence from various sources to establish 
whether IL could be found in the reform process. Concerning the evaluation of theoretical 
explanations for the adoption of the reform, the analysis has two main aims: Firstly, it investigates 
whether IL, as defined in Chapter 2, was present in the reform process, i.e. one or several of its 
aspects (denouncing the policy status quo; introducing and defending new policy principles; 
appealing to reform opponents to reconsider their resistance, political orientation).159 Assuming 
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that Minister Riester was the person to bear the final responsibility for the project of pension 
reform, the questions to be asked are as follows:  
 
1) Did Minister Riester clearly reject the status quo in pension policy (and its old policy 
principles)?  
2) Did he clearly express and legitimise new policy principles, using cognitive arguments (related 
to problem-solving) and normative arguments (related to societal norms and values)? 
3) Did he appeal to critics to give up their reform resistance? 
4) Did he act based on an interest in the contents of reform (policy orientation) or did he engage in 
tactical games in order to keep his power (in accordance with aspect 5 of the IL framework)?  
Secondly, the analysis also attempts to give an answer to whether IL was indeed the crucial factor 
in the process (Section 5.5). This will be done by considering three strategies the Government 
might have followed in adopting the reform, and exploring the relevance of alternative 
explanations for dealing with reform resistance: 1) making substantial content-based concessions 
for reform critics and 2) ignoring or outmanoeuvring reform critics, in analysing the data collected 
on the case. In order to see how IL mattered in the final adoption of the reform, it presents pieces 
of information regarding its adoption, based on the views of observers on the reform process. In 
addition, the same information will allow an evaluation of Minister Riester’s role during the 
reform process.  
The remainder of Section 5.4 focuses on assessing the behaviour of the main political actor 
responsible, Minister Riester, who was destined to oversee the long-drawn process of structural 
shifts in German pension policy. Whether or not he did this in a manner that corresponded with the 
criteria of IL will be explored throughout the section.  
 
5.4.1 Rejecting the Status Quo?  
 
Chancellor Schröder’s choice of Walter Riester as Minister of Labour was motivated by at least 
two considerations. Firstly, Riester agreed with Schröder about the need for a structural pension 
reform and how to tackle it: by creating an additional capital-funded pillar of pension provision. 
Secondly, a more symbolic motive also played a role in the choice for Riester. According to the 
Minister, ‘on the one hand, it was a positive signal towards the unions to choose “one of them”; on 
the other hand, he set a signal by taking aboard a union man who did not have the reputation of 
being traditionalist’ (BAHauptstadtvertretung 2004a:70). The lack of traditionalist thinking on 
Riester’s part referred to his ideas and perceptions of what action needed to be taken in the labour 
market and in social policy, which, in his opinion, had to undergo far-reaching reforms, not merely 
corrective adjustments which would have left the policy status-quo largely intact. Furthermore, the 
issue of pensions was for him a central one: 
 
Led by the idea of opening up a perspective for people’s future, developing a reform of pension provision 
became the key question to me (…).To find answers to this question, while departing from a process of 
discussion and debate, was for me the biggest incentive to accept the Ministerial office when it was offered to 
me (ibid:126).  
 
Indeed, Riester had been thinking about this issue even before he became Minister, especially 
during the last years of the Kohl Government. He came up with the idea of creating a ‘collective 
agreement fund’ (Tariffonds) to ease the problems with early retirees burdening the statutory 
pension scheme and discussed it with the social partners. During this period, he also voiced his 
ideas by publicly advocating (in interviews with, for instance, Die Zeit and Süddeutsche Zeitung), 
radical reform of social security schemes in reaction to long-term societal developments, which 
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were affecting the workings of the post-war labour market. In doing so, he adhered to a sort of 
“holistic” view on policy-making when he said that: 
 
Given the existing distributional systems through tax, finance, and social policy, as well as collective 
bargaining policy, I saw a comprehensive recalibration as essential. The Kohl Government had looked at each 
of these systems in isolation, to me it made more sense to see them as a connected whole and ask what each 
of them could contribute to a common solution (ibid: 133).  
 
The above quotation illustrates that Riester, by virtue of his previous career and earlier thoughts 
and initiatives on pension issues, had acquired the profile of a reformist and a modernizer within 
one of the largest German trade unions. However, in what ways would he actually tackle the status 
quo during his office?     
The policy status quo, and whether it could still be considered viable, was closely linked to 
the perception of the statutory scheme at the time when Riester took his first steps towards a 
reform proposal. Riester addressed the question of how reliable the statutory pension scheme was 
in his own writings with due care. One article written by the Minister at a point in the process 
when he was still engaged in so-called “consensus talks” with the CDU and FDP opposition 
(which broke down in the fall of 2000), illustrates the point.160 In the article, Riester explained the 
rationale behind conducting a far-reaching reform, and claimed that in the upcoming pension 
reform, a fundamental choice had to be made about the future position of the statutory scheme. He 
referred to ‘political forces arguing that the statutory pension scheme would not be able to resist 
demographic change in the future and plead instead for a tax-financed basic pension’. In the light 
of this challenge, to him ‘a fundamental decision needed to be taken on whether this first pillar 
should continue to ensure pensioners’ living standards or whether it should merely serve to avoid 
the decline into poverty’. For an answer to this problem, he left no doubt about the Government’s 
position, which saw a tax-financed basic pension as no alternative to the current PAYGO system, 
and he predicted that the latter would ‘continue to form the main pillar of old-age provision’. In 
the Minister’s eyes, reform had to be conducted carefully in the sense that it did not burn all 
bridges with the past:  
 
The contribution-based statutory pension scheme will continue to form the backbone of old-age provision. 
My aim is to create an affordable system of pension insurance which continues to guarantee a reasonable 
standard of living to retired people. But it is also true that the statutory scheme has to respond to societal 
changes if it is supposed to still exist in the future.  
 
The fact that the statutory pension system was no longer viable in its present form, according to 
Riester, was linked to a number of challenges: demographic developments, technological progress 
and resulting changes in working conditions and a change of values in society. The threat to its 
viability lay in the combined consequences of these changes for the scheme’s financial 
sustainability, which Riester explained in detail. In other words, the Minister’s attitude towards the 
status quo in pension policy was one of caution and respect for policy legacies, but he also clearly 
communicated and explained the reasons why, in its present state, it was not sustainable for much 
longer.  
During the phase of policy formulation before the start of the formal legislative process, 
Riester kept reiterating the need for his reform ideas by stressing the main problems that had beset 
current pension arrangements. With this, he usually combined an outline of proposed goals and 
                                                           
 
 
 
160 ‘Keine Problemlösung auf dem Rücken der jüngeren Generation’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 13.03.2000.   
  
Chapter 5 
 118 
instruments needed to reach these goals. Notwithstanding earlier reforms of the pension scheme, 
the Minister pleaded for further reform solutions within the next decade, in order to anticipate the 
failure of the current system of pension provision. He linked this plea to a systematic diagnosis of 
the rationale for structural reform: once again, reasons relating to demographic trends were named 
but there was also some concern about high levels of non-wage labour costs and the system’s 
general economic and budgetary significance.161  
In one extensive interview,162 the Minister reiterated why it was necessary to react to the 
worrisome state of the pension system. Riester also hinted at ‘false promises’ made in the past by 
the state-administered system about ‘securing the standard of living’ and determined today’s 
requirements in terms of how long, in order to receive a full, ‘at best fictive’ pension, contributions 
must be paid for. Neither did he miss the opportunity of stressing that, in his eyes, no other 
government before had reached this prudent conclusion:  
 
We are the first ones to bring about generational justice, which means that we do not leave the problems to be 
resolved by the next generation. We are making sure that a long-term stabilization of the pension contribution 
level at an acceptable level of pension provision is guaranteed.  
 
At the beginning of the legislative process, in an article directed to a trade union audience, he 
added a twist to the communicative pattern of rejecting the policy status-quo.163 Rather than 
pointing outright to the failure of the state-administered system, the Minister observed a growing 
lack of confidence in that system due to a long period of ‘an attitude of procrastination and 
belittlement of emerging problems’. Here, Riester was clearly referring to the recurring statement 
of his CDU predecessor, Blüm, who had not ceased to assert, up until the late 1990’s, that 
‘pensions are secure’ (‘Die Renten sind sicher’). This instance of Riester’s thinking shows that he 
sometimes (and possibly adapting his wording to the audience) added nuances to his attacks on the 
status quo, which suggest that rather than blaming the system for its failure, complacent and idle 
policy-makers should be the ones to blame.  
During the later stage of the parliamentary process,164 Riester kept reiterating the fundamental 
demographic challenge to the statutory system (as well as summarizing its goals and repeating its 
key elements). At that time, after a tedious, long-drawn, parliamentary process that often dwelled 
on small details of the legislative proposals, he also had to endure a lot of criticism for his 
proposals; however, he still tried to remind the audience of the fundamental reasons behind his 
reform project:   
 
No pension scheme, however well it may function, can cope permanently with the fact that people have 
longer life expectancies, that they receive their pension for a longer period of time and that they face lower 
child birth rates. With these developments, fewer contributors will have to finance the pensions of more 
retired people for longer time periods.  
 
The previous examples of Riester’s communicative efforts that address the need for a change in 
the status quo of pension policy, illustrate that he, throughout the reform process, linked the need 
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for structural reform to the shortcomings of the current state of the statutory pension scheme. His 
statements made in public and in writing, both before and during the legislative process of the 
2001 pension reform, indicate that Riester fulfils the criteria for the first aspect of IL, which deals 
with rejection of the status quo. 
 
5.4.2 Legitimizing New Policy Principles?  
 
Similarly, Minister Riester undertook various efforts in legitimizing his reform plans in various 
communication contexts and by addressing different audiences. An example of his early pleas for 
substantial reform can be found in his address to the SPD party congress on the future of social 
security in November 1999.165 In a rather programmatic statement, he looked back on those social 
policy changes already implemented during the first year of the Schröder Government, and listed a 
number of reforms that were still on the Minister’s agenda. Among the upcoming projects, he 
announced a structural pension reform as the ‘the largest social policy project ahead in the next 
months’. His explanation and justification of such a far-reaching reform included core goals of the 
reform proposal, such as the ‘generational contract’, ‘security of the pension system’, ‘stable 
contribution rates’, ‘stable pension levels’ and the innovation of ‘additional private pension 
provision’. In addition, he considered this large reform project to be well in line with 
programmatic innovation within the SPD, as he stressed the close connection between those 
reform goals and the programmatic statement on which delegates were to vote during the party 
congress. That statement highlighted the need for ‘a balance between individual responsibility and 
state benefits’ and the upcoming pension reform was in Riester’s eyes one important example of 
putting this balance into practice. 
In 2000, the Minister continued his efforts in promoting the provisions of the proposed 
reform, explaining what it was about and how it should help to address the growing weaknesses of 
the statutory system. On one occasion, for instance, he set the reform proposals in the larger 
context of earlier decisions on pension policy,166 and gave an overview of its goals and 
instruments. Appealing to ‘a sense of pragmatism’ in German society, which was needed to 
support his reform plans, he presented the totality of the past and envisaged reform measures as 
one cohesive programme. In this bid to muster early support for his plans, before they were 
formally decided upon by the cabinet and the beginning of the legislative process, Riester kept 
clarifying why the proposed measures were necessary. He did this by typically presenting the 
proposed goals and attached policy instruments as answers to the problems with the current 
system. With this approach, he also explicitly related new policy instruments and their underlying 
ideas to their expected effects. To give an example, he outlined the effects of a new pension 
calculation formula and the new compensation factor, which would decrease pension levels 
slightly to accommodate the impact of demographic effects:   
 
If the younger generation has to spend more money from now on to secure a comfortable life for when they 
will retire, then it is legitimate to ask an extra contribution of those who are now receiving their pensions. It is 
not possible to have everyone benefit. The same is true for the new compensation factor. It is introduced to 
realize a slight decrease in pension claims for those who will retire in the future (starting with 0.3 percent in 
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2011 rising up to 6 percent in 2030). Without this decrease, contribution rates and demographic developments 
would be no longer manageable.167  
 
Alongside this effort to legitimize his reform proposals, Riester also presented the reform’s goals 
and principles, which have cognitive (problem-solving) and normative (relating to society’s norms 
and values) elements to them. For instance, these included ‘fair and just burden-sharing across 
different generations’, ‘long-term stabilisation of old-age provision in order to reassure the 
retired’, ‘modernisation of old-age pension provision by constructing a fully-funded pillar of 
private pensions’, the ‘prevention of old-age poverty’, and several innovations improving the 
situation concerning widowers pensions and the pension rights of women raising children.168 On 
another occasion,169 the Minister restated that the reform’s main goals addressed the statutory 
scheme’s financing problems by saying ‘we are making sure that a long-term stabilization of the 
pension contribution level at an acceptable level of pension provision is guaranteed’. Indeed, this 
reasoning proved to be at the core of the reform: getting everyone to accept that the aim to and 
need for lowering pension levels in the long run had to be combined with the competing goal of 
keeping contribution rates (as well as the state subsidy to the pension budget) under control.   
Apart from frequently referring to its goals and principles, Riester also legitimized the reform 
by outlining its expected positive effects on various groups of the population: the young 
generation, older employees about to retire, and employers.170 For instance, he combined his 
promise of a genuine structural pension reform with improvements in welfare for these three 
groups, as his concept was designed to provide not only a suitable, but also ‘a just answer to many 
future questions about old-age provision’.171  
To recapitulate, from a variety of sources, it is evident that even before the legislative phase 
of the reform process, the Minister had been legitimizing his reform proposal by explaining both 
the cognitive and normative implications of its provisions, as well as its supposed benefits to the 
population. Did he also continue these efforts in the later phase of the reform process? Once the 
parliamentary process had begun, Riester could be expected to take the opportunity of his 
appearance in parliament in order to continue legitimizing his proposals. A comparison of his three 
speeches during the readings of the bills, and before the final vote on the most controversial part of 
the reform, concerning the establishment of the additional private pillar, confirms this. The 
Minister spent most of his speaking time outlining and explaining the goals and main elements of 
the proposals. At the first reading of the two bills, he began by returning to the reform’s 
underlying principle of inter-generational justice.  
 
Concerning solutions, we are first of all concerned with finding a fair balance between the different 
generations. We have put forward a solution that lives up to this goal. In our pension reform, the young and 
the old are both winners. We create generational justice; we put emphasis on solidarity with gains, as well as 
on security and affordability. 172 
 
Then, he once again went on to explain at length the goals of the reform, the creation of an 
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additional private pension pillar and the stabilization of contribution levels, as well as control of 
the growth of non-wage labour costs. Other goals pertaining to other elements of the reform were 
to help people (especially women) with interrupted pension contribution trajectories, and 
combatting old-age poverty. When concluding his talk, the Minister optimistically went back to 
the point of the ‘many winners’ of the reform proposals, repeating the gains of each group. 
Referring again to the normative legitimization of the plans, he finally alleged that ‘this reform is 
more than an overdue and necessary repair of the system and one of  the most forward-looking 
reforms for many decades, combining the principle of solidarity with individual responsibility’.  
At the second reading of the bill in January 2001,173 the Minister reiterated his commitment to 
the four initially formulated goals (increased funding for pension provision, stabilized contribution 
rates, equal treatment of parents, prevention of old-age poverty), despite the numerous revisions 
made to the draft bill. After repeating these goals and their justification, as well as presenting the 
reform as the logical continuation of earlier pension reform measures by the Schröder 
Government, he concluded, with a certain sense of pride, that ‘all four goals have been realised 
with this reform, which makes it the most important social policy reform in post-WWII history’. 
The belief in making an historic step towards the sustainability of pension arrangements that were 
to result in restored public trust in the system can also be found elsewhere in Riester’s writings. In 
the spring of 2001, when the parliamentary process approached its climax in the mediation 
procedure, he stated:    
 
The goal of our pension reform is to make the statutory system sustainable, adapting it to foreseeable 
demographic change. We want to secure the level of pension provision for current and future pensioners, 
make for predictability and regain confidence in the statutory scheme.174 
 
With regard to sustainability, he highlighted the tax-credit scheme whose effect was to lead to a 
situation in which future pensioners would reach a level of provision that is ‘permanently higher 
than the current level of provision in the state-run system’. With perhaps startling confidence, 
Riester also claimed that ‘we have started our task of dissolving the reform backlog in this country 
and with this pension reform we live up to this expectation’. All in all, the reform was supposed to 
reduce the backlog of reforms (Reformstau) in the country by making pensions sustainable for the 
older generation and affordable for the younger generation. 
The Minister’s final appearance at the last reading of the bill for the Old-Age Extension Act 
in May 2001 may be seen as an attempt to legitimize the essence of what had begun with a handful 
of core ideas almost two years earlier. Riester listed up the improvements that had been adopted in 
the final version of the bill (concerning the status of women, people with ill health and 
disabilities), particularly stressing the generosity of subsidies for the private pension plans:  
 
We are not only talking about a quantum leap in old-age provision, but we carry it out because the capital-
covered additional pension as second pension will be subsidized for everyone. This means solidarity with a 
gain! 175 
 
Using a legitimizing pattern, which he had used before on various occasions, Riester ended his 
final speech in parliament by again pointing out the supposed winners of the pension innovations: 
                                                           
 
 
 
173 Speech of Walter Riester to parliament, 26.01.2001, Bundestag plenary protocol 14/147, p.14428 
174 ‘Eine zukunftsfeste und bezahlbare Rente’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25.4.01.   
175 Speech of Walter Riester to parliament, 11.05.2001, Bundestag plenary protocol 14/168, p.16444   
  
Chapter 5 
 122 
These are the future retirees who know that they will receive a higher pension than according to the present 
situation; the younger generation who knows that their contributions will stay affordable and that they will 
receive two sorts of pensions later on; and, everyone in this country raising children who know that their 
pension claims will be adjusted accordingly.  
 
In addition, he remarked, underlining his satisfaction with the reform, that ‘by concluding this 
reform we make clear that the term “reform” also implies that people are better off afterwards 
compared to the pre-reform situation’.176   
To conclude, this compilation of the Minister’s written and public spoken statements includes 
a variety of examples in which he explained and/or legitimized the 2001 pension reform by 
referring to its goals and principles. He did so by either linking these goals to the problems the 
reform was supposed to address (making cognitive arguments) or by showing that the normative 
principles underlying the reform (and by implication the reform as such) indeed relate to socially 
desirable norms and values. Riester also legitimized the reform measures with references to the 
expected benefits for the main groups of the population that were to benefit from the changes. All 
in all, the conclusion can be drawn that Riester fulfils the criteria for the second aspect of IL that 
deals with legitimizing a reform in cognitive and normative terms.    
 
5.4.3 Appeals to Give up Reform Resistance   
 
Once Riester, the former IG Metall deputy chairman, entered the political arena, it soon became 
clear that the way towards comprehensive recalibration of socio-economic policies would be more 
difficult than expected. Early in his period in office, he succeeded in defending his ideas on 
pension reform against more traditional thinkers within the SPD in the process of drawing up the 
coalition agreement. At that time, the Minister realized that it was ‘decisive to take on the 
challenge of achieving a forward-looking pension reform’. For him, this first instance of internal 
party confrontation was clearly a learning experience, which possibly influenced his later style in 
dealing with the opposition and led him to pledge not to allow others to restrict him even before 
embarking on my work as Minister of Labour’ (Riester 2004: 85).  
Later on, the Minister indeed took the opportunity on various occasions in the reform process 
to voice his disillusionment with reform critics. In 1999, at a fairly early phase in the reform 
process,177 he sharply attacked the approach of the CDU/FDP opposition towards social policy 
issues as ‘populist, lacking in concepts and untrustworthy’. Admittedly, the choice of such a tone 
was probably related to the context of the party congress, which tends to invite a more 
confrontational rhetoric and can be seen as distinct from Riester’s other public reactions to 
criticism.  
Looking at some examples, it appears that the Minister’s attacks on criticism in other 
contexts, such as interviews and parliamentary speeches, were qualitatively different. They often 
struck up a more serious and warning tone, especially when directed at the opposition, on whose 
cooperation in the CDU-dominated Bundesrat the Minister ultimately depended for part of the 
proposals. When asked about how he would deal with the resistance of the parliamentary 
opposition, he pointed out in an interview that the CDU would have a severe credibility problem if 
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they dared to veto the tax credits to citizens for private pension provision.178 The background 
behind this assessment was that the Government’s funding plans exceeded by far the amount of 
funding the CDU had requested, indicating that a veto would contradict their earlier arguments and 
subsequently be counterproductive to them and to the progress of the reform. This statement may 
be taken as an example of an appeal to the opposition to rethink their attitude.  
Furthermore, at the second and final reading of the Old-Age Provision Act bill in January 
2001, 179 the Minister accused the CDU of party-political tactics in their continued resistance to 
elements of the reform. In addition, he severely criticized the way in which the CDU had 
pretended for some time to cooperate with the Government. The offer of the Christian Democrats 
to enter into consensus talks with the Government to work constructively towards solutions and 
their subsequent switch to blocking behaviour was one object of the Minister’s frustrated remarks. 
Against the background of a controversial CDU advertising campaign to mobilize society against 
the Government ’s pension plans, Riester also attacked the opposition for their agitating behaviour 
and for using populist arguments: instead of using reasoned argumentation, he alleged, they were 
rather keen on defaming the Government, and particularly his own person. The Minister also took 
advantage of his final appearance in parliament, before the Bundesrat vote on the reform, to 
lament about the opposition’s non-cooperative attitude:  
 
As always in life, there cannot only be winners. Ladies and Gentlemen of the opposition, you have not come 
a long way. Today, you stand at exactly the same point where you departed from. I regret this since I have 
wished for the opposition to cooperate constructively.180 
 
As he had done on the previous occasion, he addressed the issue of the opposition’s behaviour 
while making a careful distinction between what he saw as ‘constructive cooperation’ by the 
liberal FDP and the ‘blockade, procrastination and defamation’ on the part of the Christian 
Democrats. In both cases, he directly referred to parliamentarians whose behaviour he saw as 
exemplary for both parties. Apart from underscoring that his appeals to reform critics became 
remarkably direct towards the end of the reform process, such rhetoric also highlighted the end of 
policy-making under the condition of cross-party consensus, which had dominated German 
pension policy-making for many decades (Bäcker 2002).  
In conclusion, the examples presented above support the idea that Minister Riester did 
confront the hurdle of reform resistance. Regarding the theoretical framework of IL, this means 
that his way of communicating provided sufficient evidence for the aspect of the IL concept, 
‘appealing to give up reform resistance’. Most of the examples were found in the later stages of the 
reform process (after the bills had entered into the parliamentary process), after it had become 
obvious that the opposition was not going to cooperate with the government on the proposal and 
the opposition’s efforts in derailing the reform concept had become more pronounced.  
 
5.4.4 Political Orientation  
 
To come to a judgment about Riester’s political orientation, it is worthwhile considering the 
Minister’s own ideas about his aspirations as a politician and his attitude towards political power. 
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When Riester himself reflected upon his own political style and his understanding of holding a 
political office with considerable authority, he made clear that his intention was not to adapt too 
much to the rules of the political arena and to participate in political rituals. At the same time, he 
was well aware that this pledge to keep his integrity and to remain true to his personal beliefs 
might equally be interpreted as a lack of flexibility in the political game and thus as a potential 
weakness by political observers. He also speculated that political opponents of his would see this 
“weakness” magnified. This was due to the fact that he largely lacked connections to the SPD 
parliamentary group, as he had no previous experience as a member of parliament because of his 
direct transfer to politics from the trade union movement. The Minister compared his entry into 
politics with making an entrance into a closed system that consisted of an inner political circle and 
an attached media-driven environment. He also admitted to having difficulties with that system, 
being ‘someone to whom the principle “give and take” did not matter and who could not accept it 
as political leadership style’ (Riester 2004: 95). In other words, these thoughts point to a politician 
who intended to set out and follow his own path, and engage as little as possible with established 
political circles, but who also was self-conscious of the drawbacks of this choice.  
Related to Riester’s attitude towards “doing politics” was his personal interpretation of 
power, which, according to him, ‘is no end in itself (…) but one that only shows in social relations 
[…]. It is not a negative term by definition, but one that implies the shaping and changing social 
realities’ (Riester 2004:96). About his approach to power and policy-making, he explained that:  
 
It is important to me to link my concerns to societal realities and developments. I am not interested in - as it is 
done frequently - developing my ideas while depending on plotting and underhand doings. On the other hand, 
I want to do justice to societal complexity and integrate different needs of different groups in society, also 
beyond what seems to be necessary (ibid: 96-97).  
 
At the same time, he recognized that his efforts to remain ‘authentic’ may have their price:  
 
Of course the question arises whether I would have made things easier for myself if I had adapted more, if I 
had participated more fully in the political game, or if I had been on the spot more clearly. All of this may 
have been correct, but it was not my style of doing things (ibid: 98). 
 
Riester’s self-characterization reveals that he hardly saw his mission in politics as one of achieving 
political results in order to gain power and personal prestige, but rather as informed by idealism 
and personal integrity, which can be associated with a policy-seeking motivation. His own idea of 
leadership seemed to be clearly directed towards effecting policy change in a way that does not 
depend on political “give and take” as he puts it, but rather relying on the power of ideas and 
arguments. How did these intentions fare in the realities of the process of pension reform? Did 
Riester’s behaviour during the reform process also have a steering role in the reform process? 
These questions will be taken up again in Section 5.5.2.  
To conclude, the analysis in this section supports the supposition that Minister Riester 
manifested elements of IL. The findings reveal a recurrent argumentative structure that included 
linking the necessity of reform to existing and expected policy problems, and an exposition of the 
reform concept, including its goals, its instruments and their expected effects. The “modernizer” 
Riester exposed the disadvantages of the old statutory pension scheme while trying to justify the 
core of his reform proposal, which rested on the principle of generational justice. His answer to the 
old system’s troubles was to adapt the financing of the statutory system while at the same time 
introducing a second pillar of privately funded pension provision. This proposal was defended by 
communication in terms of both reform necessity and appropriateness. Riester’s speeches in 
parliament disclosed numerous attempts to condemn the blocking tactics of the Christian 
Democrats, and his accusations directed at the opposition and their destructive attitude can be seen 
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as indicative of the third aspect of IL. Finally, the Minister’s policy-orientation could be verified 
with the help of his biographical writings. From the findings of this section, it can be concluded 
that Minister Riester fulfilled the criteria for four aspects of IL, which include that a key politician 
rejects the policy status quo, legitimizes new policy, appeals to reform opponents to give up their 
resistance, and shows a clear policy-orientation in his or her attitude towards political office. In 
short, the findings support the argument that Minister Riester was an ideational leader during the 
process leading up to the 2000/2001 pension reform. However, we need to bear in mind that the 
assessment of communication content does not tell us much about the effectiveness of the 
message. In other words, the question whether such purposeful communication - even if in 
agreement with the aspects of IL - also had an influence on the achievement of the reform cannot 
be ascertained from texts alone. Section 5.5 addresses this very question.  
 
5.5 Analysis Part II: What Role for Ideational Leadership? 
 
This second part of the analysis follows on from illustrating the presence of IL. The  question of 
interest is now why the reform was eventually successful, and to what extent Riester, who has 
been identified as an ideational leader, can been seen as crucial to its adoption. In order to answer 
the question of how important IL proved to be, I will draw on the views from interview accounts 
as to why the process eventually led to the legislative passage, as well as on Riester’s own 
account, as sources of information. Additionally, I will also consider which mix of strategies the 
government used in order to push through their reform concept, and how Riester’s role related to 
these strategies. I will consider each of these in turn. 
 
5.5.1 Strategies of the Government to Adopt the Reform 
  
In order to evaluate to what extent IL by Minister Riester led to a successful conclusion of the 
reform, we need to consider which strategies were used by the Government and how they may 
have contributed to the reform outcome. This will be done by considering what observers thought 
about the relevance of three possible strategies to get the reform adopted. These strategies 
involved argumentation involving persuasion; making concessions, and ignoring or 
outmanoeuvring reform opponents. The assumption is that finding considerable evidence for the 
argumentation strategy, relative to the other two, would provide extra support for the role of the 
ideational leader Riester. 
To begin with, the first strategy, legitimizing reform proposals by way of argumentation and 
persuasion, was recognized clearly as a strategy employed by the government, and Minister 
Riester’s share in it was explicitly stressed.  However, while respondents recognized that there had 
been efforts to legitimize the reform in public, towards interest groups and to persuade the SPD’s 
parliamentary group (Interviews policy expert 22.04.04, Green party official 16.07.04, former SPD 
MP, 15.06.04), it was also pointed out that this communicative strategy was found to be lacking in 
one way or another. More specifically, it was alleged that communication on the reform drafts 
between the Ministry and the SPD party faction began too late in the process, had a flavour of 
‘there is no alternative’ about it (Interview SPD official 28.06.04), was too limited in the 
beginning of the process (Interview BMGS official 16.06.04), or too open towards the diverging 
positions of other policy stakeholders (Interview Green party official 29.06.04). On the other hand, 
from the perspective of interest groups, the Government’s communication was qualified as 
resolute and as ‘leaving no alternative’ as far as the ‘if’ of the reform was concerned. Concerning 
  
Chapter 5 
 126 
the details of the reform draft, reformers tried to be persuasive by using economic arguments and 
sophisticated calculations in order to underline the need to adjust the statutory scheme However, 
this approach was seen to be too one-sided as it stressed the technical details of policy instruments 
rather than the design of the reform in its entirety (Interviews DGB official 14.06.04 and former 
DGB official, 28.06.04).   
Following on from this, the use of the second strategy, making concessions to reform critics, 
was also widely acknowledged. In particular, trade unions were named as those who saw their 
demands accommodated by the government, but also social welfare associations (who are 
lobbying for the interests of recipients of social security benefits), and critics within the SPD were 
named as being successful in achieving concessions. At the same time, respondents rarely 
reflected on the importance of these concessions for the final result from the Government’s 
perspective, but when they did, opinions diverged on whether granting them had been positive or 
negative for the overall outcome of the reform. For instance, it was argued that when the Minister 
agreed to concessions in response to demands from the SPD parliamentary party, this decision 
came too late to avoid damage to his reputation linked with his performance in the reform process 
(Interview former SPD MP, 15.06.04). However, it is unclear whether this unfortunate course of 
events delayed the adoption of the reform. In contrast, the view from the perspective of the 
Minister’s staff on concession-making was different. A ministry source saw the concessions 
concerning the status of occupational pensions in particular as a crucial instrument in winning the 
approval of trade unions for the new minimum pension levels that were a core provision of the 
reform (Interview senior official BMGS, 16.06.04). As far as the opposition was concerned (and 
apart from the question as to whether concessions had contributed to the final result), the 
significance of the Minister’s concessions was that they illustrated the remarkable influence trade 
unions could have on the Red-Green Government (Interview CDU MP, 17.06.04), and eventually, 
on the extent of pension reform.  
In contrast to the former two strategies, the presence and significance of the third strategy, 
ignoring or outmanoeuvring reform opponents, was more contested. An SPD source found this 
type of strategy to be characteristic of the early phase, corresponding to the agenda-setting and 
policy formulation phase up to 2000, of the reform process (Interview SPD party official 
28.06.04). The choice not to take the criticism of ‘traditionalists’ within the SPD during the 
concept development phase seriously was an example of the government ignoring opponents in the 
early stage of the reform process (Interview senior official BMGS, 16.06.04). Another obvious 
example of this strategy was mentioned several times: the attempt by Minister Riester to 
encourage the CDU opposition in separate talks to agree to a cross-party consensus on the pension 
plans (Interviews policy expert 22.04.04, Green party official 29.06.04, SPD party official 
28.06.04). While the Minister wanted these talks to bring the opposition ‘on board’, they were at 
the same time an attempt to outmanoeuvre intra-party opponents, that is, to neutralise critical 
voices within the SPD with the “threat” of CDU parliamentary approval (Interviews policy expert 
22.04.04, Green party official 29.06.04). However, as the talks broke down before the legislative 
process (despite the fact that the government had accommodated and even over fulfilled CDU 
demands on funding private pension provision), it is questionable whether this strategy was 
ultimately productive. Only after it had become clear that the CDU was no longer prepared to 
engage in consensus-building, did the Minister start to look elsewhere for support for his proposal, 
i.e. within his own party and with the trade unions (Interview SPD party official, 18.06.04). 
Conversely, from the perspective of trade union officials, there was little question of being ignored 
or outmanoeuvred by the Government during the later (legislative) stage of the process, as it had 
been responding actively with concessions to their most important points of criticism (Interview 
former DGB official 28.06.04). Finally, the decision to split the reform package into two parts, one 
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of which did not require Bundesrat approval - in order to avoid prolonged negotiations on 
provisions that could be adopted by a single majority in the Bundestag -  can also be seen as an 
example of this strategy.   
On the basis of the evidence just presented, and keeping the course of the reform process in 
mind, the following may be concluded: the first strategy, legitimizing reforms by way of consistent 
communication and persuasion, was present in the efforts of the reformists, and was associated 
with the Minister in particular.181 However, the argumentation in favour of reform was found to be 
more comprehensive vis-à-vis the general public and interest groups (especially trade unions) than 
vis-à-vis the SPD party faction in parliament, which apparently alienated some of its left-wing 
parliamentarians and formed a hindrance in the process. The second strategy, making concessions 
to reform opponents, was found to be equally important. Indeed, given the numerous occasions 
during the process when the reform provisions were modified, by Riester, and sometimes by 
Schröder, it is hard to neglect the role of concessions, including the final compromise reached 
between the coalition and some of the Länder in de Mediation Committee on the outcome of 
reform. In this respect, the accounts of respondents reaffirmed what has been stressed in the 
summary of the reform process (Sections 5.2 and 5.3). Notwithstanding the Ministry’s efforts to 
“sell” its reform proposals, many of its measures were seen as unacceptable to key actors such as 
the CDU, the trade unions and their allies within the left wing of the SPD. Despite the 
government’s effort to legitimize the proposals, it was inevitable that this kind of resistance 
necessitated a number of concessions in order to bring the reform to a close. By contrast, evading 
criticism or sidestepping it was apparently not a viable option. The observations on the role of the 
third strategy, ignoring or outmanoeuvring reform opponents, made it appear less important 
relative to the other two strategies, indicating an overall weaker role. The practice (during the pre-
legislative phase) of purposefully excluding interest groups from the debate, Riester’s attempt to 
involve the CDU in a cross-party consensus in order to strengthen his stance vis-à-vis the objectors 
in his own party, and the division of the proposals into two separate draft bills to avoid the 
Bundesrat having to approve of all provisions, fell into this category.  
Keeping in mind that both the argumentation strategy, notwithstanding its procedural 
weaknesses, and concession-making were prominently present in the reform process, let us take a 
closer look at Minister Riester’s leadership qualities.  
 
5.5.2 The Role of Minister Riester in the Reform Process: Signs of Leadership?  
 
What can finally be said about the role of Minister Riester himself? Having found evidence of his 
IL on the basis of criteria relating to communication, was he also (perceived as) a leader who 
could see the reform through?  
The Minister reportedly displayed certain leadership abilities during the process. One source 
from the Ministry of Labour even praised the Minister for ‘his achievement of paradigmatic 
change in the face of fierce resistance’ (interview BMGS senior official, 16.06.04). His sound 
knowledge of facts and thorough conviction that the changes he advocated were necessary made 
                                                           
 
 
 
181 One lesson learned from the interview accounts is that the strategies might be complementary (in the sense of occurring 
together), rather than being mutually exclusive, as the term ‘alternative explanations’ implies. Indeed, 7 out of 9 
interviewees reported that all three strategies had been used by the Government, albeit at different stages in the process and 
in different intensities.  
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him into a credible reformer. His reformist attitude was allegedly also helped by his background, 
his determination to innovate and by a certain level of political support:  
 
Riester has shown stamina, and he did so in a special kind of way. He was an outsider to the political arena 
[…] he had no mandate in parliament and could only influence the parliamentary group in his quality as a 
Minister (…). Yet I think we would not have come that far if we had not had a Minister recruited from 
outside the political landscape who was willing to explore new paths […]. In addition, his political backing 
by the Chancellor was of central importance, and so was the loyalty of the coalition’s parliamentary groups 
that was needed for the eventual success’ (Interview BMSG senior official 16.06.04).  
 
Riester’s personal observation of the reform process reinforces this appraisal of someone who was 
willing to persevere if the chance to do so was politically endorsed. At possibly the most 
precarious moment in the reform process, in December 2000, while travelling abroad during the 
parliamentary expert hearings on the draft bills, he prematurely returned to Berlin due to heavy 
criticism of the drafts and the demand by trade unions for the controversial adjustment factor to be 
dropped (and claiming an alleged promise to do so by the SPD party faction, which the Minister 
was not informed of). Despite the delicate situation and speculations in the media about Riester’s 
resignation over the issue, the Minister, after reassuring himself of the continued backing of 
Chancellor Schröder (and the SPD party faction), decided to continue in office, although he had 
been informed that the reform had to proceed without the controversial adjustment factor. After 
the crisis was defused, the Minister recalled that ‘I quickly returned to work and was determined to 
push through the pension reform despite everything that had happened’ (Riester 2004: 159).       
The views on Riester’s leadership orientation held by other observers were more diverse and 
stressed different aspects of how leadership may express itself. For instance, the Minister’s party 
colleagues were more critical of the Minister’s abilities in this respect. One source noted that he 
was good at handling the communication and persuasion aspects of his job, but that at the same 
time, he regrettably made mistakes when it came to process management. As for the latter, this 
referred to Riester’s misinterpretation of the power resources of his opponents and to unfortunate 
choices, such as the Minister’s deliberate absence during a key parliamentary hearing (Interview 
former SPD MP, 15.06.04). Another SPD source found but little evidence for Riester’s leadership, 
judging him ‘too sensitive to influences from within the Ministry and neglectful in terms of 
building support within the party’ (Interview SPD party official, 18.06.04). Other coalition sources 
confirmed the latter view, but still attested to the Minister’s leadership. At the same time, they 
found him to be lacking in sensibility to political processes and actors, as well as being too 
responsive to outside suggestions (Interview Green party official, 29.06.04). However, it was also 
suggested that the Minister clearly deserved to take the credits for the adoption of the reform, 
despite deficiencies in dealing with the process, including the Minister’s tendency for making 
concessions too easily (Interview Green party official 16.07.04). As regards the views of policy 
stakeholders, trade union representatives were divided on whether Riester behaved as a leader in 
the process. On the one hand, he was seen above all as a policy-oriented politician, who was 
‘consistently arguing for his plans and giving others the impression he was strongly convinced of 
their importance and their quality’ (Interview DGB official, 16.06.04). On the other hand, it was 
stated that ‘the many amendments to the proposals do not attest to a strong leadership style’ 
(Interview former DGB official, 28.06.04).   
The picture emerging from this survey of evidence about the form and role of Riester’s 
leadership is diverse: it was certainly there, but at the same time it was continuously put to the test. 
As Section 5.4.5 has illustrated, the Minister started out with clear aspirations to change policy in 
accordance with his principles. Eventually, he steered his reform proposals towards adoption, 
despite serious ups and downs in the intermediate process, coupled with situations that resulted in 
legislative adjustments. Although the media helped to foster a picture of a tarnished politician who 
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had to water down his reform plans as the process went along, Riester, with the backing of 
Chancellor Schröder, managed to hold on to the core points of the reform until its adoption in May 
2001. In this sense, his idealism and focus on substantive policy issues paid off, although the way 
to the finishing line had been far from smooth, and personally disappointing: his initial belief in 
the willingness to cooperate with several prominent CDU politicians (Riester 2004: 170) had been 
frustrated, and the lack of learning potential of his former working environment, the trade unions 
had become obvious (ibid: 144). 
 
5.5.3 Decisive Factors in Getting the Proposals Accepted 
 
After assessing the strategies followed by the Government and the role of the Minister’s 
leadership, it is worth considering whether there was evidence of any other factors possibly 
playing a crucial role in the eventual adoption of the reform, perhaps by increasing acceptance of 
the reforms. The purpose of doing so is to check whether interview accounts support or disconfirm 
on this count the earlier findings of this section, as the evidence gained by consulting a small 
number of observers on this question may not have produced answers that covered all aspects.   
Firstly, the favourable economic situation provided support for the acceptance of the new 
private pension scheme. Stock exchanges at the time were flourishing (the so-called “New 
Economy boom”), which was said to influence positively the debate about the potentials and 
possibilities of capital-funded pension provision at a time when the reform process unfolded 
(Interviews policy expert 22.04.04, Green party official 29.06.04, SPD party official 15.06.04, 
former DGB official 28.06.04). In connection with this, the financial industry, that is, banks and 
insurance companies hoping to profit from the business possibilities offered by the new scheme, 
reportedly employed lobbying activities in the process, so as to have the reform designed to the 
best of their interests and to see it concluded (Interviews policy expert 22.04.04, BMGS senior 
official 16.06.04). A second factor mentioned in this context was “reform fatigue”, in the sense 
that actors became more conciliatory as they wished to see the conclusion of a long-drawn out 
process on debating pension reforms (Interview SPD official, 28.06.04). Sources from a trade 
union background mentioned that a sort of “resignation to the facts” had helped reform adoption, 
while denying that the trade unions’ decrease of resistance to the proposals had little to do with an 
increase of acceptance, but rather with accepting the inevitability of the reform (Interview former 
DGB official, 28.06.04). This acceptance was ‘without real conviction, due to serious doubts about 
the long-term viability of the reform’ (Interview DGB official, 14.06.04).  
Furthermore, the role of concessions and the accommodation of a series of demands by the 
government in the course of the process were also stressed by several respondents (Interviews 
former SPD MP 15.06.04, SPD official 28.06.04, policy expert 22.04.04). In particular, the 
massive increase of tax subsidies for the private scheme, announced by Chancellor Schröder after 
the contours of the reform had been made public, was said to have been influential for the 
conclusion of the process (Interview policy expert 22.04.04). These statements do sustain the 
importance of the alternative strategy of concession-making mentioned above.  
Subsequently, it was acknowledged that the demands of policy advisors and pension experts 
(both nationally and internationally, e.g. by the OECD) had helped in creating awareness of 
Germany’s pension problems and advanced progress towards a concrete reform proposal and its 
adoption (Interviews BMGS senior official 26.06.04). In a similar vein, policy-makers’ awareness 
of the state of the pension scheme - when seen in international perspective - was also furthered by 
its reporting obligations under the European Union’s open method of coordination (Interview 
former DGB official 28.06.04). As a parallel process, there had been a notable change in the 
debate on pension provision. It consisted of a switch from a former closed debate between a small 
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group of experts and policymakers towards a more open and broader societal discussion on what 
the future of pensions should be, taking into account the problems posed by demographic trends 
and so forth (Interviews Green party official 29.06.04, CDU MP, 17.06.04, SPD party official, 
15.06.04). This opening up was assisted by a different style of media reporting, perhaps due to a 
generational change, which did no longer see reforms of statutory pensions as undesirable or 
unnecessary (Interview CDU MP, 17.06.04). These two factors in particular, when taken together, 
shaped an environment, in which Minister Riester’s ideas about an additional pension pillar and 
adjustments to the statutory scheme fell on fertile ground. Notwithstanding the many voices that 
disagreed about the fine-tuning of the reform’s goals and the desirable instruments to reach these, 
as the reform process went on, the ‘if’ of the reform seemed increasingly indisputable.  
Finally, an important factor in concluding the reform was that the actors involved, after some 
reflection on the issue, had understood that the reform did not represent a radical and complete 
policy turnaround, as a ministry source reported:  
 
I think that after a phase of uncertainty about whether the passage of the law would be blocked (this would 
have meant to avoid systemic change altogether) or whether - by passing the law - a path could be opened up 
to win back confidence for the statutory pension scheme, those forces willing to carry out the reform won. All 
actors involved realized after all that the reform proposal did not carry the risk of a total systemic change 
(Interview BMGS senior official, 16.06.04).  
 
The last point underscores that Riester’s nuanced reform strategy, complementing the pension 
system with new pillars while preserving the existing statutory pillar, had finally been understood 
by policy stakeholders as more of a chance than a threat, and this realization facilitated eventual 
agreement. If this is a correct interpretation, it supports both the argumentation strategy and the 
effectiveness of Riester’s leadership capabilities.  
 
5.5.4 Combining the Findings: Did IL Have an Impact?   
 
To what extent can IL be seen as responsible for the reform outcome? To answer this question, I 
will reconsider the different elements discussed so far in this section. How plausible an 
explanation is ideational leadership by Minister Riester for the adoption of the reform?182 I will 
argue that both IL and concession-making had their share in concluding the Riester pension 
reform. In order to draw this conclusion, I considered the role played by argumentation and the 
other two alternative strategies the Government had at its disposal in order to push ahead with the 
pension reform; the role played by Minister’s leadership; and other factors that were important in 
achieving the reform.  
Regarding the choice of strategies to conclude the reform, the Government, and most 
prominently the Minister of Labour, did carry out an argumentation strategy.  However, it was 
                                                           
 
 
 
182 One caveat is in order: one, if not the major difficulty of gauging the effects of IL lies in the fact that it is difficult to 
pinpoint ‘instances’ of leadership, such as important decisions taken by a key politician during the reform process, and 
evaluate the immediate reaction of reform opponents in terms of whether leadership had an effect, in terms of preference 
changes towards approval or at least acceptance of the reformist position. A possible drawback is that such processes might 
occur with considerable delay, complicating efforts to detect them, as reactions would have to be monitored over a long 
period of time. I rather assume that leadership resembles an ongoing process with few discernable “peaks” and the way to 
proceed is to assemble as much evidence as possible that illustrates leadership, and show how it contributed to the final 
result of reform adoption. In doing so, showing the (relative) absence of alternative explanations strengthens the argument 
about IL.  
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directed more at policy stakeholders and the public than the SPD party faction, a fact which did 
not help a smooth debate between the ministry and the coalition parties. The evidence for this 
strategy can be seen to back up the findings about Riester being an ideational leader in terms of the 
first two aspects of the IL concept.  
 The evaluation of the Minister’s political orientation and role suggests that he brought a 
policy-oriented approach to political office, hoping to make a difference to policy-making by 
staying true to his own principles and, by extension, policy ideas. At the same time, despite a fair 
amount of criticism about his style of handling the reform process and in the knowledge of the 
Chancellor’s backing, he carried on with his plans, determined to bring the project to a conclusion, 
which testified to his leadership capabilities. The impression his role in the process left on others 
was one of leadership expressed in terms of steadily defending the core of his proposals, while 
being forced to accommodate various demands in the course of the same process: this he did by 
way of concessions to the trade unions, the opposition, and last, but not least, to the coalition’s 
parliamentary parties.  
As this limitation on Riester’s leadership already indicates, of the two alternative strategies, 
concession-making was important to calm the demands of critics in the pre-legislative and the 
legislative phase up to the final compromise reached by the Mediation Committee in May 2001. 
From the review of decisive factors contributing to the finalization of the reform, those 
concessions also emerged to be relevant. At the same time, it suggested that reform critics realized 
that the draft bills were not going to introduce a complete make-over of German pension 
arrangements, but were an attempt to make state pensions more sustainable in the future, which is 
consistent with the message Riester had been spreading from the outset of the reform plans. 
Considering all the evidence together, it is fair to conclude that IL and concession-making were 
both important factors in finalizing the reform. The Minister was certainly forward-looking and 
idea-driven, as he defended his reform proposals with personal conviction and stamina and in this 
sense, the choice of the Chancellor for the trade union modernizer was probably a sensible one. 
Nevertheless, his personal attitude towards the practice of political power may have eventually 
caused him to clash with established political circles, complicating his task of steering the reform 
through the legislative process and gathering support for its adoption; instead, he watched his plan 
being watered down despite his attempts to keep it intact. To the extent that he had to make more 
and more concessions to critics as the process went along, his authority weakened somewhat, 
inviting additional demands. That loss of authority was surely also related to his decision to 
prepare the draft bill in the relative secrecy of the Ministry before going public, and to some 
miscalculations with respect to the scope of opposition his proposals would meet. Conceding these 
weaknesses, he sought to compensate for them by putting a lot of energy in persuading critics of 
the merits of his policy ideas and by showing remarkable stamina in the face of criticism.  
The Importance of Political Consensus-Building: a New Aspect of IL 
Finally, the results of the analysis pointed to a new aspect of IL that stresses the need for 
undertaking political consensus-building. The reason is that Riester’s performance, in this respect, 
was found to be lacking and it is plausible to suggest that a systematic focus on activities linked to 
this aspect could have aided the adoption of far-reaching reforms. In what ways did this deficiency 
show? Admittedly, the Minister preferred to keep away from ‘political games’ and was inclined 
towards preserving personal integrity in political disputes (Riester 2004: 94-95). However, this 
does not mean that he did not sense the importance of winning over political opponents to support 
his proposals: at some points in the reform process his actions demonstrated that he saw the need 
to engage in political consensus-building in order to bring his reform project to completion. 
During the difficult period in the autumn of 2000, when the reform legislation was still at its 
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drafting stage and Riester saw himself faced with day-to-day complaints from societal associations 
(including the trade unions) that were readily backed by the CDU opposition, he sensed that  
 
This moment was critical for the reform. Our plan could only be saved if we could take away the Union’s (i.e. 
the Christian Democrats) “sounding board” of societal associations in order to end the public discussion on 
possible details of the reform. This, in turn, meant to quickly present a legislative draft and to persuade the 
trade unions to support its provisions (ibid: 154).  
 
At that moment, Riester thus thought actively about accommodating the trade union’s demands in 
order to increase overall support for the proposals. He also tried to convince the speaker for social 
policy issues in the SPD parliamentary group, Ulla Schmidt, that only after getting the trade 
unions on board could a viable agreement be reached. However, renewed union demands and 
lobbying efforts of the VDR to scrap the unpopular adjustment factor escalated the situation and 
thwarted Riester’s plans. To make matters worse, the SPD parliamentary party had decided to 
offer the unions a compromise without consulting Riester beforehand.    
This course of events has shown how important political consensus-seeking attempts can be 
in achieving a final result on reform, and that the lack of success of such a strategy can at least 
hinder or delay such a result. In Riester’s case, he seems to have underestimated the amount of 
support he would need to speedily conclude the reform process. While Riester did pursue an 
agreement with the trade unions (after attempting to find a basis for early consensus with the 
opposition), he apparently neglected to build bridges within the parliamentary parties of the Red-
Green coalition, whose support he seemingly took for granted. Thus, his efforts at consensus-
seeking remained in this respect deficient.  
 
5.6 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have described and analyzed the process leading to the 2001 pension reform 
initiated by Minister of Labour Walter Riester. This significant reform ended the one-pillar 
structure of German pension arrangements, introduced a second privately financed and state-
subsidized element, and strengthened the third, company-based element of pension provision. 
Section 5.2 has clarified why I consider this reform to be structural in character with reference to 
its changes in financing, benefits, and regulation, and outlined the parameters of the political 
process by looking at its chronology, the main actors and their policy positions. Section 5.3 has 
revealed that considerable opposition - both inside and outside parliament - had gathered in 
response to Minister Riester’s initial reform proposal, and needed to be addressed by those who 
advocated the reform. Despite several changes to the proposal, and various concessions on the part 
of the Ministry towards resisting actors (opponents within the SPD, the CDU and trade unions), 
Riester nevertheless managed to preserve some innovative features of the reform when it was 
finally adopted in the spring of 2001. A combined analysis of documents and interviews has 
shown that the Minister may be described as an ideational leader on the basis of four initially 
formulated aspects of IL. Nevertheless, he failed to pay due attention to the need for consensus-
building with all relevant critics including his opponents in the SPD. This was a mistake which 
made the reform process, from his perspective, more difficult, but, more importantly, could not 
derail it completely. At the same time, although he had the credentials of an ideational leader, he 
also needed to make considerable concessions to reform critics: ignoring their demands completely 
would not have resulted in the desired adoption of the reform.  
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Two main lessons can be learned from this analysis: firstly, the first three aspects associated 
with IL can indeed be found in the political communication efforts of a key policy-maker who, in 
the final analysis, managed to adopt a structural reform. In addition, Riester’s political motivation 
corresponded to a policy-seeking orientation. Secondly, the IL hypothesis has helped to shed light 
on how the reform was brought to a successful conclusion. However, in the face of compelling 
political-institutional obstacles, Minister Riester, with the consent and backing of Chancellor 
Schröder, also had to make concessions in order to accomplish a final breakthrough. Therefore, 
Riester’s ideational leadership was but one of at least two factors to explain this particular 
structural reform. In terms of refining the IL concept, the evidence of Riester’s failure to engage 
sufficiently in comprehensive consensus-building, suggested an addition to the IL concept, that is, 
the aspect “efforts at political consensus-building”. At the same time, other aspects, such as 
"discarding the status quo" should be interpreted in a slightly different way. For instance, IL is 
essentially innovative in character, but does not necessarily imply that the policy status quo needs 
to be discarded completely. Regarding the latter, the study of the Riester pension reform 
demonstrates how a key policy-maker may carry out innovation by advocating new elements that 
address pressing problems, while preserving more traditional and still appreciated elements of 
existing policy. 
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 6. Hartz IV: IL Leading to Structural Reform in Labour Market 
Policy?  
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
The analysis of the Riester pension reform has demonstrated that the responsible Minister showed 
characteristics of ideational leadership (IL) before that reform was adopted. However, as explained 
in the methodological chapter (Chapter 3), this finding needs to be corroborated by further 
evidence. To this end, I will look at the case of a second structural reform to see whether IL also 
played a prominent role there. After having covered the area of pension policy, I will proceed to 
analyze another key social policy area that has also recently seen a structural reform: 
unemployment insurance.  
My second case centres on the 4th Law on Modern Services on the Labour Market, also 
known as “Hartz IV”, which came into effect on January 1st, 2005. The unofficial name of the 
reform may be traced to Peter Hartz, the former director of human resources of Volkswagen AG, 
who headed the government-appointed ‘Commission on the Modernisation of Labour Market 
Services’ in the spring of 2002. The recommendations made by the Hartz-Commission were 
transformed into four laws (called Hartz I through to Hartz IV), which were passed between 
December 2002 and December 2003. Most measures contained in these laws were related to active 
labour market policy, but their most controversial elements brought major changes to the schemes 
of unemployment protection. These changes were: drastically shortened duration of insurance 
benefits; tighter requirements for the unemployed to accept suitable jobs; simplification of 
insurance regulations; wage insurance for older unemployed workers; and the merger of 
unemployment assistance and social assistance (Reissert 2005). It is this last reform that will be 
analyzed in this case study.   
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 explains why Hartz IV 
qualifies as a structural reform and will introduce its main provisions. Section 6.3 provides a 
summary of the process leading to the concrete reform proposal, its acceptance by parliament, the 
positions of political and other important actors, and important events in the reform process. By 
combining information on the contents of the reform and the political process, the reader should be 
well equipped for the analysis in Sections 6.4 and 6.5. Section 6.4 sheds light upon the question 
whether IL, in its different aspects, was shown by Minister Clement (6.4.1), and how his role 
related to other important “reform-promoting” actors (6.4.2). Finally, Section 6.5 explores why the 
proposal for Hartz IV eventually became law and to what extent IL influenced the process. 183 
                                                           
 
 
 
183 Former Minister Wolfgang Clement endorses the reconstruction of the reform process in this chapter. Furthermore, he 
stated that he had fully identified himself with the greater project of comprehensive labour market reforms including Hartz-
IV. From his perspective, the negotiations aimed at reaching a final compromise on Hartz IV had been extremely difficult, 
but at the same time, the December 2003 compromise had been vital to make the reform happen (personal communication, 
22.11 and 28.11.06).    
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6.2 Features of Unemployment Insurance and the Hartz IV Reform  
 
This section provides necessary background knowledge for understanding the system of German 
unemployment insurance and for seeing why the Hartz IV reform radically broke with some of its 
foundations.184 Moreover, by explaining the structural character of the reform, I will make clear 
why Hartz IV is a suitable case.  
In the post-war German welfare state, unemployment protection was provided within a two-
pillar system consisting of unemployment insurance (Arbeitslosengeld) and unemployment 
assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe). From the 1960’s onwards, the system was complemented by the 
scheme of social assistance (Sozialhilfe), which provided a guaranteed minimum income available 
to anyone in need, no matter whether someone was available (as a registered unemployed person) 
to the labour market, or not. The table below illustrates the basic characteristics of this de facto 
three-pillar structure:  
 
 
Benefit Unemployment 
Insurance 
 
Unemployment 
assistance 
Social assistance 
Entitlement After 12 months of 
insured employment 
during previous 3 years 
After exhausting 
entitlement to 
unemployment insurance 
when still unemployed 
All persons in need 
irrespective of status on 
labour market185 
Financing Insurance contributions Taxes (federal 
Government budget) 
Taxes (Local 
Government budgets, but 
regulated by federal law) 
Level  Percentage of previous 
net earnings, not taxed 
Related to previous net 
earnings + means-tested 
Flat-rate amount for each 
member in household + 
cost of housing 
Character  
  
 
Earnings-related Earnings-related + 
means-test 
Flat-rate 
Maximum duration Dependent on length of 
previous employment and 
age 
Initially granted for one 
year; in principle 
indefinitely as long as 
qualifying conditions 
persist 
Indefinitely as long as 
individual need persists 
Table 6.1: Comparison of the three benefits before the Hartz IV reform (Jantz 2004) 
 
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, local government budgets were increasingly strained due to mass 
unemployment and cutbacks in the first and second pillars of unemployment insurance. This 
process, called the ‘municipalization of unemployment’, left local governments with the 
administrative and financial responsibility for the increasing number of unemployed (Hanesch 
1987 cited in Reissert 2003: 2.1 ). Studies have confirmed that a relationship exists between the 
                                                           
 
 
 
184 The information contained in this paragraph follows Reissert’s overview of the German system of unemployment 
protection (2005).  
185 If household income from all sources (including unemployment insurance or assistance) is below minimum level, the 
gap will be covered by social assistance.  
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rise in unemployment, the rise in social assistance expenditure, and the decline in investment 
expenditure in local governments (Seitz and Kurz 1999 cited in Giaimo 2002). The tendency of the 
different pillars to shift responsibilities for benefit recipients back and forth between them (see 
Section 6.3 for a short summary of this problem) has helped to contribute to a growing consensus 
in the 1990’s that the co-existence of the three programmes was undesirable and fraught with 
problems. Moreover, during the 1990’s, German unification and massive shifts in the East German 
labour market contributed to successive, yet in character incremental reforms of the unemployment 
benefit schemes. Since the mid-1990’s, job-seekers’ obligations to look for work, to accept job 
offers and placements in activation programmes and sanctions for non-compliance, have been 
extended in both the unemployment benefit system and the social assistance system (Webber 
1989; Gerlinger 2003:293). These reforms proved to be detrimental to the social assistance 
scheme. One of them was a reform limiting a certain sub-type of unemployment assistance, which 
implied cutbacks in the federal budget, which were compensated by rising expenditures of local 
governments and the Länder (Karr et al. 1993a cited in Perschke-Hartmann 1994). Despite these 
intensifying pressures within the three-pillar structure, no comprehensive reform had been 
attempted in tackling these problems. In 2003, the Hartz IV proposal was the first attempt to do so.  
The core of the Hartz IV law is the merger of two different benefit schemes, creating one new 
scheme to provide a “secondary unemployment benefit” (Arbeitslosengeld II, or short ALG II). 
This new scheme, effective as of January 1st 2005, provides a means-tested benefit for households 
of registered unemployed who do not qualify for unemployment insurance benefits. The benefit 
level equals the level of ordinary social assistance, which grants a guaranteed minimum level of 
income defined as a flat-rate amount plus the cost of housing.186 One notable exception is that 
people, who claim the new benefit after the end of their entitlement to unemployment insurance 
(and would have otherwise been able to claim unemployment assistance), receive a degressive 
supplement in order to compensate for the difference between the insurance benefit and the new 
benefit.187  As with unemployment assistance and social assistance, the new benefit is granted for 
an indefinite time, as long as claimants fulfil the qualifying conditions of unemployment and 
individual need. ALG II is financed from the budget of the federal Government and administered 
jointly by the FEA’s local labour offices and local authorities’ social assistance offices under the 
FEA’s general responsibility (Trägerschaft). As with unemployment assistance (but unlike social 
assistance), those entitled to the new benefit are also covered by the statutory pension, health 
insurance and invalidity schemes; the costs for this are borne by the federal Government.  
In addition to the merger, the Hartz IV reform has also tightened requirements for the 
unemployed with respect to their obligation to accept suitable job offers. Firstly, people eligible 
for the new benefit must in principle accept any job offer (with exceptions): a job offer cannot be 
refused on the grounds of being incommensurate with former employment and training, longer 
travelling time or more unfavourable conditions of employment.188 Secondly, while the Hartz I law 
had already reversed the burden of proof for the acceptability of job offers for unemployment 
                                                           
 
 
 
186 This amount is currently € 345 per month for the first adult in a household in the Western Länder and € 331 in the 
Eastern Länder, with dependents receiving lower amounts. These amounts slightly exceed the flat-rate amounts for social 
assistance because it includes lump-sums for specific needs that are paid on an individual basis to social assistance 
recipients.  
187 This supplement covers a maximum of two thirds of the difference between the two sorts of benefit, with a maximum of 
€ 160 per month. It is reduced by half after one year and is phased out after two years of claiming the new benefit.  
188 See corresponding paragraph 10 on acceptability of work,  BGBI I Nr.66 (2003), S.2954, § 10 (2).  
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insurance benefits,189 Hartz IV introduced even tighter sanctions for those who refuse job or 
training offers, especially for the young. For example, adult recipients of ALG II who refuse such 
offers are subject to a 30 percent reduction in the flat-rate benefit; while recipients under the age of 
25 are disqualified from the benefit (with the exception of housing costs).  
In terms of numbers of recipients before Hartz IV was enacted, the status quo situation 
presented itself as follows: in mid-July 2004, 2,26 million persons received unemployment 
assistance, while there were 1,1 million households (in 2003) with social assistance recipients, 
alone or with dependents. At the time of the launch of ALG II, estimates on the number of new 
benefit recipients in 2005 amounted to a total of 2,66 million eligible households (referred to under 
the new rules as Bedarfsgemeinschaften), comprising a total of 5,371 million people, out of which 
3,659 million were considered to be available for work.190   
How many of those entitled to the new benefit would gain financially compared to the 
situation before the reform? In general, the expectation was that most former social assistance 
recipients would slightly benefit or see their position unchanged, while most recipients of 
unemployment assistance would, on the whole, lose at least some of their entitlements. The table 
below shows estimates as of mid 2003. 
 
June 2003 West in 
millions 
in %  East in 
millions 
In % Total in 
millions  
Recipients of 
unemployment 
assistance  
 
1,087 
 
100 
 
0,967 
 
100 
 
2,054 
post-Hartz IV 
situation of 
recipients 
 
 
   
no entitlement   0,217 20 0,348 36 0,565 
less benefit 0,554 51 0,425 44 0,979 
about the same  0,120 11 0,06 6 0,180 
higher benefit  0,196 18 0,135 14 0,331 
Table 6.2: Consequences of Hartz IV  
(source: DGB-Informationen zur Sozial- und Arbeitsmarktpolitik 1/2004, p.5) 
 
The Structural Reform Qualities of Hartz IV  
Which of its characteristics makes Hartz IV a structural reform? First of all, the reform constituted 
a major change of the benefit structure of German unemployment insurance. It created a clear two-
pillar benefit structure in the system of unemployment insurance (based on unemployment benefit 
and ALG II), and therefore ended the de facto three-pillar structure. The latter came about due to 
the social assistance scheme increasingly being used by the unemployed (Reiners 1993; Hinrichs 
1994),191 while it was originally intended as a last resort for those in need and unable to work. As 
                                                           
 
 
 
189 Previously, the FEA had to prove in court cases that a certain job was suitable and acceptable for an unemployed person. 
Hartz I laid the burden of proof with the unemployed: any job offer is regarded to be acceptable and refusal to accept it 
means to be disqualified from unemployment insurance benefits for a certain period.  
190 The data were given in a talk given by Marc Heinrich, BMWA, titled Die Grundsicherung für Arbeitssuchende (SGBII), 
28.01.2005, Berlin.  
191 Since the mid-70s, social assistance expenditure has risen much more rapidly than other categories of social spending 
and, notably, other local government expenditure. These large increases have mostly been caused by mounting 
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Hartz IV thus merged two forms of benefit into one, it simplified the existing system, but the shift 
in the benefit structure also had a second component, namely a change in eligibility rules: the new 
benefit ALG II is granted only after a means-test, in contrast to unemployment assistance, which 
was a hybrid between an insurance-based and a means-tested benefit.   
Secondly, concerning the financing structure, although on the face of it the source of 
financing seems unaltered, important changes have been made: the new benefit is in principle tax-
financed (from the federal budget), just like the former unemployment assistance benefit. 
However, in the course of parliamentary proceedings, it was agreed that local authorities were 
going to finance some items that are paid on top of the flat-rate benefit, i.e. costs for housing and 
heating (Giaimo and Manow 1999). In fact, the benefit is co-financed by the federal Government 
and local authorities.  
Thirdly, the management structure of the new scheme is clearly different from the ones for 
unemployment assistance and unemployed social assistance recipients. In contrast to the original 
plans of the Government, which envisaged a “centralistic” organization under the FEA’s auspices 
(which would in itself have implied a change in management structure), Hartz IV provides for a 
rather complex cooperation between the local offices (Arbeitsagenturen) of FEA and local 
authorities in the form of local consortia (Arbeitsgemeinschaften). The exceptions to this are 69 
local governments (Optionskommunen), which are going to administer and support the recipients 
of the new benefit without any involvement from the FEA. 
Given the long phase of immobility in the de facto three pillar system, the question arises as 
to how much political and societal resistance confronted these changes when the first serious 
reform plans took shape. Ironically, the changes in terms of organization or management were a 
greater source of controversy than those connected to the actual merger of the two benefits. The 
latter was regarded, with the benefit of hindsight, as a very logical step, yet a step many politicians 
had not dared to take only few years earlier, that is, during the first Schröder Government. As a 
SPD MP remarked:  
 
The idea of merging the two systems is not new, but revolutionary, one of the largest reforms in German 
social policy ever. This is why we first had to muster the necessary courage to bear the resulting conflict; we 
did not dare to tackle the issue immediately (Interview, 25.01.05).  
 
After this outline of the status quo in German unemployment insurance and the structural changes 
of the Hartz IV Law, I will now turn to the reform process.  
 
6.3 The Reform Process: Chronology, Actors and Policy Positions 
 
It is impossible to give an account of the Hartz IV reform without mentioning the developments 
that contributed to its placement on the political agenda of the Schröder Government. The current 
section will outline the chronology of the reform process, beginning with its agenda-setting phase, 
and, subsequently looks at the legislation-building and decision-making phases. Although, in 
accordance with the research design, the analysis of the case ends with the final decision by 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
 
 
unemployment (Reissert 1998). In 2001, more than 40 percent of all claims to social assistance were caused by registered 
unemployment, amounting to € 3 billion of the € 7 to 8 billion spent by local governments on this benefit 
(Gemeindefinanzreformkommission 2003).  
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parliament, one sub-section (6.3.2) is dedicated to the events after formal decision-making, as they 
are relevant for the final shape of the reform.  
 
6.3.1 The Chronology of a Merger Project   
 
The first Red-Green coalition agreement of 1998 included a declaration of intent to improve 
cooperation between the local offices of the FEA and social assistance offices. This approach led 
to the initiation of an experiment with 30 pilot cooperation projects at local level under the 
acronym “Mozart”, which was considered reasonably successful.192  In the spring of 2002, a 
scandal involving the FEA and its job placement statistics came to light, prompting the Schröder 
Government to rethink the internal organisation of the agency. The political answer resulted in the 
appointment of a commission, chaired by Hartz, with a mandate to work out a blueprint for 
organizational reform of FEA, as well as other instruments of labour market policy. This mandate 
also included developing the organizational aspects (excluding finances) of a future merger of 
unemployment assistance and social assistance (Brandhorst 2003:39).   
The commission’s report was released in August 2002, just before the federal elections 
scheduled for September, and it drew massive attention from the media and the public. Chancellor 
Schröder earned much political credit by committing himself, in case he was re-elected, to 
implement the proposals of the Hartz report ‘on a one-by-one basis’ (Eins-zu-Eins Umsetzung). 
The merger of unemployment assistance and social assistance was firmly put on the Government’s 
political agenda. However, it took yet another year (until August 2003) before the Cabinet 
approved and presented a draft bill to parliament. 
Between 2002 and 2003, extensive preparations had begun - on different levels - to establish 
a definite legislative basis for the merger. A special working group of the Commission for the 
Reform of Communal Finances (Gemeindefinanzreformkommission) was given the task of making 
suggestions for the financial relationship between the federal, Länder and communal level 
regarding Hartz IV. By early 2003, polls indicated that the SPD was steadily losing popularity, 
while unemployment continued to rise. Because of these developments, and in reaction to the 
accusations by the media of “twiddling his thumbs”, Chancellor Schröder sought to renew his 
image as a reformer by announcing a comprehensive reform programme titled Agenda 2010 in 
March 2003. The merger of unemployment assistance and social assistance formed part of this 
ambitious and contentious programme, and was backed by an important financial pledge directed 
at financially weak local authorities. The merger plan also appeared promptly in Minister 
Clement’s implementation schedule of Agenda 2010. Subsequently, the process of working out the 
details of a draft bill was carried out by a coalition working group with the participation of 
officials from the Ministry of Economics and Labour Affairs (BMWA). Drawing on the proposals 
from the Hartz-Commission and the recommendations made by the respective working group of 
the Commission for the Reform of Communal Finances, its task consisted of working out the 
details of the draft bill in order to enable, at a later date, a smooth passing by parliament.  
The core points of the Government’s draft bill included the following: the new ALG II benefit 
was to be based on a level similar to social assistance; benefit recipients were to turn to and 
receive support from local job centres, and the FEA was to bear overall responsibility, both 
financially and organizationally, for these local offices. Concerning the issue of acceptability, 
                                                           
 
 
 
192 Presentation ‘Die Grundsicherung fuer Arbeitssuchende (SGBIII)’, Referat II B4 Grundsatzfragen des SGBII, BMWA, 
Berlin, 28.01.05  
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recipients had to accept any job offered to them. The citation below from a high-ranking ministry 
official illustrates the underlying philosophy of the Hartz IV reform, which went further than just 
merging two systems:   
 
The object of the 4th Law for Modern Services on the Labour Market is the merger of unemployment 
assistance and social assistance with a new, need-oriented and means-tested benefit for people available for 
work. In doing so, measures that promote reintegration in the labour market have to take preference over 
benefits enabling reasonable maintenance. Taking up paid employment is going to be promoted by integrative 
measures and incentives. Those who work will have more money at their disposal than those who do not 
work despite being available for work.193 
 
In September 2003, the parliamentary readings of the draft bill began, and despite the fact that 80 
to 90 percent of the initial text could be found back in the final version (Interview  BMWA 
official, 28.01.05), the remaining contentious points made for very difficult negotiations. In 
November 2003, the Bundesrat, by adopting a rival concept launched by the CDU-led Länder, 
rejected the Government’s draft, which started the proceedings of the Mediation Committee. A 
month later, just before Christmas, the committee reached a compromise based on a settlement on 
the acceptability criteria for the unemployed, and the organizational consequences of the Hartz IV 
reform. The compromise was reached under considerable media attention and public interest, and 
only after the personal involvement of the main party leaders. In addition, it came about as a result 
of behind closed-doors horse-trading, as a whole range of reforms was included in the same 
mediation procedure.194 The compromise included the general responsibility for the support and 
attendance of beneficiaries of ALG II to be taken over by both the FEA and local governments 
(towns and municipal bodies). To realize this solution, so-called local consortia 
(Arbeitsgemeinschaften) were to be established to take over local service provision. The financial 
responsibility for the benefit and administrative costs were borne by the FEA (thus by the federal 
budget), while local governments took over costs for housing and heating and some other items 
paid on top of the flat-rate amount of ALG II. The provisions with regard to the acceptability of 
job offers were again amended,195 returning to the original formulation of the Government draft; in 
principle, the unemployed were now expected to take up any job offer they received in order to 
avoid being disqualified from the benefit.196  
However, this compromise did not mean that the reform was swiftly concluded. On the 
contrary, its complete adoption required a second parliamentary process through which the details 
of the agreed form of cooperation between FEA and local authorities had to be clarified. What is 
more, the possibility of an “opt-out” from this cooperation for local authorities had to be clarified 
and made into law. Given that agreement on these points was far from certain from the outset, it 
took another six months (and another mediation procedure), until the Bundestag passed  the 
follow-up law to Hartz IV, the so-called Kommunales Optionsgesetz (KOG) on July 2nd, 2004 (see 
for an overview Perschke-Hartmann 1994). This final compromise, which settled the details of the 
                                                           
 
 
 
193 Letter of BMWA parliamentary secretary Gerd Andres to the parliamentary parties of the Government coalition, 
26.06.2003    
194 These included very diverse issues such the Hartz III-reform (organisational reform of the FEA), the loosening of labour 
law regulations such as dismissal laws and the law on collective agreements, the loosening of the regulations on crafts and 
trades, and a range of reforms related to taxation, e.g. bringing forward a planned income tax relief for citizens by one year.  
195 By way of a parliamentary amendment, reform critics had succeeded in declaring work unacceptable that ‘is not paid 
according to the applicable collective agreement or, when this is lacking, according to what is paid according to local 
conditions’. This clause had been inserted in order to avoid downward pressures on salaries.  
196 Beschlussempfehlung des Vermittlungsausschusses, Bundestag-DS 15/2259, 16.12.2003.  
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implementation of Hartz IV and concluded the reform process, stipulated the inclusion of an 
experimentation clause, as well as an agreement on splitting costs between the federal Government 
and local authorities. Concerning the former, 69 local authorities were offered the opportunity (for 
an initial period of six years) to opt out of the local consortia-model and provide services to the 
long-term unemployed. In terms of financing the new benefit, the federal Government would 
cover the ALG II benefit and its administration, while local authorities would bear the costs for 
housing and heating.197  
 
6.3.2 Reactions to Hartz IV Beyond the Parliamentary Process  
 
Once the legislative work was finished, the Government still could not lean back and prepare 
quietly for the official introduction date of the new benefit on the 1st of January 2005. Following 
the distribution of application forms and increased media coverage of the practical details and 
possibly negative implications for potential recipients of ALG II, Schröder and Clement were 
confronted by a wave of recurring demonstrations (dubbed Montagsdemonstrationen by the 
organizers in an analogy with the famous demonstrations of the East Germans in 1989), which 
drew most of their support in Eastern Germany. Although the protests, which started in August 
2004, died out after several weeks, they had two main effects. Firstly, although Minister Clement 
repeatedly insisted on carrying out the reform as parliament had passed it, the Government reacted 
with a few minor corrections to the timing of payment of ALG II (which was brought forward), 
and the rules regarding the amount of assets recipients and their children were allowed to have. 
Secondly, in reaction to these protests, the responsible Ministry stepped up its public 
communication efforts to combat misinformation, which thrived on the distortion of reform 
consequences by the media. Consequently, the street protests lost their momentum. As a trade 
union official remarked:  
 
The public relations and communication deficit became painfully clear: the Monday demonstrations can be 
explained by a lack of communication by the Government and the media in equal measure. Therefore, fears 
were allowed to build up although not all of them were justified (Interview DGB official, 03.02.05).  
  
A SPD parliamentarian who accused the media of a ‘merciless and organised campaign against 
Hartz IV’ observed that after the compromise was reached in July 2004, the media changed its 
attitude and journalists tried to achieve a better balance in reporting on the reform. He suspects 
that ‘the turnaround only happened following the Federal Press Office’s launch of a large 
advertising campaign informing about Hartz IV’ (25.01.05). Interestingly, Minister Clement 
himself, though several months later, admitted in an interview that communication deficits played 
a role in relation to Hartz IV by remarking that ‘in terms of communication, this one obviously 
was not a masterstroke’. Only a day later, Schröder made it clear in another interview that Clement 
was the one to bear the responsibility for the recent labour market reform, including Hartz IV.198 
Some press observers were quick to interpret this statement as the Chancellor distancing himself 
from his Minister. Despite the rather hasty implementation of the administrative infrastructure 
needed to implement the compromises of December 2003 and June 2004 (and continued media 
                                                           
 
 
 
197 This may seem an odd construction in practice but reflects the Government’s willingness to accommodate the wishes of 
local governments. The compromise also entailed a financial concession by the federal Government: It would bear 29,1 
percent of local government costs, resulting in a predicted financial relief of € 3,2 billion.    
198 ‘Schröder: Clement für Erfolg von Hartz IV verantwortlich’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29.12.2004, p.2 
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focus on the expected delays and problems with the implementation), most of the new ALG II 
recipients did receive their first benefit on time in January 2005.  
Table 6.3 gives an overview of the Hartz IV process: 
 
Date 
 
Event  
October 1998 1st Red-Green Coalition agreement envisages 
‘cooperation between employment agencies and 
social assistant offices’ 
February 2002  Scandal surrounding statistical reporting of Federal 
Employment Agency (FEA) 
March 2002  Hartz-commission takes up work 
 
August 2002  Hartz-commission publishes final report; 
Chancellor Schröder pledges to implement report 
‘point for point’ in case of re-election in September 
2002 
September 2003  Red-Green Government re-elected, Wolfgang 
Clement becomes head of newly created Ministry 
of Economic Affairs and Labour 
March 2003  Schröder announces Government programme 
Agenda 2010, containing merger as one of the 
reform projects 
April 2003  Commission on reform of communal finances 
presents final report   (included a sub-group on 
financial implications of merger project) 
June 2003  Red-Green coalition working groups presents 
cornerstones for concept bill 
August 2003  Cabinet decides on concept bill 
 
September - October 2003  Readings of the bill, bill agreed upon by the 
Bundestag 
November 2003  Bundesrat adopts rival bill backed by CDU-Länder, 
Mediation Committee begins work 
December 2003  Compromise reached in the Meditation Committee, 
bill finally adopted by the Bundestag 
January -  June 2004   2nd parliamentary process of ‘communal opt-out 
bill’, culminating in  another conciliatory process 
August 2004  Popular protests (mostly in East Germany) against 
Hartz-IV effects; some minor changes to the law 
January 2005  Hartz IV becomes effective 
 
Table 6.3: Important events in the Hartz IV political process, source: own compilation   
 
 
6.3.3 Principal Actors in the Reform Process and Their Policy Positions 
 
It goes without saying that the process described above can be understood better with knowledge 
about the main actors and their positions and/or orientations with regard to the reform proposals. 
Therefore, this section illustrates the political context of the reform, showing what kind of reform 
resistance the Government was confronted with. The positions of important actors are presented 
below, focussing on the Government, the main political parties, local authority associations and 
trade unions.  
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To begin with, some introductory remarks on the degree of controversy about the Hartz IV 
reform are in place. At the time of political agenda-setting, which coincided with the release of the 
Hartz-proposals, the main political parties had agreed on the general need for the reform. In the 
debate on negative consequences of parallel systems, involving politics and policy experts alike, 
major arguments towards bringing an end to the coexistence of unemployment assistance and 
social assistance for the unemployed were (Webber 1989):  
 
• the administrative costs due to the coexistence of two bureaucracies: the FEA with its 
local net of labour offices, one the one hand, and the social assistance offices of local 
governments, on the other;  
• the creation of a separate system of active labour market measures for social assistance 
recipients at the local level (access to similar measures of the FEA is usually restricted to 
recipients of unemployment insurance or assistance);  
• the fact that the unemployed claiming social assistance and unemployment benefits 
needed to deal with two different administrations and legal frameworks; 
• and the tendency of each of the two systems to shift benefit recipients to the other system, 
the so-called ‘shift-yard’ problem (Verschiebebahnhöfe), most visible in the case of local 
governments, which established job creation programmes for social assistance recipients 
in order to provide them with new entitlements to unemployment insurance.  
 
Nevertheless, agreement on the goals of reform and its underlying necessity does not imply 
agreement on the means and instruments in reaching these goals. In this respect, Hartz IV caused 
strong disagreement between the major political parties on the administrative details of 
implementation.  
The Government, that is, Minister of Economic Affairs and Labour Clement, with the 
backing of Chancellor Schröder, championed the merger of the two benefit systems. This specific 
reform project was an integral part of Schröder’s Agenda 2010. While Schröder had endorsed the 
proposals of the Hartz-Commission concerning a merger with his implementation pledge in the 
run-up to the federal elections, Clement assumed political responsibility for the preparatory work, 
the legislative process and subsequent implementation of the reform after he had taken up his post 
in October 2002.  
The parliamentary parties of the Red-Green coalition stood largely behind the bill they had 
helped to prepare, by way of a coalition working group with some participation from the Ministry. 
In terms of content, they favoured moderate incentives for the unemployed to take up work 
(acceptability criteria), and were in favour of the FEA to take on responsibility for new 
beneficiaries, in terms of financing and job placement/support. While the parliamentary party of 
the Greens rallied behind the coalition proposals, the Social Democrats faced more opposition 
within their own ranks. This was not surprising, as the party was undergoing a lengthy process of 
coming to terms with the whole catalogue of measures announced in Chancellor Schröder’s 
Agenda 2010 in the spring and summer of 2003.  
 
There was a process of polarization, fuelled by the announcement of Agenda 2010 which would cost us, the 
SPD, a lot of energy. We had started an intra-party dialogue which was risky and which indicated that we had 
to pay a high price for the reform (Interview SPD MP, 25.01.05).  
 
Against this background, left-wing Social Democrats opposed the merger because they feared a 
spiral of retrenchment of social protection.     
The Christian Democratic parties (CDU/CSU) and the Liberals (FDP) formed a conservative-
liberal front against the Government’s proposal. In terms of the regulation surrounding the benefit, 
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they pushed for stricter demands on the unemployed to take up work (reasonability criteria), and 
for additional incentives for recipients to earn extra money. Also, from the outset they pleaded for 
the ALG II benefit to be set at the level of social assistance, a position that was also embraced by 
employers’ associations and economic research institutes, which claimed that the level of social 
security benefit defines the minimum salary at which unemployed persons are willing to take up 
work. Both hoped that a lower level of social security in the case of unemployment – combined 
with the obligation to also accept lower paid work – would lead to an expansion in the low-wage 
sector (Perschke-Hartmann 1994:42-43). For ideological reasons, both Christian Democrats and 
Liberals tended to subscribe to those ideas. They were applied in a CDU draft for the so-called 
Existenzgrundlagengesetz that offered an opposition alternative to the Government’s draft bill, and 
associated with the CDU Prime Minister of Hesse, Roland Koch. The position of conservatives 
and liberals regarding the organisational and financial design of the reform was a lot more 
consequential: they squarely opposed the Government position by demanding that the competence 
for support of long-term unemployed should be transferred to local authorities alone. In their view, 
they were much better suited to carry out the tasks of job placement and support of ALG II 
recipients. The main arguments given were greater flexibility and proximity as well as familiarity 
with local conditions of unemployment. In this position, they saw themselves backed by the DLT 
(Deutscher Landkreistag), one of the local authority associations (see paragraph below) and the 
German Council of Economic Advisers (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der 
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung) (Bandelow 2006).  
As far as societal actors were concerned, local authority peak associations, Deutscher 
Städtetag (DST), Deutscher Landkreistag (DLT), Deutscher Städte- und Gemeindebund (DSGB) 
were important in as much as they were directly affected by the administrative-organizational 
aspect of the reform. The interests of these organisations were quite diverse: while large towns and 
cities were eager to transfer their responsibility for the long-term unemployed to the FEA, 
provincial authorities (Landkreise) mostly saw Hartz IV as a chance to take over responsibilities 
from local FEA offices in order to ensure their organizational viability, which had come under 
pressure from several developments (Interview policy expert, FHTW Berlin, 21.03.05). 
Accordingly, the peak associations of towns and local governments, DST and DSGB, were 
pleading to hand over the responsibility for long-term unemployed to the federal Government and 
the Länder. In their words,  
 
Labour market policy for the increasing number of long-term unemployed has to be coordinated with 
economic policy instruments and must not be left to local governments in the form of a new social benefit or 
social assistance as the last safety-net of social security.199  
 
On the other hand, the DLT position stressed that administrative districts (Landkreise plus 
‘kreisfreie Städte’) were well-positioned to carry responsibility for a uniform new system assisting 
the long-term unemployed. In addition, it reaffirmed the need to have this task financed in a solid 
way and secured under constitutional law.200 There is evidence to suggest that these associations 
lobbied the Government and the opposition parties so as to insure that their respective financial 
and organizational interests would be protected (Interview Spiegel journalist, 03.02.05).  
                                                           
 
 
 
199 Letter of Deutscher Städte- und Gemeindebund and Deutscher Städtetag to Prof. Bernd Reissert, FHTW Berlin, 
18.12.2002.  
200 Deutscher Landkreistag: Arbeitslosen- und Sozialhilfe durch einheitliches Leistungssystem ersetzen! Pressemitteilung, 
18.06.2002, source: http://www.landkreistag.de  
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Finally, trade unions, represented by their peak organisation DGB, took an early stance 
against the Government proposals for Hartz IV. They were in fact opposed to the paradigm change 
from a salary-based to a necessity-based benefit for the long-term unemployed. In their view, the 
reform meant a change for the worse for the majority of long-term unemployed, bringing only 
slight improvements to a group of social assistance recipients and unemployed with very low 
incomes. In their view, these benefit cuts for many recipients of unemployment assistance (at the 
beginning of 2003, the means-test character of this benefit had been further strengthened) meant 
further social welfare cuts for this segment of the population and consequently, a loss of 
purchasing power in economically weak regions. What is more, the DGB saw the tightening of 
criteria for accepting work as a possible development towards a low-wage sector, which they 
rejected. The level of the proposed benefit, corresponding to the level of social assistance after a 2-
year transition period, was also a point of contention. An earlier statement by the Chancellor (to 
the DGB federal congress) that the reform was primarily intended to effect savings on bureaucracy 
and not to lower the level of unemployment assistance, was still well-remembered. In short, in the 
DGB’s view, the reform should be offering integrated support and services to the long-term 
unemployed instead of achieving cost savings reached at their expense.201 After Agenda 2010 had 
been announced in March 2003, the DGB mobilised its members to protest against what it saw as 
considerable social retrenchments, of which, although the only one, the Hartz-reform was an 
important measure. However, most of their substantial objections and offering an opposition 
alternative to the Government’s draft bill. Other suggestions for the merger project, such as the 
benefit level and the acceptability criteria, were not taken up. In the view of the DGB, the fears 
and demands of the trade unions had been all but ignored by a Minister who seemed to be open for 
talks but did not deviate from his general reform line, thus escalating the situation between trade 
unions and the Government (Interview DGB official, 02.02.05).  
The fact that Hartz IV was not discussed in isolation, but was seen by trade unions (and 
diverse social welfare associations and churches) in the context of a larger debate on the future of 
social security provision (Agenda 2010, health care and pension reform) hindered a pragmatic 
discussion, which the Government had hoped for. Instead, the arguments of diverse welfare-
oriented interest groups against the plans were framed in polemic terms: by earmarking the new 
benefit as being a direct road to poverty, they accused the Government of impoverishing the 
unemployed and consolidating budgets at the cost of socially weak groups. Rather than 
acknowledging the Government’s self-declared goal of improving job placement support for the 
long-term unemployed able to work, the criticism of these groups centred on the consequences of 
Hartz IV for the distributional goals of social policy.       
 
6.4 Analysis Part I: Observing Ideational Leadership 
 
This section constitutes the core of the case study, as it presents evidence from various sources in 
order to establish whether IL could be found in the process. With regard to evaluating theoretical 
perspectives that explain the realization of the reform, the goal of this analysis is twofold. Firstly, 
it needs to establish whether ideational leadership, as defined in Chapter 2, may be found in the 
                                                           
 
 
 
201 Sozialabbau – DGB-Argumente gegen die Absenkung der Arbeitslosenhilfe auf Sozialhilfeniveau, Einblick 08/03, 
28.04.2003, source: www.einblick.dgb.de  
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reform process, that is, one or several of its aspects (denouncing the policy status quo; introducing 
and defending new (cognitive/normative) policy principles; appealing to reform opponents to 
reconsider their resistance; building political consensus based on subject matter or content, not by 
tactical games). Considering that Minister Clement was the person to bear the final responsibility 
for this particular reform project, the following questions needed to be asked: 
1) Did Minister Clement clearly reject the status quo in unemployment insurance/labour market 
policy (and its old policy principles)?  
2) Did he clearly express and legitimize new policy principles, using cognitive arguments (related 
to problem-solving) and normative arguments (related to societal norms and values)? 
3) Did he appeal to critics to give up their reform resistance? 
4) Did he engage in political coalition-building in order to push through reform, based on an 
interest in reform content or did he engage in tactical games in order to keep his power (in 
accordance with aspects 4 en 5 of the IL framework)?   
 
Secondly, the analysis tries to answer whether IL was indeed the crucial factor in the process 
(Section 6.4.4). This will be done by considering which strategies the Government followed and 
by asking what role Minister Clement played in the process. The approach followed here also 
explores the relevance of alternative explanations in dealing with reform resistance: 1) making 
substantial content-based concessions to reform critics and 2) ignoring or outmanoeuvring reform 
critics, in analysing the data collected on the case. The initial part of the analysis, however, focuses 
on assessing the behaviour of the main responsible political actor, Minister Clement, who was 
destined to play a leading role in pushing through the reform proposal after accepting his 
ministerial post in October 2002. Whether he did this in a way that matched my criteria of 
ideational leadership will be explored in the remainder of this section.  
 
6.4.1 Rejecting the Status Quo?  
 
After 2002, the status quo in German labour market policy had been increasingly seen as no longer 
tenable (Interviews Ministry official NRW, 21.01.05; SPD mayor, 31.01.05; policy expert IAB 
08.03.05) and this realization coincided with a background of rising financial and economic 
problems. Against this general background, the status quo referred to in the first aspect of IL also 
relates to a specific problem within unemployment protection, recognized by policy makers and 
experts alike: the inefficient co-existence of the systems of unemployment assistance and social 
assistance. A party adviser gave her view on the roots of the problem in the following way:  
 
Just like the proposals for conducting the merger, the problems have grown slowly. The unemployment 
assistance benefit and the practice of shifting individuals between this benefit and social assistance have not 
been created for ideological reasons, but in reaction to financial pressures (or incentives). Such systems often 
do not arise for pragmatic reasons but grow over time. The problem has long been criticized by policy experts 
and academics alike (Interview CDU/CSU party adviser, 01.02.05).  
 
In short, the inefficiencies and deficiencies in terms of bringing benefit recipients back into paid 
employment, came to be recognized as a major shortcoming of the dual system in assisting the 
long-term unemployed and those without former employment, but, in principle, able to work. The 
Hartz-Commission expressed its dissatisfaction with the situation as follows:  
 
The parallel existence of two social benefit systems leads to considerable administration efforts and 
intransparency in the support of beneficiaries as well as unnecessary obstacles for those affected. […] A lack 
of coordination and responsibility concerning the efforts to integrate unemployed persons can slow down the  
 
 
  
Chapter 6  
 148 
 
process of placing people into jobs. In addition, there are cost-shifting effects between the funding bodies of 
the benefit systems (Hartz-Kommission 2002: 125-127).   
 
With his pledge to implement the recommendations of the commission in case of re-election in 
September 2002, the Chancellor endorsed the questioning of the status quo and the proposals of 
the commission. When Minister Clement entered the newly formed Ministry of Economics and 
Labour, the whole of the Hartz proposals became part of his portfolio. He quickly identified 
himself with the reforms, including the merger project that was later to be known as Hartz IV. 
Rather than leaving his own imprint on his particular area of labour market policy by way of 
proposing alternative plans, he embraced the Hartz proposals as if they had been of his own 
making and started working on their legislative implementation (Interview Spiegel journalist, 
03.02.05). Did the Minister, during this process, contribute to the questioning of the status quo in 
labour market policy?   
Concerning the specific proposal on the merger of unemployment and social assistance, 
evidence exists that he had propagated a change of the status quo prior to the announcement of 
Agenda 2010 by Chancellor Schröder. In a speech to the Bundestag during the debate of the first 
and second Hartz-laws, he had mentioned the project, presenting it within the totality of labour 
market reforms that originated in the Hartz proposals:     
 
The third big step has already been announced: before January 2004 we must have overcome the parallel 
existence of unemployment assistance and social assistance and combined both in a new secondary 
unemployment benefit, as it is called in the concept of the Hartz-Commission.202 
 
Asked about his own expectations for the year 2003, following the presentation of dire economic 
forecasts, he had pleaded for an activating employment policy in response, adding that: 
 
We must achieve structural change in order to have more growth and employment. This cannot be 
accomplished without pain: with the planned merger of unemployment assistance and social assistance we 
will be faced with the task to bring 800.000 unemployed social assistance recipients back into employment.203      
 
On another occasion, in a lengthy February 2003 interview with the weekly Die Zeit, 204 Clement 
stressed:  
 
What will be decisive is a fundamental turnaround: we no longer pay for unemployment but we place people 
into jobs. In this connection, we need a different conception of work in Germany, namely that work is a 
means through which the self-responsibility of the individual needs to be shown. And this turnaround will 
begin with young people.  
 
In the same interview, when asked whether he was discouraged by recent political reactions to his 
earlier reform announcements in the area of dismissal protection, he revealed his general attitude 
towards the policy status quo:  
 
                                                           
 
 
 
202 Speech of Minister Clement at the first and second reading of the Hartz I and II bills, 7.11.2002, source: 
www.arbeitsmarktreform.de/Arbeitsmarktreform/Navigation/Presse/, accessed 23.03.2005.  
203 Interview with Minister Clement, Welt am Sonntag, 26.1.2003.  
204  Interview with Wolfgang Clement, Hamburger Zeit Matinee, 16.02.02, source: 
http://zeus.zeit.de/text/politik/zeit_matinee_160203. 
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In order to make it clear: there must be no single instrument or policy relevant to the labour market which is 
exempt from a process of questioning, in the sense of whether it obstructs a positive development or whether 
it does not.  
 
Following the announcement of Agenda 2010 in March 2003, the Ministry’s key points on the 
merger, contained in its implementation schedule, clearly highlight the main deficiency of the 
status quo and its goal, ending the inefficient co-existence of two benefits and two administrations 
for people who are threatened or affected by long-term unemployment.205 In a discussion with 
journalists on the roots of the German problem, about a month after the presentation of the 
Chancellor’s reform programme, Clement clearly breaks with the past in labour market policy:  
 
It is surely more important to know that we had the wrong recipes in labour market policy. We do know that 
today. We should have made sure, most of all, to place successfully the unemployed into jobs, to enable them 
to get back to work. Instead, almost everything revolved around rights of social protection which did not 
really protect but contributed to the continuation of social distress, namely unemployment.206  
 
Later in 2003, while work on the draft bill was making progress, Clement continued to call 
attention to the errors made in the past, as he stressed in a Zeit interview, ‘Basically, it is neither 
just nor reasonable to invest enormous sums, about € 30 million per year, to fight unemployment 
and still lack successes, as it is now. This is why we need to embark on a different path’.207 
Equally, the preamble of the Ministry’s bill presented to the Bundestag in September 2003 starts 
with a short summary of why the present state of affairs must not continue:  
 
The Commission for Modern Services on the Labour Market (i.e. the Hartz-Commission) has made clear that 
the present parallel existence of two state-run benefit systems – unemployment assistance and social 
assistance for those able to work – is inefficient, intransparent and little citizen-friendly.208     
 
In his parliamentary speeches during the readings of the draft bill, Clement reiterated his need to 
reject the policy status quo:   
 
The bills we have now introduced into parliament – for the third and fourth Hartz laws – open up the 
opportunity for the future Bundesagentur für Arbeit to act effectively and customer-oriented as the modern 
service provider on the labour market. They end – that is the core of the Hartz IV concept – the inefficient 
parallel existence of unemployment assistance and social assistance. We must bring an end to these two 
benefit systems, one on the local level and one on the federal level. We must also end the contradictions that 
exist between the two systems.209 
 
At the bill’s second and third reading, at a point in the process where the administrative and 
financial implications of the reform had gained prominence in the debate, he continued to remind 
his audience of the basic reason for their work:  
 
  
 
                                                           
 
 
 
205BMWA (2003), Umsetzungsfahrplan zur Agenda 2010 im Bereich Wirtschaft und Arbeit: Arbeitslosen- und Sozialhilfe 
zusammenführen, p.9-11, source: 
http://www.arbeitnehmerkammer.de/sozialpolitik/doku/04_gesetze/gesetzgebung/2003/2003_04_08_agenda2010.pdf. 
206 ‘Wir sind am Anschlag’, Interview with Minister Clement, Der Spiegel, 16/2003.  
207 ‘Die Zeit in der in Deutschland gewartet wurde, bis sich was bewegt, die ist einfach zu lang’, Interview with Minister 
Clement, Die Zeit 30/2003.  
208 Bundestag-DS 15/1516, 05.09.2003, p.1 
209 Speech of Minister Clement at the first reading of the Hartz IV bill, Bundestag plenary protocol 15/60, 11.09.03, p.5106 
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We must end the situation that, in Germany, two benefit systems exist next to one another: unemployment 
assistance as a welfare system of the state, and on the other, social assistance as a welfare system of the local 
authorities. These two systems have developed in parallel, are full of contradictions and sometimes work 
against each other. We must integrate them in order to finally work more systematically with one instrument 
that is geared towards all job seekers.210  
 
Even in his later parliamentary appearances, during the readings of the follow-up Optionsgesetz, 
Clement would not miss the opportunity of reminding his audience that the present situation had 
become intolerable:  
 
Only by providing integrated support and measures we can avoid that long-term unemployed continue to be 
pushed back and forth between institutions and between the different social support programmes in Germany, 
as has happened much too frequently until now. In this matter, we have reached consensus.211   
 
Clement’s last speech in parliament during the whole of the Hartz IV process likewise paid 
attention to the fundamental reason for the reform:  
 
To put it clearly: the merger of unemployment assistance and social assistance – that is what the 
Optionsgesetz is about – is long overdue. We have committed the mistake - for decades - of sustaining two 
social benefit systems, one state-run and one administered locally, alongside each other and in part against 
each other; at the least they were not sufficiently coordinated.212  
 
The previous examples of the Minister’s efforts to reject the status quo illustrate that he 
consistently related the necessity for reform to the wrongs of the existing situation. A sizeable 
number of statements made in public, as well as appearing in documents drawn up by the Ministry, 
both before and during the legislative process of the Hartz IV reform, signal that Clement meets 
the criteria for the first aspect of IL, “rejecting the status quo”. Although the Minister was neither 
the first nor the only politician to criticize the effectiveness of existing policies,213 he was in the 
position to argue forcefully the case against the status quo, which he obviously did. Once the 
governing Red-Green coalition had reached a consensus on the need for merging the two systems, 
the focus of the reformists might have shifted: from convincing actors of the need to take 
legislative action to persuading them of the benefits of the particular approach chosen.214 However, 
Clement’s continuing references to the undesirable status quo, served as a consistent reminder of 
the cross-party consensus on the merger and the Government’s resolve to finalize the reform, 
especially in the later stage of the legislative process, when the implementation of Hartz IV was at 
stake.  
                                                           
 
 
 
210 Speech of Minister Clement at the second and third reading of the Hartz IV bill, Bundestag plenary protocol 15/67, 
17.10.03, p. 5738 
211 Speech of Minister Clement at the first reading of the Optionsgesetz bill, Bundestag plenary protocol 15/103, 02.04.04, 
p. 9350 
212 Speech of Minister Clement at the 2nd/3rd reading of the Optionsgesetz bill, Bundestag plenary protocol 15/105, 
29.04.04, p.9488-89 
213 The co-existence of several benefits had already been seen as problematic by opposition parties before the SPD-led 
Government took political action. Examples of this are a 2001 CDU/CSU discussion paper by the party’s labour market 
policy speaker [Laumann, K.-J. (2001) CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Arbeit für alle: Wege zu einer neuen Sozialhilfe] and an 
unsuccessful motion submitted to the Bundestag in May 2001 [FDP-Fraktion(2001), Für eine sinnvolle Zusammenführung 
von Arbeitslosen- und Sozialhilfe, Bundestag-DS 14/5963].  
214 This also applied, for the most part, to trade unions, churches and social welfare associations. These contributed plenty 
of criticism on the details of the reform until it was fully worked out and passed the legislative hurdles, but did not see it as 
an ‘unbearable reform’ (Interview SPD MP 25.01.05).  
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6.4.2 Legitimizing New Policy Principles?  
 
Following on from this, the question is whether Minister Clement, apart from distancing himself 
from the status quo, also legitimized the new policy principles underlying the Hartz IV proposals. 
Firstly, these principles need to be identified. The philosophy behind Hartz IV may be linked to 
the dual principle of ‘Fördern und Fordern’ (compare the English expression “carrot and stick”). 
Allegedly, this concept took up a central position in the Ministry’s strategy behind the reform 
(Interview BMWA official, 28.01.05). It corresponds to the idea that the unemployed should 
receive appropriate financial and administrative support in their efforts to return to paid 
employment (“Fördern”). At the same time, they are expected to be more flexible than in the past, 
accepting jobs which may be inferior, both in terms of necessary qualifications and salary, to their 
previous job (“Fordern”). In line with a general trend of activating labour market policies and a 
shift towards recommodification of long-term unemployed (Interview policy expert IAB, 
08.03.05), 215  this principle was announced by Chancellor Schröder as a prominent element of 
Agenda 2010: 
 
This is why we need one-stop agencies for benefits and related matters. In this way, we increase the chances 
of those who are able and willing to work […]. At the same time, we accommodate those people with whom 
we will have to be more demanding […] No one will be allowed in the future to lean back on the cost of 
society at large. Who refuses to accept reasonable work – we are going to adjust the criteria for this – will 
face sanctions.216  
 
In this context, it is important to realize the qualitative dimension of change in the approach 
towards the (long-term) unemployed, as the two quotes below illustrate:  
 
The element of demanding has been institutionalized with Hartz IV and had important consequences for the 
decommodification of the long-term unemployed […] The receipt of the new benefit is more strongly linked 
to the individual’s cooperation to take up work […] Behind this I see the idea that any job (also if less well 
paid than the previous one) is better than no job at all and this clearly contradicts traditional ways of thinking 
in Germany (Interview policy expert IAB, 08.03.05). 
 
What remained mostly unnoticed was that we got a completely new paradigm concerning the financing of 
unemployed who are able to work: financing on the basis of need and no longer related to number of years in 
paid employment or to salary levels (Interview SPD mayor, 31.01.05).  
 
In addition to the ‘Fördern und Fordern’ maxim, Hartz IV also became associated with a 
redefinition of the normative principle (or value) of social justice, in the sense of placing more 
responsibility on the individual work-seeker receiving benefits from a community of contribution- 
and tax-payers. Social justice forms part and parcel of the social-democratic party programme of 
the SPD, and is commonly invoked by SPD politicians, both as a programmatic goal and a 
justification of policy measures, and also underpinning, more generally, the Red-Green coalition’s 
labour market policy reform programme.  
Did Minister Clement propagate ‘Fördern and Fordern’ and the social justice principle 
underlying the new benefit? He was certainly not idle when it came to stressing the underlying  
 
                                                           
 
 
 
215 Recommodification refers to a process due to which work seekers must make a living on the basis of his or her 
employability on the labour market as opposed to social insurance benefits.   
216 Press- and Information Office of the Federal Government (2003) Agenda 2010 – Mut zum Frieden und Mut zur 
Veränderung, govenment declaration of Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder, 14.03.2003, p.21-22   
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principles of the reform and linking them to the envisaged goals of the reform project. In addition, 
he frequently linked them to the Government’s long-term goal of bringing more unemployed back 
into work, a goal that supersedes the immediate objective of ending bureaucratic inefficiencies and 
“shift yards”.  
Clement, on various occasions in the process, did indeed legitimize the shift in perspective on 
the rights and obligations of the unemployed on various occasions in the process. Firstly, after the 
March 2003 announcement of Agenda 2010, he explained at length the measures belonging to his 
portfolio, including the merger, in a speech to the SPD parliamentary party. He justified the project 
as follows: 
  
The creation of a unitary benefit system of unemployment assistance for all who are able to work is a crucial 
step towards placing people faster in jobs and apprenticeships. And, by the way, it is one of the greatest 
structural reforms we have resolved to do. We will merge the two systems because their co-existence is 
inefficient and because they hamper employment […]. The most important goal of our reform – one cannot 
stress it often enough – is a faster and more carefully tailored placement of people fit to work..217  
 
The goal of getting people back to work with greater speed and a greater focus on targets, as 
implied in the ‘carrot and stick’ approach to the unemployed, served here as the main rationale 
behind the reform, along with the expected efficiency gains. On the same occasion, Clement 
reminded his SPD audience of the logic behind Agenda 2010, which included ‘recalibrating the 
welfare state towards more justice in terms of benefits and needs’.218 Apart from a renewed 
interest in the definition of justice, the question of when a society can be considered as “social” is 
also raised by Hartz IV, according to Clement:  
 
We have to question the assumption that the length of entitlement to unemployment benefit or social 
assistance is crucial in deciding whether a society can be qualified as “social”. Much more important is the 
question of how entitlements enable citizens to make a living on their own and live their lives completely or 
at least, as far as possible, in accordance with self-responsibility. This will mean that in the future any 
reasonable job offer has to be accepted.219    
 
Following the controversial SPD special party convention in June 2003 (where Chancellor 
Schröder called for a necessary change of mentality in Germany concerning the principle of self-
responsibility), Clement agreed in an interview with the need for a ‘discussion on basic values’, 
and stressed that, regarding labour market reforms, ‘decisively, any legal work is reasonable in 
principle’.220 Asked in a later interview if it made sense to oblige unemployed persons to accept 
jobs that did not match their previous work experience, the Minister replied with a reference to a 
redefined version of the solidarity principle:  
We must make sure that all possibilities to take up work are fully utilized. This also has to do with a change 
of mentality that we need in Germany. The Chancellor has made this clear and I want to underscore in all 
clarity: we are dependent on people seeing solidarity as a mutual task and obligation, i.e. society is there for 
those in need, e.g. for those without jobs, but that those who are able to accept work do accept it, this is the 
crucial point. […] We have to let go of the idea that the state or the community of contribution-payers could 
finance any situation.221 
                                                           
 
 
 
217 Speech of Minister Clement to the SPD parliamentary party on ‘Agenda 2010 für Wirtschaft und Arbeit’, 08.04.2003, 
Berlin. 
218 ibid. 
219 ‘Wir sind am Anschlag’, interview with Minister Clement, Der Spiegel 16/2003. 
220 ‘Jeder Job ist zumutbar’, interview with  Minister Clement, Die Zeit, source: http://zeus.zeit.de/text/2003/24/Clement. 
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During the parliamentary process, Clement clearly legitimized the goal of creating a one-stop 
agency for those seeking work with the ‘carrot and stick’ and the solidarity principle:  
 
We must ensure that every woman and every man in Germany seeking work has one agency where she or he 
gets advice and support on the way back into the labour market. This is not simply a technical aspect since it 
is linked with the often mentioned principle of ‘Fördern und Fordern’. We must expect that work-seekers, 
who receive an offer of a job, accept it. […] Someone who rejects reasonable work cannot rely on the fact 
that he receives public funds. This principle of reasonability, which applies to everyone, must be brought to 
bear in Germany. It is an expression of the principle of solidarity that someone claiming the support of 
society also needs to be prepared to do what relieves society. Therefore she or he must accept reasonable 
work.222   
 
Asked more broadly why he was convinced that his way of redefining policy was the correct one - 
in contrast to the demands of his SPD-critics - the Minister responded with a reference to 
principles:  
 
In any case, I am sure that the comprehensive welfare state we used to have is no longer tenable here or 
anywhere in the world. We need to think again more in terms of our own capabilities and make use of them. 
That means self-responsibility, self-initiative and autonomy, solidarity and subsidiarity, justice in terms of 
education and employment, but also distributive justice. These are only catchwords but perhaps they serve to 
map out the direction which we have to follow.223    
 
Even after the compromise of December 2003 had been reached, at the two readings of the 
Optionsgesetz, he still reiterated the ‘carrot and stick’ principle underlying the merger:  
 
Our maxim ‘Fördern und Fordern’ is a guiding idea behind the new basic benefit for the unemployed. By 
implementing this maxim, every unemployed woman and man receives the support she or he needs. We will 
ensure that any recipient of the new benefit gets qualified support which deserves this label. But we also 
demand, from her or him, to do everything to get out of unemployment.224  
 
People finally have to be taken out of unemployment and placed back into work. We must not concentrate on 
financing unemployment. The latter has been demanded by everyone for decades, but, unfortunately, no 
significant progress has been made. We must apply the principle of ‘Fördern und Fordern’. All this is 
contained in the legislation that we have brought under way.225 
 
The most extensive statement explaining the elements of the ‘carrot and stick’ principle was made 
late in the legislative process, just after the conclusion of the parliamentary process in July 2004. 
In this speech, Clement fleshed out the elements of ‘Fördern’ (personal case managers, new 
benefit, possibilities to keep additional earnings from work etc.) and ‘Fordern’ (reasonable work, 
cutting benefits when rejecting work). He also explained the benefits of the principle in terms of 
the normative goal of social justice:  
 
The philosophy of ‘’Fördern and Fordern’ at a one-stop agency’ is more efficient and more equitable than 
anything we have achieved in labour market policy so far […]. And it must be stated clearly that he or she 
who does not make an effort, should not be sustained by the grace of the public. Social justice is no one-way 
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street. To sum up the question whether Hartz IV confirms to criteria of social justice, I am firmly convinced 
that the answer is yes.226    
 
To conclude, the Minister’s public statements contain plenty of passages in which he explained 
and/or legitimized the Hartz IV project by reference to its underlying principles. In these 
statements, he either linked these principles to the goals of the reform (in cognitive arguments) or 
he shows that they (and by implication the entire reform) relate to socially desirable norms and 
values. Clement also made a connection between the endeavour to place people more quickly and 
efficiently into jobs and the activating approach implied by the ‘carrot and stick’ approach. 
Furthermore, this goal was linked to new definitions of social justice and solidarity implying 
continued support to those needing it, but, at the same time, asking for more self-initiative from 
them than was previously done. Taken together, these observations warrant the conclusion that 
Clement fulfilled the criteria for the second aspect of IL, legitimizing a reform with cognitive and 
normative arguments. 
 
6.4.3 Appeals to Rethink Reform Resistance  
 
On various occasions in parliament, Minister Clement appealed to those, who had opposed his 
plans, to implement the merger. Furthermore, he also lamented the style of some of his political 
opponents. Below, I will present examples of such communicative patterns as empirical evidence 
for the third aspect of IL. 
During the first reading of the draft bill in the Bundestag, Clement spent considerable time 
explaining why he rejected the rival draft bill of the CDU/CSU. Here, he appealed to common 
goals of ‘bringing the responsibility for the financing and organisation of the future job centres 
together’ and ‘supplying benefits from one source’, and stated that the opposition’s draft did not 
envisage doing away with the existing doubling of structures.227 Consequently, at the second 
reading, he aptly summarized the remaining ‘core differences’ with the opposition on the division 
of labour between the FEA and local authorities, and appealed to parliament not to ‘engage in 
dogmatic discussions’ and ‘avoid artificial divisions’ but ‘to unite those actors we need in the fight 
against unemployment’. By making such statements, he clearly anticipated and tried to allay the 
opposition’s resistance to the Government plan. When the bill of the follow-up Optionsgesetz was 
presented in parliament, Clement intensified his calls to complete the legislative task, even in the 
face of resistance:  
 
I take on and bear the responsibility for this project to succeed. I say this notwithstanding those – whom we 
know – who keep speaking of chaos, of a catastrophe, of certain failure, of sloppiness and what have you. We 
will leave them behind and realize the reform. It is inescapably necessary.228  
 
He also made clear that the controversial character of the bill in the eyes of the opposition could 
not bring Hartz IV to a halt:  
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We will have to discuss the bill we bring in today in the Mediation Committee (…) However, I want to be 
very clear on this: This discussion cannot and must not stop the set-up of the Arbeitsgemeinschaften and the 
merger of unemployment assistance and social assistance.229  
 
Between the first and the final reading, the debate on the shortcomings of the organizational design 
in the Optionsgesetz, had intensified: the Minister opened his speech at the plenary debate with a 
clear rebuke of those who countered the Government’s effort in bringing Hartz IV to a close:    
 
It is of special importance to give a warning to those who make for pessimism in Germany: those who are 
defeatist, those who badmouth, those who try to prevent reforms, those who see chaos looming everywhere. 
They are the ones who want to prevent growth and progress. They must not and they will not stop our 
reforms. 230  
 
Reaffirming the resolve of the Government to go ahead with Hartz IV, irrespective of whether 
agreement was to be reached on the Optionsgesetz or not, he warned the parliamentary opposition:  
 
The fate of the Optionsgesetz does not change our planning for the merger of the benefits unemployment 
assistance and social assistance. I say this loud and clear because I observe that the opposition seemingly 
cannot keep these two issues apart or perhaps does not want to. Some, however, try to abuse the discussion 
about the concrete technical and organisational design of this system change on the 1st of January 2005. They 
abuse it in order to question the solution of a divided responsibility between the FEA and the local authorities 
we agreed upon in the conciliatory committee. 231  
 
Before the start of the Mediation Committee deliberations, in a subsequent speech to the 
Bundesrat, he clearly expressed his disapproval of the tone of the debate and the political style of 
his opponents:  
 
We want a pragmatic discussion, just as we had with you until the end of March. […] The debate at the 
second and third reading of the draft bill in the Bundestag was strikingly different. I do not want to hide that I 
was shocked by the style of the debate on the merger. One who replaces pragmatic arguments by personal 
defamation does not solve problems but creates them. I am hopeful and glad that the tone of the debate in the 
Bundesrat is more factual and I ask for your cooperation with the problems at issue.232 
 
While the parliamentary process of the Optionsgesetz ended with another government-endorsed 
compromise, Minister Clement had to face, late in the summer of 2004, large-scale street protests 
against the Hartz IV project. As the next citations show, he criticized this particular way of 
showing disapproval, and argued that the protests only deflected attention from the real problem:  
 
The societal scandal we are faced with is not Hartz IV, but long-term unemployment and a certain amount of 
fatalism that comes with getting used to this phenomenon. I need to tell those who now propagate civil 
disobedience that this is completely misplaced. I am trying to appeal for civil action for apprenticeship places 
and jobs, that is what we need today in Germany, and not protests against reforms that can overcome 
unemployment.233  
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Many people in this country pretend that we have designed these labour market reforms as a way of 
agonizing people. (…) I do not have a bad conscience. The real catastrophe is not the entitlement to a social 
basic benefit available to all job-seekers, but continually rising long-term unemployment.234 
     
In conclusion, the evidence presented above supports the idea that Minister Clement did indeed 
confront the hurdles of resistance by reform critics. In terms of the theoretical framework, this 
means that he demonstrated the third aspect of the IL concept, appealing to give up reform 
resistance, which brings him one step closer to meeting all of the five IL aspects. He engaged with 
it most fiercely during the later stages of the reform process, when the opposition’s efforts to block 
an agreement on the organizational design of local consortia and the financing of the reform, 
became more and more obvious. During the first part of the parliamentary process, he appealed 
less against resistance in general but rather criticized the opposition’s plans, which challenged the 
concept of the Government on crucial details. His firm attitude towards those who wanted to 
thwart his reform plans during the legislative process was again confirmed by his response to the 
public protests (after the formal conclusion of the reform), which were, in his opinion, not 
relevant, as they failed to recognize the real problem.   
 
6.4.4 Political Consensus-Building and Political Orientation  
 
In order to explore the fourth and fifth aspects of ideational leadership, we need to ask whether 
Minister Clement undertook efforts to organize the necessary support for adopting the project, 
without resorting to tactical behaviour related to a power-seeking rather than to a policy-seeking 
orientation. In other words, did the Minister act like someone who tried to convince and win the 
approval of his political opponents for the sake of the reform or did he resort to political tactics in 
order to get his way? The answer to this question will be approximated by examining evidence 
(statements and opinions) on the Minister’s political style. 
In the media, Clement was often portrayed as an impatient doer; the variety and sheer number 
of reform initiatives and ideas he launched - often without prior consultation of his party, the SPD 
- earned him the nickname ‘minister of announcements’.235 Besides being impulsive and pro-
active, he also acquired the reputation of being hard-working and having professional competence 
in dealing with complex subject matters. In addition, as former editor-in-chief of the daily 
Hamburger Morgenpost, the Minister knew how to present himself and his policies in the media. 
After his start as “Superminister”, combining the portfolios of the previous Ministers of 
Economics and Labour and Social Affairs, he played the role of chief reformer well, trying to give 
neither the opposition nor his own party the opportunity to attack him, which obviously changed 
during the Hartz IV process.236  For many SPD traditionalists, he personalised a growing schism 
within the party, being seen as a “neoliberal modernizer”, who asked more of the ordinary man in 
the street than of businesses and employers.237 This image was apparently carried over from his 
previous position as Minister-President of North-Rhine-Westphalia, and related to his willingness 
to accommodate the wishes of business on issues such as the loosening of dismissal regulations, 
and acceptability criteria for jobs. In addition, he was inclined to engage in political confrontations 
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 in order to defend his personal convictions on policy issues such as the dispute about industry 
emissions with Minister of Environmental Affairs Trittin, which was decided - in Clements’ 
favour - by Chancellor Schröder.238 Equally, his firm rejection of a new tax on business to create 
additional apprenticeship places – in opposition to the stance of SPD-leader Müntefering – brought 
him in conflict with his party but yielded a new, voluntary initiative targeted at industry and trade, 
with no additional demands on employers.239 In any case, Clement seemed conscious of his key 
role in the Schröder Cabinet and did, at least on one occasion (before the final conciliation 
committee meeting in June 2004) threaten immediately to ‘draw consequences’ if Hartz IV were to 
fail.240  
Sources from political parties did not describe him as someone who preferred tactical games, 
but, on the contrary, as ‘pragmatic and focused on results and no political tactician’ (Interview 
adviser B90/Greens, 03.02.05), as ‘pragmatic, compromise-oriented negotiator, not tactical’ 
(Interview CDU/CSU advisor, 01.02.05), or as ‘someone who persuaded through arguments, no 
tactical talent’ (Interview Spiegel journalist, 03.02.05). While defending his own convictions 
fervently, if necessary, even against the majority of his party comrades, he did not seem overly 
attached to ideals or ideologies.241 These qualities indicate a straight-forward and down-to-earth 
political style and, as he showed with Hartz IV, a genuine concern about the substance of the 
reform. However, another aspect mentioned was his disposition to engage in the search for 
compromises, which, at times, was seen as problematic by fellow party members:  
 
He was in the end – through his personal engagement – more ready to compromise than we were, so that we 
had to watch out that he did not give away too much (…) An individual’s capacity to suffer is greater than 
that of a group (Interview SPD MP, 25.01.05).  
 
This indicates that the Minister cared more about the realization of the project than about whether 
all provisions proposed by the Government would pass the parliamentary hurdles and be 
implemented. This speculation is supported by the following observations on how Clement dealt 
with details: 
 
Clement is someone who stressed the need for and importance of Hartz IV, he is more of a propagandist than 
someone who negotiates about the details of the compromise (…) Being little involved in the preparatory 
work and the Mediation Committee negotiations on details, he urged all sides to come to an agreement.’ 
(Interview Spiegel journalist, 03.02.05).    
 
The Minister did not seem to look for a consensus (with the trade unions, SS), was result-oriented 
and kept his line of argument at the expense of sacrificing Social Democratic values. From the 
Government’s perspective he was surely the right person to accompany the process (Interview 
former Hartz-Commission member, 08.02.05). In other words, the exact contents of the reform 
seem to have mattered less to the Minister than did achieving a result: his efforts at persuasion 
were aimed at concluding a reform at all rather than the detailed implementation of the Ministry’s 
reform proposal. In this way, Clement demonstrated insight into the need for political consensus-
building to prevent a last-minute failure of the reform. 
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What can we conclude from the Minister’s political style after having examined his part in the 
process? Does he fulfil the IL criterion for political coalition-building coupled with a policy 
orientation? At this point, the evidence is somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, Clement did 
make considerable efforts to keep his concept intact, avoiding giving in to the demands of intra-
party critics and interest groups, but was ultimately forced, by the realities of a conservative 
majority in the Bundesrat, to accommodate some demands from the opposition in order to avoid a 
last-minute failure. The Hartz IV reform formed part of a larger basket of reforms in the final 
conciliatory committee negotiations. Thus, due to the inevitable horse trading that occurs in such 
settings, it is almost impossible to trace how much influence the Minister could exert over the 
coalition negotiators in order to keep the contents of that particular reform intact.  
To conclude on the findings of section 6.4, Minister Clement fits the first three criteria of IL, 
stipulating that a key politician 1) rejects the policy status quo, 2) legitimizes new policy, and 3) 
appeals to reform opponents to stop their resistance. Concerning the fourth and fifth aspect, the 
evidence is less straightforward. While Clement insisted firmly on the Government concept vis-à-
vis the demands of interest groups (and later popular protest), his efforts at political consensus-
building, in order to secure the opposition’s support, were not fruitful: the Minister had little 
choice but to work towards a final compromise with the opposition because of diametrically 
opposed positions on the question of administrative responsibility and financing of the reform. On 
the other hand, the evidence suggests that he undertook this task with a great deal of pragmatism 
and personal dedication in reaching a solution, which points to his policy-orientation. In fact, there 
is more evidence about Clement adhering to pragmatic (and not ideological) argumentation and 
persuasion than to suggest tactical behaviour and self-interested motivations. In this sense, we may 
conclude that Clement complied with the fourth and fifth aspects of ideational leadership. 
Consequently, he meets all criteria we set for ideational leadership, warranting the qualification of 
an ‘ideational leader’.  
Finally, the study of the evidence revealed that the conditions for exerting IL were 
favourable: this was because of other actors’ efforts to promote the reform before the Minister 
appeared on the scene of federal politics, and to some extent, also while the Minister was busy 
advocating Hartz IV. In this context, Chancellor Schröder and the Hartz-Commission deserve to 
be mentioned. The Chancellor contributed to the renouncing of the policy status quo, by first 
establishing the Hartz-Commission, and by turning its recommendations into a political pledge, 
which put the Hartz IV reform on the policy agenda and initiated a phase of policy formulation. 
Later, through his Agenda 2010 speech, he helped Clement, by making a case for rejecting present 
structures and, by setting the scene for more self-responsibility among citizens, to legitimise Hartz 
IV:   
 
We also need to think about our social support systems and ask ourselves whether welfare benefits are really 
benefiting those who need them. I do not accept that people who are able and willing to work need to turn to 
the social assistance office while others, who may not be available for work, receive unemployment 
assistance. Neither do I accept that people, who are comparable in their willingness to work, receive different 
amounts of financial support. I do not think this is successful labour market integration.242    
 
In this sense, it may be argued that the Chancellor contributed to the ideational innovation Clement 
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was advocating. With regard to the Hartz-Commission, it contributed to a change in mentality in 
the debate on the long-term unemployed by giving a clear impulse (the blueprint for the merger of 
two systems) for the departure from current policies. By doing so, it helped to end a long-drawn 
period of political hesitation and resistance to fundamental changes in labour market policy. Seen 
from this angle, it may also be argued that the Hartz-Commission prepared the ground for 
Clement’s efforts at ideational innovation by creating a climate in which the status quo became 
seen as debatable and by making proposals for policy alternatives. Subsequently, Section 6.5 deals 
with the question of whether Clement’s IL was decisive in determining the reform outcome.  
 
6.5 Analysis Part II: What Role for Ideational Leadership?   
 
The second part of the analysis goes one step further than illustrating the presence of IL, which has 
been done in Section 6.4. The main question to be explored in this section is why the reform was 
eventually adopted, and to what extent Clement, as an ideational leader, can be seen as a driving 
force behind its passing. In answering the question of how important IL proved to be in the 
process, interview accounts proved to be valuable sources of information, as they disclosed views 
on why the process eventually led to the passing of reform legislation reform, on which strategies 
the government used to push through their reform concept; and, finally, by shedding light on 
Clement’s role. I will consider each of these in turn.   
 
6.5.1 Strategies of the Government to Adopt the Reform 
 
It was generally agreed that the argumentation strategy was present in the reform process, yet there 
was disagreement on when it was used most, and how important it was relative to the other 
strategies. Two interviewees pointed out that argumentation mattered most in the phase preceding 
the legislative process; one of them stressed its role during the proceedings of the coalition 
working group (Interviews NRW Ministry official, 21.01.05 and B90-Greens adviser, 03.02.05). 
Argumentation was also crucial in the attempt to convince critics of a clear competence 
distribution (the FEA’s central responsibility in the draft bill), before the competence issue was 
again discussed - and substantially altered - by the Mediation Committee (Interview SPD mayor, 
31.01.05). Even observers, who did not ascribe a prominent role to it acknowledged its use, or 
pointed out that it was used only to feign openness to the arguments of interest groups, while the 
official policy stance was not to give in to them (Interview DGB official, 02.02.05). At one 
interview, it was pointed out that argumentation inevitably goes together with making concessions 
(Interview CDU/CDU adviser, 01.02.05).  
The second strategy, making concessions, was most commonly identified as the most 
prominent strategy. Concessions were made mostly during the parliamentary process, as 
adjustments to the draft bill, and, most significantly, in the final phases of the mediation procedure 
in December 2003 and June 2004. The key concessions by the Government in reaching the first 
compromise concerned the acceptability criteria for job offers (they were strengthened to include 
more types of work), and on the question of administrative competence (Interview BMWA 
official, 28.01.05). The 2004 compromise included the concession of a fixed number of local 
governments who could “opt out” of the local consortia, granting them extra financial 
compensation. Seen from the perspective of trade unions, few concessions had been made to them 
before and during the parliamentary process, except for minor adaptations to the law after the 
summer of 2004 (Interviews DGB official, 02.02.05 and VerDi official, 08.02.05). It was also 
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highlighted that, from the coalition’s point of view, making some concessions was seen as 
inevitable from the start given the opposition’s majority in the Bundesrat (Interview SPD MP, 
25.01.05), and thus, proved crucial in solving the still controversial question of administrative 
competence (Interview IAB policy expert, 08.03.05).  
When it came to the strategy of ignoring or outmanoeuvring reform critics, respondents could 
be divided into those who felt that their own party or organization’s critique was ignored in the 
process, and those who thought there was no serious room to ignore criticism, at least not when it 
came from the Christian Democratic-governed Länder, who had the power to reject the 
Government’s proposal in the Bundesrat. One interviewee pointed out that some active labour 
market policy measures first contained in the Hartz IV draft concept bill had been made into 
separate laws in order to pass them without Bundesrat approval, but these measures did not relate 
to the core of the merger project (Interview NRW Ministry official, 21.01.05): in this respect, there 
was no room for an outmanoeuvring strategy. Another confirmed that the criticism by the trade 
unions, and the public protests in the summer of 2004 (which only led to minor modifications) 
were hardly paid attention to by the Government, while it had no choice but to engage more 
seriously with the criticism voiced by the opposition (Interview B90/Greens party adviser, 
03.02.05), due to their majority in the Bundesrat, which could have resulted in the reform project 
being derailed. 
How do these observations on possible strategies contribute to answer the initial question? 
Firstly, they help us to make inferences about how important these strategies were relative to each 
other. Secondly, they indicate the limits of the IL explanation in accounting for the adoption of 
reform. Concession-making by the Government, especially during the first mediation process 
concluded at the end of 2003, appeared to have been decisive in agreeing on the shape of the 
reform as far as the first Hartz IV law was concerned. The importance of making concessions in 
order to pass the implementation law, the Optionsgesetz, was hardly mentioned by interviewees in 
this respect. At the same time, the Government’s initial argumentative efforts cannot be neglected. 
Argumentation had an impact on the initial shape of the reform concept, especially in the early 
phases of the reform process (when interest groups were involved both through informal 
consultations and the Gemeindefinanzkommission), but it was not sufficient to reach a final result. 
Given the adamant stance of the conservative-liberal opposition, we may conclude that the 
Government’s argumentation was more effective in persuading critics within the coalition (which 
was nonetheless important) than in the conservative-liberal camp.  
Persuasion was thus not absent, but it played a greater role during the preparatory stages of 
the proposed reform. As far as the strategy of ignoring or outmanoeuvring critics was concerned, 
the Government largely ignored criticism from trade unions and social welfare associations, as it 
could afford to do so. On the other hand, it could not disregard the criticism of local authority 
associations, which formed an informal coalition with the opposition, and the opposition parties 
themselves, (especially the Christian Democrats), which could urge their Länder in the Bundesrat 
to block the proposal. Neither did the Hartz IV reform offer an opportunity to outmanoeuvre this 
institution, as it had implications for the lower levels of government, which necessitated obtaining 
Bundesrat approval. Consequently, in this case, ignoring reform criticism was not a viable option 
in pushing the reform through. As it were, the evaluation of the strategies indicates that the reform 
was achieved with a mix of argumentation and (last-minute) concessions, and not by ignoring 
criticism.  
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6.5.2 The Role of Minister Clement in the Reform Process  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, all interviewees, regardless of their institutional affiliation, indicated that 
Minister Clement played a major role throughout the reform process.  This was attributed to his 
personal commitment to the reform and his intense involvement in the negotiations of the first 
conciliatory process and later in the legislative process of the Optionsgesetz. A high-ranking, 
former BMWA official described him as ‘very involved and remarkably enthusiastic’ and ‘intent 
on motivating his staff and on keeping the process going’ (Interview former BMWA official, 
23.01.06). Moreover, Clement ‘made himself into - and was made into - the symbol of Hartz IV’ 
(Interview SPD MP 25.01.05), ‘took on the responsibility for the reform wholeheartedly’ 
(Interview NRW Ministry official, 21.01.05) and ‘turned the reform process into his personal 
project’ (Interview SPD mayor, 31.01.05). With regard to his role in the conciliatory negotiations, 
he took on the ‘role of chief negotiator’ (Interview adviser B90/Greens, 03.02.05) and functioned 
as a ‘moving power’ in the working group of the conciliatory committee’. Moreover,  
 
Clement’s leadership, negotiation skills and use of his political weight as a Minister made a compromise 
possible, at a time (i.e. December 2003), when it was far from clear whether the Bundesrat would vote in 
favour of the bill (Interview BMWA official, 28.01.05).   
 
When enquiring more specifically as to whether Clement demonstrated leadership during the 
process, responses were mostly affirmative, even by reform critics, and stressed the connection 
between leadership and adhering to one’s policy plans. The Minister, and along with him his State 
Secretary Andres, ‘massively fought for reform’, and ‘tried to win acceptance and the trust of the 
SPD parliamentary party’ (Interview BA official, 04.10.05). Furthermore, the Minister was seen to 
display ‘leadership throughout the process and a willingness to go further than his own party in 
finding compromises’ (Statement FDP MP, 31.01.05). Similarly, others judged him as ‘being 
determined to follow the Government’s course and to sit out criticism’ (Interview SPD MP, 
25.01.05). One observer found that both Chancellor Schröder and Minister Clement showed strong 
leadership and little consideration vis-à-vis their clientele, pushing through their programme 
against resistance (Interview IAB policy expert, 05.03.05). Another interpretation of leadership 
was linked by a respondent impressed by Clement’s engagement in the legislative process of the 
implementation law in the spring of 2004.  
 
He has also shown leadership by including reform critics and main political actors involved. This is (…) 
when we fought, together with the Deutscher Städtetag, about the details of financing. He started a persuasion 
and negotiation process, I believe unique in German post-war history that led to an increase in acceptance 
through argumentation (Interview SPD mayor, 31.01.05). 
 
6.5.3 Decisive Factors?  
 
Alongside the Minister’s role, which, apparently, was perceived as central to, and increasingly 
associated with leadership, I also investigated what interviewees thought were decisive factor(s) 
behind the passing of the reform. Once, it was observed that it is unlikely to find a single such 
factor in a process depending on a lot of tiresome work on details carried out by a large number of 
dedicated people in various working groups (Interview SPD MP, 25.01.05). Accordingly, most 
interview accounts explicitly pointed to a combination of factors that had proven decisive. For 
instance, the mix of high unemployment, which increasingly set the government under pressure to 
act, and the stamina of its members in pushing through the project were found to be vital 
(Interview SPD mayor, 31.01.05). This observation supports the idea from the preceding sub-
section that Clement’s leadership did matter in bringing about the reform. Other factors mentioned 
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included the consensus on the necessity for reform, and changes in labour-market policy discourse 
pleaded for by experts. The former relates to an increased urgency to get the unemployed back to 
work and the absurdity of the co-existence of two systems for the same clientele (Statement FDP 
MP, 31.01.05), while the latter points to the role of the Hartz- Commission, which functioned as a 
catalyst for the process that followed and also as a reference point for working out concrete 
legislative proposals (Interview VerDi official, 08.02.05). Finally, the role played by local 
authority associations was mentioned, both as a factor that broke a major stalemate in the 
negotiation process, and that helped to work out the final compromise on financial compensation 
(Interview Spiegel journalist, 03.02.05).  
Notably, the compromise reached in the Mediation Committee was most frequently seen as a 
vital factor in the adoption of Hartz IV. It relied on the willingness of the Government to agree on 
such a compromise in December 2003 (on the major controversial points of administrative 
responsibility and acceptability criteria for work). More specifically, the compromise required a 
readiness to make financial concessions to the Länder and local authorities, and its acceptance of 
overall financial liability for the new benefit (Interviews DGB official 02.02.05 and B90/Greens 
advisor 03.02.05). However, it was also alleged that the compromise was the result of a political 
“non-decision”, reflecting a conscious choice for leaving the details to be decided by the 
implementing agencies, as well as the ultimate consequence of the government failing to reach an 
early stance on the implementation issue (Interviews BMWA official 19.08.05 and labour-market 
policy expert 21.03.05). In another interpretation, the compromise was the consequence of the lack 
of an “exit strategy” in case the government concept could not be realized (Interview BA official, 
04.10.05). Finally, the realization of the necessity to reach a compromise, both by the Government 
and the opposition, with the failure of Hartz IV looming as worst-case scenario, was also regarded 
as important (Interviews CDU/CSU adviser, 01.02.05 and Spiegel journalist 03.02.05). While from 
the Minister’s perspective, concerns about his own and the government’s reformer image were 
central to this realization (Interview BMWA official 19.08.05), the opposition’s approval was 
owed to the prevailing of the more conciliatory (i.e. opposing a blockade) wing within the CDU 
(Interview BMWA official 28.01.05)   
To conclude, Section 6.5 has explored why the Hartz IV reform was eventually adopted and 
to what extent IL was crucial to this process. My answer is that both IL and concession-making 
played their respective roles in concluding Hartz IV. In order to reach a conclusion, I considered 
the role played by (government) argumentation and the Minister’s leadership; the evidence from 
the other two alternative strategies the government may have employed in order to advance with 
Hartz IV; and other factors that were important in achieving the reform. As regards government 
strategies, argumentation was especially present in the agenda-setting and pre-legislative phases, 
and until the end of the legislative phases, where argumentation efforts were employed to convince 
critics; this strategy can be seen as corresponding to the first two aspects of IL. In addition, the 
evaluation of the Minister’s role suggested that he made an important contribution towards 
completing the reform process, demonstrating leadership in its course. Clement was intensely 
involved in the process, at least from the moment the mediation procedure began in November 
2003, and he kept pushing for a conclusion to the reform, even when, initially in December 2003, 
the limits of persuasion became apparent. These two elements together suggest that IL did indeed 
contribute to the concluding of the reform process. At the same time, out of the two alternative 
strategies, only concession-making proved to matter in the decision-making phase on the way to 
the final compromise in the mediation committee. This observation is backed up by witnesses to 
the process, who suggested several decisive factors that contributed to the finalization of the 
reform without agreeing on one particular factor. However, it was frequently suggested that the 
crucial compromise in the Mediation Committee enabling the passing of the reform was decisive - 
  
Hartz IV: IL Leading to Structural Reform in Labor Market Policy? 
 
 163 
supporting the evidence in favour of the concession-making strategy - and made a difference for 
the final result. Consequently, we can conclude that both IL and concession-making had a bearing 
on the realization of the reform.  
Having established this, one should note that ascertaining the relative influence of ideational 
leadership is fraught with difficulty. However, I think in order to verify this claim, one should 
examine to what extent the substance of the compromise matches the reform’s core characteristics 
and conclude whether the concessions made for the sake of the final compromise outweighed 
argumentation and IL in importance. After all, it would be hard to maintain that ideational 
innovation through IL had prevailed, if the compromise had resulted in a throrough revision of the 
reform. Specifically, did the Government have to sacrifice the core of the reform in order to save 
it? While the initial government proposal already implied its structural character, this was not 
diminished by the final compromise(s). The merger of two benefit schemes came about as 
envisaged by the Red-Green Government, even though the responsibility for the recipients of the 
new benefit ended up being more complex than was intended by the Hartz-Commission or the 
drafters of the government proposal.243 It came to be relevant because the issue of administrative 
responsibility, which, in the beginning, was assumed to be uncontroversial, touched on the sphere 
of competences and attached financial relations between various levels of government.  
The compromise that emerged from the two mediation procedures on Hartz IV forced the 
Government to make concessions, but it did not derail the overall project. Admittedly, it did delay 
its introduction, but left its core intact. That is to say, the merger of two benefit schemes and the 
new approach to the long-term unemployed and former social assistance recipients was 
introduced, as set out in the original plan. Although the Government (and Minister Clement) did 
not fully realize their plan with regard to the organization of the reform provisions (i.e. the 
centralistic model of responsibility for the new benefit), its substance, that is, the combination of 
granting a benefit, and  offering support services at one-stop agencies for all those available for 
work, was implemented as planned.244  
 
6.6 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have analyzed the process leading up to the merger of unemployment assistance 
and social assistance, known as the Hartz IV reform. Considering that it broke with the status-quo 
of a de facto three-pillar system of German unemployment protection, it qualified as a structural 
reform. I have outlined the long-drawn political process that led to the passing of legislation and 
described the difficult political context in which the reform was debated and finally adopted. To 
conclude, I will return to the initial IL hypothesis in order to see whether the Hartz IV case 
confirmed or disconfirmed it. In Section 6.4, I have established that Minister Clement acted during 
the reform process in accordance with the criteria of ideational leadership and have pointed out 
                                                           
 
 
 
243 As a reminder: instead of the straightforward organisation around job centres under the organizational and financial 
auspices of the FEA, the position of the Christian Democrat opposition and part of local authority associations (especially 
the Deutsche Landkreistag) pleaded until the end for a greater role for local governments. This was also true for the second 
conciliation procedure in June 2004.  
244 An alternative interpretation, from a perspective that stresses the effects of the reform after implementation, would be 
that the administrative and financial provisions of the compromise have unduly complicated the implementation of the new 
benefit ALGII while the essence of the merger had been to simplify and streamline the procedures of what used to be two 
separate systems.  
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that the Minister’s endeavour to promote Hartz IV was aided by Chancellor Schröder and the 
Hartz commission. While Clement’s performance as an IL was undoubtedly important, Section 
6.4.1 has suggested a combination of argumentation efforts and concessions as the key to the 
realization of Hartz IV. Similarly, Section 6.4.2 has stressed the importance of the Minister’s 
leadership - to keep the reform process going and to bring it to a close - and the forging of 
compromises, particularly at the end of 2003, and again in June 2004. These findings confirm that 
IL was important in achieving a break from traditional ways of thinking in labour market policy 
and in bringing an ambitious reform closer to decision point. Yet, IL alone could not bring the 
reform to an end. Rather, it was IL in combination with the Government’s willingness to achieve a 
compromise on reform implementation, which led to its adoption. The communicative efforts of a 
reform-minded and results-oriented Minister like Clement were essential to maintaining the 
momentum in the reform process and to pushing the parliamentary opposition towards the 
reform’s conclusion, even though the final result differed from the initial government concept. 
Instead of getting its centralistic solution adopted, the compromise provided for a split of 
administrative competences between local consortia and a number of local authorities, as well as 
for the division of financing responsibilities with regard to the new benefit. In his task of bringing 
the reform process closer towards completion, Clement could rely on the political commitment of 
Chancellor Schröder, who also helped his minister by providing a general direction for social and 
economic policy reform. Moreover, as a conceptual blueprint for Hartz IV, Clement could draw 
upon the work carried out by the Hartz-Commission. Yet, despite all communicative efforts by 
Clement (and to some extent by Schröder) to achieve a mentality change with regard to the 
question of how to tackle long-term unemployment, the reform was only concluded after 
accommodating the criticism of the parliamentary opposition concerning the role of local 
governments, and the Länder in the Bundesrat. The Minister’s willingness and ability to achieve a 
compromise proved to be crucial for the Government in ensuring that the core provisions of the 
reform were adopted and in upholding its reformist image in the eyes of the public.  
The conclusion that the reform was not adopted by IL alone, but was realized after lengthy 
negotiations, due to treatening Bundesrat rejection, confirms my theoretical expectations about 
when (i.e. in which phase of) the reform process IL will be most effective (see Chapter 2). As the 
institutional veto power of the Bundesrat was strong at the time, due to its domination by 
opposition-governed Länder, IL could be expected to meet the biggest obstacles in the decision-
making phase, when a compromise had to be found through bargaining.
 7. IL in the Area of Health Care Policy: Did it Lead to Structural 
Reforms? 
 
 
 
7.1. Introduction  
 
This final empirical chapter will examine reform developments in German health care policy. 
More specifically, in this third case study, I will investigate whether a presumed ideational leader 
was able to adopt reforms, which resulted in shifts within the finance, care provision or regulation 
dimension of health care policy. Section 7.2 reiterates why this case study focuses on evaluating 
the outcomes of an individual’s period in office, instead of on a single reform process, as was the 
case in Chapters 5 and 6. In addition, it explains the procedure used to identify this policy-maker 
(a small expert survey comparing several “candidate” ideational leaders backed up by an extra 
criterion closely connected to IL). Following on from this, Section 7.3 provides some background 
to the institutional set-up of the German health care system and its actors. I will also outline the 
state of the health care sector in the 1990’s in terms of its main problems. Section 7.4 forms the 
backbone of the chapter, examining and evaluating the major reforms undertaken during the 
1990’s, the 1992 Structural Health Care Act (Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz or GSG, Section 7.4.1), 
and the 1997 Health Care Restructuring Acts (1./2.GKV-Neuordnungsgesetz or GKV-NOG, 
Section 7.4.2). For each of these reforms, I will describe their provisions, re-count the respective 
reform processes, and, finally, outline the political factors that influenced the final reform result. 
The role of Minister Seehofer in the enactment of the reforms will be considered separately and 
both sub-sections end with an evaluation in the light of the structural reform criteria used in this 
study. The conclusion summarizes the main findings in terms of the link between IL and 
(structural) reform outcomes.  
 
7.2 Selection and Delineation of the Case 
 
As I have discussed in Chapter 3, when explaining the multiple case study design and its 
constituent cases, the third case differs from the others in that it was selected on the basis of the 
independent variable under evaluation in this study, IL. The aim of employing a third case in the 
overall logic of the design is to see whether a case selected on the independent variable, i.e. the 
presence of an ideational leader, would also show the outcome expected by the theoretical 
framework, namely structural reform(s). In order to put this requirement into practice, I first 
selected four criteria that would help me identify an IL-type policy-maker without examining his 
or her political performance in the context of a specific reform beforehand. These criteria had to 
meet two requirements: a) being closely related (although not identical) to the five aspects of IL 
including the expected political style of an ideational leader, and b) being precise enough for use 
in questions to respondents without further operationalization. They included:  
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• determination of a Minister to change the status quo in health care during his/her term 
• ability of a Minister to promote and legitimize structural reforms  
• ability of a Minister to decrease or overcome reform resistance 
• political style of a Minister (more policy-oriented or more power-oriented) 
 
These four criteria are close enough to the five aspects of the IL framework so as to ensure the 
selection of a politician who conforms to the same criteria used to detect and evaluate IL in the 
other cases. Note that the third case differs from the others in that I am interested in identifying 
someone who demonstrated IL throughout his or her term in office. This warrants certain 
differences between the criteria and the original aspects, which are more “process-sensitive” as 
they are geared to the narrow context of one reform project. Thus, IL aspects 3 and 4 were 
combined here in the third criterion.    
The approach followed in making the case selection was to enlist the help of experts. In order 
to corroborate my own impressions and previous knowledge of various Ministers of Health, I 
asked several close observers of health care politics to identify a presumed ideational leader. The 
experts received a short survey,245 in which they were asked to compare two past Ministers of 
Health, Horst Seehofer (1992-1998), Andrea Fischer (1998-2001), and the current Minister Ulla 
Schmidt (2001-present) using the four criteria listed above. In addition to inquiring about these 
four criteria, which were to form the basis for case selection, one complementary question 
concerned the policy legacy of the Ministers.246 A summary of the results for each question 
yielded the following ranking (the numbers in brackets refer to the total of points scored):  
 
•  Determination to change the status-quo 
1. Seehofer (17)  2. Fischer (15)  3. Schmidt (13) 
 
•  Ability to promote/legitimize reforms 
1. Seehofer (18)  2. Fischer/Schmidt (13) 
 
• Ability to overcome reform resistance 
1. Seehofer (17.5)   2. Schmidt (11.5)  3. Fischer (10)  
 
• Political style  
1. Fischer (more policy-oriented)    2.Seehofer/Schmidt (policy-/power-oriented)  
 
The results for these four questions show that Minister Seehofer was clearly ranked highest on 
“determination to change the status quo”, “promoting and legitimizing far-reaching reforms”, as 
well as “overcoming reform resistance”. Fischer and Schmidt together trailed Seehofer on the 
second criterion, Fischer ranked second on the determination criterion and Schmidt was ranked 
after Seehofer in terms of overcoming reform resistance. As far as political style was concerned, 
Fischer was rated as more policy-oriented, while Seehofer and Schmidt were judged as both 
                                                           
 
 
 
245 See for further information on affiliation of survey participants, wording of the questions and scores of each Minister per 
question the Appendix on the website http://www.ru.nl/politicologie/over_politicologie/wie_wat_waar/personen/stiller/ 
246 The Ministers were ranked on a four-point scale from “weak” to “striking” regarding criteria 1 to 3, and as “more 
policy-oriented”, more “power-oriented”, or “both” regarding criterion 4. The last question allowed an open answer to 
obtain some more detailed views on Ministers’ performances.  
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policy- and power-oriented, the difference being that some respondents could not place Schmidt in 
that respect and gave an indefinite answer (“don’t know”). Based on these results, Minister 
Seehofer appeared to be the best choice as presumed ideational leader for the case on health care 
policy, as his reputation matched most closely the qualities of IL. On three out of four IL-based 
criteria, he ranked highest compared to the two other ministers, except for the political style 
criterion, where Seehofer was ranked (together with Schmidt) as both policy- and power-oriented 
after Fischer, who was seen as the most policy-oriented minister.247  
This result, however, may have been biased in certain ways due to the wording of the 
questions about the second and third criteria, which contained the term “structural reform”. More 
concretely, the danger existed that respondents, knowing about the policy legacy of each minister, 
read those questions as if the candidates had actually achieved such reforms, which conflicts with 
my aim of making a selection on the independent variable (IL), as the overall aim of the case study 
is to establish whether structural reform did occur. Therefore, in order to compensate for the risk 
of selecting Seehofer on the basis of the dependent variable, structural reform, and to double-check 
the result of the survey, I applied an additional criterion for selection on all three candidates. This 
criterion is directly related to the aspects of IL but does not have a link to the outcome of reform: it 
refers to whether the candidates had outspoken ideas on what they wanted to achieve in the area of 
health care before taking office or at the very beginning of their term.248  
On the basis of this criterion, the three candidates fared differently: Seehofer had already, 
during his time as MP (when he vice-chaired an expert commission on health care reform),249 and 
as State Secretary, entertained views on how to increase efficiency in the cost-intensive hospital 
sector.250 As soon as he was appointed as Minister, he clearly voiced his ideas on how to deal with 
the problem of rising costs in the health care sector,251 presenting his proposals as being without 
alternative, if the goal of stabilizing non-wage labour costs was to be reached.252 Doing so, he 
surprised observers with unconventional views on how to realize cost savings, stressing that the 
burdens of his envisaged reform had to be spread equally between patients and other 
stakeholders.253 His successor Andrea Fischer was more known for her progressive ideas on the 
                                                           
 
 
 
247 In terms of policy legacies (last survey question) Seehofer’s achievements appeared ambiguous: experts referred to them 
as “substantial/positive/remarkable” (and in relation to the GSG), but also as “standstill in terms of renewing structures” or 
as “mere commencement of structural reform”. Fischer’s legacy was evaluated as “weak” and “not up to the task” as it was 
marked a fruitless fight against interest groups. Current Minister Schmidt’s legacy so far falls somewhere in between, as 
respondents disagreed about whether she initiated structural reforms or merely reversed previous ones and continued to 
implement traditional cost-containment measures. Based on this comparison, the choice for Seehofer is interesting as the 
case study may shed more light on the ambiguity of his policy legacy and establish whether his record on structural reforms 
echoes these opinions. 
248 Since the ideational element of IL is essentially about using policy ideas (in a cognitive and normative sense) to 
legitimize reforms, it can be assumed that a potential ideational leader enters office with outspoken ideas he or she would 
like to put into practice.  
249 Seehofer had been the vice-chairman of the parliamentary Enquete-Kommission ‘Strukturreform der GKV’ before 
working at the Ministry of Labour (Interview former SPD MP, 24.01.06) 
250 ‘Der neue Gesundheitsminister: Horst Seehofer’, Das Krankenhaus 5/92, p. 211. 
251 These ideas were probably influenced by his earlier experience working under Minister of Labour and Social Order 
Blüm with the failed 1988 Health Reform Act (GRG), which was attacked heavily by interest groups in the formulation 
phase and failed in the implementation phase. This experience enabled a learning process that likely impacted on 
Seehofer’s style of policy-making and reform design in terms of substance (cf. Perschke-Hartmann 1994:275).  
252 During his first week in office, Seehofer was quoted as announcing: ‘Either the enormous task in front of me will 
succeed or the rising health care costs will eat up employees’ and pensioners’ incomes in the electorally important year 
1994’ (‘Der Eimer ist voll’, Der Spiegel 19/92, p.24). 
253 ‘Klotzen statt Kleckern’, Der Spiegel 21/92, p.37-38; ‚Kampf gegen die Haie’, Der Spiegel 24/92, p.112-119.  
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future of social security (in her office as speaker for social policy issues of the Green 
parliamentary party) than on health care policy specifically.254 Whatever ideas she may have held 
on health care, when she was appointed as Minister in October 1998, they became restricted by the 
task of implementing the Red-Green coalition agreement, which stipulated that the last reforms of 
the CDU/FDP coalition needed to be repealed. While doing so, she also faced the delicate task of 
achieving considerable cost-savings and complying with the coalition’s declared goal to bring 
down non-wage labour costs, including health care contributions, leading her to resort to 
instruments of state-prescribed budgeting.255 This left little room for Fischer to voice her own 
ideas on policy, and the coalition agreement envisaged a substantial reform not earlier than the 
year 2000 (Brandhorst 2003: 215). Finally, Ulla Schmidt started out as an interim minister after 
taking over from Fischer who resigned in January 2001. Previously, she had been a social policy 
specialist for the SPD parliamentary party with no previous experience of health care issues,256 and 
lacked outspoken ideas on health care. Chancellor Schröder wanted her to calm relations with 
health care stakeholders after Fischer’s turbulent period in office, and Schmidt was told to (and 
expected to) put off substantial reforms until after the 2002 elections.257 Her first months in office 
were accordingly marked by dealing with the current business of her predecessor Fischer. Her 
primary task was to take care of the stability of health care contributions and to avoid any policy 
moves that would provoke new protests by doctors.258 Indeed, the start of her term became 
synonymous with an “appeasement” of care providers, which, for instance, could be seen from her 
early decision to abolish budgeting rules for physicians (Brandhorst 2003: 217; Bandelow 2007: 
18). In a nutshell, Schmidt started out more as a consensus-oriented administrator than as an 
innovator and her own policy ideas remained unspecified.  
The above comparison demonstrates that Seehofer was the only Minister who had clear ideas 
on how he wanted to shape policy from the outset (and even before) and wasted no time in 
working out a reform concept. In contrast, Fischer and Schmidt’s ideas to reshape health care 
policy did not become visible to the same extent, which makes them less likely to be ideational 
leaders; possibly because their first decisions in office were subordinated to political constraints. 
To conclude, on the basis of the additional criterion, the prior selection of Seehofer as a presumed 
ideational leader can be confirmed.     
Horst Seehofer is a member of the CDU’s Bavarian sister party CSU and served as Minister 
in the last two cabinets under Chancellor Kohl between 1992 (when he succeeded his unfortunate 
predecessor Gerda Hasselfeldt), and 1998. His career in the party ranks of the Bavarian CSU led 
him slowly but steadily to the post of State Secretary under Minister of Labour and Social Order 
Blüm, involving him in the preparation of the 1989 Health Reform Act (GRG). By the time he was 
appointed as Minister of Health, high hopes were set on Seehofer, not least by Chancellor Kohl 
himself. During his following six years in office, he would acquire a solid reputation for his 
determination to tackle the sector’s problems and conduct change in an environment ridden by 
                                                           
 
 
 
254  ‘Vulkan mit Kompetenz’, Der Spiegel 44/98, p. 52-55 
255  ‘Andrea Fischer tritt Seehofers Erbe an’, Handelsblatt, 14.10.98, p.4; ‘Sozialreformen der Koalition stossen auf heftige 
Kritik’, Handelsblatt, 11.11.98, p.1 
256 ‘Minister-Rücktritte: Gesundheit jetzt Sache der SPD’, Deutsches Ärzteblatt 3/98, 19.01.01 
257 ‘Von der Krise zur Agrarwende’, Der Spiegel 3/2001, p. 20-24; ‘Schröders Feuerwehrfrau für heikle Aufgaben’, 
Handelsblatt, 11.01.01, p.3  
258 ‘Neue Gesundheitsministerin steht vor alten Problemen’, Handelsblatt 11.01.01, p.3   
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powerful interest groups.259 The case study will cover the six years Seehofer spent in office as 
Minister of Health, concentrating on the most important reform projects tackled during this time, 
the 1992 Structural Health Care Act and the 1996/1997 Health Care Restructuring Acts. Before 
analyzing and evaluating these reforms, I will introduce the particularities of the German health 
care sector.   
 
7.3 Background on German Health Care Policy in the Early 1990s  
 
Before embarking on the analysis of Minister Seehofer’s reform legacy, I will provide a brief 
overview of the policy area, including its main actors and institutions, and an outline of the 
problems it faced at the beginning of the 1990’s. Taken together, this forms necessary background 
information in understanding the subsequent analysis of reform processes during Seehofer’s period 
in office.  
 
7.3.1 Actors in the German Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) 
 
German statutory health insurance is financed by payroll-based contributions, which are borne by 
employers and employees in equal parts. Employees and other members of the population are 
insured by sickness funds, as opposed to the state taking on this role. Financing is based on the 
solidarity principle, i.e. sickness fund contribution rates are set at a certain percentage rate of gross 
wages rather than based on personal characteristics of the insured. In addition, family members are 
also covered for the same contribution rate. The solidarity principle of the SHI implies that 
considerable redistribution occurs within sickness funds, which are supposed to be self-financing 
and are therefore obliged to watch their own budgets. There are various sorts of sickness funds, the 
most important distinction being between primary and substitute funds, which, for historical 
reasons, used to insure different segments of and professions in the working population. However, 
due to state requirements, their benefit packages were broadly similar, although significant 
institutional differences remained in place well into the 1990’s.  
Following on from this, the medical profession is organized and represented by various 
associations, such as the Associations of Sickness Fund Physicians (Kassenärztliche 
Vereinigungen, KVs), their federal umbrella organisation, KBV (Kassenärztliche 
Bundesvereinigung), and the physicians’ chambers, united in the Federal Chamber of Physicians 
(Bundesärztekammer). Membership in these two is obligatory: the KVs are statutory providers of 
ambulant care to the community of the insured; they negotiate fees for their members and are 
involved in policy implementation, together with the sickness funds, which are subject to state 
                                                           
 
 
 
259 After the Kohl government was replaced by the Red-Green coalition led by Schröder, he continued to be involved in 
policy-making through his role as parliamentarian and social policy expert in the CSU parliamentary party before serious 
heart problems forced him to retreat from politics temporarily in 2001. Thereafter, in 2003, he negotiated a cross-party 
agreement leading to the 2004 Health Modernisation Act (GMG) with his successor, Minister of Health Ulla Schmidt 
(SPD). In 2004, he fell out with the CDU/CSU over an internal compromise over the future financing base of the statutory 
health care insurance (which he publicly criticised), and was forced to resign from most of his party posts. In November 
2005 he returned to the forefront of federal politics as Minister of Agriculture and Consumer Protection in the Merkel 
government, but despite his new portfolio, he has since been speaking out in public on issues of health care and social 
policy more generally. 
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regulation. In addition, doctors are organized in voluntary organisations such as the 
Hartmannbund and Marburger Bund, which are usually visible in doctors’ protests and during 
negotiations of collective agreements, but formally, have little institutionalized influence on state 
policy making.  
Apart from physicians, the other important group of health care providers are hospitals. 
Hospitals are administered by various organizations, from religious organizations to municipalities 
and regional entities to private investors. The administering bodies are represented by the German 
Association of Hospitals (Deutsche Krankenhausgesellschaft, DKG) and its corresponding 
branches in the Länder. In addition, pharmacists are organized - analogous to doctors - both on an 
obligatory basis in pharmacists’ chambers, Apothekerkammern, and in the Federal Association of 
German Pharmacists (Bundesvereinigung Deutscher Apothekerverbände). Their profession is, 
however, much less involved in health politics and its institutionalized arenas of consultation and 
negotiation.  
Finally, the role of the state in the statutory health care system is a mostly indirect, but 
nevertheless important one. On some issues such as hospital financing, the federal government 
shares its competence with the Länder. As regards the financing and the provision of health care, 
the federal state draws up regulations for sickness funds and health care providers, such as 
physicians and hospitals. Most importantly, it supervises the provisions of the statutory insurance 
and secures public access through corresponding requirements. These tasks include regulating 
contribution payments, setting the income threshold (which forms a ceiling for calculating 
individual contributions), and determining the range of benefits to be covered by sickness funds 
and offered by medical care providers. Finally, the state lays down the terms of cooperation 
between doctors and sickness funds, which has been called the ‘corporatist settlement’(Giaimo and 
Manow 1999:89).260  However, the competences of the state are, of course, not fixed in all 
respects: the reforms of the past fifteen years have resulted in a different role for the state relative 
to providers and insurers, as will be become clear during the discussion of reform outcomes. 
In contrast to other social policy areas, the health care sector relies, to a considerable extent, 
on corporatist governance for its functioning. This form of governance relies on the cooperation of 
KVs and sickness funds, which are legally obliged - as private bodies under public law - to 
implement measures set out by the state in framework legislation. Implementation usually involves 
filling in the details of legislation through collective bargaining and by concluding agreements 
between the two parties, for instance, on remunerations of doctors and their terms of service. This 
far-reaching role in implementation is referred to as self-governance (Selbstverwaltung). 
Furthermore, KVs and sickness funds are also involved in the formulation of policies; they are 
represented in official consultations vis-à-vis the state by the KBV and the umbrella association of 
sickness funds. Self-governance is thus an instrument for the state to offer physicians and insurers 
a great deal of substantial autonomy, while indirectly steering their behaviour. However, it also 
allows the state to step in if self-governing bodies do not comply with their legal obligations to 
implement state policy. In such cases, the state is allowed to suspend self-administration of 
insurers and KVs, and to apply rule by decree, usually for a limited time (Giaimo 2002: 92-93).  
  
                                                           
 
 
 
260 This settlement has his origins in the late 19th century history of the German health care sector to resolve intense class 
and group conflicts associated with the process of industrialization. It favoured doctors and employers over insurers and 
workers (see Giaimo 2002: 89 ff.). 
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7.3.2 Problems of the Sector in the Early 1990’s    
 
When studying the development of German health care policy, one is inevitably confronted with 
rising costs of health care services, as well as with political efforts to contain them. Since the mid-
1970’s, the public health system has maintained the aim of cost containment in the statutory health 
insurance as its most important endeavour, irrespective of the composition of the governing 
coalition (Hinrichs 1994:6). Exploding costs of medical treatments and pharmaceuticals soon 
caused sickness funds’ contribution rates to rise and, in turn, increased payroll contributions of 
employees and non-wage labour costs of employers. The last reform before the period considered 
in the case (1992-1998), the 1988 Health Care Reform Act (GRG) enacted under Minister Blüm, 
was the first to take up the goal of stabilizing contribution rates (Beitragssatzstabilität). Imposing 
this principle as a condition for all contracts in the health care system was a novelty, adding to the 
already existing goal of cost containment (Schneider 1991 in Giaimo 2002: 107). However, the 
measures adopted by this originally ambitious, but later on substantially watered-down law 
(Esping-Andersen 1990), did not offer relief for long. Although contribution rates had decreased 
initially in 1990, by the end of 1992, they were up again at over 13 percent (from 12.2 percent in 
early 1991), as health expenditures of all sorts had increased considerably. Sickness funds were 
forced to adjust contribution rates in order to balance their budgets. These increases in 
expenditures and contributions were related to the structural characteristics and incentives built 
into the system existing before the 1990’s. These were designed in a way to keep the volume of 
health care provision expanding or, at least, not to encourage actors to restrict the supply, 
financing, or effective use of services (Gerlinger 2003). In this sense, the traditional policy of 
containing health care costs was faced with a trade-off: on the one hand, it set the goal of 
stabilizing contribution rates and controlling expenditure; on the other, it offered various financial 
incentives for providers to increase expenditures and thus health care costs.261  Therefore, the 
problem of rising costs was intertwined with the existing structures governing the care provision 
and financing of health care, and any substantial reform effort had to tackle the two problems 
together. While the concerns about exploding costs were in themselves a sufficient reason for the 
government to start thinking about another reform; other economic and political considerations 
also troubled the newly re-elected Kohl Government. In the wake of unification, there existed 
already extra financial burdens for employees, such as the income tax surcharge 
(Solidaritätszuschlag) on incomes; thus, another increase in health insurance contributions was not 
particularly welcome. Employers, an important CDU constituency, were already complaining of 
competitiveness problems due to rising non-wage labour costs. Equally, pensioners, also an 
important clientele for the ruling CDU, would particularly suffer from further increases, since a 
recent pension reform had actually lowered pension levels. The concerns of these two groups were 
taken seriously by policy-makers, not least because in 1994, a series of elections were on the 
agenda. Faced with a total of fourteen elections, including local, Länder and European ones, and a 
federal election in the autumn, the Government decided that controlling non-wage labour costs, 
and thus social expenditure, should take priority, as part of a programme to improve the economic 
                                                           
 
 
 
261 Until the early 1990s, these incentives included, for care providers (doctors and hospitals), the regulations governing 
financing and remuneration of health care provision; especially the per diem payment for hospital operating costs and 
individual transaction reimbursements for doctors. At the same time, for sickness funds, the system of regulated 
membership was factually securing their existence. Although they did try to avoid contribution rate rises, in the old system, 
the consequences of such rises for individual funds were rather limited (Gerlinger 2003: 6).  
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situation, in order to avoid electoral losses (Giaimo 2002: 112). In turn, this choice made it 
necessary, amongst other measures, to take rapid steps in order to curb health care costs.  
 
 
7.4 Analysis of the Politics of Health Care Reform 
 
7.4.1 The 1993 Structural Health Care Reform Act (GSG) 
7.4.1.1 Reform Goals and Measures  
Seehofer’s first major legislative project consisted of a whole package of provisions that clearly 
aimed at cutting costs and stabilizing SHI contribution rates. The goals cited in the bill were 
directly linked to the cost explosion in the health care sector:  
 
The dramatic cost development in all areas of the statutory health insurance necessitates short-term cost-
containment and structural reforms, which are to be effective in the long term. This Structural Health Care 
Act and the Law Amending the 5th Social Law Code are supposed to effect instant cost-savings and 
contribute, through structural measures, to a stabilization of contribution rates. As a result, the financial 
viability of the statutory health insurance will be ensured beyond the year 2000. Both bills distribute the 
burdens fairly over all parties involved.262  
 
These goals were to be achieved through a range of short-term measures designed to tighten 
control over the budgets of several health care stakeholders. These measures were aimed at 
providers, insurers and patients alike, with care providers bearing the bulk of the desired cost-
savings. Hospitals faced strict budgets for the period 1993-95 as well as new reimbursement 
arrangements; physicians working for the statutory insurance became subject to global prescription 
drugs budgets for the same period; and dentists’ medical fees were to be decreased by 20 percent. 
Moreover, medicine expenditure paid by SHI would be subject to annual budgets and the 
pharmaceutical industry had to accept a price freeze for certain categories of medicines. Patients 
also had to contribute their share, as co-payments for medicine and stays in hospital were 
increased moderately, continuing in line with the 1988 GRG law, but avoiding undue hardship for 
weaker groups in society.  
Most remarkably, the rules on sickness fund membership were to be relaxed from 1996 
onwards, resulting in a virtually free choice of sickness fund for the insured. As a complementary 
measure, a financial risk-adjustment scheme was introduced, obliging funds with wealthier and 
healthier members to make transfers to poorer funds in order to introduce more equity into the 
heterogeneous sickness fund landscape (Arbeitnehmerkammer Bremen 2005; Giaimo 2002: 114-
117). From a regulation perspective, the reform meant a ‘particular mix of state intervention, 
market innovation, and continued corporatist self-governance’, as it stood for state intrusion in 
sectoral self-governance; controlling the cost of medicine; an extension of extending joint tasks 
under corporatism; hospital reform; market mechanisms to enhance solidarity and efficiency; and 
an increase in patients’ co-payments (Giaimo 2002: 114-117).  
The crucial strength of the GSG was that, in the short term, it did indeed effect a reduction in 
health expenditure and it included a compromise that spread the burdens of such cost containment 
                                                           
 
 
 
262 Bundesrat DS 560/92, Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung – Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Sicherung und 
Strukturverbesserung der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung (Gesundheits-Strukturgesetz 1993), 14.08.92.  
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equally among service providers (Interview BMG official, 27.01.06). In addition, the idea to 
change the role of sickness funds from being mere administrators into more pro-active and 
competitive organizations and to create a redistributive mechanism (in accordance with a 
redistributive health care system), were politically convincing and came at a time when sickness 
funds themselves were thinking about organizational changes (Interview health care policy expert 
09.02.06).  
7.4.1.2 The Reform Process     
Horst Seehofer entered office on May 6th, 1992, taking over from Gerda Hasselfeldt, who had 
resigned at the end of April. She was generally seen as a weak Minister who was not up to her 
task. Minister Seehofer did not wait long before he embarked on his first reform project, making 
use of initiatives that had been developed within the Ministry and by the CDU parliamentary 
group (Esping-Andersen 1996: 258). In mid-May, he assembled the coalition’s social policy 
experts and some Ministry officials, retreating for extended consultations lasting several weeks. 
From there, things proceeded quickly and the Ministry draft bill (Referentenentwurf) was approved 
by the Cabinet in August (ibid: 259). After that, Seehofer explored ways of winning the SPD 
parliamentary group for a “grand coalition” on the issue of health care reform. When he had 
received signs that the SPD was willing to compromise, he sought and received approval for his 
approach from the relevant chairmen of the coalition parties (Kohl and Waigel for the CDU/CSU, 
Kinkel for the FDP). 
 The following step was to convene talks between the governing coalition and a negotiating 
commission consisting of representatives of the Länder and the SPD parliamentary group in the 
town of Bad Lahnstein. In order to put extra pressure on those participating, the starting date was 
October 1st and the end date October 4th, leaving the negotiators only three full days to find the 
contours of an agreement (Interview former SPD MP, 24.01.06). During the Lahnstein talks, 
Seehofer’s initial concept was complemented by new elements, such as the organizational reform 
of sickness funds leading to a risk compensation scheme (Risikostrukturausgleich). This occurred 
by way of a compromise with the SPD’s negotiation leader and vice-chairman of the parliamentary 
party, Rudolf Dressler. While Seehofer had tried to involve interest groups in the main round of 
the negotiations, the SPD had blocked this endeavour. As a consequence, Seehofer only met with 
representatives of health care stakeholders before and during breaks between the main negotiation 
rounds (Perschke-Hartmann 1994: 260). At the end of the Lahnstein talks, both parties presented 
core points for the reform, and continued to discuss remaining contentious points, in a meeting 
with the personal participation of the Minister. In this fashion, a new draft bill was produced and 
presented to the Bundestag in November, where the parliamentary proceedings went relatively 
smoothly.263 With regard to the public expert hearings in parliament, the view of the 
pharmaceutical industry was exemplary for the way the Ministry dealt with interest groups in this 
process. Hardly any viewpoints suggested in the hearings, either by themselves, or by physicians 
or pharmacists, entered the draft bill, which, according to these groups, questioned the value of 
such hearings (Interview VfA representative, 15.11.05). Indeed, the public hearings in the 
Bundestag of experts and interest groups brought few changes to the draft bill (Pierson 1994: 27 ). 
All in all, the GSG was concluded with great speed, as Table 7.1 illustrates: 
                                                           
 
 
 
263 The Bundestag committee advice was announced by the Health Committee, overruling some doubts of the Legal 
Committee on the lawfulness of limitations on doctors’ registration procedures and making only minimal amendments to 
the draft (Perschke-Hartmann 1994: 259). 
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Date  Event  
 
June 2, 1992 Announcement results from Ministry talks  
July 14 Ministry draft bill 
August 12 Cabinet decision on bill 
1st week of October Lahnstein talks with SPD  
November 5  New draft bill in BT  
December 9 2nd reading bill in BT and adoption 
December 18 BR approves bill 
January 1, 1993 GSG comes into effect 
 
 Table 7.1: Chronology of the GSG (BT= Bundestag, BR= Bundesrat) 
 
 
The Politics of the GSG   
 
Prior to evaluating the character of the GSG, I will identify and discuss the different factors that 
aided its adoption. Thereafter, I turn to the role of Minister Seehofer to illustrate how he operated 
in this process and to what extent his behaviour confirms his choice as presumed ideational leader. 
The literature describes the process leading up to the GSG as well as the outcome as exceptional 
compared to earlier reforms (cf. Pierson 1996; Pierson 2000; Bonoli and Palier 2000a). The GSG 
has been associated with ‘a break from the politics of inclusion’, referring to the successful 
strategy of excluding health care stakeholders from the process of policy formulation (Giaimo 
2002: 111 ff.). Furthermore, it has been described as effecting a re-direction of policy 
(Weichenstellung), although this did not mean the end of reforms in the health care sector (Reiners 
1993: 43). If one recognizes that the GSG indeed broke away from the past in many respects, it is 
instructive to investigate the reasons for this. The secondary literature on the GSG, as well as 
evidence from my own interviews, suggests three factors.  
First of all, the extra-parliamentary agreement between the coalition and the SPD is considered, in 
most of the literature and by the majority of interviewees, to be the main reason why the GSG 
could eventually succeed. Although the pact between the two sides was officially justified by the 
need to muster a Länder majority in the Bundesrat, there was also another reason, as Perschke-
Hartmann (1994) has noted. The cross-party agreement offered a unique possibility for balancing 
contrary positions: measures for the organizational reform of sickness funds could be adopted - 
thanks to SPD backing - across coalitional party lines. As a SPD participant of the Lahnstein talks 
confirmed, Seehofer knew that he needed to get the SPD-led Länder on board in order to secure 
both agreement in the Bundesrat, and to convince the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentary parties to 
participate (Interview former SPD MP, 24.01.06). As a matter of fact, Seehofer himself took the 
opportunity to invite the opposition to join in consensus talks with the coalition, referring also to 
earlier pacts:  
 
Ladies and Gentlemen, since we need approval for this law, and since we are dealing with a complex and 
serious issue matter, I would like to invite the SPD and the Länder – on behalf of the coalition. I also ask you 
not to misinterpret this offer. Neither are there coalition-specific tactical motivations behind it nor do we have 
the intention of pitting partners against each other. I think if one needs approval, it is wise to seek talks as 
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early as possible, but not only because of the need for approval. Since other reforms (labour promotion 
statute, pension reform and extension of pensions to the new Länder) have been concluded in a cross-party 
agreement, it would be good if we could replicate this in the difficult area of health care and statutory health 
care insurance. I invite everyone involved to do so.264   
 
Cross-party cooperation also gave the Minister a strong instrument against interest group protest, 
especially with a view to the fierce resistance of doctors and dentists. Seehofer could, in the face of 
their demands to change the reform concept, refer to even more radical SPD concepts concerning 
measures for care providers (Webber 1989). From the Ministry’s perspective, the overall criticism 
of interest groups could be borne much more easily, as a result of the cross-party agreement, than 
without it (Interview BMG official, 27.01.06). In theoretical terms, this factor can be seen as a 
consequence of Seehofer’s willingness to engage in consensus-building efforts with a view to 
bringing his reform plans to a successful conclusion: this is one aspect of IL which justifies 
Seehofer’s selection as presumed ideational leader. I will return to this in the context of the 
Minister’s political style and personal characteristics in Section 7.4.1.2.  
The GSG also owed its adoption to a new approach in the Ministry’s dealings with health 
care stakeholders (apart from the possibilities offered by cross-party cooperation just mentioned), 
coupled with certain procedural choices. In fact, the reform broke with a tradition of dealing with 
interest groups that dated back to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (Interview policy analyst 
10.11.05). From Seehofer’s perspective, this change of approach was absolutely vital in avoiding 
the mistakes made in previous reform processes, as can be seen from the experience of his 
predecessor Blüm in working out the 1988 GRG (Schmidt 2002b). That reform had seriously been 
watered down in the process, because the Ministry allowed interest groups to influence crucially 
both the concept and the process of implementation. In the run-up to the GSG, however, Seehofer 
distanced himself from interest groups, especially towards doctors and dentists’ associations, 
allowing them at best a role on the side-lines. Now, with the cross-party agreement in place, the 
traditional representative of the professions, the FDP, had been forced into the defensive, which 
meant that this channel of influence was effectively blocked for interest groups. Traditionally 
voicing the interests of the self-employed and the professions, FDP parliamentarians had openly 
been referred to as the ‘forty-six helpers in times of need’ by physicians (Interview DKG 
representative 22.11.05). In 1992, the situation had changed, as the former KBV chair phrased it: 
‘Reform critics thus had no partner left in the political arena, not even the FDP. We were 
powerless; no longer having political allies’ (Interview former KBV chair 16.11.05). The 
pharmaceutical industry also found itself in a defensive position. More specifically, at the time it 
was portrayed as the perfect “cash cow”, while its influence on health policy formulation tended to 
be grossly overstated (Interview VfA representative 15.11.05). Finally, the dealings of Seehofer 
with the German Hospital Association (DKG) were symptomatic of the new approach towards 
interest groups. At a biannual meeting of the advisory group ‘Konzertierte Aktion für das 
Gesundheitswesen’, he took the opportunity to criticise the DKG heavily for the extreme 
expenditure growth of its members (Interview DKG representative, 22.11.05). Furthermore, this 
new approach also meant a new form of negotiation with interest groups, as the room for 
negotiation was now defined by the government unilaterally and not by both sides together, as had 
previously been the case (Ross 2000b: 263).  
                                                           
 
 
 
264 Speech of Minister Seehofer to parliament at the first reading of the GSG, Bundestag plenary protocol 12/105, 11.09.92, 
p.8995  
  
Chapter 7  
 176 
In addition, besides distancing from interest groups and closing off their lobbying efforts, 
some procedural factors helped Seehofer to achieve a breakthrough: among them were the choice 
for a rapid drafting of the bill, and the choice to enter into extra-parliamentary negotiations with 
the SPD, even though the legislative process had already started. After July 1992, when 
parliamentary proceedings and parallel negotiations with the opposition were taking place, interest 
groups found it hard to follow the details under discussion and also to intervene. Possibly, this 
parallel process was even set up intentionally to confuse and keep health care stakeholders at bay 
(Reiners 1993:26). With regard to the course and the openness of the reform process, it seemed 
that policy-makers were anxious to avoid all errors committed during the reform process of the 
GRG. When interpreted in this manner, a different course of action, based on learning processes, 
contributed to the conclusion of the GSG. 
Furthermore, an increase in pressures stemming from financial and economic problems 
certainly contributed to the conclusion of the reform. The main sources of this pressure were, 
firstly, an increasing political intolerance to rising contribution rates, which, in turn, increased 
non-wage labour costs with adverse effects for the competitiveness of business and the economy 
as a whole. Secondly, the financial burdens of reunification and the effects of competition 
expected after the finalization of the Single Market within the EU, exacerbated fears of an 
economic downturn. Finally, there were spill-over effects from other policy areas: the threat of 
increasing contribution rates for pensions would bring extra burdens on pensioners (and was 
considered an electoral risk), and an additional increase in health contributions was seen as 
unacceptable (Giaimo 2002: 111). While these developments worried policy-makers, on the other 
hand, they strengthened the political determination of the partners in the informal coalition, 
decreasing their sensitivity to interest groups’ demands and their readiness to make substantive 
concessions (Perschke-Hartmann 1994: 261-262). In addition, and turning to the reasons for 
including organizational aspects of sickness funds in the GSG, Seehofer knew of the urgent need 
to reform the sickness fund sector. At the time, it included over 1200 individual funds with 
sometimes considerable differences (up to 10 percent) in contribution rates (Interview former SPD 
MP, 24.01.06). This fragmentation created an overhead of administrative costs and implied 
substantial inequalities for the insured.  
The fact that pressure was mounting from different sources, provided a motive sufficient to 
begin without delay the drafting of a reform bill (Interviews policy analysts 10.11.05 and 
11.11.05). In addition, from the Minister’s perspective, the fact that the political success of 
Ministers of Health is linked to their ability to stabilize contribution rates was also a crucial 
incentive to act (Interview BMG official, 27.01.06). This view was reinforced by Seehofer himself 
who, on different occasions, took the opportunity of presenting several indicators of economic and 
financial pressure as sufficient motivation to tackle reforms immediately.  
 
The situation is not only serious. I say this deliberately: the situation is dramatic. We booked a deficit of 5.5 
billion Marks in 1991 and this year we expect a deficit of at least 10 billion Marks. The expenditure rises 
which were 10 per cent in 1991 and twice as high as the rises in contributions, have been gaining momentum 
in the first quarter of 1992 (…) Ladies and gentlemen, this is a dramatic situation. Not to engage with it and 
failing to act would be simply irresponsible.265   
 
Record-breaking contribution rates in the old Länder, record-breaking deficits in the history of social 
insurance in the health care sector and deficits in the new Länder – there can only be one answer to this: we 
                                                           
 
 
 
265 Speech of Minister Seehofer at a debate on health care policy, Bundestag plenary protocol 12/98, 24.06.92, p. 8125  
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cannot allow this to continue. In this situation we do not need red cards, colourful posters or noisy 
conferences. What we need is the willingness to act. This coalition has the courage to do so. 266  
Seehofer’s personal concern about such pressures, which he saw as an incentive to improve on the 
status quo situation, may be interpreted as an indication of another aspect of IL, the concern with 
exposing policy failure. At the same time, the Minister never pleaded for the abolishment of the 
SHI, but rather for its adaptation, guarding the principle of solidarity but introducing a principle of 
contribution stability or expenditure-centred policy (assuming that SHI expenditures need to be 
covered by its income from contribution). This aspect will also be taken up in Section 7.4.1.2 
below. Finally, the fact that there had been a change at the top of the Ministry, leading to a change 
in political style, was a last but crucial factor in influencing the adoption of the GSG. As 
Seehofer’s role is of central concern to this chapter, it will be dealt with separately in the following 
sub-section. 
7.4.1.3 Seehofer’s Role in the GSG Process: A Minister ‘Taking on the Sharks’
267
 
Considering the different facets of Minister Seehofer’s role is not only of substantive interest (in 
order to evaluate the hypothesis on the link between IL and structural reforms), but it also serves to 
back up his selection as a presumed ideational leader. By distinguishing several aspects of the 
Minister’s conduct and personal qualities that together describe his role in the process, and by 
matching these, where possible, to the aspects of IL as they were used in previous case studies, it 
is possible to conduct an additional check as to whether Seehofer’s selection as ideational leader 
was justified.  
From the previous discussion, it followed that Seehofer contributed to each factor speeding 
up the reform process. In this sub-section, I will argue that at least two of the factors identified 
above were intertwined with his personal determination and commitment: the new approach 
towards interest groups and the cross-party agreement. That Seehofer was determined to shape the 
reform process in crucial ways did not only depend on his personal qualities, but was also due to a 
political learning process related to his previous experience as Parliamentary State Secretary of 
Minister Blüm (Interview policy analyst 11.11.05). Blüm had been notorious for his conflictive but 
permissive relationship with interest groups, which contributed to the failure of his proclaimed 
“reform of the century”, the 1988 GRG. Seehofer represented a break from his predecessor’s 
political style and practices, as he seemed determined at all costs to avoid a repetition of the errors 
made. At the first reading of the GSG in parliament, Seehofer referred to a remark of a physician 
representative, who had allegedly proclaimed ‘we physicians want our Norbert Blüm back’. By 
this, the Minister implied that from the perspective of physicians (who had just begun to protest 
against the GSG), Blüm, in retrospect, appeared to be the lesser of the two evils.268      
The first aspect of his role relates to how Seehofer dealt with interest groups. As one policy 
expert noted:  
 
Initially, I was surprised at how Seehofer freed himself from the pressure of interest groups. He literally stood 
there as a rock, presented his reform concept and made it clear that this reform was a task for the whole of 
society and especially those making money in the system.(...) For someone with a CSU background - who can 
be expected to be care provider-friendly - this was very remarkable (Interview health policy expert, 09.02.06). 
 
                                                           
 
 
 
266 Speech of Minister Seehofer at the first reading of the GSG, Bundestag plenary protocol 12/105, 11.09.92, p.8988 
267 Several observers have referred to the German health care sector and its stakeholders as a ‘pool of sharks’, which 
illustrates the usually uncomfortable task of Ministers who are responsible for this policy area.  
268 Speech of Minister Seehofer at the first reading of the GSG, Bundestag plenary protocol 12/105, 11.09.95, p. 8988.  
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Seehofer’s boldness in dealing with interest groups, and particularly with representatives of care 
providers, was both infamous and effective, as two examples will illustrate. Apparently, the 
Minister publicly stated that physicians had agreed to new budgeting rules while he had merely 
consulted a leading KBV representative on various options of implementing these budgets 
(Interview former KBV chair, 16.11.05). Another stakeholder,  the DKG, found itself confronted 
with Seehofer’s “carrot and stick” methods: they had the choice either to implement envisaged 
changes to hospital remuneration voluntarily, or their association would be converted into a body 
of public law, which would effectively oblige them to implement whatever the legislature required 
(Interview DKG representative, 22.11 05).  
One of Seehofer’s personal characteristics that became relevant in dealing with interest 
groups was that he never seemed to be afraid of confrontation but wanted it to be fair, observing 
rules of mutual respect and decency. He ‘kept appearing at events of interest groups, not shying 
away from confronting his critics’ (Interview policy analyst 11.11.05). For instance, when faced 
with a large dentists’ strike in the Rhineland region, the Minister was not impressed. Reportedly, 
his reaction was to turn up the pressure on care providers in order to save money: ‘I am going to 
make them all carry out their duties’. Exactly the same statement he had made shortly after his 
inauguration as Minister in June 1992, underlining his determination from the start.269 In addition, 
he was well informed about his opponents’ arguments and knew how to enter into a dialogue with 
those affected by the reform, so that they felt they were being taken seriously, even if Seehofer 
finally did not accept their arguments (Interview CDU/CSU parliamentary party employee 
23.01.06). From the opposition’s perspective, he ‘displayed a tendency towards populism that 
certainly earned him the admiration of journalists’ but, at the same time, ‘he possessed what 
politicians need and what earns them respect: competence and courage to confront political 
opponents’ (Interview former SPD MP, 23.01.06). Notwithstanding his sometimes confrontational 
style, ‘he kept justifying his plans, showing interest groups where their limits were, often under 
loud disapproval of those present’ (Interview policy analyst 23.11.05). That he had acquired the 
nickname “most-hated Minister” did not stop him from patiently making his case for the proposals 
over and over again. Furthermore, he resorted to the practice of “naming and shaming”: in reaction 
to the exaggerated campaigns of doctors and pharmacists against the GSG’s provisions, he urged 
health care stakeholders participating in the process to stick to the truth and to stop defaming 
political actors in the course of a democratic process of opinion-forming. He also reminded these 
actors of their special responsibility to those in need of medical attention:   
 
Notwithstanding the need to confront each other with arguments, and despite our ongoing dispute, which will 
continue in the weeks to come, I am calling upon doctors: beware of getting patients involved in the 
confrontation! (…) I want to appeal to your sense of responsibility. Think of the fears you are spreading 
amongst patients if you circulate such information [about supposed restrictions on necessary treatments due 
to the reform], despite knowing better or because of ignorance (Seehofer 09.12.92, p. 10947).270  
 
From the ways in which Seehofer approached lobbyists and health care stakeholders, we can  
 
 
 
                                                           
 
 
 
269 ‘Wir müssen härter rangehen’, SPIEGEL-interview with Minister Horst Seehofer, 03.08.1992, source: 
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/0,1518,380995,00.html  
270 Speech of Minister Seehofer at the final reading of the GSG, Bundestag plenary protocol 12/127, 09.12.92.  
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deduce both a determination to change the policy status quo, at least as far as the relationship with 
interest representative were concerned (IL aspect 1), and to deal with the resistance of reform 
opponents (IL aspect 3). 
The Minister combined this open but firm approach towards health care stakeholders with 
other personal qualities that were useful for keeping the reform out of trouble, and which 
underscored his ability to promote and legitimize reforms. His personal credentials include a 
reputation of expert knowledge coupled with self-confidence and an ability to persuade people and 
to create public acceptance for policy proposals. The mix of professional competence, charm and 
openness in dealing with interest groups contributed to his good reputation in health care circles, 
and helped him to continue working as social policy specialist for the CDU/CSU parliamentary 
party after leaving office in 1998 (Interview CDU/CSU parliamentary party employee 23.01.06). 
His professional competence also owed much to his closest aides in the Ministry, in particular 
those heading the relevant departments, who strongly supported him (Interview health policy 
expert, 09.02.06). Besides, this knowledge and competence surely helped the Minister in coming 
up with a coherent pattern of argumentation to legitimize the GSG, as is to be expected from a 
politician who exhibits IL. Seehofer indeed made clear the overall goal of the health care system, 
defined goals of the reform (and explained its connections with the contents of the reform), and 
explained why the reform was also acceptable in normative terms:  
 
I stick to my argument: we Germans can count on a qualitatively high-grade health care system; I even think 
the best one in the world (…) Ladies and gentlemen, I want to maintain the quality of our statutory health 
insurance and the health care sector for everyone. This is what this reform intends to do, by securing the 
functioning, the quality, and the financial sustainability of the SHI.271 
 
The Minister also argued that ‘it is possible to reduce an undesirable quantitative extension of 
health care provision, that is, inefficiencies in health care policy, without harming the necessary 
and high quality health care provision for German citizens’. In order to ensure the goal of 
maintaining high-quality health care, avoiding the future rationing of services, a necessary 
precondition was to make sure that ‘the SHI is also capable of financing the protection it promises 
to those it insures. This is why we do not take anything away from it, but secure the financial basis 
of the scheme. This is the underlying political goal’.272 In addition, this meant to tackle its 
underlying structures:  
 
Since in these days we see attempts to confuse parliamentarians on questions of detail in order to create 
confusion and insecurity, I would rather stress again the two main elements of the reform (…).  
Ladies and gentlemen, it is now of utmost importance that politicians find the strength not only to stop 
expenditure rises but also to change structures. Politicians must go directly to the root of the problems.273   
 
As for the first cornerstone of the GSG, immediate curbs on expenditure rises in order to stop 
contribution rates increasing even further, Seehofer made a threefold argument against 
contribution rises, labelling them as ‘wrong in terms of health policy’ (inviting inefficiency and 
wastefulness), ‘economically dangerous’ (raising non-wage labour costs and endangering jobs) 
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and ‘socially unjust’ (burdening contribution payers).274 By adding this last aspect, Seehofer also 
linked normative considerations to the goal of achieving immediate savings, which he explained as 
follows:  
 
I consider a health care system as unjust if we, on the one hand, spend billions on inefficiencies and an 
undesirable quantitative expansion of health care services, and on the other hand lack the necessary funds for 
great social policy challenges. I think politicians have an ethical obligation to redirect funds from the sources 
of wastefulness towards other tasks, where these funds are necessary for people in need, e.g. those dependent 
on long-term care.275   
 
Another important normative argument in justifying the shape of the final reform concerned the 
just sharing of burdens implied by the reform:  
 
I think that in the present political situation we have a common political obligation (extending beyond the 
SHI), to do our best to share as far as possible the burdens of unavoidable savings programmes. I think we 
have succeeded here in doing so, as care providers bear three quarters and patients and insured one quarter of 
the savings.276      
 
In short, this selection from Seehofer’s argumentation in favour of the GSG makes it clear that he 
was able to come up with a discourse explaining why the reform was necessary, and to what extent 
it was also acceptable in normative terms. In this sense, this facet of his role in the process, based 
on personal competence and knowledge, may be related to the second aspect of IL.   
With respect to the gathering of necessary support for his reform proposal, another personal 
quality became important: Seehofer surely had the ability to perceive and exploit chances that 
were presented along the way. Although being faced with substantial pressure, he knew how to 
capitalize on it, which eventually enabled him to open up a window of opportunity, namely 
embarking on the course of reform with the opposition on board. One interviewee put it this way: 
  
 
He had the ability to sense what had to be done in the SHI and took up proposals from critically thinking 
institutions, which was a courageous step forward. Then, he succeeded in convincing people that these 
proposals were correct in the sense of improving the sustainability and future position of the SHI (Interview 
health policy expert, 09.02.06). 
 
Most importantly, it was his recognizing the chances for concluding a cross-party agreement that 
made him approach the SPD, and in SPD social policy expert Rudolf Dressler he found a like-
minded partner: ‘Seehofer knew how to keep party-political divisions open for consensus in 
negotiations - given the background scenario of increasing contributions - and keep them 
committed to common problem-solving, the task at hand’ (Perschke-Hartmann: 264). In the pre-
Lahnstein situation, both Seehofer and Dressler capitalized on the constructive political climate, 
making use of the power of persuasion (associated with professional competence), and the good 
chemistry between them as chief negotiators. More generally, the role of a Minister in achieving 
such a cross-party consensus is a crucial one, and such consensus is only possible with a Minister 
who succeeds in selling one’s policy (or reform proposal) politically, which was obviously true in 
Seehofer’s case (Interview BMG official, 27.01.06). This was confirmed by a source, who argued 
that ‘the chief negotiators treated each other with personal respect and knew each other’s limits in 
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terms of negotiating positions’ (Interview CDU/CSU parliamentary party official, 23.01.06). 
Reflecting on the results of the strategy, he chose to reach a cross-party agreement and a 
compromise was reached, which Seehofer characterised as follows:  
 
We as policy-makers have, with this reform, taken up and used a unique chance in the last weeks and months 
(…). Against all claims to the contrary, this compromise has not yielded a minimal solution, but in my 
opinion, an optimal one (…). There has been a fair balancing of interests between four parties with each one 
giving and taking (…). I have experienced the talks and have tried to contribute as a broker to this 
compromise, so that everyone could return to their clientele, looking them straight in the eye.277   
 
Apart from the value of the compromise in terms of settling the details of reform, he saw its 
greatest benefit in more abstract terms, since it ‘demonstrates the capacity of parliamentary 
democracy to act, which, in turn, increases public confidence in the system’.278 This last aspect of 
Seehofer’s role in the reform process, his capacity to take chances in order to gather reform 
support is reminiscent of the fourth aspect of IL, which is concerned with politicians who make 
efforts to build consensus for reform.  
To sum up, this sub-section has presented several facets of the Minister’s way of acting and 
further explained his role in the GSG reform process. Specifically, I have looked at his particular 
way of dealing with interest groups, influenced by political learning and informed by his 
characteristic of engaging in tough but fair debate with critics; his other qualities such as self-
assurance and professional competence that fed into his ability to promote and legitimize reforms; 
and his capacity to create and take chances in order to gather necessary support. I have argued that 
each of these (behavioural or personal) facets can be re-interpreted as aspects of IL, as formulated 
in my theoretical framework. With the exception of aspect 5 (policy-orientation), which has 
proven difficult to demonstrate, all other aspects of IL (turning away from the status quo, 
legitimizing new policy, engaging with reform critics, efforts at consensus-building) were shown 
as elements of Seehofer’s behaviour. On this basis, it seems plausible that Seehofer conformed, in 
the GSG reform process, substantively to the criteria of the IL framework.  
7.4.1.4 Was the GSG a Structural Reform?  
The analysis so far has established that the role played by Minister Seehofer was crucial in the 
realization of the GSG. Since the central question in this case study is whether a presumed 
ideational leader also achieved structural reforms, it needs to be established whether the GSG was 
structural. My approach will be to review the stance of various authors on this question and then 
ask, applying my own criteria for structural reform, whether the provisions of the GSG induced 
shifts in the three dimensions of the policy structure (financing, care provision and regulation). As 
observed above, the GSG introduced a mix of budgeting instruments, particularly aimed at care 
providers; an organizational reform of sickness funds concerning whom they could insure 
(freedom of choice for patients regardless of their occupational status); and a redistributive 
financial risk-adjustment scheme. To what extent were these changes structural shifts?  
Regarding judgements of the GSG in the health care policy literature, it appears that authors 
do not exactly agree on its significance. Brandhorst (2003: 212), for instance, notes a 
‘paradigmatic change’ from corporative coordination to a different system of incentives, in which 
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actors adapt their behaviour, on the basis of their own financial interests, to the goals of limiting 
both expenditure and the quantity of care services.279 Likewise, and taking a long-term 
perspective, Rosenbrock and Gerlinger (2004:249) state that the GSG ‘marked the beginning of a 
process of drastic change, which the legislature continued to pursue with the ‘third stage’ of health 
care reform and the 2000 SHI reform, and which continues to characterize health care policy at the 
beginning of the 21st century’.280 In contrast, some locate the GSG somewhere between a 
paradigmatic change and an adjustment of existing policy instruments: ‘the GSG does not 
represent a fundamental paradigmatic change, but it extends the instruments of the cost 
containment strategy […] In addition, the GSG contained various elements, which were more 
aimed at efficiency and competition in the health sector’ (Luke 2000: 5). Others argue that against 
a background of two decades of incremental reform, the GSG ‘stands out as exceptional’, 
introducing ‘a multiplicity of structural reforms to the health sector’(Blondel 1987: 977).281 
Finally, the GSG has been characterized as an ‘emergency brake operation to control the hike of 
health expenditure’ but also as symptomatic for a ‘reorientation of health care policy, which 
almost “imperatively” brings about more far-reaching steps of reform’ (Schmidt 2002b: 132-
133).282 These judgements confirm that the GSG was an outstanding reform in the context of the 
early 1990s, i.e. compared to the immediate past, although they differ on exactly how far-ranging 
and significant the reform was.283 While indicating that it went beyond an incremental reform, it 
still needs to pass the test of a structural reform according to the criteria of this project, to which I 
now turn.  
Beginning with the financing structure, the GSG introduced measures which affected, but did 
not change this aspect of the system. The increase in patients’ co-payments can be seen as a slight 
shift from contribution financing to private financing of care and service provision, but, 
importantly, it did not change its contribution-centeredness: on the whole, the financing structure 
of the system thus remained untouched. With regard to the structure of care provision, the 
diagnosis is similar: the extensive introduction of budgeting did create new rules which care 
                                                           
 
 
 
279 For Brandhorst, this is visible in the end of state-regulated sickness fund membership; the risk-adjustment mechanism 
for avoiding competition about healthy and wealthy members; the change of the compensatory system in the hospital sector 
(more competitiveness through a prospective budgeting system; and linking doctors’ and hospital remunerations and 
expenditures for medicine to the development of wages for 3 years). 
280 Furthermore, the authors stress that the particular contribution of the GSG was to introduce a number of steering 
mechanisms, which durably changed actors’ incentive structures, for instance, by allowing competition between sickness 
funds and the introduction of lump-sum payments or individual budgets for care providers.  
281 Without defining structural reforms in detail, Giaimo and Manow noted changes in the financing mode of hospitals; the 
sickness fund risk-adjustment and free choice of sickness fund; the ceilings on care provision expenditure; and restrictions 
on doctors to set up practices. 
282 Hinrichs argued that the cost-containment measures allowed time for the preparation of further reforms, while the 
organisational reforms concerning sickness funds already established some prerequisites for a structural reform, which 
could also question established principles. 
283 The conversations with experts and other close observers of health care policy revealed that 13 years after the adoption 
of the GSG, opinions on the GSG are (still) divided: some of them point to the short-lived character of some of its 
provisions and the abandonment of others (Interview policy analyst, 10.11.05). Others still see it as ‘paradigmatic’ 
(Interview policy analyst 23.11.05), and ‘a structural reform to a certain extent’ (Interview policy analyst 11.11.05) while 
other close observers rather think that it was a reform that defined a direction for further structural reform. However, at the 
time of its adoption, and with a partially failed reform predecessor, the GSG must have appeared more spectacular than we 
can grasp today. Another observation from the conversations was how little overall agreement exists on the definition of 
the term ‘structure’ in the field of health care. Interest group representatives tend to define structure somewhat narrower, 
i.e. regarding the institutions applying to their own clientele (Interviews DKG representative 22.11.05 and former KBV 
chair 16.11.05) than the wider definition adopted and used in this study, which covers the three main dimensions of a 
policy area.  
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providers had to respect, but they did not change the existing division of work between the 
different care providers in the ambulant or the stationary (hospital) sector.  
By contrast, the regulation structure of the sector did undergo notable change through the 
organizational reform of sickness funds. Sickness funds form an intermediary between the 
regulating state and the care providers in a more narrow sense: in their role as insurers they 
receive, administer and spend insurance contributions for the services of care providers, on behalf 
of patients. The introduction of freedom of choice between sickness funds for the insured aimed to 
make funds on the whole more competitive, and the financial risk-adjustment scheme was 
designed to put them on a fair financial base. This meant a huge shift from a strictly state-regulated 
and fragmented system towards a more market-like constellation.284 In addition, the regulation 
structure saw another, although temporary, shift from self-governance to state regulation. Self-
governance of care providers was infringed upon by the Ministry’s introduction of budgets and, in 
the case of pharmaceuticals, a price stop. The latter two measures managed to rein in price rises 
and, in the case of the pharmaceutical industry, caused double-digit losses in turnover (Interview 
VfA representative 15.11.05). More specifically, the state as part of the management structure 
made use of its competence to rule by decree, in case self-governing bodies failed to carry out their 
work, which was the case in the wake of GRG (Giaimo 2002: 114).  
To conclude, to what extent was the GSG a structural reform? It was structural as far as the 
regulation structure was concerned, but it did not transform the sector’s finance and care provision 
structures. By changing the role of the state and the organization of sickness funds, the regulation 
of health care was notably affected by the provisions: through the GSG, the state, on the one hand, 
reaffirmed and strengthened its regulatory role, even though some elements, such as the budgets, 
were only meant to be a temporary step; on the other hand, it introduced market-oriented elements, 
i.e. the patients’ right to choose sickness funds freely, and therefore competition between funds. 
While finance and care provision structures were hardly affected, there was a strengthening of the 
state in regulatory matters and a greater role for the market, through the introduction of 
competition between funds. The latter was the actual innovation of this reform, which was 
successfully adopted under Seehofer’s auspices.  
 
7.4.2 The 1997 Health Care Reorganization Acts (1. /2. GKV-NOG)
 285
 
7.4.2.1 Reform Goals and Measures  
In 1995, Seehofer and his Ministry initiated consensus talks involving the ‘essential partners in the 
health care system’ to draw up legislation to develop a ‘concept for a quality-oriented and 
financially viable future of our health care system that one can consent to in its essential elements’. 
With regard to the instruments needed to achieve this, an internal CDU/CSU memorandum 
stressed in March 1995 that ‘taking out services, increasing co-payments or improving the 
financing base of the SHI are not the main focus of the health care reform’, but rather ‘creating 
new structures which enable self-governing bodies to confront flexibly the dynamics of the health 
                                                           
 
 
 
284 The conscious choice for more competition in this part of the health care system was also characterized by some 
respondents as a clear structural change (Interviews sickness fund analyst, 22.11.05, and policy analyst 23.11.05).  
285 Since the laws discussed in this sub-section are strongly connected in terms of their goals and content, the discussion of 
the reform processes and politics will be combined. Note that the NOG laws will be treated in more detail than its 
predecessor, the Contribution Relief Act, which merely serves to illustrate the origins of the NOG laws and the conflictive 
character of policy-making at the time.   
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care system’.286 However, the plan to reform self-governance without putting new burdens on 
patients did not materialize, and by the end of 1996, the government’s turnaround on equal 
burden-sharing would be complete. In a message to CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians, it was 
argued that  
 
The opposition parties (SPD and B90/The Greens) want to abolish co-payments: this is a populist proposal 
that would lead to the financial collapse of the SHI; [on the contrary] we need to strengthen the self-
responsibility of individuals, co-payments are an indispensable component of finance health care services.287  
 
By the spring of 1996, the Ministry of Health had prepared an emergency law, signalling the end 
of equal burden sharing. The rationale for this so-called Contribution Relief Act 
(Beitragsentlastungsgesetz) was that ‘unemployment has reached a level that threatens the 
economic base of the welfare state’; ‘the level of taxes and non-wage labour costs’ was identified 
as the main culprit.288 Its measures were clearly designed to contain costs in the short term and 
included:  a forced reduction in statutory health insurance contributions; creating more space in 
hospitals by applying long-term care provisions; considerable increases of co-payments for 
medication; abolishment of sickness fund subsidies for glasses frames and dental replacements; a 
reduction of statutory sickness pay by 10 percent and the reduction of funding for sickness 
prevention. The aim of these measures was to keep contribution rates stable in the year 1996 and 
reduce them by 0.4 percent in January 1997, which would amount to lowering the average rate 
from 13.4 to 13.0 percent.289  
At the same time as the Contribution Relief Act was drawn up, the coalition had launched two 
other bills in its further pursuit of the ‘third step’ of health care reform, the so-called GKV-WEG 
(Weiterentwicklungsgesetz) and a reform of hospital financing (Krankenhausfinanzierungsreform). 
Both laws needed Bundesrat approval, but had been rejected on 12 September 1996. After that 
date, Seehofer invited delegates of the SPD and Greens parliamentary parties and the SPD-led 
Länder (essentially following the approach taken at Lahnstein in 1992) to explore whether there 
were possibilities for a renewed cross-party agreement. However, it soon became clear that this 
was out of the question. The SPD’s Rudolf Dressler defended - in retrospect - the party’s 
unwillingness to cooperate:  
 
The offer of the government and the coalition to our party faction implied that we lend our support to the anti-
social elements of the legislation which will be voted upon today. That is legitimate. But […] it is equally 
legitimate for us to decline this offer categorically.290 
 
Since the opposition refused to cooperate, work on the GKV-WEG was terminated, and the 
government had to choose another course of action, which eventually led to the proposal of, as an 
alternative, the two SHI Reorganisation Acts or NOGs (Interview BMG official, 27.01.06). In 
 
                                                           
 
 
 
286 ‘Lohmann: Keine Leistungsausgrenzungen’, CDU/CSU-Fraktion Pressedienst, 3.3.95 
287 ‘Neuauflage der 3. Stufe der Gesundheitsreform – Erstes und Zweites GKV-Neuordnungsgesetz’, letter by MP 
Wolfgang Lohmann to the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentary parties 28.11.96.  
288 The Contribution Relief Act was embedded in the governments comprehensive ‘Growth and Employment Programme’, 
which also included measures in pension and unemployment policy, sought to consolidate social insurance budgets and 
reduce the total level of social contributions.  
289, Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und FDP, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Entlastung der Beiträge in der 
gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung (Beitragsentlastungsgesetz – BeitrEntlG), Bundestag DS 13/4615, 10.05.96 
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October 1996, a bill for the first NOG was presented with its overarching goals of reducing 
unemployment and ensuring the competitiveness of Germany’s economy:  keeping contribution 
rates stable should both help to control non-wage labour costs and ensure the competitiveness of 
German business. Remarkably, only months after the Contribution Relief Act had been presented 
in Parliament, the drafters of the NOGs had to admit that that Act would not succeed in reducing 
contribution rates by 0.4 percent as of January 1997. Additional measures were deemed necessary 
in order to strengthen the financial responsibility of sickness funds and make contribution hikes 
more difficult. As a result, the first NOG included instruments that would make contribution rate 
increases more difficult by linking them to automatic increases of patients’co-payments, and it 
introduced the possibility for patients to switch between sickness funds, in the case of contribution 
rate rises. It also announced measures that would ‘strengthen the self-responsibility of patients, 
improve possibilities for self-administration bodies to regulate matters, and increase financial 
responsibility of sickness funds’. The character of the bill was urgent, as it stressed the ‘need for 
short-term implementation of measures, as otherwise, sickness funds would not be able to 
implement them effectively before 1997’.291  
Its complement, the second NOG of November 1996, contained measures that were to make 
‘self-governance bodies take responsibility, both carefully and cost-consciously, for handling 
health care contributions.292 Its aims were to be reached through the following measures: 
strengthening the rights of insured; giving new possibilities to self-governance for dealing with 
providers; incorporating the hospital sector in financial stability provisions; financing hospital 
maintenance with support by patients’ co-payments; and new regulations regarding the provision 
of dental replacements, including fixed subsidies instead of subsidies based on a certain percentage 
of the total costs.293 Both drafts triggered fierce political and public discussion about the 
desirability of their provisions. In particular, there were two contentious issues. Firstly, the 
limitation put on sickness funds to raise contribution rates (linked to rising co-payments for the 
insured), and its consequences for ensuring adequate care and services for patients. Secondly, it 
was feared that giving sickness funds more possibilities for redesigning individual contracts would 
enable them in the long run to exclude certain types of services from the benefit catalogue, and 
encourage selection of the insured on the basis of expected risks. In response to the debate on both 
issues, even the Health Ministry realised it was necessary to communicate the need for these 
measures to coalition parliamentarians, providing them with arguments for justification of the 
reform in their constituencies.294  
7.4.2.2 The Reform Process  
In order to keep the overview of these long-drawn processes brief, the key dates of the legislative 
                                                           
 
 
 
291 Bundestag DS 13/5724 8.10.1996, Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und FDP, Entwurf eines Ersten 
Gesetzes zur Neuordnung von Selbstverwaltung und Eigenverantwortung in der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung 
(1.GKV-Neuordnungsgesetz – 1.NOG) 
292 ibid. In particular, the hospital sector and dentists were singled out as being responsible for rising costs. In the former, 
rising costs were to be expected after the termination of cost-stabilising budgets in 1996, and due to expected major 
investment expenditures after a ruling by the Federal Administrative Court. The dental sector, for its part, gave reason to 
worry because it failed to promote preventive measures in place of dental replacements and since subsidy regulations gave 
incentives to dentists to provide comprehensive and costly dental care services. 
293 Bundesrat DS 822/96 8.11.96, Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Zweiten Gesetzes zur Neuordnung 
von Selbstverwaltung und Eigenverantwortung in der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung (2. GKV-Neuordnungsgesetz – 2. 
GKV-NOG) 
294 Letter of Parliamentary State Secretary Bergmann-Pohl to the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentary parties, 14.11.96 
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processes are summarized in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 below. 
 
Date  
 
Event  
24 May, 1996 1st reading in BT 
28 June 2nd/3rd reading in BT, adoption with amendments 
19 July Rejection by BR 
26 August Compromise decision reconciliation committee 
29 August BT rejects compromise decision 
12 September BR vetoes rejection 
13 September BT overrules veto by absolute majority vote 
1 January, 1997 Contribution Relief Act comes into effect 
 
Table 7.2: Summary of the legislative process of the Contribution Relief Act of 1996 (BT = Bundestag; BR 
= Bundesrat) 
 
 
 
                    1. GKV-NOG 
 
               2. GKV-NOG 
Date Event Date Event 
 
10 October, 1996 1st reading BT 15 November, 
1996 
1st reading BT 
15 November 2nd/3rd reading and 
adoption by BT  
19 November BR rejects bill 
19 December BR rejects bill 20 March, 1997 2nd/3rd reading BT and 
adoption 
12 March, 1997 Compromise 
decision 
reconciliation 
committee 
25 April BR rejects bill for the 2nd time 
20 March BT rejects 
committee decision 
14 May Recommendation Mediation 
Committee 
25 April BR vetoes rejection 15 May BT rejects committee decision 
+ reaffirms adoption of the 
bill; BR restates veto 
12 June BT overrules veto 
(absolute majority) 
12 June BT rejects veto 
1 July 1.GKV-NOG comes 
into effect 
1 July/1 January 
1998 
2. GKV-NOG comes stepwise 
into effect 
 
 Table 7.3: Summary of events in the legislative process of the two GKV-NOGs (BT = Bundestag; BR = 
Bundesrat) 
 
 
All three processes were overshadowed by an antagonistic attitude between the two chambers of 
parliament, which used both their constitutional powers to either push through (Bundestag) or 
block (Bundesrat) the respective pieces of legislation. At the time, the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition 
had a slight majority in the Bundestag, while the Bundesrat was dominated by the SPD-governed 
Länder. What triggered this institutional conflict will be discussed further on in the section. 
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The Politics of the GKV-NOG Laws   
 
In the eyes of one close observer, the NOGs represented ‘a huge step backward’ and a ‘failure in 
health care policy’ (Interview former SPD MP, 23.01.06). More precisely, they were perceived as 
a break from the consensus reached four years earlier at Lahnstein.295 The NOGs introduced 
measures to keep a lid on contribution rates and health care costs, especially regarding the 
employers’ share; they stood for a restoration of corporatist self-governance, as well as its 
extension to other sub-sectors; and they tightened the grip of the market by increasing patient cost-
sharing and extending market experiments (Giaimo 2002:124-126). As such, they reflected a 
thorough change in the approach of Seehofer and his Ministry to policy-making by 1996. In the 
following, I will highlight three factors that made the process leading up to the NOGs both drawn 
out and controversial, arguing that the factors that had expedited the adoption of the GSG were 
now largely absent. The ways in which Minister Seehofer impacted on the process will be 
considered in the next sub-section.  
To begin with, the chances of reaching another cross-party agreement between the coalition 
and the SPD in 1996/97 were bleak. For a host of reasons the political climate had changed, which 
made a similar agreement a remote possibility. First of all, the 1994 elections had produced a 
different power balance within the ruling CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. The FDP had gained 
parliamentary seats and had been revitalised vis-à-vis its larger coalition partner. It was determined 
to put a more neo-liberal stamp on policies than had been possible before, and it did not agree to 
more deals with the SPD over health care (Giaimo 2002: 129). Apparently, the memories of the 
treatment received in Lahnstein still had their impact. As one source recalled, ‘For the FDP, 
Lahnstein represented a Waterloo, which they never wanted to repeat. To speak with FDP MP 
Thomae: ‘There won’t be a second Lahnstein with us’ (Interview former SPD MP, 23.01.06). The 
new balance of power between the coalition parties once again favoured the physicians, as the 
Government pushed for more  “individual responsibility”, taking away the cost-saving pressure on 
providers. Equally, employers gained more influence in health policy matters in the process 
leading up to the NOGs, by fuelling the debate on mass unemployment and non-wage labour costs 
that influenced the CDU’s position. As a consequence, its business wing gained a greater say in 
social policy matters (Giaimo 2002: 128). In addition, the SPD was now led by Oskar Lafontaine 
who, in contrast to his predecessor Scharping, seemed determined to lead a strong course of 
opposition to the increasingly neo-liberal policy approach of the coalition, and effectively ruled 
out any cross-party agreements (Interview policy analyst, 10.11.05). Moreover, it has been argued 
that CDU and SPD followed, at least since 1995, two different approaches to health care policy 
(Brandhorst 2003: 213). The government now tried to avoid additional sacrifices by care providers 
(apart from the budgets), an approach fostered by the parties’ relationship with business and the 
professions, and its recognition of the importance of the health sector for the economy and labour 
market opportunities. Instead, the coalition advocated a greater responsibility for patients, giving 
them incentives to economize on health care services (“demand-centred steering”). The SPD, on 
the other hand, demanded more competition on the providers’ side. They believed that the demand 
for medical services depended upon how doctors prescribed treatments and services and on 
                                                           
 
 
 
295 In this respect, one symbolic act of this break was that Minister Seehofer handed the remainders of the ‘Positivliste’ (one 
of the measures of the GSG agreed upon with the SPD to contain the price of medication but never implemented) at a 
meeting with the chairman of the German pharmaceutical association as a birthday present. 
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whether it was in their financial interest to expand provision (“supply-induced demand”) (ibid: 
212-214). Moreover, in 1996/1997 the forthcoming federal elections of 1998 already cast their 
shadow. This meant that the measures taken in the NOGs reflected that the economic situation had 
to improve and that high non-wage labour costs needed to be dealt with quickly for electoral 
reasons.296  
In addition, procedural choices resulting from this increase in political antagonism 
contributed to the long-drawn out character of the process. As may be seen from Table 7.3 above, 
the legislative processes began in the fall of 1996 and took until the summer of 1997 to be 
completed. One reason for this was certainly the battle of the Bundesrat to assert its right of 
approval to the second NOG, an undertaking that eventually failed. The splitting of the draft bill 
into two parts was seen as an instrument for speeding up the legislative process (Interviews policy 
analysts 10.11.05 and 23.11.05). Other sources stressed that the splitting of the law may have been 
counterproductive, fuelling the opposition’s motivation to block the proposal.297 Once it had 
chosen this procedure, the Government could do little more than wait and see what the legislative 
process would produce (Interview sickness fund analyst, 22.11.05). Eventually, both NOGs would 
be adopted after making several concessions to those who had campaigned against them, including 
some CDU/CSU-governed Länder: sickness funds were not allowed to drop the so-called 
voluntary services from their benefit packages in case of financial problems, and the new co-
payment regulations included income-based ceilings for the chronically ill and socially weak.  
A second important factor concerned the qualitative change in the relationship between health 
policy-makers in the Government and interest groups. While this relationship had grown distant 
and was dominated by the Ministry at the time of the GSG, it now returned to the pre-1992 pattern. 
That pattern, which became most noticeable in the formulation and implementation of the 1988 
GRG, may be characterized as a give-and-take relationship between the Government and 
stakeholders, with the latter trying to avert any damage to the interests of their clientele (Interview 
policy analyst, 23.11.05). For instance, the representatives of the ambulant and stationary sectors, 
the KBV for physicians and the DKG for the hospital sector, were reported to have re-gained 
access to the policy formulation process. Seehofer allegedly sought the support of the DKG, with 
which he was involved in intensive discussions (Interview DKG representative 22.11.05). Equally, 
the KBV thought that the Minister was again trying to make policy “with” them, and not, as in 
Lahnstein, “against” them (Interview former KBV chair 16.11.05). Those broad consultations in 
the policy process, which included the KBV, secured preferential treatment for doctors in the 
reform’s provisions. Since 1995, the coalition had revived its motto ‘priority for self-governance’ 
(Vorfahrt für die Selbstverwaltung), which entailed a rapprochement with interest groups. As a 
result, expenditure ceilings on medication, medical services and doctors’ remunerations were 
partially reversed and partially reformed. Only the ceilings on expenditure in the hospital sector 
remained in force, while more steering competence was given to self-governance bodies, and the 
insured became the focus of health policy steering efforts. This new focus on patients evoked the 
anger of trade unions, sickness funds and the SPD opposition, all of whom campaigned against 
                                                           
 
 
 
296 In fact, the importance of this time-related factor was stressed by most interviewees: in a situation which resembled a 
de-facto election campaign, agreements with the opposition, which tried to sharpen its electoral profile, are hard to realize. 
The SPD actively campaigned against higher co-payments and other elements of the NOGs, which was, in retrospect, one 
of the main reasons why the CDU/FDP lost the 1998 elections (Interview former SPD MP, 24.01.06).  
297 Indeed, as one respondent reported, ‘the fact that Seehofer had several bills drawn up in order to circumvent Bundesrat 
approval, only led to conflicts about this matter (...) Personally, I was dismayed by the procedure chosen for the NOGs 
despite it being legitimate’ (Interview former SPD MP, 23.01.06).  
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higher burdens for patients, bringing the Ministry into an uncomfortable position.298 In the words 
of a Ministry source:   
 
There was a complete phalanx of resistance of relevant public bodies and organizations in the policy field 
against the governing coalition, which had to explain itself in parliament and create acceptance among the 
public. However, because the elections were fast approaching, the concept behind the reform could not be 
successfully explained (Interview with BMG official, 27.01.06).   
 
Not only had the political climate changed in 1996/1997, but also the challenges to be confronted 
were different, which gave rise to a third factor. In contrast to 1992, when the troubles of the 
health care sector dominated the concern of policy-makers, by the mid-1990’s, they began to 
realize how serious the general economic situation actually was: only then did the magnitude of 
the financial burden, as a result of German unification, become apparent. Finance Minister Waigel 
struggled to present proposals for viable public budgets, while European monetary integration was 
about to be concluded: the new Maastricht criteria on budget deficits and public debts would 
shortly take effect, posing additional restrictions on policy. In addition, the new EU requirements 
on public budgets were not often acknowledged publicly at the time, but only slowly found their 
way into politicians’ arguments for enacting austerity measures (Interview policy analyst, 
11.11.05). In this growing climate of austerity, the government decided to launch a comprehensive 
‘Programme for Growth and Stability’, which led to cost-saving efforts across all programmes of 
social insurance; health care would not be an exception. The cornerstone of this undertaking was 
containing the burden of social contributions, which were to be controlled at all costs. As a 
consequence, Minister Seehofer had little choice but to find ways of contributing to this austerity 
course in his own portfolio, even more so because many of the budget provisions of the GSG were 
about to expire and health care costs were expected to skyrocket again.  
7.4.2.3 Role of Minister Seehofer in the NOG Process  
 
There was no longer a strategy, it was all about muddling through: there was a lack of enthusiasm to shape 
changes (...). My impression was that during the years 1995-1997, a clear concept was lacking and policy-
making was merely reactive (...). To me, it seems that Seehofer gave away a lot of his achievements during 
his last two years in office (Interview health policy expert, 09.02.06). 
 
This citation summarizes aptly the disillusion felt by one observer of German health care politics 
when commenting on Seehofer’s later years. There were strong signs that the political fortunes of 
the Minister had reversed in 1996/97. As the previous sub-section showed, a change in political 
climate, rapprochement with the stakeholders of the health care sector (especially doctors, dentists 
and hospitals), and a reappearance of economic and financial pressure made policy-making (and 
thus the adoption of reforms) in this period more difficult. I will argue that these factors had 
negative repercussions on how much of a steering role Seehofer could play in the process. In terms 
of my research question, this reduction in the Minister’s political leeway lessened his chances to 
act as an ideational leader.  
                                                           
 
 
 
298 The SPD’s Dressler steadily maintained his opposition against the plans, labelling them as ‘a combination of a measure 
of punishment for the ill and a purposefully serving of some interests in the health care sector’. He also announced that the 
SPD would obstruct these intentions with the backing of a majority of patients, as well as the support of sickness funds and 
of many care providers (Speech of Rudolf Dressler, Bundestag plenary protocol 13/181, 12.06.97, p. 16258-16260).  
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To begin with, his determination to tackle health care reforms (‘changing the status quo’ in 
terms of IL) was still there, but the message he tried to promote was more difficult to sell. 
Seehofer had to show, once more, like in 1992, personal commitment to the goal of containing 
costs, but he added an additional focus: personal responsibility. The Minister justified the reform 
proposals by pointing to a number of challenges that impacted on the SHI and the sustainability of 
its financial base, including rising life expectancy, medical and medical-technical progress, and 
increased expectations towards the health care sector’s capabilities. The latter necessitated a higher 
degree of individual responsibility, which could be seen both as a change in attitude towards 
medical provision (concentrate on what is medically necessary, not on what is desirable), and as 
sharing more in the costs of the SHI (via co-payments or cost sharing).299 The fact that the 
Minister chose to take up this stance was linked to the realization that the health care sector was 
now seen as a potential generator of growth and employment, but whose potential to expand was 
limited by the principle of stable contribution rates. This stance was in turn influenced by a 
specially commissioned report of the health expert advisory council (Sachverständigenrat zur 
Begutachtung der Entwicklung im Gesundheitswesen) presented in 1997.300 As a consequence, 
policy-makers decided that care providers could no longer be burdened with additional cost 
savings (Interview CDU/CSU parliamentary party employee, 12.01.06). Instead, this time around 
it was the patients and the insured that were to provide an additional financial contribution to the 
sector by higher co-payments for medication and services.301 This new approach was reinforced by 
a FDP-borne focus on strengthening the personal responsibility of patients, leading to the 
privatization of parts of the SHI provisions and allowing sickness funds to introduce elements of 
private health insurance in their insurance contracts (in the second NOG) to add an equivalent for 
the missing price mechanism. 302 Furthermore, co-payments were extended (through periodic 
increases), and the provision of dental protheses for those insured and under 18 years of age was 
privatized.  
Although Seehofer tried to come up with a discourse legitimizing the NOG laws, his ability to 
promote and legitimise the change in policy focus ran into obstacles that had not been there in 
1992. This was possibly due to the fact that the NOGs clearly produced new burdens for patients, 
while leaving other stakeholders in relative peace. Undoubtedly, the Minister again used his 
rhetorical abilities to explain and justify the measures in the NOGs, both to political opponents and 
to the public, but it proved much more difficult to sell a reform that put most of the burdens on the 
insured (and those in need of treatment), unlike the GSG, which could be legitimized by reference 
to equal burden-sharing among those affected. Seehofer tried to deal with this dilemma by 
defending his preference for co-payments as a choice of the “lesser evil”:  
 
Regarding the difficult question whether to keep up the level of SHI coverage by excluding services or by 
realizing greater cost-sharing through more personal responsibility, I am undoubtedly in favour of greater 
                                                           
 
 
 
299 Speech of Minister Seehofer, Bundestag plenary protocol 13/166, 20.03.1997, p. 14908-14910  
300 Sachverständigenrat (1997), Gesundheitswesen in Deutschland. Zukunftsfaktor und Wachstumsbranche. Band II: 
Fortschritt, Wachstumsmärkte, Finanzierung und Vergütung,  
source: http://www.svr-gesundheit.de/Startseite/Startseite.htm, accessed 04.04.06.  
301 An alternative proposal by Seehofer to allow the employee share of health care contributions to rise while keeping the 
employers’ share constant (in order to avoid higher co-payments by patients) was dismissed by the CDU/CSU 
parliamentary group (Interview policy analyst 23.11.05, and CDU/CSU parliamentary party employee 12.01.06).  
302 Sickness funds therefore received additional parameters on which to compete with each other, not only through the 
contribution rate, both on the demand and on the provisioning side: they were authorized - for a limited period -  to test new 
care and compensation structures (Brandhorst 2003: 214). 
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cost-sharing. The exclusion of services does not know exemption clauses nor social considerateness, it means 
a hundred per cent cost-sharing for those who are ill.303   
Seehofer thus legitimized the increase in co-payments in the first NOG by arguing that citizens 
needed to spend more of their income on health care in order to avoid a further increase in non-
wage costs and to maintain the current coverage catalogue of the SHI. In order to limit the 
negative consequences this would cause to the insured, extra co-payments were designed in a 
socially acceptable manner: the chronically ill and low-income households could profit from 
exemption clauses and income-related ceilings for such payments (Härtefallregelung). With 
regard to the new automatic mechanism for the prevention of contribution rate rises, the Minister 
stressed that in this fashion, higher contributions, as a result of inefficient budgeting practices, 
could be ruled out and yet no one would be excluded from the safety net of the SHI.304 As 
Seehofer explained, this new mechanism would be a disciplining measure, forcing sickness funds 
to use efficiency reserves before raising contribution rates, whilst allowing contribution rises, 
when needed, to cover the costs of medical progress or meet the challenges of demographic 
developments. A failure to accommodate the latter two trends would again, as Seehofer warned, 
raise the specter of budgeting or rationing health care services.305 Until his final speech, at the vote 
on the two laws, he made it clear that personal responsibility was there to stay in the SHI:  
  
We want to carry the SHI’s solidarity principle into the next century, that is, a high-quality health care 
provision for everyone without applying criteria of income, age or origin (…) But if we sustain the SHI at a 
high level (…) we also need to say truthfully that we cannot go down the path of increasing labour costs, but 
that we need to tell the public: we need more personal responsibility where it is reasonable. Solidarity and 
personal responsibility are twin concepts.306   
 
Despite these efforts to defend the NOG measure in the new context of reform, defined by 
austerity plus personal responsibility, one observer concluded that 
  
Seehofer no longer managed to come up with convincing chains of argumentation but tried to reach a 
consensus on the lowest common denominator (....) He could no longer create acceptance for the reforms he 
wished to adopt, if he indeed wished it. If one tried to find what remains of his own ideas, these were no 
longer visions of policy but rather definitions of what was still possible (Interview health policy expert, 
09.02.06). 
 
Allegedly, Seehofer also had a hard time convincing the public of the need for the measures. The 
general public is, by definition, a more diffused audience to address than a particular stakeholder 
group, and patients’ associations, which nowadays represent the interests of the insured, hardly 
existed at the time. The existence of such associations would have given him a more defined 
audience to debate with, just as he engaged with doctors and dentists during the GSG process. 
Instead, the sickness funds claimed to speak on the patients’ behalf and had decided to campaign 
against the reforms, which made his task increasingly difficult (Interview CDU/CSU 
parliamentary party employee 12.01.06; Interview former SPD MP 24.01.06). Seehofer did 
publicly underwrite the goals and instruments of the NOGs, but, as a CDU/CSU source speculates, 
by doing so, he may well have compromised his own beliefs with regard to the reform needs 
                                                           
 
 
 
303 Speech of Minister Seehofer, Bundestag parliamentary protocol 13/166, 20.03.1997, p. 14910  
304 ‘Kranke müssen bei Arzneien mehr zuzahlen’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 16.11.96; ‘Gesundheitsreform-Gesetze abgelehnt“, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20.12.96   
305 See footnote 303, p.14911 
306 Speech of Minister Seehofer, Bundestag plenary protocol 13/181, 12.06.97, p.16257  
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(Interview CDU/CSU parliamentary party employee, 12.01.06).   
Turning to another facet of his role, the Minister’s approach to organizing the necessary 
political majorities for reform, by including the opposition, did not come to fruition in 1996/1997. 
In terms of the IL concept, this corresponds to the aspect of political consensus-building, in which 
the Minister clearly was not successful, despite an attempt to integrate the SPD’s standpoint into 
the NOG predecessor laws. Another question is which motives (political or procedural) led the 
Minister to divide the legislation in two parts and to read it at two different time slots in 
parliament, since both laws did not require Bundesrat approval, according to the government.307  
The Minister was also restricted by Chancellor Kohl in his freedom to move politically (and, 
ultimately, by mounting economic and financial pressure). Clearly, overcoming reform resistance 
by a cross-party agreement would have required Seehofer to have the freedom to conclude such an 
agreement. This discretion, however, apparently no longer existed. Kohl’s unequivocal message to 
Seehofer had been to cut non-wage labour costs (Interview policy analyst 11.11.05), and his 
limited political options now excluded the option of putting most of the burden on care providers, 
as had been the case with the GSG five years earlier (Interview policy analyst 10.11.05). The 
Chancellor had also made it clear that conflicts about health care reform had to be avoided in the 
run-up to the 1998 elections; therefore, Seehofer needed to keep the SHI up and running, but had 
to stay clear of yet more reforms that would invoke the wrath of stakeholders (Interview health 
policy expert 09.02.06). At the time, his commitment to efficiency goals even earned him the 
nickname ‘Minister of Austerity’ (Interview policy analyst 11.11.05), which, in German politics, 
mostly tends to be reserved for the Minister of Finance.308  
Finally, the Minister’s reputation as an eager reformer had suffered in the meantime. 
Seehofer’s unsuccessful attempts at continuing his term with reforms of similar standing as the 
GSG had not gone unnoticed in public; and he himself had been expressing his disillusionment 
with the situation. As a consequence, the earlier almost glorious image surrounding his personality 
and his determined approach to policy-making had been fading, and he had become more 
vulnerable politically (Interviews policy analysts 10.11. and 11.11.05). Another observer 
expressed Seehofer’s decline in more drastic terms: 
 
He started like a tiger, but ended as a “fur carpet”: he began with an impressive dose of determination and 
then fell down deeply (...). This is reflected in the legislation he got adopted, which does not show a 
consistent line, but features an abrupt break. He was one of the strongest personalities we have ever had in 
this office, but towards the end he lost it (Interview health policy expert, 09.02.06). 
 
At the beginning of 1997, a Spiegel article stressed that the times were over when Seehofer was 
referred to as a “shooting star” and a “dragon killer” by members of the governing coalition. When 
asked to draw up a balance of his first five years in office, he replied:  
 
 
 
                                                           
 
 
 
307 On this point, a Ministry source recalled: ‘the consequence of the failure of another cross-party agreement was followed 
by an approach that would induce further conflict: this meant to split the NOG into two bills, none of which needed 
Bundesrat approval. The choice for this procedure led to a conflict between Bundestag and Bundesrat with the latter 
turning eventually to the German Constitutional Court, which later ruled that both bills indeed did not require Bundesrat 
approval’ (Interview BMG official, 27.01.06). 
308 Although Seehofer seemed to underwrite those goals, and to agree with putting a greater share of the reform burdens on 
patients, the measures implied in the reforms must have been compromised his beliefs in social justice as he had to 
succumb to austerity pressures that were out of his sphere of control.  
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Firstly, egoism in Germany is more wide-spread and more brutal than I could ever have imagined. Secondly, 
our social insurance programmes are financed in a fashion showing solidarity, but are taken advantage of in 
ways that are far removed from such solidarity. Finally, everything revolves primarily around money, this is 
horrible and repugnant.309 
 
In short, Seehofer’s role in the process of adopting the NOGs was the one of a politician still 
determined to improve the system, but whose options for shaping the goals and means of the 
legislation had been curtailed. No doubt some of these developments were of Seehofer’s own 
making, as was the change in approach to one part of the stakeholders (doctors, pharmaceutical 
industry), which added to the political opposition he faced. Others, however, like the mounting 
pressures of an economic and financial kind, and the changed political climate, were factors out of 
his control. By the time Seehofer left office, he was convinced that the NOGs, with their 
unpopular measures, had been, in part, responsible for the electoral defeat of the Kohl Government 
(Interview CDU/CSU parliamentary party employee 12.01.06).  
7.4.2.4 Were the NOG Laws a Structural Reform?  
 
The previous sub-section argued that the process in which the Contribution Relief Act and the 
NOGs were adopted was long-drawn, full of conflicts, and constituted, in some respects, a return 
to pre-1992 health politics. However, what did these laws bring in terms of substance, and to what 
extent did they introduce changes that implied structural shifts? On the whole, the reforms of 
1996/1997 pale into insignificance compared to the GSG. All in all, interview sources remain 
somewhat contradictory in their appraisal of the reforms. Compared with the changes introduced 
in the GSG, these shifts seemed to appear like ‘mere adjustments’ (Interview policy analyst 
11.11.05). From the view of the pharmaceutical industry, which was hardly affected by the NOGs, 
their provisions were qualified as ‘non-structural’ (Interview VfA representative, 15.11.05). From 
the physicians’ viewpoint, the NOGs initially contained the potential for a structural reform, but 
was opposed by the sickness funds: the initial proposal would have relaxed restrictions on doctors 
but was thwarted by the sickness funds, whose demands were echoed by the SPD. Thus, it could 
have been a structural reform (compared to the cost containment measures of the GSG), if the 
legislative process had turned out differently (Interview former KBV chair, 16.11.05). Equally, the 
second NOG contained some structural elements to strengthen the role of hospitals in self-
administration bodies, and their possibility to negotiate with sickness funds over new forms of 
integrated care (Interview representative DKG, 22.11.05). What becomes clear from these 
responses is that they are coloured by the organization the interviewees were affiliated with, and 
do not lead to a consistent answer. 
Does applying the structural change criteria provide more clarity? First of all, the sector’s 
finance structure, which the GSG had already adjusted somewhat (towards more private financing 
sources), was again affected by the NOGs. It experienced more adjustments, starting with the 
extension of co-payments through the Contribution Relief Act. However, this did not amount to a 
structural shift, as the principle of contribution financing was kept intact. The way in which co-
payment increases were introduced (including provisions to exempt the socially weak and 
chronically ill), tapped into an additional financing resource, but left the existing financing scheme 
in place. The same applied to the provisions that “privatized” parts of the SHI catalogue, mostly 
                                                           
 
 
 
309 ‘Ende des Drachentöters’, Der Spiegel 11/1997, source: http://www.spiegel.de/Spiegel/0,1518,380989,00.html.    
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with regard to dental care. However, it is true that the reforms contributed to a hollowing out of the 
principle of parity financing (shared health care costs between employers and employees), forcing 
patients to pay more out of their own pockets, on top of their payroll contributions (Interview 
policy expert 09.02.06).  
Secondly, with regard to the care provision structure (corresponding to the benefit structure in 
other social policy sectors), the laws merely made a cautious attempt at overcoming the division of 
care provision into ambulant and stationary care by allowing for experiments with integrated care 
provision (Rosenbrock and Gerlinger 2004: 228). However, this hardly constitutes a structural 
shift, since its implementation depended on the will of care providers. Essentially, this structure 
thus remained the same. 
Finally, with regard to the sector’s regulation structure, the reforms contained some measures 
that could be characterized as potential structural shifts but only one of which materialized, 
bringing more delegation of tasks to self-governing bodies than was previously the case, i.e. a shift 
from state to more self-governance. The measure in question extended the competences of doctors 
and insurers in the Federal Committee of Physicians and Sickness Funds by them having to draw 
up guidelines for most areas of the health care system. Furthermore, corporatist bargaining was 
also extended to control matters such as medicine prices and guidelines for other practitioners 
(Giaimo 2002: 133-135). Similarly, the existing market-oriented and state-led control instruments 
were supplemented by corporatist steering instruments: state-prescribed expenditure controls (to 
be worked out in agreement between the sickness funds and the KVs), and new provisions for 
hospital remuneration (which required collective agreements between sickness funds and hospitals 
(Brandhorst 2003: 214).   
In contrast, the other two salient provisions of the NOGs did not constitute shifts in the 
regulation structure, in the sense that the state gained more competences. The automatic link 
between contribution rate rises and increases of co-payments, essentially a cost-containment 
element, was never used. Indeed, many of the NOG provisions were short-lived and failed to make 
a long-term impact, since they were overturned by the new Red-Green coalition in 1998.310 The 
other feature, a state-prescribed transformation of certain care services into voluntary items of 
insurers’ statutory provision package was largely abandoned in the course of the legislative 
process: eventually sickness funds and care providers were encouraged to come to “rational” 
solutions on their own. 
It is tempting to characterize the 1996/1997 laws as an exercise in pure cost containment, just 
as other social insurance reforms in the areas of pensions, unemployment insurance and social 
assistance adopted at the same time. By any means, the Contribution Relief Act and the NOGs 
surely did not continue on the path of structural reform, which seems to have opened up with the 
GSG, i.e. facilitating further competition among sickness funds. To summarize, it is fair to say that 
these reforms left the care provision structure relatively untouched. In the financing sphere, they 
introduced measures intended to contain contribution rates, continuing down the path of 
privatizing health care costs. While opening up an additional source of income of the SHI, 
however, health care contributions still dominated the financing structure of the SHI. Finally, the 
reforms did affect the regulation structure in the sense of transferring more competences from the 
state to self-governance bodies: therein lies a structural shift that may be compared with the GSG. 
The 1996/97 reforms reflect a change of approach towards regulation in the health sector, 
                                                           
 
 
 
310 This applied to the increase of co-payments in the Contribution Relief Act, as well as the elements of private health 
insurance in the second NOG. 
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signalling a trend towards a more market-oriented SHI, via demand-side measures. Changes in the 
balance of power between sectoral actors and political parties contributed to a change in the 
debate, and eventually, in the contents of the reform, which put more burdens on patients and 
insurers and less on providers, in particular the medical profession (Giaimo 2003: 127).311 While 
the GSG had set the tone for a more market-oriented SHI, after 1996, this orientation was only 
pursued further for the demand-side, i.e. patients and sickness funds, and not the supply side, i.e. 
care providers (Brandhorst 2003: 214). In this sense, it may be argued that the structural shift in 
the regulation sphere associated with the GSG (towards more market competition), was perceived 
as more far-reaching, and therefore more important to observers of the sector, than the structural 
shift contained in the NOGs (towards more self-governance). Two reasons may account for this: 
first, the latter shift was much more “hidden” behind a bundle of unpopular and one-sided cost-
containment measures, second, the laws also stood for a return to the pre-1992 situation (surely 
regarding the collective bargaining between KVs and sickness funds).  
 
7.5 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have tried to shed light upon the possibilities for an ideational leader to effect 
structural reforms in the field of health care policy. On the basis of a short expert survey, which 
contained questions on key characteristics of IL among several Health Ministers and a criterion in 
order to gauge their initial policy ideas, my choice of presumed ideational leader fell on Minister 
Seehofer. Accordingly, this case study focused on the major reform projects during his term in 
office, the Structural Health Reform Act (GSG), adopted in 1992; and the Health Care 
Reorganization Acts (1. and 2.GKV-NOG), adopted in 1997. I have found clear differences 
between the two reform outcomes in terms of their structural character, the reform processes, and 
with regard to the role of the Minister: Seehofer’s behaviour in 1992 was clearly more in line with 
the criteria for an ideational leader than it was in 1996-1997.     
Summarizing the first set of policy changes, the GSG consisted of a combination of measures 
for the controlling of care costs (introducing several budgeting instruments aimed at the various 
types of care providers); and an organizational reform that affected the regulation of sickness fund 
membership (freedom of choice for patients regardless of their occupational status), and relations 
among insurers by establishing a redistributive risk-adjustment scheme intended to spread 
insurance risks evenly between funds. I have argued that this law does qualify as a structural 
reform due to the changes it introduced in the regulation structure: firstly, the state reaffirmed its 
regulatory power vis-à-vis the self-administration bodies and interest groups; and secondly, 
sickness fund reform (the freedom to choose for patients and the risk-adjustment scheme between 
funds) introduced an element of market competition into a formerly static and state-regulated 
system.  
Regarding Seehofer’s role in concluding the GSG, the rapid drafting and adoption of the 
reform owed much to the Minister’s approach of working out a reform concept together with the 
                                                           
 
 
 
311 These burdens were seen to provide eventually efficiency gains and therefore cost savings. The measures of the NOGs 
stood for a system of different incentives, which were to encourage both sickness funds and patients to act cost-consciously 
when financing and using health care services. On the other hand, some expenditure control for providers was maintained 
through budgets (which had been greatly reduced since 1996/97).  
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SPD opposition. His new approach regarding the dealings with health care stakeholders, and his 
fast and determined way of acting, brought the reform project to a successful conclusion. 
Moreover, his distinctive political style, which relied on persuasion in legitimizing the GSG’s aims 
of cost containment and structural reform, coupled with a display of determination, proved 
effective. Seehofer’s dual goal of stabilizing the SHI and opening it up to competition, embedded 
in a reform concept that divided the burdens equally amongst all stakeholders, proved to be 
acceptable, and survived the protest of care providers, especially doctors. The resulting reform, in 
which Seehofer personally became involved, has received notable attention of health policy 
analysts due to its far-reaching character, compared to earlier or later reforms, although its precise 
significance remains debatable. In short, the GSG reflected the Minister’s determination and 
commitment to carry out reforms that would end the existing policy situation, his ability to 
promote and legitimize a bold reform concept, and the will and skill to overcome reform resistance 
by engaging in political consensus-building with the opposition. All of these IL aspects may be 
attributed to Seehofer and confirmed his selection as presumed ideational leader. In the case of the 
GSG, Seehofer’s IL manifested itself and the ensuing reform was structural, which provides 
evidence in favour of the IL hypothesis.    
To summarize briefly the changes of the NOGs, its first part introduced measures to limit 
increases of contribution rates by linking them to increases of patients’ co-payments, while making 
it easier for the insured to switch funds, in the case of contribution rate rises. Moreover, it 
considerably increased co-payments, strengthened the financial liability of sickness funds and 
extended the possibilities of self-governance bodies for the regulation of particular issues. The 
second law strengthened patients’ rights vis-à-vis sickness funds; gave new competences to self-
governing bodies for concluding agreements with providers; incorporated the hospital sector into 
financial stability provisions (allowing it to co-finance maintenance with patients’ co-payments), 
and introduced new remuneration regulations for dentists.  
The NOG laws were less far-reaching in scope than the GSG had been, and were perceived as 
one-sided as well as unpopular with the electorate and sickness funds, as their measures 
highlighted the personal responsibility of patients and the liability of insurers to contain costs. All 
in all, the reforms brought a change in the regulation structure of the SHI, but this concerned a 
backward shift, restoring some former responsibilities of self-governing bodies, and thus can 
hardly be seen as an innovative structural reform. The assessment of the NOGs showed that it may 
be problematic to evaluate a reform as structural or non-structural by looking simply at its features 
without taking policy legacies, especially previous reforms, into account. If a structural change is 
simply the reversal of an earlier reform or if it is known that a particular structural change was 
reversed by a later reform (as was the case with the NOG), can it still be called “structural”?   
With regard to Seehofer’s role, the contextual setting of the policy-making process in the run-
up to the 1997 reforms was rather different compared to the one of the early 1990’s. Seehofer had 
to operate in an unfavourable policy-making climate, which made the adoption of these two laws a 
conflict-ridden and lengthy process. After restoring closer relations with interest groups, and 
following a failed attempt to involve the opposition in his plans, the Minister tried to push the 
reform through, against the wishes of the SPD opposition and the Länder. Due to changed political 
circumstances and clear instructions by Chancellor Kohl to control health care costs and 
contribution rates, his leeway to continue with structural reforms was clearly more restricted, 
compared to four years earlier. In the end, Seehofer did not manage to organize the necessary 
support for a more far-reaching reform and did not succeed in selling the resulting reform proposal 
as a politically consistent and balanced plan.   
All in all, can we confirm that the presumed ideational leader Seehofer indeed demonstrated 
IL during this second reform process? It is difficult to answer this question in a clear-cut way. 
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Although Seehofer displayed some characteristics of IL during that process, its effects were rather 
limited. The contrast with his self-conscious appearance of earlier years disillusioned those who 
had to observe what, to them, seemed a complete turn-around in policy. Taken together, the reform 
outcome can hardly be defined in terms of a truly structural shift and it is difficult to discern 
effects of IL: therefore, there is no compelling evidence for either a structural reform or effective 
IL. This is not to say that signs of IL were completely absent, as Seehofer tried to defend his 
efforts at changing the status quo, legitimized the proposals and attempted to reach a consensus 
with the opposition. His initial and more ambitious reforms plans had been frustrated early on by 
the Bundesrat and the same can be said of his determination to carry on adjusting the status-quo: 
the Minister had to settle for the NOG reforms as a second-best solution. Seehofer’s ability to 
promote and legitimize these reforms did just not come to fruition, as his message seemed to be 
cancelled out by the rather unbalanced design of the reform (i.e. putting relatively greater burdens 
on patients than on care providers). Moreover, his attempts at consensus-building ran aground and 
they were restricted in their scope, due to, amongst other things, the lack of political backing from 
the Chancellor.  
The Minister’s record as ideational leader therefore appears rather mixed: his legacy includes 
the success of an acclaimed and, using my evaluation criteria, structural reform at the beginning of 
his term and a rather controversial and ambiguous reform towards its end. Although the NOGs 
nevertheless contained an element of structural change, it also represented a reversal to earlier 
practices rather than an innovation. What do these findings tell us about the possibilities for 
linking structural reforms to IL? One lesson to be learnt from this case is that a policy-maker who 
acts according to the IL criteria may do so in one set of circumstances but not in another (at a later 
point in time), i.e. IL cannot be seen as a constant quality or ability of any one policy-maker, but is 
contingent on the circumstances of each reform. If this is correct, it is necessary to examine which 
circumstances are conducive to IL and which ones are not: this lesson has to be incorporated in the 
theoretical framework. Another lesson refers to the definition of structural reform: the comparison 
of the two reform processes indicated that a parsimonious definition of structural reform is 
difficult to apply to reforms in highly complex policy sectors such as health care, where structures 
are defined in different ways by policy actors and may even exist on sub-sector levels (e.g. 
sickness funds, hospitals). 
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 8. Conclusion  
 
 
 
“Often research doesn’t solve a mystery but it provides a step forward in reaching this goal.”  
Russell J. Dalton312  
 
 
8.1 Research 
 
This study has explored if and how key policy-makers are able to break through the proverbial 
resilience of contemporary welfare states in order to engineer structural reforms. Such resilience is 
particularly found in Continental welfare states, of which Germany is a prime example. The 
guiding proposition was that ideational leadership of key policy-makers would explain unexpected 
structural reforms in welfare states.  
 
8.1.1 A Puzzle and Preliminary Answer  
 
The project has departed from the puzzling observation that far-reaching reforms did occur, 
despite theoretical expectations of major approaches to welfare state politics and regimes based on 
historical institutionalism. More specifically, my project took issue with the stability bias in the 
work of Esping-Andersen ('t Hart 2000; Goldfinch and 't Hart 2003) and Pierson (Moon 1995; 
Luke 2000; Schmidt 2002a), who are the most important advocates of these approaches. I have 
argued that their theorizing fails to explain adequately the occurrence of major welfare state 
reforms, as it overstates the forces of continuity inherent in institutions, such as mechanisms of 
path-dependency, vested interests, and electoral hazards. However, despite the predictions of these 
theorists, advanced welfare states have experienced major reforms in recent years. I have proposed 
to refer to such changes as “structural reform” (as opposed to quantifiable retrenchment), drawing 
on earlier work on qualitative changes in welfare states (Burns 1978; Ross 2000a). Structural 
reform has been defined as legislative changes leading to a re-ordering of actors’ competences and 
responsibilities of main actors governing a social policy programme. Such shifts affect the 
financing, benefit, or regulation structure of a policy (or several of them).  
The argument about theoretically unexpected, yet major reforms has been underscored by recent 
examples from advanced welfare states, including Germany. This country proved particularly 
suitable for my analysis for several reasons. Specifically, Germany offers an intriguing context for 
investigating structural reforms due to a peculiar combination of reform obstacles, tied to the 
country’s political and welfare institutions, and salient reform pressures from multiple sources 
(socioeconomic, fiscal and demographic characteristics). All of these factors combine in a 
perplexing contrast of institutional obstacles on the one hand and substantial incentives to tackle 
reforms on the other. From the 1990’s onwards, theoretically unexpected major reforms have 
occurred in Germany, and the question is how this was possible.  
                                                           
 
 
 
312 Thoughts on Developing a Research Project, undated, unpublished manuscript, University of California at Irvine, p.5 
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Existing explanations of far-reaching policy change suggest that various types of factors 
(economic, institutional, party-political and ideational) can account for these reforms. However, 
none of these macro-level (regimes) and meso-level (policy programmes) explanations can 
satisfactorily explain major reforms in Germany. This study has argued that the solution to the 
puzzle lies in explanations found at the micro-level of analysis, considering individual policy 
makers. Therefore, combining the role of political agency, its linkages to policy ideas, and how 
these may influence far-reaching reform, has led to the concept of ideational leadership (IL), the 
independent variable in this study. IL has the advantage of relating to welfare institutions, as well 
as to political-institutional and party-political factors. Rather than considering these factors one by 
one, it is more productive to explore how political agency, in the form of IL, interacts with them.  
 
8.1.2 The Ideational Leadership Framework  
 
IL seeks to offer an answer to the puzzle introduced above. However, ideational approaches often 
neglect causal mechanisms that connect causes and effects of policy change, and draw insufficient 
attention to political agency, while leadership approaches underspecify how politicians achieve 
policy change and why they want to achieve it (Heclo 1974; Braun 1999; e.g. Ferrera and 
Gualmini 2004). In my view, IL compensates for these weaknesses by combining the strengths of 
these literatures in the field, and makes up for the incapacity of the dominant theories in being able 
to explain major policy change. The IL concept was devised after reviewing relevant concepts in 
the leadership and ideational literatures related to policy change (Krasner 1988; Pierson 1996; 
Pempel 1998; Boin and 't Hart 2000; Hay 2001; Pierson 2001; Kuipers 2004; Béland 2005; 
Streeck and Thelen 2005). From these concepts, leadership-related tasks that enable reform were 
selected, as well as relevant elements regarding the role ideas play in substantial policy change. 
The hypothesis on IL specifies that key politicians, by certain communicative and behavioural 
patterns, are linked to the adoption of structural reforms. These patterns or aspects are listed in the 
figure below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Conceptualization of IL 
 
 
Two types of causal mechanisms link these aspects with the outcome of structural reform. The first 
mechanism operates at the level of beliefs (cognitive and normative) of opposing actors and the 
level of (ideal) interests. This “ideational” mechanism works through a change in cognitive and 
normative preferences, and relates to Heclo’s concept of “puzzling” (Hering 2004: 305-306). The 
second mechanism relates to interests and changes the perception of opposing actors’ interests, 
which is reminiscent of the notion of “powering within puzzling” (Hall 1993), that is, policy actors 
 Aspects of IL 
   
Communicative/behavioural aspects 
 
1) Exposing the drawbacks of the policy status quo 
2) Making consistent efforts to legitimize (the principles of) new policy 
3) Engaging with reform opponents by framing their resistance as “problematic” 
4) Making efforts at political consensus-building to muster support for a particular reform 
        
Orientation/motivation aspect 
 
5) IL-type policy-makers are policy- rather than power-oriented 
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who try to organise consensus around preferred policy solutions while at the same time taking 
political considerations into account. Finally, the framework assumes that IL-type actors are 
predominantly policy-oriented, which contrasts with the more power-seeking oriented type of 
conventional policy-makers. The combination of these mechanisms, that is, effecting changes in 
beliefs, norms, and ideal interests of stakeholders, produces favourable circumstances for an 
institutional break-out, a situation in which institutional lock-in is penetrated by policy 
alternatives, and allows structural reform to materialize   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2: Four causal mechanisms linking IL with the outcome of structural reform  
 
 
Essentially, IL breaks with traditional thinking about leadership as an essentially power-related 
concept, as it stresses that a reform-minded leader needs the will to innovate as well as persuasive 
skills, instead of formal sources of authority in order to achieve reforms. Thus, IL extends the 
meaning of leadership in the context of policy-making and caters for a demand in contemporary 
research, namely, in that it specifies how policy ideas, vested interests and political institutions 
interact during different stages of the policy process (Majone 1996: 15).  
 
8.1.3 Research Design and Methodology  
 
The IL hypothesis was evaluated in a multiple case study. This choice suited the main 
requirements of the research design: permitting an empirical exploration that would allow tracing 
the linkages between IL and reform outcomes and evaluating these linkages in a complex 
empirical context. The German polity formed the context of analysis, while the case studies 
focussed on single reform processes as objects of investigation. Within the cases, I applied the 
process-tracing technique, and used two (actor-centred) alternative explanations of overcoming 
reform obstacles as additional tools for evaluating the IL hypothesis.313 The main empirical 
                                                           
 
 
 
313 Alternative explanations imply that a certain outcome is the result of other influences than the one(s) hypothesized. By 
collecting information about those other influences, hypothesized explanations can become potentially stronger by 
excluding other plausible explanatory factors or alternative explanations. I specified two sorts of alternative explanations: 
the first one involves that they try to ignore or outmanoeuvre reform critics (both inside and outside parliament). In short, 
this strategy sees politicians at a minimum refusing to engage with reform criticism and at a maximum trying to adjust the 
institutional context in which they operate t in order to push through their preferred policy adjustments. This explanation 
reflects the use of political power. The second alternative explanation states that key policy-makers make concessions in 
order to push through reforms. The promise of some form of pay-off, i.e. financial benefits or other compensation for 
societal groups and/or political veto players may be another way to calm opposition and get reforms adopted. Theoretically, 
Ideational mechanisms 
1) Policy failure or loss of effectiveness brings on the search for alternatives  
2) Creating insights into the logics of appropriateness and necessity behind the innovation helps to 
reduce switching costs and re-define values underlying old policy and institutions 
 
Interest-related mechanisms 
3) Reform opponents are made to “face the facts” or redefine (the perception) of their interests,    
lowering switching costs  
4) Forging consensus based on policy-seeking instead of power-seeking motives reduces switching  
costs  
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question guiding the analyses was two-fold: to what extent is it possible to observe IL in the 
reform processes leading up to reform adoption, and in what ways did it relate to the adoption of 
structural reform?  
Within the multiple case study design, each of the three cases carried a different emphasis. 
The first case study served primarily to check whether evidence of IL could be found at all. The 
second case served to see if the conclusions from the first case about the plausibility of IL would 
hold in another case, and to visualize its effects on structural reform. Both cases were selected on 
the dependent variable, structural reform. The third and final case, selected on the independent 
variable, IL, served to investigate whether there was also a reverse relationship between the two 
variables. That is, would a presumed ideational leader also manage to adopt structural reforms, and 
would his designation be confirmed by finding aspects of IL in the same way as done in the first 
two case studies? The main concepts structural reform and IL were operationalized so as to allow 
case selection in accordance with my theoretical criteria of far-reaching reform and to carry out 
systematic analyses of data sources aimed at detecting the presence, as well as, the effects of IL. 
The first case was originally designed as a pilot case study, resulting in some fine-tuning of the 
initial, theoretical framework, adding one additional aspect and refining the wording of others.   
To gather empirical evidence, the case studies relied on a triangulation of sources, which 
consisted of policy-related documents; speeches and interviews of key policy-makers; thirty-five 
expert interviews; and daily and weekly quality press coverage. The process of data collection and 
interviews covering the three policy sectors took place between May 2004 and February 2006. 
Qualitative content analysis was performed on the written material collected as well as on 
interview transcripts. In these analyses, the operationalized indicators of IL were applied, as well 
as indicators for the occurrence of alternative explanations, all for the overall goal of gathering 
evidence for or against the presence and effectiveness of ideational leadership.  
 
8.1.4 Case Study Findings  
 
The empirical findings have provided backing for the IL hypothesis. Instances of IL were found in 
the first two cases on pension and unemployment reform. With regard to the assumed 
effectiveness of IL-type policy-makers, these cases also showed that these individuals had to resort 
to other strategies too, while the third case, selected on the basis of an IL-type policy-maker, 
demonstrated that he or she may be effective in one process, while running into difficulties in 
another. These curbs on the effects of IL point to a number of conditions which offer interesting 
prospects for further research (see Section 8.3 below).  
Pensions   
The first case study analyzed the process preceding the 2001 pension reform, named after Minister 
of Labour Walter Riester. This significant piece of legislation ended the de facto one-pillar 
structure of German pension arrangements, introduced a privately financed and state-subsidized 
element, and strengthened the company-based element of pension provision. I considered this 
reform to be structural in character due to the changes it introduced in financing, benefits, and the 
regulation of pension arrangements. In response to the Minister’s initial reform proposal, 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
 
 
these two power- and exchange-related explanations can be distinguished from the IL hypothesis, which draws attention to 
processes of persuading critics and getting consensus for reforms.  
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considerable opposition, both parliamentary and societal, had gathered against it, and needed to be 
addressed by the reformist camp headed by the Minister. Despite repeated changes to the proposal, 
and various concessions on the part of the Ministry to its critics (including opponents within the 
Social Democrats, the opposition Christian Democrats, and major trade unions), Riester 
nevertheless preserved the core innovations of the reform until its final adoption in the spring of 
2001. The combined analysis of documents, biographical material and interviews confirmed that 
the Minister acted in accordance with IL on the basis of the concept’s three core aspects. These 
included “rejecting the policy status quo”, “legitimizing new policy proposals” and “appealing to 
critics to rethink their resistance”. In addition, the study of the Minister’s attitude to political office 
and leadership showed that he was indeed predominantly policy-oriented. At the same time, 
Riester failed to pay due attention to consensus-building with all relevant critics, including the 
trade unions and his left-wing opponents within the SPD. Riester’s shortcomings in this particular 
activity, comprehensive consensus-building, suggested a refinement to the IL concept, that is, 
adding the aspect “efforts at political consensus-building”. From the Minister’s perspective, his 
neglect to build stable bridges with important reform critics complicated the course of the reform 
process, but, essentially, could not stop it. Faced with compelling political-institutional obstacles, 
he also had to make concessions in order to accomplish a final breakthrough, even though he could 
count on the backing of Chancellor Schröder. Although Riester qualified as an IL-type policy-
maker, he had to make substantial concessions to the critics of the proposed reform. Clearly, by 
ignoring their demands, the desired adoption of reform would not have materialized. Therefore, 
the IL of Minister Riester was but one of at least two factors in explaining this particular structural 
reform.  
Unemployment insurance   
The second case study focused on the process preceding the 2004 reform of unemployment and 
social assistance, known as Hartz IV. This structural reform broke with the status-quo of a de facto 
three-pillar system of German unemployment protection, and provoked substantial debate on how 
to deal effectively with mass unemployment. The evidence collected established that Minister of 
Economic Affairs and Labour Clement had acted in accordance with the criteria of IL during the 
reform process. In addition, his endeavour was aided by Chancellor Schröder and the Hartz-
Commission, an ad hoc body of expert advisors. While Clements’ performance was undoubtedly 
important, it was a combination of argumentation and concessions that allowed Hartz IV to 
materialise.  
The analysis of the effects of IL highlighted the importance of the Minister’s leadership, 
showing that it was crucial to break with traditional ways of thinking in labour market policy and 
to move an ambitious reform plan closer to decision point. Yet, IL alone was not sufficient: 
Clements’ relentless effort in combination with the government’s willingness to achieve a 
compromise on implementation led to its adoption. The communication of this reform-minded and 
results-oriented Minister was essential for keeping the momentum in the reform process, and for 
pushing the parliamentary opposition towards acceptance of the reform. Despite the efforts by the 
reformist Clement to bring about a mentality change in tackling long-term unemployment, the 
reform was not concluded until the criticism of the parliamentary opposition, concerning the role 
of local governments and the Länder in the Bundesrat, was accommodated. Instead of adopting the 
Ministry’s “centralistic” solution (with the Federal Employment Agency as responsible actor), the 
compromise foresaw a split of administrative competences between local consortia and a number 
of local authorities, and the division of financing responsibilities concerning the new benefit.  
In his mission to move the reform plans towards completion, Clement could rely on 
Chancellor Schröder and his political commitment, which provided a general direction for social 
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and economic policy reform. Moreover, he could draw upon the preparatory work carried out by 
the Hartz-Commission. Clement’s willingness and ability to achieve a compromise proved crucial 
in ensuring that the core of the reform was adopted (even though the final result differed from the 
initial government concept), and it helped to uphold the government’s image as being capable of 
adopting important reforms.  
 
Health Care   
The third case was to evaluate the skills of an IL-type policy-maker in the field of health care 
policy. The choice of presumed ideational leader was based on a short expert survey and an 
additional criterion that gauged the scope of initial policy ideas of several Health Ministers. 
Compared to the other candidates, Minister Seehofer appeared to have the most characteristics of 
IL. The study centred on two major reforms during his period in office, the 1992 Structural Health 
Reform Act (GSG) and the 1997 Health Care Reorganization Acts (1./2.GKV-NOG). The analysis 
found clear differences between reform outcomes, the processes, and the Minister’s role: Seehofer 
came closer to the criteria for an ideational leader in 1992 than in 1996/1997.    
The first reform aimed to control health care costs through the imposition of budgeting on 
various care providers; and introduced an organizational reform affecting sickness fund 
membership (free choice for patients of sickness fund) and relations between insurers (introduction 
redistributive risk-adjustment scheme to spread insurance risks). It was structural due to its 
changes in the sphere of regulation. The state reaffirmed its regulatory power vis-à-vis the self-
administration bodies and interest groups and the market gained ground in a formerly static and 
state-regulated system through sickness fund reform. The rapid conclusion of the reform stemmed 
from Seehofer’s attempt to strike a deal with the Social Democrats. His new approach in dealing 
with health care stakeholders and his fast and determined way of acting also speeded up the reform 
project. Moreover, his distinctive and determined style of legitimizing the aims of the GSG, cost 
containment and structural reform (of sickness funds), proved effective. The Minister’s dual goal 
of stabilizing the SHI and opening it up to competition, in a concept that shared the burdens 
amongst all stakeholders, was convincing and withstood the protest of care providers. The 
resulting reform received considerable attention by analysts due to its far-reaching character, 
although its precise significance remains debatable. It reflected Seehofer’s commitment to change 
the unfavourable state of health care, his ability to legitimize a bold reform concept, and the will 
and skill to overcome reform resistance. All ingredients of IL were there, confirming Seehofer’s 
choice as presumed ideational leader.  
The 1997 reform package aimed to limit contribution rates by linking them to increases in co-
payments and increased sickness fund choice for those insured. Moreover, these laws considerably 
increased co-payments, strengthened the financial liability of sickness funds, and extended the 
competences of self-governing bodies. Moreover, patients’ rights were strengthened, the hospital 
sector faced financial stability regulations, and dentists saw new remuneration rules. These 
reforms were less far-reaching in scope than the GSG. Critics perceived them as one-sided, 
overstating the personal responsibility of patients and the liability of insurers to contain costs. 
Although they did alter the regulation structure of the SHI, this concerned the reversal of former 
provisions on self-governance, which makes it difficult to compare them to a truly innovative 
structural reform as the GSG. With regard to Seehofer’s role, the political context in the period 
leading up to the 1997 reforms differed considerably from that in 1992. The Minister had to 
operate in an unfavourable policy-making climate. Having restored closer relations with interest 
groups, and after a failed attempt at taking the opposition on board, he tried to push the reform 
through despite considerable resistance from the Social Democrats and the Länder. Due to clear 
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instructions by Chancellor Kohl to cut costs without alienating health care providers, the 
Minister’s leeway to continue with structural reforms had considerably decreased. He failed to 
organize the necessary support for a more far-reaching reform, and was unable to sell the resulting 
reform proposal as a logically consistent and well-balanced plan. Although Seehofer did display 
some characteristics of IL during this process, its effects were surely limited. The reform outcome 
can hardly be described as a clear-cut, structural shift, while discerning effects of IL remain 
difficult. Seehofer’s ability to promote and legitimize these reforms did not lead to visible results, 
as it seemed to be kept in check by the substantive content of the reform that put greater burdens 
on patients than on care providers. Moreover, his attempts at consensus-building ran aground and 
were restricted in their scope, due amongst other things to the lack of political backing by the 
Chancellor.  
 
8.2 Findings  
 
This section discusses the findings of the empirical investigation in terms of what has been learned 
about the IL hypothesis. Furthermore, as it is customary to conclude the cycle of empirical 
research by reconsidering the theories that stood at its beginning, it returns to historical 
institutionalist accounts and theories of policy change.   
 
8.2.1 Relating the Findings to the Hypothesis: Revisiting IL  
 
Revisiting the IL hypothesis implies a two-step assessment. Firstly, to what extent were IL-type 
policy-makers found, and, secondly, to what extent were they effective in getting structural 
reforms adopted? To be able to corroborate the proposition, IL had to be identified in the two cases 
selected on the outcome of structural reform (the dependent variable). In addition, the connection 
between IL and structural reform needed to be demonstrated, preferably along the lines of the 
causal mechanisms. Conversely, the hypothesis would be rejected if ministers did not meet the 
criteria of IL or if they met the criteria but could not be credibly linked to a structural reform 
outcome. In the analyses, both lines of evaluation were followed, firstly, establishing the 
characteristics of the key politicians under investigation, and, secondly, gathering evidence of their 
efforts to realize structural reform. Regarding my conclusions on structural reform, these will be 
covered by Section 8.2.3, which deals with policy change. There, I will sum up the contribution of 
the IL framework to the conceptualization of reform as policy change, and to explanations of such 
change compared to existing theories.   
All in all, the evidence presented gives no reason to reject the hypothesis. In the first two 
cases, the presence of IL has been demonstrated. In the health care case (using a slightly different 
approach from the pension and unemployment cases), the presumed IL-type policy-maker was 
confirmed as having performed along the lines of IL. 
More specifically, the first case delivered evidence for both IL and concession-making. 
Firstly, it underlined the plausibility of the IL hypothesis by demonstrating that IL-type leaders 
may indeed be found. Minister Riester proved successful in pushing through the innovation of an 
additional private pension pillar in order to save the traditional pay-as-you-go system. That 
innovation weakened the principle of securing former living standards without dismantling it 
completely. At the same time, Riester combined IL with concessions to reform opponents in order 
to realize his policy plan. This case also demonstrated that a successful re-definition of policy 
principles (under the condition of proximate elections) and verbal tackling of reform opponents 
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may not be sufficient in getting a reform adopted; making material concessions also proved to be 
important. Echoing the findings of the pension case, the second case revealed that IL, in 
combination with concession-making (and to a lesser extent strategies that circumvent reform 
opposition), may lead to the adoption of structural reforms. The Hartz IV reform, merging 
unemployment assistance and social assistance, materialized due to Minister of Economics and 
Labour Clement’s strong display of IL. Clement was aided in his effort by the preparatory work of 
the advisory Hartz-Commission and by Chancellor Schröder, which eventually resulted in a 
strengthened principle of activation (“Fördern und Fordern”) in this policy area. At the same time, 
a complex mix of federal, regional and local competences during the process resulted in 
conflicting interests of reform stakeholders. That complexity forced the Minister to resort to 
concessions that enabled a compromise on how and where (federal or local level) the new policy 
instruments should be administered.  
The final case on health care reform reversed the guiding question. It did not ask whether 
structural reforms were influenced by IL-type leaders, but whether a selected IL-type policy-maker 
managed to adopt structural reforms. The selected policy-maker, Minister Seehofer, clearly 
displayed IL in the run-up to the Health Restructuring Act in 1992, a clear-cut structural reform 
that re-ordered the financial regulation and insurance function of sickness funds. Conversely, IL 
played a less prominent (and effective) role concerning the second major and market-oriented 
reform plan in 1996/1997. The latter process ended in a controversial and short-lived reform, 
which reversed earlier provisions, although it still represented a structural shift in the regulation 
dimension of policy. The health care case indicated that the effects of IL are contingent, since 
leadership led to structural reform in one case, and to a less clear-cut outcome in another. It also 
pointed to restricting conditions weakening the effects of IL, which are to be discussed below. 
Moreover, the health care case underlines that sector-specific features may be consequential as to 
whether major reforms will be adopted: the presence of strong stakeholders and diametrically 
opposed preferences inevitably makes for strong opposition to comprehensive reforms from 
different sources. Under unfavourable circumstances, these may prove problematic for IL-type 
communicative and behavioural patterns.   
While the evidence supports the IL hypothesis, a caveat is in place. IL did not shape the 
conditions for structural reforms all by itself. Instead, IL-type leaders also resorted to concessions, 
as the reforms initiated by Riester and Clement indicated.314 Regarding Minister Seehofer, his IL-
type behaviour was quite effective during the first reform process, while it mattered less during the 
second: the outcome was a reform that was admittedly structural but only reversed earlier changes. 
While the last case demonstrated that IL was followed by structural reform, it also raises two 
questions about the relationship between IL and structural reforms. Firstly, given that IL is not 
always followed up by structural reform, is that because some of its stipulated aspects were 
missing, or because of certain conditions that applied? Secondly, concerning the concept of 
structural reform, is it equally useful when applied to erratic reform patterns over time rather than 
to single reforms?315  
The bottom line of the three analyses is that there is empirical backing for the IL concept. IL-
type leaders do indeed exist in empirical reality and their actions do matter. However, two 
                                                           
 
 
 
314 These concessions were important in that they allowed the reform processes to continue and to be concluded, but they 
did not change the structural character of the reforms, as Chapters 5 and 6 explain in more detail.  
315 By erratic I mean reforms that are mere reversals of earlier ones or reforms that are only short-lived as the incoming 
government announces their reversal.  
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clarifying remarks are in order. IL was not found to preclude other actor-related strategies, but it 
matters alongside such strategies (see Cases 1 and 2). In addition, if politicians are found to 
possess IL-type characteristics, they are also capable of structural reforms (Case 3). That sort of 
knowledge matters for conceptualizing actor-centred explanations of policy change and for 
thinking about the limits of IL, both of which I will discuss below. Indeed, an important lesson 
from the health care case is that IL may be contingent in certain ways rather than a constant quality 
or ability of particular policy-makers: as such, it comes closer to a process-sensitive characteristic 
of policy actors rather than a personality trait.  
 
8.2.2 Relating the Findings to Explanations of Welfare State Change  
 
Given that the IL hypothesis has endured its first evaluation, what does this knowledge imply for 
historical institutionalist accounts of welfare state politics (Pierson) and regime theory (Esping-
Andersen)? Are these theories in need of modification in order to accommodate what has been 
learned about the relevance of political agency and ideas for engineering major policy change? Or 
might the IL framework be seen as their complement, providing a framework for explaining those 
empirical instances they cannot elucidate? My answer is yes to both questions. These theories may 
still be useful to welfare state analysts for explaining why welfare state regimes tend to stay the 
same or change in incremental steps. Indeed, they are best suited to explain why (some) policy-
makers tend to shy away from unpopular reforms. Undoubtedly, some of their motivations for 
doing so, whether related to electoral reasons or institutional characteristics, as Pierson originally 
contended, still hold in many instances, where reform has been absent.  
At the same time, however, these theories need to supply explanations for far-reaching 
reform, if they aspire to explain more recent empirical welfare state developments, or need to be 
complemented by new theories of welfare state transformation. Firstly, Esping-Andersen’s regime 
theory would explain more if it specified conditions under which reforms other than incremental 
ones may happen. For instance, this would include stating how and under what conditions reforms 
might transform welfare states by introducing features of other regimes over time (e.g. by shifting 
responsibilities and competences within policies, as implied by structural reforms). Secondly, 
Pierson’s “new politics” account would benefit if it not only specified that politicians tend to shy 
away from potentially unpopular reforms and at best engage in patterns of blame-avoidance. It 
would also need to spell out how the same politicians might promote such reforms proactively, as 
the theoretical framework of IL does. Thus, IL is a valuable complement to the literature of 
welfare state politics, as it sheds light on such patterns of reform promotion. The case studies have 
also produced a number of conditions that impact upon the relationship between IL and structural 
reform (see also Section 8.3.2 below): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3: Additional restrictions on and/or opportunities for IL-type policy-makers  
 
 
• proximity/distance of key election data  
• financial/economic crisis perception imposed on reformists/used by reformists  
• relative proximity/distance of party-political positions on reform 
• lack of backing/backing by head of government 
• absence/presence of catalytic effect by external actors   
• low/high degree of fairness in spreading reform burdens 
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These additional conditions, as suggested by the case studies, largely differ from Pierson’s work 
on the politics of retrenchment (Lieberman 2002), whether one looks at his hypotheses on reform 
obstacles (electoral hazard, “status quo-ness”, organized interests, path-dependent effects), or 
those on retrenchment opportunities (electoral slack, budgetary crisis, changing the rules of the 
game, potential for hiding reforms through blame-avoidance strategies). The only overlapping 
elements are the conditions with respect to elections and crisis (which I found to restrict the 
prospects for structural reform, but, in Pierson’s opinion, facilitated retrenchment).316 As for as the 
other points, restricting and enabling conditions on reformist politicians are quite different from 
past thinking on obstacles to and opportunities for retrenchment. The most striking observation is 
that both sorts of conditions define the context in which reformist politicians operate, better: this 
includes other actors (head of government, external advisors), the party-political environment 
(policy positions), the political institutional context (timing of elections) and the policy substance 
of a reform (degree of fair burden-sharing). As such, they go further than pointing to existing 
policy characteristics and related interests as forces that impede far-reaching reform. And instead 
of suggesting that policy-makers search for ways to avoid blame, they point out what factors might 
help or hinder their message of reform by innovation. Finally, the comparison indicates that a fair 
number of conditions may hinder, but also potentially help reformists to get reform proposals 
adopted. The plausibility of and ability to generalise these factors (are they found in other cases as 
well?), their relative importance (which of them matters most?), and linkages between them (do 
some of them tend to occur together?) certainly merit further investigation.  
In this sense, the findings of this study are less complementary, but much more an extension 
of the “new politics” argument. Its central claim was that the politics of retrenching welfare states 
differs fundamentally from the politics of extending them (Starke 2006). Surely, an important 
difference that comes to mind is that the conditions just described arose from reforms that differed 
from retrenchment-type reforms. Politicians were proactively engaged in promoting innovative 
proposals rather than pursuing defensive blame-avoidance strategies. This strongly suggests that 
contemporary processes of welfare state restructuring differ from those surrounding retrenchment. 
Spelling out how politicians might tackle major and potentially controversial reforms questions 
important assumptions of the “new politics” argument: specifically, the unpopularity of reforms 
and the character of policy-makers as office-seekers fearing electoral hazard. On the basis of 
German reform patterns, the argument may be made that reforms that involve restructuring and 
recalibration of policies are not unpopular per se, as the assumption went with “pure” 
retrenchment. Admittedly, restructuring may include unpopular measures (for instance, the merger 
of benefits implied by the Hartz IV reform also included substantial and potentially unpopular 
benefit cuts that were resented by important actors in the process), but the presence of IL-type 
actors who explain and defend the necessity of reforms may redress the popular appearance of 
reforms as painful cutbacks of social security provision. Moreover, it was not the case that policy-
makers under scrutiny behaved as mere office-seekers, as Pierson assumed when specifying his 
strategies of blame-avoidance. On the contrary, they showed an active interest in the substance of 
policy and were not put off by potential electoral losses in the first place.  
                                                           
 
 
 
316 Strictly speaking, the condition on crisis perception is close to the first aspect of IL, “rejecting the status quo”. However, 
with the second health care reform, a general perception of economic crisis (not restricted to the status quo in the health 
care sector) became synonymous with the imperative to effect cost-savings and prevented Seehofer from continuing with 
structural reforms rather than helping him.   
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In a nutshell, the politics of transforming welfare states is different from the politics of 
retrenching welfare states, which could be observed during the 1990’s. In order to explain welfare 
state reform in the early 21st century, analysts need to rethink their assumptions and analytical 
tools. Moreover, as Pierson has aptly recognised in his more recent work, welfare state 
restructuring occurs according to different political dynamics in different welfare state regimes 
(Hay 2001). To follow this reasoning, reforms in Social Democratic or Liberal regimes may follow 
a different logic compared to that in Continental regimes, such as Germany. The IL framework has 
made a step towards disclosing the reform logic of this pre-eminently resilient regime by stressing 
the role of individual actors in contrast to Pierson’s “new middle coalition” (2001: 452). The 
question of how to conceptualize the “politics of welfare state transformation” naturally revolves 
around the variables that should be included (and under which conditions they apply). This is a 
non-trivial question: after the launch of the “new politics” argument, plenty of explanatory factors, 
whether socio-economic, party-political, political-institutional, welfare-institutional, and ideational 
explanations have competed for attention and recognition. But can they all be correct?  
 
8.2.3 Relating the Findings to Theories of Policy Change  
 
By raising the question of what has led to far-reaching reforms in the German welfare state, this 
project also has implications for broader questions of what constitutes policy change and how to 
assess it. By proposing an explanation for unexpected instances of social policy change, its 
findings add to theories of policy change, as they complement existing conceptualisations of 
dependent and independent variables in such theorizing.   
Concerning dependent variables, we are interested in what exactly is meant by “change” and 
concerning independent variables, we are interested in what causes it. While the primary goal of 
this study has been to deepen the understanding of theoretically unexpected policy change in 
advanced welfare states (that is, explaining changes in the dependent variable), its secondary goal, 
to conceptualize significant change, is valuable in itself. Conceiving of such change as shifts in the 
structural dimensions of a policy provides an extra dimension to existing theories of policy 
change, which often rely on concepts of path-dependency and departure. Structural shifts in policy 
depend on the creation of conditions which facilitate a process in which policy alternatives replace 
the policy status quo.  
Secondly, the results also contribute to the debate on the pace of significant change. They 
suggest that structural reforms are the result of gradually evolving and lengthy reform processes 
(even when studying the process of one particular reform), and are often accompanied by learning 
processes of (opposing) actors, encouraged by an IL-type policy-maker. In turn, this means that 
far-reaching reforms do not necessarily occur suddenly, being triggered by unforeseen events such 
as crises, but frequently require a certain period of “incubation”. This observation contrasts with 
two important strands of the policy change literature, the first of which deals with “very major but 
abrupt and discontinuous change“ (Hay 2004: 6) and “punctuated equilibrium” (Blyth 2002), 
interrupted from time to time by “radical shifts” (Blyth 2003). In addition, the literature on policy-
making under conditions of crisis asserts that extreme circumstances can produce radical policy 
change, and views such change as being dependent on the construction of crises and their 
exploitation by political actors to achieve reforms (Campbell 1998; Lieberman 2002; Hering 
2004). In contrast, the findings of the present study are closer to a second strand of accounts, 
which conceptualize institutional change as complex, sequential processes. For instance, 
institutional change may begin by a destabilization of the status quo, followed by “alternative 
replacement” and, eventually, institutional transformation (Hay 2006: 376). Although the present 
study focused on instances of single reforms implying structural shifts, these reforms may be 
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comparable in their effects to transformations occurring as a result of sequential reforms over a 
longer time period: the two views on transformative change are compatible because structural 
reforms are not conceptualized as total system changes such as Hall’s paradigmatic changes 
(Schmidt 2006), which tend to be very rare in the realm of social policy.  
Thirdly, the concept of structural reform proved useful in empirically capturing far-reaching 
change. Structural reform lends itself to describe instances of policy change that are much closer to 
institutional change than to retrenchment. For three out of the four reforms studied, it has mapped 
out what were clearly more than routine changes in policy arrangements. With regard to the fourth 
reform (the 1996/97 health care reform), it was suggested that the structural reform concept might 
also take into account the timing of reforms and substantive policy legacies to allow for adequate 
classification of changes. In policy sectors that experience frequent policy change and/or reforms, 
the concept might be adjusted accordingly, by, for example, adding a component to take into 
account whether a reform is simply a reversal of earlier legislation. Likewise, one could 
distinguish “true” structural shifts from others that are simply reversals of earlier reforms and lack 
innovative elements or reforms that were reversed in due course, as they would not be likely to 
have a lasting impact.  
As well as enhancing the dependent variable dimension of policy change, the study also 
provides fresh input for the conceptual debate on what causes policy change, by presenting IL as 
an actor-centred explanation beyond the specific debate in the literature about welfare state 
change. Notably, that debate revolves around the factors which are best suited to explain changes 
in public policy and political order: ideas, interests or - perhaps - both (Cheng and Novick 1991; 
Lieberman 2002; Stiller and Van Kersbergen 2005). While scholars with constructivist convictions 
tend to stress the power of ideas over interests (Jick 1979; Brannen 1992; Tashakkori and Teddlie 
1998; Brannen 2005), a number of other authors insist on ideas and interests being seen as equally 
important or even as necessary complements in building more comprehensive explanations (Ragin 
1987; Ragin 2000; Hahm, Jung et al. 2004). In the institutionalist school of thought, a diverse 
group of scholars pursues a similar debate, with some claiming that their field includes up to seven 
variants (cf. Ragin 2000), and stressing different explanatory factors of change within the general 
paradigm of “institutions matter” (Collier and Mahoney 1996).  
My contribution to this more general debate is to bring IL in as an actor-centred explanation. 
In so doing, I depart from the customary focus on institutions in the literature and zoom in on a 
much-neglected, explanatory factor without losing sight of the richness of the empirical context 
surrounding political agency. Focussing on actors in conjunction with ideas contributes to a shift 
away from institutions, without having to subscribe to more radical, constructivist assumptions on 
the role of ideas. Although the IL framework does address institutions as the object to be changed 
(in a dual role, as a restraining factor of change as well as the object of change), much greater 
weight lies on the agents of change. This contributes to a greater focus on the “how” of change in a 
framework that incorporates ideas, interests and institutions.  
One important note concerning any explanatory model of policy change is appropriate in this 
context. Any such model implies a theoretical balancing act due to the inescapable trade-off in 
theory-building between achieving parsimony and retaining empirical richness. While it makes 
analytic sense to specify separate, theoretical explanations of breaking reform resistance, empirical 
realities prove to be much more complex. The IL framework contributes towards theoretical 
parsimony while retaining a great deal of this complexity. It stresses the capacities of leaders and 
the potential of their ideas in providing input and guidance for the restructuring of social policy. At 
the same time, the results show that the capacity of IL is limited by certain conditions (related to 
political institutions and the factor “politics”), and that even effective IL-type actors have been 
found to use several strategies to overcome institutional resistance. All in all, actor-centred 
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explanations of reform processes appear to be a valuable complement to existing explanations of 
welfare state politics and to policy change more generally. My message to theorists of policy 
change is that ideas, institutions and interests all matter, but that political agency is the focal point 
of explanations of policy change, and not only in the realm of the welfare state. The IL explanation 
may also be relevant to other areas of public policy, as long as their institutions pose serious 
obstacles to far-reaching reform and policy stakeholders and/or other vested interests affected by 
that policy can be expected to resist such reform.  
As a final note, any explanation of policy change implies certain meta-theoretical 
assumptions, and throughout this study my thinking about explanations of policy change has 
evolved in the following direction. While the IL framework stresses the importance of a single, 
explanatory factor, other models may include a number of different factors interacting in several 
ways to produce substantial policy change. However, in order to develop more such 
comprehensive and inclusive accounts of policy change, a configurative perspective on causality 
and patterns of change may be more suitable . In order to devise such comprehensive explanations 
of political change, outcomes should be seen in terms of configurations (or combinations) of 
several explanatory conditions. When applying this insight to prominent explanations in policy 
studies, that is, institutions and ideas, significant change may better be seen as a product of the 
interaction of these factors (and friction caused by overlapping ideational and institutional 
elements), than by focusing separately on ordered patterns of ideas or institutions (ibid: 709). This 
alternative perspective of causation of policy change may be usefully applied to the complex 
universe of welfare state reform and will be readdressed in Section 8.3.3.  
 
8.3 Reflections: Lessons Learned and Further Research   
 
8.3.1 Lesson I: Improving the Measurement of IL  
 
The first lesson is about measuring the effects of leadership, and more specifically, IL. This effect 
has been conceptualized as causal mechanisms bridging the gap between IL as independent 
variable, the conditions that enable institutional break-out, and structural reform, the dependent 
variable. The case studies have revealed that it is difficult to demonstrate these mechanisms 
empirically, not least, because of a lack of adequate data to illustrate fully the working of the 
theorized causal mechanisms . The problem can be remedied by searching for evidence that 
indirectly reflects causal mechanisms (for instance, taking a trade union’s change in policy 
preference indicative of a re-consideration of interests), before better data sources become 
available. Moreover, the effects of IL were demonstrated in a two-step procedure. After finding 
indications for its presence, its effects were traced by looking for signs of causal mechanisms and 
other actor-related strategies (alternative explanations). Future research might come up with ways 
of illustrating the four causal mechanisms more explicitly (e.g. by collecting more systematic data 
on how reform opponents reacted to the different aspects of IL). Likewise, it may be possible to 
show in more detail how politicians’ actions and the adoption of theoretically unexpected reforms 
are interlinked. For the time being, it remains problematic for social scientists to establish one 
important assumption of the causal mechanisms of IL, preference changes, by “looking into 
people’s heads”. More sophisticated methods need to be developed to detect signs of preference 
change by looking at actors’ actions, from verbal or written communication, or, to use theories 
from other social science disciplines to shed light on actors’ preferences and motives underlying 
decision-making. 
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8.3.2 Lesson II: Explicating the Impact of Contingencies   
 
The second lesson is about the contingency of IL. Through the case studies, it has become clear 
that certain “restricting” conditions can reduce the effectiveness of IL (or conversely, there are 
“enabling” conditions that can enhance it). In theories of causality, as well as in everyday social 
science terminology, one tends to distinguish “real causes” from “conditions”, which enable a 
cause to produce an effect . Without becoming embroiled in such epistemological debates, I 
propose a distinction that sees “causes” as factors, implying generative sources of outcomes or 
mechanisms (ibid: 118). In contrast, a restricting condition implies that a condition is present that 
hinders something or someone either ready or willing to take action.  
The IL framework already includes such a condition, which relates to the limits imposed by 
political institutions (“institutionally informed conditions”). The underlying assumption was that it 
is unrealistic to expect a deterministic relationship between IL and structural reform. Instead, the 
framework specified that the political-institutional context limits the effectiveness of IL depending 
on the phases of the policy process. Accordingly, its influence was hypothesized to be ‘medium to 
strong’ in the agenda-setting and legislative phases, and ‘weak’ in the decision-making phase. 
These expectations were mostly confirmed, as Table 8.1 illustrates. The prior expectation of a 
‘medium to strong’ effect before the final decision-making phase was indeed matched by the 
empirical evidence. In the agenda-setting phase, Riester and Seehofer were able to translate their 
policy ideas into policy proposals without much hindrance, while Clement was able to build on a 
reform agenda that had already been set by others (Hartz commission, Schröder). In addition, my 
prior expectation about the weakness of IL in the decision-making phase (when it needs to be 
complemented by other strategies) was corroborated. Minister Riester and Minister Clement 
indeed used concession-making strategies during the last phase of the process in order to adopt 
their pension and unemployment insurance reforms. However, some of the findings of Case 3 did 
not match prior assumptions, in that IL was also ‘strong’ during the decision-making phase (1992 
reform), but ‘weak’ during the legislative phase (1996/97 reform), as table 8.1 indicates. 
 
 
Phase 
 
                         Effects of IL 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3:  
1992 
Case 3:  
1996/1997 
Agenda-
setting 
 
 
Medium to 
strong 
Medium to 
strong 
Medium to 
strong 
Medium to 
strong 
Legislative Medium Strong Strong Weak 
Decision-
making 
Weak Weak Strong Weak  
 
Table 8.1: Empirical findings on institutionally informed conditions 
Legend: Bold = finding diverges from theoretical expectation 
 
 
As for the 1992 reform, IL had a strong influence until and including the decision-making phase, 
because Seehofer’s consensus-building efforts with the parliamentary opposition ensured a 
supportive vote in the Bundesrat, making additional strategies to adopt the reform redundant. As 
for the 1996/97 reform, the unexpected weakness of IL in the legislative phase can be explained by 
the fact that the substance of the reform frustrated Seehofer’s plans. Despite the Minister’s 
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legitimizing efforts, the redistributive implications of the reform were more favourable for health 
care providers than for patients. This, in turn, fostered a general sense of injustice, fuelling 
opposition against the reform and neutralizing Seehofer’s legitimizing message.  
Beyond the restricting impact of political institutions, the case studies also highlighted 
additional restricting (or conversely, enabling) conditions for IL, which are summarized in Table 
8.2. Their effect is thought to be “restricting”, as most of them arose from the third case study as 
obstacles to reform. Conversely, the absence of some of these conditions can give an extra impetus 
to IL-type actors, and thus have an “enabling” effect (for instance, no proximate elections; a small 
party-political gap on reform positions; backing by the head of government; fair burden-sharing 
implied by a reform proposal).  
 
Case Findings related to conditions Conditions  
 
 pensions 
 
- reform-promoting external actors (e.g. OECD, IMF) 
furthering debate about alternative pension 
arrangements  
- Riester’s continuous support by the chancellor  
 
1. presence/absence catalytic 
effect external actors (+/-) 
 
2. presence/absence backing 
head of government (+/-) 
 
unemployment 
insurance 
 
- role of the advisory Hartz commission, paving the 
way for comprehensive labour market reforms before 
the Minister’s start  
 
- Clement’s backing by the chancellor  
 
 
1. presence/absence catalytic 
effect external actors (+/-) 
 
 
2. presence/absence backing 
head of government (+/-) 
 
health care 
 
 
- party-political constellation in 1996/97 (large 
differences between policy positions  government - 
opposition) compared to more favourable conditions 
for a “grand coalition” in 1992  
 
- proximity of federal elections thwarted NOG-
reforms in 1996/1997 while prospect of key election 
year 1994 gave added urgency to plans in 1992 
 
- Kohl’s explicit backing (on Seehofer’s initiative) for 
1992 reform; no such backing for another 
compromise with SPD in 1997;  
 
- reformists’ perception of crisis in health care, 
increasing urgency to intervene, along with high level 
of economic/financial pressure  
 
- degree of “fairness” regarding the distribution of 
reform burdens between different policy stakeholders 
(high:1992, low:1996/97)  
 
3. relative closeness/distance 
of party-political positions on 
reform (+/-) 
 
 
4. proximity of or distance to 
key election data (-/+) 
 
 
2. presence/absence backing 
chancellor (+/-) 
 
 
5.(lack of) crisis perception 
of reformists (+/-) 
 
 
6. high/low degree of 
fairness in spreading reform 
burdens (+/-) 
 
Table 8.2: Additional conditions on the effectiveness of IL as suggested by the case studies  
Legend: + = enabling effect; - = restricting effect on relationship IL and structural reform 
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Given that these additional conditions can impact on the relationship between IL and structural 
reforms, this relationship, is visualized in a stylized way in Figures 8.3 and 8.4:  
 
 
  
 
Figure 8.3: Relationship between IL and structural reforms,  
Legend: grey rectangle represents obstacles posed to structural reform by welfare state institutions (path-
dependent institutions and related interests) 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 8.4: Conditions on the effectiveness of IL 
Legend: oval “political institutions’ represents ‘institutionally info med conditions’, small oval shapes 
represent additional restricting/enabling conditions  
  political 
institutions 
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From the newly acquired knowledge on the contingencies of IL, two conclusions may be drawn. 
The case studies have corroborated the effects of political institutions as far as the German 
political-institutional context is concerned. However, as institutional restrictions are likely to vary 
in other countries, further research would have to look into other institutional contexts. Secondly, 
the list of additional conditions drawn up on the basis of three case studies strongly points to 
further contingencies, but is, necessarily, preliminary. Therefore, more work needs to be done in 
order to probe into the significance of these conditions, possible interactions between them, and 
implications for the effectiveness of IL.  
 
8.3.3 How to Proceed with Research on IL? Alternative Research Designs   
 
The conclusions stated in Section 8.3.2 directly translate into requirements for further research on 
the IL hypothesis. Follow-up studies should build upon the findings by designing tests of the IL 
hypothesis and thus strengthen its empirical base. In order to proceed accordingly, future research 
designs would certainly differ from the present one concerning their scope and depth of the 
research question. As a consequence of the goals and theoretical underpinnings of this study of 
significant welfare state reforms, the research design has included relatively time-consuming case 
study methods and has been small-n in character. Further corroboration of the IL hypothesis asks 
for comparative analysis, preferably across countries and/or policy areas and based on a larger 
number of reform observations. For instance, one follow-up study might investigate far-reaching 
reforms that have occurred in other Continental welfare states, such as France, Italy or Austria. 
Alternatively, it would be interesting to explore whether IL also plays a role in countries with 
other political-institutional (e.g. majoritarian democracies such as the UK) and welfare-
institutional make-ups than in Germany. Consequently, subsequent hypotheses may state that such 
reform contexts do not require political agency to push through reforms (e.g. in Social Democratic 
welfare states), or do offer enough possibilities for the executive to effect far-reaching changes 
without making a particular effort (e.g. in Liberal welfare states).  
Such approaches, in turn, require another sort of research design and methods of analysis, if 
they are to provide, in the terminology of quantitative research, more rigorous tests of hypotheses. 
To undertake work that includes more cases and observations of policy change, a combination of 
different methods would be advisable. Indeed, the awareness of this option has resulted in an 
increasing amount of literature with methods dedicated to method triangulation or “mixing 
methods” . To reduce the drawbacks of small-n research, especially its limited empirical range and 
time requirements, alternatives may be quantitative or qualitative comparative (QCA/fuzzy-set) 
techniques . The latter is especially useful for the investigation of more cases than case study 
research would be able to cover, but less than would be required for large-n quantitative methods.  
Applying quantitative methods in order to evaluate the effects of IL on policy outcomes  
could complement the present small-n qualitative approach to measuring leadership and its effects. 
For example, a quantitative approach could employ different sources, such as surveys, to generate 
alternative insights into the views of policy process observers; a better picture of strategies 
associated with ideational leadership; and other complementary leadership styles or behavioural 
patterns.  
QCA or fuzzy-set analysis would be another option. This methodology differs from 
conventional variable-oriented research in that it treats cases as configurations; sees populations as 
flexible, manipulable constructions; focuses on outcomes, and understands causation as 
conjunctional and heterogeneous . Under this assumption of causal heterogeneity, outcomes are 
explained in terms of (combinations of) necessary and/or sufficient conditions; while variable-
oriented research probes the explanatory value of one or several causally important factor(s) under 
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the assumption of causal homogeneity . The results of such analyses would specify, for instance, 
that certain combinations of ideational, leadership, and party-political factors produce a certain 
reform outcome. Conventional variable-oriented research, in contrast, would stress, for instance, 
the relative explanatory power of ideational and leadership variables over party-political variables. 
However, using alternative methodologies, whether quantitative or QCA/fuzzy-sets, is no 
panacea for improving explanatory accounts. After all, analytical categories and measurements 
(e.g. ideational factors, aspects of leadership) need to be based on substantive theoretical claims 
and the presence of suitable data to illustrate the presence (or absence) of various conditions. 
Difficulties in meeting the latter requirement may nevertheless turn out to be advantageous: they 
induce analysts to devise better indicators for causal linkages, or, alternatively, to make use of 
theories from adjacent disciplines. In this sense, to return to the two lessons at the beginning of 
this section, future research would improve both theorizing and empirical illustration of the 
mechanisms linking leadership behaviour, additional explanatory factors, and policy outcomes. In 
turn, this helps to increase the quality of idea- and leadership-based explanations of welfare state 
reform and brings advancement to the field.   
 
8.4 Final remarks  
 
This chapter has recapitulated the theoretical and empirical contributions of this study. Its main 
finding was that the IL hypothesis agrees with the empirical reality of recent welfare state reforms 
in Germany. For welfare state theories, this means that to analyze a “politics of transforming 
welfare states”, they can no longer rely on the assumptions of stability and reform-averse policy 
makers but need to take account of political agency. In terms of theories of policy change, the 
structural reform concept, as a measure of qualitative change, as well as IL as an actor-centred 
explanation, make for valuable additions to existing theories. However, every study also offers 
possibilities for follow-up work. Two important lessons to be drawn have been the need to 
improve the measurement of leadership effects, and to explicate the multiple sources of 
contingencies that IL-type policy-makers face when operating in the midst of complex reform 
processes. To proceed with a more comprehensive, that is, cross-sectional or longitudinal, 
investigation of IL, I have proposed a triangulation approach, using quantitative analysis, and/or 
QCA/fuzzy-set methodology. 
Finally, I would like to return to Dalton’s statement at the beginning of this chapter. Has this 
study illuminated the “mystery”, which stood at its beginning, the seemingly inexplicable major 
changes occurring in the German welfare state? The answer is that it has indeed unravelled an 
important part of how Germany, the former prototype of incrementalism, was capable of some 
major social policy reforms. As a matter of fact, the “lateness” of those reforms has led many to 
rethink the pros and cons of the formerly admired “German Model” which, by the late 1990’s, had 
been increasingly called into question. But rather than searching the reasons for reform in the 
sphere of the German political economy, this study focussed on another plausible explanation: key 
political actors. By reconsidering the role of agency in combination with political ideas in reform 
processes often hampered by institutional obstacles, a new facet has been added to existing 
explanations of major policy change. Agency is not subordinated to structure at all times, on the 
contrary. Besides making a theoretical case for political agents and their ideas, this study has 
found evidence for the crucial role that these key actors may play, and for the strength of their 
policy ideas, even when they operate in complex reform processes. The bottom line is that key 
policy makers can make a difference and, in the German context, have made a difference in three 
important policy areas that were thought to be immune to far-reaching reform. These insights 
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provide fresh input for the literature on policy and political leadership on the one hand, and on the 
influence of policy ideas, on the other. Illustrating the role that key political actors can play has 
successfully solved one part of the puzzle. At the same time, it is too early to lean back 
comfortably and call it a day. Other pieces of the same puzzle are still out there and have to be 
found before obtaining the full picture. 
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 Epilogue: More Structural Reforms Under the Merkel Government?  
 
Chapter 4 of this book has surveyed developments in German social policy from the 1970’s until 
the second Schröder Government. The survey has revealed an array of incremental reforms, but, 
notably also a number of important structural reforms that defy the resilience arguments about the 
German welfare state. Schröder’s Red-Green coalition did not complete its second term in office 
due to the Chancellor’s risky decision to call early elections for September 2005, which it lost by a 
narrow margin. Since the formation of a “Grand Coalition” (Grosse Koalition) government in 
autumn 2005, consisting of CDU/CSU and SPD, expectations have run high. This has to do with 
the fact that observers expected the coalition’s comfortable majority in both chambers of 
parliament to translate into a number of important reforms, which were not tackled by past 
governments, when typically one of the main parties led the opposition, frequently obstructing or 
even blocking reform attempts by the government. In the following, I will assess the first year of 
the Merkel Government in terms of its social policy record and outline developments and look 
ahead to the immediate future. Covering the three main social policy areas that were central to this 
study (pensions, unemployment insurance and health care policy), the question is whether the 
Merkel Government has already enacted or is going to enact more structural welfare state reforms?   
The record of Merkel and her cabinet members responsible for welfare state issues, Minister 
Müntefering (Labour and Social Affairs) and Minister Schmidt (Health care) has been mixed. In 
labour market policy, the Government started to act upon the first comprehensive evaluations of 
the 2002 and 2003 Hartz reforms, and, in reaction, announced legislative adjustments of those 
instruments which had proved to be either problematic or ineffective, to be tackled in 2007. 
Considering the most controversial of these reforms, Hartz IV, a first review was undertaken 
during spring 2006, leading to legislation that introduced stricter eligibility rules for the Hartz IV 
benefit, ALG II (Arbeitslosengeld II); new benefit regulations for those under 25 of age; and equal 
benefit levels for all Länder. Yet another law revising the Hartz IV provisions was passed in June 
2006, and included stricter controls on benefit abuse; the facilitation of information exchange 
between authorities; and tougher sanctions for those refusing job offers.317 These corrections, 
which reflect the Governments’ reaction to a larger number of claims on the Hartz IV budget than 
expected, as well as accusations of large-scale abuse, strengthened the element of activation in 
unemployment insurance policy and tried to combat benefit abuse. The latest correction of Hartz 
IV, adopted by the Bundesrat in December 2006, has slightly changed the division of financing 
living expenditures attached to Hartz IV benefits (Wohngeld), giving some more responsibility to 
the federal government and easing the financial burden of the Länder.318 
In the wake of these changes, and despite a general sense of economic recovery accompanied 
by a durable reduction in unemployment compared to 2005, the debate on how to handle 
unemployed persons, especially those in long-term unemployment, has somewhat abated but not 
ebbed away. In the autumn of 2006, it was revived by a study from the SPD-affiliated Friedrich 
Ebert Foundation (FES) on poverty in Germany, which revealed a growing class of socially 
excluded persons in German society (titled “Prekariat” by the authors). Given the growing 
awareness of the side effects of Hartz IV and other social policy reforms that stress the personal 
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responsibility of beneficiaries, the CDU seems to be split between strengthening the requirements 
on long-term unemployment and easing them. On the one hand, some prominent CDU politicians 
kept pleading for a more comprehensive revision in the autumn of 2006 that would increase the 
incentives to take up work even more (but which has not translated into concrete proposals so far). 
319 On the other hand, some prominent left-wing politicians within the party, for instance, 
Minister-President Rüttgers of North Rhine-Westphalia, pleaded for a more gradual transition to 
the lower Hartz IV benefit for older long-term unemployed persons, giving them credit for the 
length of the period they paid contributions for. The latter issue has figured high in the debate on a 
more social profile of the Christian Democrats, which according to some has been too neo-liberal. 
However, the SPD, which under Schröder had adopted substantial restrictions on the duration of 
unemployment benefits, has so far refused to re-open the discussion. Thus, so far these 
considerations have not led to any new legislative initiatives by the coalition.  
In short, in the area of unemployment insurance, we have observed a host of incremental and 
corrective corrections of an earlier structural reform, Hartz IV, rather than a new one. At the time 
of writing (December 2006), a working commission (consisting of ministry officials, CDU and 
SPD labour market specialists and other) set up by Minister Müntefering in August, is still busy 
working out a blueprint for a “comprehensive reform” of the Hartz laws. If any of the new 
instruments under discussion materialize, such as a minimum salary (Minimumlohn), or a model of 
state subsidies on top of unemployment benefits or ALG II (Kombilohn),320 new structural reforms 
could ensue.   
With regard to another continuously discussed policy area, old-age pensions, the agenda of 
the “Grand Coalition” has largely centred on the proposal to increase the legal pension age to 67 
years. That idea had first appeared in public debate in 2003 under the second Schröder 
Government, was then quickly dismissed and did not re-appear until the new government of 
CDU/CSU and SPD was formed in late 2005. Its resurgence was probably due to the fact that the 
introduction of the “sustainability factor” (in 2004) defused the debate on whether statutory 
pensions were sufficiently equipped to meet the demographic challenge in the short to medium 
term. Therefore, the necessity for an additional measure to relieve pension budgets through a 
deferral of the legal pension age (which has already been discussed and/or implemented in several 
European countries), took more time to find its way to the policy-making agenda. The coalition 
agreement contained the intention to implement a very gradual increase of the legal pension age 
from 65 to 67, starting in 2012 until 2035 (for those age cohorts first affected by the change).321 In 
February 2006, Minister of Labour Müntefering took up the issue and proposed to phase in this 
change earlier than planned (completing the phase-in by 2029), which was approved promptly by 
the Cabinet. In addition, automatic pension indexation was set to be postponed until 2009 in order 
to keep contributions stable. In December 2006, the Bundestag first discussed the corresponding 
bill with regard to the question, coupled with measures to help the creation of job for employees 
over the age of 50.322 Another measure to stabilize the budgets of the statutory pensions, the 
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increase of the pension contribution rate from 19.5 to 19.9 percent for 2007, was approved by the 
Bundesrat.323 
In short, the developments in pension policy under the Merkel Government show that change 
has so far taken the shape of incremental measures – in entitlement rules, contribution financing 
and automatic benefit adjustments – with the common goal of securing the main pillar of 
provision, statutory pensions. Although they seem small-scale, they can be expected to have 
substantial effects in the long run, as they strengthen the financing base and reduce the level, and, 
indirectly, the average duration of benefits. As such, these changes continue the line of policy 
initiated with the introduction of the sustainability factor in 2004, complementing the more radical 
change introduced in Minister Riester’s structural reform (2001) that set German pensions firmly 
on a path to multi-pillar footing. While the Merkel Government does not seem to envisage another 
far-reaching restructuring of pensions, it surely continues the way towards lower pension levels 
that was chosen around the turn of the century. 
In health care policy, the Merkel Government has put a major reform of health care policy on 
the agenda, which it “inherited” by the Schröder Government, which had no more time to tackle 
the issue after the call for early elections. The reform’s declared goal was to put the financing of 
statutory health care insurance (SHI) on a new and more solid footing, although the coalition 
agreement of November 2005 did not yet specify the exact approach to be followed. Instead, the 
coalition agreement stated:  
 
The coalition sees as one of its challenges to secure the effectiveness of the health care system through stable 
financing structures. In this respect, the parties have developed different concepts, the “solidaristic health care 
premium” (CDU/CSU) and the “citizens’ insurance”, which are not readily combined. We are going to 
develop a common solution to this question in the course of 2006.324 
 
As the quote illustrates, the coalition parties were deeply split on the issue, each favouring 
different concepts, either citizens’ insurance (SPD), or a variant of the health premium model 
(CDU/CSU). That gap between policy ideas implied that a combination of the two models had to 
be found that could strengthen the revenue base of the SHI as well as make it less dependent on 
wage-based contributions. In early 2006, SPD-parliamentary party leader Struck optimistically 
announced that the coalition hoped to present a bill for health care reform before the parliamentary 
summer break in July and to adopt it later this year to enable implementation by early 2007.325 
With much difficulty, and accompanied by close media attention, the coalition reached an 
agreement on core elements of the reform in early July, followed by its adoption in the Cabinet. 
However, due to the considerable need for intra-coalition discussion, Merkel declared that the 
introduction of the reform should be deferred to April instead of January 2007. Necessarily 
compromising their own positions, both parties agreed on measures for more flexibility, 
transparency and stronger competition in the relations between patients, sickness funds and care 
providers; the establishment of a new health fund (Gesundheitsfonds) to redistributive 
contributions among sickness funds; more extensive tax financing of health care (for children) and 
more competition between sickness funds and private insurers.326  
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The plans met with fierce criticism from both experts and the media, as they frustrated the 
expectation of a truly major reform that would radically change the current strictly contribution-
based financing mode. Sickness funds, supported by some trade unions, promptly announced a 
protest campaign directed against the new health fund, despite warnings of Minister of Health 
Schmidt not to react prematurely.327 Physicians and pharmacists joined in with a day of public 
protest in November, highlighting the supposed negative consequences of the reform for their 
practices and business. Currently, the government plans are still subject to change, as they are still 
being processed by the Bundestag and still need to gain approval by both chambers of parliament 
(to be expected by Februrary 2007) to become effective in April 2007. Rapid approval by the 
Bundesrat has become questionable, since three CDU/CSU-governed Länder have announced to 
vote against the bill because of allegedly higher financial implications for their budgets than those 
envisaged by the Minister, thereby revoking their earlier agreement on the key provisions 
(Eckpunkte) of the reform.328 Minister Schmidt has countered this threat by announcing another 
independent study by the government advisers Rürup and Wille to be presented in January 2007. It 
is hoped that this move will clarify the reform’s financial implications and take away the Länder’s 
objections. In addition, Chancellor Merkel has been backing her Minister’s stance as she has 
reasserted her determination to keep the earlier compromise on the key provisions intact.329 
In a nutshell, it remains to been seen, whether the essence of the reform, which in its current 
form clearly implies structural shifts, for instance, in the financing of the SHI, will remain 
unaltered until the legislative process is completed. Despite the bad reputation the proposal has 
with public opinion and a great part of the media, another factor comes to Schmidt’s resort:  the 
symbolic value of this reform project for the viability of the “Grand Coalition” makes its complete 
derailment unlikely.  
In contrast to the topical developments in health care, a comprehensive reform to address the 
deficit problems of long-term care insurance (which is also contained in the coalition agreement) 
has not figured prominently in political debate that far.330 Again, the CDU/CSU-SPD Government 
has taken up this project in the coalition agreement, stating, that ‘the concept for a law for the 
sustainable and just financing of the long-term care scheme will be presented in the summer of 
2006’.331 However, due to the coalition’s preoccupation with other more pressing reform projects, 
notably health care, long-term insurance will not be tackled until 2007. That being said, the 
potential for a structural reform in this area can be considered high as it is widely accepted that it 
is unsustainable in its present form.  
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In sum, the Merkel Government’s record on social policy so far has been noteworthy, surelyg 
given the extent of substantial party-political disagreements between CDU/CSU and SPD that are 
more intense than those of the Red-Green coalition. However, despite the quarrelling, a number of 
initiatives that add to and complement past reforms have been passed, and others, with a potential 
for substantial change, are still in the making. This short survey gives plenty of reason to think that 
the image of Germany as “frozen welfare state” is no longer appropriate: the structural reforms 
analysed in this book will surely not be the last ones as Germany, at its own pace, proceeds down 
the path of welfare state transformation. 
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Samenvatting  
 
In deze studie is onderzocht hoe en op welke manier vooraanstaande beleidsmakers de weerstand 
tegen verandering van hedendaagse welvaartsstaten kunnen doorbreken, teneinde structurele 
hervormingen te bewerkstelligen. Deze weerstand is vooral aanwezig in continentale 
welvaartsstaten, waarvan Duitsland een uitstekend voorbeeld vormt. De hypothese van deze studie 
is dat ideeëngericht leiderschap (IL) theoretisch onverwachte structurele hervormingen in 
welvaartsstaten kan verklaren. 
De aanleiding voor deze studie is de observatie dat zich verregaande 
welvaartsstaathervormingen hebben voorgedaan, ondanks de verwachting van de afwezigheid van 
zulke veranderingen in de dominante theorieën over de politiek van de verzorgingsstaat en 
verzorgingsstaatregimes in het historisch institutionalisme (hoofdstuk 1). Meer specifiek heeft 
deze studie het werk van Esping-Andersen en Pierson behandeld en gewezen op het gevaar van 
“stability bias”, de sterke neiging om mechanismen te benadrukken die de bestaande 
verzorgingsstaat in stand houden. Hiertoe behoren padafhankelijkheid, gevestigde belangen en 
electorale risico’s. Door deze krachten te benadrukken, blijven de mechanismen die wel kunnen 
zorgen voor veranderingen buiten beschouwing. Mijn voorstel is om aan verregaande 
hervormingen te refereren als structurele hervormingen, dit in contrast met hervormingen die 
kwantificeerbaar zijn en vaak als “retrenchment” worden aangeduid. Uit literatuur over 
kwalitatieve veranderingen in welvaartsstaten is afgeleid dat zich structurele hervormingen zich als 
volgt kenmerken: het zijn veranderingen als gevolg van wetgeving, die een herschikking van 
competenties en verantwoordelijkheden van belangrijke actoren die zijn betrokken bij het beheren 
van een programma van sociaal beleid teweegbrengen. Dit soort veranderingen of verschuivingen 
hebben betrekking op de financerings-, de uitkerings- of de reguleringsstructuur van het beleid (of 
meerdere van deze tegelijkertijd).  
Theoretisch onverwachte, vergaande hervormingen hebben zich voorgedaan in verschillende 
Europese verzorgingsstaten waaronder Duitsland. Dit land leent zich om meerdere redenen voor 
een diepgaande analyse van structurele hervormingen. Hierbij valt te denken aan de bijzondere 
combinatie van obstakels tegen hervormingen (politieke en verzorgingsstaatsinstitutities) en een 
opvallende druk uit verschillende bronnen om hervormingen door te voeren (socio-economisch, 
financieel en demografisch). De bestaande theorieën die deze beleidsverandering zouden kunnen 
verklaren, suggereren dat factoren van economische, institutionele, partijpolitieke en ideële aard 
hierin een rol kunnen spelen. Deze factoren kunnen de structurele hervormingen in Duitsland 
nauwelijks verklaren. In deze studie wordt betoogd dat, in plaats van verklaringen te zoeken op het 
macro- (regime) of meso-niveau (beleidsprogramma’s), het micro-niveau van analyse (individuele 
beleidsmakers) uitkomst biedt. Preciezer introduceert deze studie het concept van ideeëngericht 
leiderschap (IL), als een combinatie van politieke actoren (“political agency”), hun relatie met 
politieke ideeën en hoe deze de totstandkoming van hervormingen kunnen beïnvloeden.  
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft aan hoe het concept van IL is ontwikkeld. Dit gebeurde door na te gaan 
welke elementen uit de literatuur over leiderschap en uit de literatuur over ideeën nodig zijn om 
het totstandkomen van structurele hervormingen te verklaren. De combinatie van elementen uit 
beide literaturen wordt als noodzakelijk gezien om hun relatieve zwaktes te compenseren. Ten 
aanzien van leiderschapsconcepten betreft dit een tekort aan aandacht waarom en hoe precies 
politici verregaande hervormingen willen doorzetten en wat betreft de ideeënliteratuur een tekort 
aan aandacht voor causale mechanismen die ideeën als oorzaak van veranderingen verbinden met 
het realiseren van concrete hervormingen. Het uiteindelijke concept van IL draagt zowel 
elementen van bestaande leiderschapsconcepten alsook elementen betreffende de rol van ideeën bij 
verregaande beleidsveranderingen in zich. Dit levert uiteindelijk vijf aspecten op die zowel 
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communicatief als gedragsgerelateerd zijn (1 t/m 4) en inspelen op de oriëntatie van een politicus 
van het type ideeëngericht leider (5). IL behelst dat de betreffende politicus 1) de nadelen van de 
status quo beleidssituatie aan het licht brengt, 2) op een consistente manier nieuwe 
beleidsprincipes onder de aandacht brengt (zowel wat hun probleemoplossend vermogen betreft, 
alsook hun normatieve kant oftewel hoe deze passen bij bestaande normen in de samenleving), 3) 
ingaat op tegenstanders van de beoogde hervormingen door hun weerstand als “problematisch” te 
kenmerken, 4) pogingen onderneemt om politieke consensus te bereiken door steun voor een 
beoogde hervorming te zoeken. Tenslotte wordt aangenomen dat politicus van het soort IL in zijn 
motivatie eerder (of overwegend) beleids- dan machtsgeoriënteerd is en daardoor oprecht 
geïnteresseerd in de inhoud van het beleid.  
Deze aspecten worden door twee causale mechanismen verbonden met het totstandkomen van 
beleid. Het eerste en ideeëngericht mechanisme (verbonden aan aspecten 1 en 2) werkt op het 
niveau van overtuigingen en ideële belangen van tegenstanders en bewerkstelligt veranderingen in 
cognitieve en normatieve preferenties. Het tweede en belangengerelateerde mechanisme 
(verbonden aan aspecten 3 en 4) beïnvloedt de perceptie van eigenbelangen bij tegenstanders op 
een manier waardoor deze de beoogde hervormingen toch kunnen accepteren. Als de 
desbetreffende persoon overwegend beleidsgeoriënteerd is, versterkt dit het effect van de twee 
mechanismen. De combinatie van het voorgaande schept de condities voor een institutionele 
“break-out”. Dit wil zeggen dat beleidsalternatieven de padafhankelijke status quo binnendringen, 
een ommekeer van de eerdere “lock-in” van instituties plaatsvindt, zodat een structurele 
hervorming (in de vorm van een wetsvoorstel) kan worden aangenomen. 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt ingegaan op de keuzes van het onderzoeksontwerp en de methodologie 
en worden de centrale begrippen IL en structurele hervormingen geoperationaliseerd. De IL 
hypothese wordt geëvalueerd door middel van een meervoudige case study binnen de context van 
de Duitse verzorgingsstaat, waarin de casussen worden gedefinieerd als beleids- en politieke 
processen omtrent een specifiek hervormingsvoorstel. Bij elke casus is “process-tracing” 
uitgevoerd en, naast de IL hypothese, twee alternatieve verklaringen (doen van concessies en 
omzeilen van tegenstanders) om obstakels van hervormingen te overwinnen, geëvalueerd. De 
empirische vraag die in elke casus centraal staat, is: in hoeverre is het mogelijk om IL in het 
proces van hervorming te ontdekken, en op welke manier is IL gerelateerd aan de realisatie van 
een structurele hervorming? De focus van de in totaal drie casussen verschilt. De eerste casus 
(oorspronkelijk opgezet als pilot en resulterend in een verfijning van het IL concept) moest 
uitwijzen of er überhaupt bewijs voor IL gevonden kan worden. De tweede casus moest uitwijzen 
of de bevindingen van casus 1 ook in een tweede hervormingsproces opgaan en om de effecten 
van IL op de uitkomst van het proces beter te belichten. Deze twee casussen zijn geselecteerd op 
de afhankelijke variabele, structurele hervorming. De derde casus, geselecteerd op de 
onafhankelijke variabele (IL), is bedoeld om te onderzoeken of een ideeëngericht leider ook in 
staat is om tijdens zijn ambtstermijn structurele hervormingen te bewerkstelligen. Bij het 
bestuderen van de casus is gebruikgemaakt van bronnentriangulatie. Hiervoor zijn documenten 
(beleidsdocumenten, toespraken en interviews van de betrokkene beleidsmakers, persberichten uit 
dag- en weekbladen) en de verslagen van 35 expert interviews gebruikt. Dit materiaal is met 
behulp van kwalitatieve inhoudsanalyse bestudeerd, waarin zowel indicatoren voor IL alsook 
alternatieve verklaringen zijn gebruikt om zowel de mate van aanwezigheid alsook de uiteindelijke 
rol (en dus effectiviteit) van IL vast te stellen en te beoordelen.  
Hoofdstuk 4 gaat nader in op de institutionele kenmerken van de Duitse welvaartsstaat (zowel 
op macro- oftewel regime niveau alsook op meso- of programma niveau), de bijbehorende 
politiek-institutionele context en de soorten van druk voor verandering. Een terugblik op de 
ontwikkeling van de belangrijkste beleidsterreinen van de verzorgingsstaat (pensioenen, 
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werkloosheidsverzekering, gezondheidszorg) onder de verschillende regeringen sinds de jaren 
zeventig laat zien dat het merendeel van de hervormingen stapsgewijs van aard was en dat pas 
meer recentelijk, sinds de jaren negentig, een aantal verregaande en dus structurele hervormingen 
is gerealiseerd.  
De empirische hoofdstukken 5, 6, en 7 bevatten gedetailleerde analyses van processen die tot 
een aantal hervormingen hebben geleid. De eerste case study behandelt de pensioenshervormingen 
uit 2001 genoemd naar Minister van Werkgelegenheid Walter Riester. Deze wetgeving beëindigde 
in feite de op één zuil berustende structuur van het Duitse pensioenstelsel door er een particulier 
gefinancierde en publiekelijk gesubsidieerde tweede zuil aan toe te voegen. Daarnaast werd ook de 
derde zuil, pensioensvoorzieningen via de werkgevers, versterkt. Deze hervorming was structureel 
omdat zij verschuivingen in de financiering, uitkeringen en regulering van pensioensvoorzieningen 
met zich meebracht. Minister Riester kreeg met forse oppositie tegen het oorspronkelijke voorstel 
te maken, zowel binnen het parlement als daarbuiten, waarop hij een antwoord poogde te vinden. 
Ondanks het herhaaldelijke aanbrengen van veranderingen in het voorstel, waarmee het ministerie 
concessies deed aan de critici, wist Riester de kern van de innovaties van de hervorming te 
bewaren tot het wetsvoorstel werd aangenomen in 2001. De analyse betoogt dat Riester in 
overeenstemming met de drie kernelementen van IL heeft gehandeld. Daarnaast wordt aangetoond 
dat zijn attitude ten aanzien van zijn ambt en politiek leiderschap inderdaad als beleidsgeoriënteerd 
kan worden omschreven. Tegelijkertijd was Riester nalatend wat betreft het werken aan een 
consensus met alle relevante critici inclusief de vakbonden en de linksgeoriënteerde tegenstanders 
binnen de Sociaal-democratische partij. Deze laatste observatie heeft geleid tot het toevoegen van 
een aanvullend kenmerk aan IL, “het ondernemen van pogingen om tot politieke consensus te 
komen”. Hoewel Riester IL toonde, was hij ook gedwongen om concessies te doen teneinde 
politiek-institutionele obstakels te overwinnen en zodoende een compromis te sluiten die het 
uiteindelijke vaststellen van de hervormingen mogelijk maakte. Daarmee zijn twee factoren aan te 
wijzen die de realisatie van de Riester hervorming hebben geholpen: IL door de Minister en 
daarnaast het doen van concessies aan critici.  
De tweede case study handelt over het proces omtrent de hervorming in 2004 van de 
werkloosheidsuitkeringen en bijstandsuitkeringen, bekend als “Hartz IV”. Deze structurele 
hervorming maakte een eind aan het Duitse uit drie zuilen bestaande systeem van 
werkloosheidsbescherming en lokte een debat uit over een effectieve aanpak van de 
massawerkloosheid. Het verzamelde materiaal wijst erop dat de betrokken Minister van 
Economische Zaken en Werkgelegenheid Wolfgang Clement door zijn optreden tijdens het 
hervormingsproces aan de vijf criteria van IL voldeed. Daarnaast werd hij in zijn streven 
bijgestaan door de Kanselier en de Hartz-Commissie, een ad hoc groep van beleidsexperts. Terwijl 
Minister Clement’s energieke optreden voor de hervorming uitermate belangrijk bleek, was het de 
combinatie van IL en concessies waardoor de Hartz IV hervorming gerealiseerd kon worden. De 
analyse laat zien dat het leiderschap van de Minister essentieel was om met de gangbare manier 
van denken over arbeidsmarktbeleid te breken en om dit ambitieuze hervormingsvoorstel 
dichterbij een beslissing te brengen. Wat in deze casus echter ook bleek, was dat enkel IL niet 
doorslaggevend was. Ook Clement’s niet aflatende inzet om een compromis over de invoering van 
de wetgeving te bereiken, waren onontbeerlijk. In plaats van de centralistische oplossing, die werd 
geopperd door het Ministerie, betekende dit compromis een splitsing van administratieve 
bevoegdheden (tussen nieuw te scheppen “consortia” en een aantal gemeentes) en financiële 
verantwoordelijkheden betreffende de nieuwe uitkering. Minister Clement kon in zijn streven om 
Hartz IV te realiseren rekenen op de steun van Schröder en terugvallen op het voorwerk van de 
Hartz-Commissie. De Minister’s bereidheid en vermogen om tot een compromis te komen was 
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echter cruciaal in het behouden van de kern van de hervorming en hielp om het imago van de 
regering als in staat zijnde om belangrijke hervormingen door te voeren, hoog te houden. 
De derde en laatste casus was bedoeld om het vermogen van een IL tonende beleidsmaker op 
het gebied van de gezondheidszorg te evalueren. De keuze voor een beleidsmaker, Minister van 
Gezondheidszorg Horst Seehofer, is gebaseerd op een korte enquête onder experts alsook een 
criterium dat de aanwezigheid van beleidsideeën bij verschillende ministers in kaart bracht. De 
casus behelsde twee opvallende hervormingen tijdens de ambtsperiode van Seehofer, uit 1992 
(GSG) en 1997 (1./2.GKV-NOG). De analyse van beide hervormingen bracht verschillen tussen 
uitkomsten, processen en de rol van Seehofer aan het licht: Seehofer vervulde de criteria voor een 
ideeëngericht leider in 1992, maar minder in 1997. De eerste hervorming behelsde 
kostenbeheersing (invoeren van budgetten voor zorgaanbieders) en een organisatiehervorming met 
consequenties voor de deelname aan ziekenfondsen en de relaties tussen fondsen. Zij was 
structureel door verschuivingen in de regulatiesfeer. De resulterende hervorming kwam snel tot 
stand, ook doordat de Minister de oppositionele Sociaal-democraten wist te winnen voor een 
gezamenlijke aanpak. Daarnaast wist Seehofer effectief om te gaan met belangen in de zorgsector; 
bewees hij doorzettingsvermogen door de moeilijke situatie in de zorg niet te laten voor wat ze 
was; toonde hij een groot vermogen om zijn ambitieuze voorstel te legitimeren en de wil om 
weerstanden te overwinnen. Dit alles bevestigde de keuze voor Seehofer als ideeëngericht leider.  
De hervormingen uit 1997 omvatten een pakket maatregelen, waaronder beperkingen op 
stijgingen van ziekenfondscontributies (vooral ten laste van verzekerden), meer concurrentie, meer 
financiële verantwoordelijkheid voor verzekeraars en meer vrijheden voor zelfregulerende 
instanties binnen de sector. Het karakter van deze wijzigingen, die vooral in de regulatiesfeer 
lagen, is slechts beperkt structureel te noemen, des te meer omdat de weinige structurele 
veranderingen of van korte duur bleken te zijn of een terugkeer van eerder beleid betekenden. De 
analyse van de rol van de Minister in dit proces laat zien dat hij slechts beperkt kenmerken van IL 
vertoonde en dat deze in ieder geval weinig effect sorteerden. Gegeven de minder gunstige 
politieke context had Seehofer moeite de noodzakelijke steun voor meer verregaande 
hervormingen te verwerven en het resulterende voorstel als consistent en afgewogen voor alle 
betrokken belangen te presenteren. Ook was een herhaling van zijn strategie uit 1992 voor 
samenwerking met de oppositie nagenoeg uitgesloten doordat zijn ruimte door Kanselier Kohl 
werd beperkt.  
Concluderend wordt vastgesteld dat er empirisch bewijs voor het concept van IL is gevonden: 
de empirische analyses vormen geen aanleiding om de IL hypothese te verwerpen. Vooraanstaande 
beleidsmakers met kenmerken van IL bestaan en hun handelen maakt een verschil. In de eerste 
twee casus is de aanwezigheid van IL aangetoond. Wat betreft de rol van IL, werd in de analyse 
van de Riester hervorming duidelijk dat zowel IL alsook het doen van concessies belangrijk waren 
om de hervorming te realiseren. Hetzelfde geldt voor de Hartz IV hervorming, waar een 
combinatie van IL en concessies tot het eindresultaat leidde. In de casus over de gezondheidszorg 
werd gevonden dat de vooraf gekozen beleidsmaker met kenmerken van IL, Seehofer, zich deels 
volgens de patronen van IL gedroeg. Tegelijkertijd liet deze casus zien dat de effecten van IL niet 
altijd optreden omdat het in slechts in een van de twee hervormingen tot een eenduidige structurele 
hervorming kwam. Daarnaast is ook op een aantal beperkende en/of versterkende (“enabling”) 
condities van IL gewezen.  
Deze bevindingen zijn belangrijk voor theorieën over welvaartsstaatveranderingen. Hoewel 
deze theorieën nog steeds van waarde zijn voor het verklaren van stabiliteit of stapsgewijze 
veranderingen, moeten zij worden aangevuld met andere theorieën, zoals het hier ontwikkelde 
theoretisch kader van IL, om de hedendaagse “politiek van transformatie van welvaartsstaten” (in 
contrast tot de eerdere “politiek van de terugdringing”) te kunnen analyseren en verklaren. 
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Daarnaast gelden er in de verschillende verzorgingsstaatregimes waarschijnlijk verschillende 
logica’s voor hervormingen en heeft het kader van IL een bijdrage geleverd aan het ontcijferen van 
de logica van het continentale regime.  
Ook zijn de ontwikkelde concepten en uitkomsten van belang voor theorieën van 
beleidsverandering in meer algemene zin. Door een verklaring te bieden voor onverwachte 
hervormingen op een ander dan de gebruikelijk niveau’s van analyse en een definitie voor 
verregaande hervormingen voor te stellen, draagt dit onderzoek bij aan het spectrum van 
afhankelijke en onafhankelijke variabelen binnen de discipline van beleidsanalyse. 
Tenslotte wordt een aantal lessen geformuleerd die voortvloeien uit deze studie, met name 
hoe de meting van IL kan worden verbeterd; hoe IL onderhevig is aan beïnvloeding door 
institutionele en andere condities; en hoe vervolgonderzoek naar de IL hypothese vormgegeven 
kan worden. 
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